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PREFACE
Eight years ago, on July 6, 1965, the Congress approved and proposed to the States the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
A year and a half later, on February 23, 1967, it was ratified by the
necessary three-fourths of the States. The Amendment sought to clarify the ambiguity of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution as to
Presidential disability and to provide for the first time a procedure for
filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice-President.
Recent events have caused numerous questions to be raised about the
operations of the Amendment, and a large number of inquiries on this
subject have been directed to the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments. Because many of the Senate and House documents relating to the Amendment are out-of-print and because there appears
to be a clear need to collect together in one place various other materials on the Amendment, I have asked the Senate to print as a Senate
Document the following compilation of Congressional documents, law
review articles and legal memoranda.
BIRCH BAYH,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
(V)

Calendar No. 1317
88TH CoNGREsS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT

No. 1382

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE.
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

AUGUST 13, 1964.-Ordered to be printed

Mr. BAYm, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the

following

REPORT
together with

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. J. Res. 139]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the resolution (S.J. Res. 139), proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon, with amendments, and recommends
that the resolution, as amended, do pass.
AMENDMENTS

On page 1, line 7, following the word "States" strike the colon
and add the following:
within seven years from the date of its submission by the
Congress:

Strike all of SEC. 1, SEC. 2, SEC. 3, SEc. 4, SEc. 5, Smc. 6, and Sinc. 7
and insert in lieu thereof the following:
Article SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.

SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the

Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majoritvote of both Houses of Congress.

SEc. 3. If the President declares in writing that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
SEc. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.
SEc. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress
his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body
as Congress may by law provide, transmits within two days
to the Congress his written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Thereupon Congress shall immediately decide the issue.
If the Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to
discharge the same. .as Acting President; otherwise the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
PURPOSE OF THE AMENDMENTS

To substitute perfecting language that was acquired by the reception of testimony from expert witnesses in the field of constitutional
law and from discussion of the problem by members of the subcommittee.
PURPOSE

The purpose of the proposed Senate joint resolution is to provide
for continuity in the office of the Chief Executive in the event that the
President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the
Office, and further, to provide for the filling of vacancies in the Office
of the Vice President whenever such vacancies occur.
STATEMENT

The constitutionalprovisions
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the executive
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a President. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the Office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5 reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide

for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,
death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change the
substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear that
this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately submitted
was a considerable alteration of the proposal which the Committee
had received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability.
As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention contain only one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with the
question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convention
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice President John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United States.
While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator
William, Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognized
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 31June 1, 1841).
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,

Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all have become President
in this manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, or
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919)).
The Tyler precedent, therefore, has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice-President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
Where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as President, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency. This
interpretation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5 of the Constitution which provides that:
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States. [Italic supplied.]
The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed materially to the f ailure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which he
performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be disposed of by the
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision,
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of

Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler and Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedly
included the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it would
be desirable for the Vice President to act but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them from
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. This
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the Udited States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as the Shantung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's
wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screening
board on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impairment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "My Memoirs,"
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White House," pp.
105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
of the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such a possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "Woodrow
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents involving the physical health of the President served to focus
attention on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in the
Constitution relative to Presidential inability, and he attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with Vice
President Nixon. The agreement provided:
1. In the event of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.

2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnson as has President Johnson with Speaker John
McCormack. Such informal agreements cannot be considered an
adequate solution to the problem because: (A) Their operation would
differ according to the relationship between the particular holders of
the offices; (B) a private agreement cannot give the Vice President
clear authority to discharge powers conferred on the President bythe Constitution, treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for
the situation in which a dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled. Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers
as well as Attorney General Kennedy agree that the only definitive
method to settle the problem is by means of a constitutional
amendment.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The
clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
which may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define
inability so that the existence of such a status may be open and
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails to
define the period during which the Vice President serves. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives
of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President has in fact recovered
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented from
doing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive authority is
more important today than ever before. The concern which has been
manifested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisons relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized is not
because
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience

with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested provision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the presidential inability
problem.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. They
point out that article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution authorized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the President ad Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication,
Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and at what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
that article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the Congress the authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is necessary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Deputy Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
necessary. In addition to the American Bar Association and the
American Association of Law Schools, the following organizations
have agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,

Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.;. city of New YorkPassaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
Milwaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the commencement and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the Ofice of the President
While the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
-of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing
days of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
was considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice and even a council of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch should a
lapse of Executive authority come to pass.
On September 4,1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recommended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties to
be performed by the occupant of the office. Although much deliberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice President to the office of President in case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and
(2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of his
death, resignation, removal, or inability.
While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, the
importance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparent
by article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provision
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Convention, however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect

was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appease
disappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in ensuing years to mold the Vice Presidency into an office of inferiority and
disparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The death of President Kennedy and the accession of President
Johnson has pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen times the United States of America has been without a Vice
President, totaling 37 years during our history.
As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did not,
however, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many individuals. We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
The argument that Congress can designate a Vice President by law
is at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is measured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6 which states thatthe Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties

and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor Vice President to act.
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidentialoffice to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of the
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer to that question is "Yes." The Constitution has given,
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4.
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers,
including a "President pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is very difficult to argue that a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the procedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22 can be, the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the Office of Vice President
when it becomes vacant is to permit the person next in line to become
familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is.
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential succession law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
designates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations leading to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice-Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure whatever it be.

Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argument
in favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority concerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With this
division in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolutelegitimacy was needed.

ANALYSIS

Inability
The proposal now being submitted--is cast in the form of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 139 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 embrace the procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes
clear that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the
office" that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the
status of the Vice President during the period when he is discharging
the powers and duties of a disabled President.
Section 4 is the first step, of two, that embraces the most difficult
problem of inability-the factual determination of whether or not
inability exists. Under this section, if a President does not declare
that an inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the President is disabled shall, with the written approval of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of the
powers and duties of the Office as Acting President upon the transmission of such declaration to the Congress.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion and
their possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men" at the
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
President, both politically and physically, and presumably most
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familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distinguished advocates for a specially constituted
group in the nature of a factfinding body to determine presidential
inability rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannot
declare his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relatively simple. No need would exist for a special factfinding
body. Nor is a factfinding body necessary if the President can and
does declare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dispute should not be determined by a special commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,
for example, if a commission of seven voted 4 to 3 that the President was fit and able to perform his Office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his Office? If the vote were the
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placed
in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience.
Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President
to resume the powers and duties of the office upon his transmission
to the Congress of his written declaration that no inability existed.
However, should the Vice President and a majority of the heads of
the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then they
could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of
the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the
Congress within 2 days. Once the declaration of the President stating
no inability exists and the declaration of the Vice President and a
majority of the heads of the executive departments stating that
inability exists, have been transmitted to the Congress, then the issue
is squarely joined. At this point the proposal recommends that the
Congress shall make the final determination on the existence of
inability. If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable, then the Vice President continues
as Acting President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner
to cast a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the
position that the President was unable to perform the powers and
duties of his office, then the President would resume the powers and
duties of the office. The recommendation for a vote of two-thirds
is in conformity with the provision of article I, section 3, clause 6 of
the Constitution relating to impeachments.

This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vacancies
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always possess a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred
in that Office. The nominee would take office as Vice President once
he had been confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the
Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was observed that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important
positions in our country. The days are long past when it was largely
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific and
important responsibilities in the executive branch of Government.
He has come to share and participate in the executive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy, there would be no
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the recent uninterrupted assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is compatible with the President. The importance of this compatibility
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political parties
in according the presidential candidate a voice in choosing his running
mate subject to convention approval. This proposal would permit
the President to choose his Vice President subject to congressional
approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice President of the same political party as the President, someone who would
presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the President.
CONCLUSION

This amendment seeks to remove a vexatious constitutional problem from the realm of national concern. It concisely clarifies the
ambiguities of the present provision in the Constitution. In so doing,
it recognizes the vast importance of the office involved, and the necessity to maintain continuity of the Executive power of the United
States.
The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments approved this
proposal after hearing testimony and receiving written statements
from many distinguished students on the subject. The subcommittee also had the benefit of considerable study reflected in congressional documents previously published on this subject. In the light
of all this material and evidence, the committee believes that a serious
constitutional gap exists with regard to Presidential inability and
vacancies in the office of the Vice President, and that the proposal
which is now presented is the best solution to the problem.
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RECOMMENDATION

The committee, after considering the several proposals now pending
before it relating to the matter of Presidential inability, reports favorably on Senate Joint Resolution 139, with amendments, and recommends its submission to the legislatures of the several States of the
United States so that it may become a part of the Constitution of the
United States.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HRUSKA
The problem of Presidential inability and succession has long
been neglected and ignored. It is for this reason that I welcome the
opportunity to consider the joint resolution now presented to the
Senate.
In the opinion of most legal scholars and writers who have given
this problem careful study, the solution lies in a constitutional
amendment. Considering the gravity of this issue and the ramifications of the solution, it is imperative that in any proposal advanced
the paramount consitutional principle in our governmental framework is preserved. That is the doctrine of separation of powers.
One cannot predict the political crisis in which the Presidential
powers may hang in balance. A review of the cases involving a disabled President reveals the anxiety and confusion which can prevail.
It is also helpful to review the one case involving the impeachment
clause of the Constitution. The intrigue and interplay within the
Congress during the impeachment trial serves as a warning of clear
and present dangers when Congress is called upon to consider where
to place the mantle of the Presidential powers.
For these reasons our examination of proposed solutions should
carefully weigh the wisdom of adopting a method which does not
explicitly adhere to the principle of separation of powers. The exact
procedure prescribed, if clear and direct, is not my concern. Nor am
I wedded to any particular language. It is only the principle which
pervades the Constitution which I strongly feel should be respected
by any amendment.
With regard to Senate Joint Resolution 139, my preference would
be to leave the matter of providing a method to subsequent legislation,
so long as it is limited to a determination within the executive branch,
and not lock in any specified plan in constitutional terms. It is
therefore of considerable concern to me that Senate Joint Resolution
139 not only sets forth a particular method in an amendment but
goes further to provide a procedure whereby Congress can be thrust
into a controversy better left in the domain of the Executive.
ROMAN L. HrusxA.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. KEATING
I heartily join in reporting favorably, with the amendments
approved by the committee, this proposed constitutional amendment
to the full Senate.
It is a great forward step, in my judgment, toward the final adoption of a workable solution of these twin problems, the problems
of succession and inability which from the adoption of the Constitution have loomed as the most serious single threat to the stability
and continuity of the American Presidency as an institution.

Yet much remains to be done. There is the task of shepherding
this measure, or some version of it, through both Houses of the Congress by the required two-thirds vote in each; and then, for ratification by the States, through the required three-fourths of the State
legislatures.
The process of amending the Constitution poses an additional
dimension to the problem. It is not enough that we devise a solution which on its merits appears to be workable. More is required.
The solution which we adopt here in the Senate must also be acceptable elsewhere. It must be acceptable to at least two-thirds of our
colleagues in the House, many of whom have their own deeply held
convictions, as evidenced in various bills and resolutions, as to how
the problem should be handled. It must be acceptable also to as many
members of 50 State legislatures as will make possible its approval
in at least three-fourths of them. At bottom, of course, this means
that the solution must be acceptable to the American people, who
through their understanding of what needs to be done and their
expression of confidence in what is being proposed, will ultimately
decide the day in the Halls of Congress and m the State houses of
the Nation.
It is not enough, therefore, that Senate Joint Resolution 139, as
it is reported to the Senate, is a good solution and one that I myself
can thoroughly and conscientiously support. What is involved, in
addition, is the extent to which it will muster the support of others,
so that these efforts will not be in vain. This is a weighty practical
consideration. As many who have been concerned with these issues
over the years have said, it is ever so much more important to reach
an attainable solution than to strive for perfection at the considerable
risk of bogging down in disagreement as to precise detail.
It is this reason, among others, which impels me to offer certain substitute language to this resolution which, if adopted, would in my
judgment considerably enhance the chances of ultimate success as well
as providing an equally workable and in some respects, superior
plan.
These changes, which I shall describe and explain below, would
leave unaffected in their entirety sections 1 and 2 of the proposed
constitutional amendment. Both of these sections, one confirming
the so-called Tyler precedent and extending it to cases of resignation
and impeachment as well as death, the other providing for filling a
vacancy in the Office of Vice President by Presidential nomination
with confirmation by majority vote of both Houses of Congress, have
my unqualified and wholehearted endorsement.
Sections 3, 4, and 5, on the other hand, which would enshrine quite
detailed procedures on Presidential inability into the Constitution,
give me serious pause. In my judgment, it would be preferable to
simply provide by constitutional amendment that Congress shall have
the authority to establish inability procedures by ordinary legislation. This would avoid freezing any particular method into the
Constitution itself, make it easier to change the method if unforeseen defects are revealed by the actual operation of any congressionally prescribed plan, and most important, so simplify the amendment
as to make it more readily understood and, hopefully, more likely of
final congressional approval and ratification in the States.

I therefore intend to offer an amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 139, which would strike present sections 3, 4, and 5, and insert
instead the following new sections 3, 4, and 5:
SEc. 3. In case of the inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the said
powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President as
Acting President until the inability be removed.
SEc. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of
removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then be
President, or in the case of inability, act as President, and
such officer shall be or act as President accordingly, until a
President shall be elected or, in the case of inability, until the
inability shall be earlier removed.
SEc. 5. The Congress may prescribe by law the method
by which the commencement and termination of any inability shall be determined.
These three sections which I am proposing to substitute are identical
to the last three sentences of Senate Joint Resolution 35, sponsored
by the late Senator Kefauver and myself. Senate Joint Resolution
35 had earlier been approved by the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments and at this moment is still pending on the agenda of
the parent Judiciary Committee.
Section 3 as I propose to amend it would make it clear that it is
not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the office" of the
President which devolve on the Vice President in cases of Presidential
inability. By establishing the title of Acting President, the proposal
would further clarify the status of the Vice President during the
period when he is discharging the powers and duties of a disabled
President. In addition, it would make clear that the President may
reassume the powers and duties of his office when his inability has
ended. In all these respects, section 3 as I offer it would be identical
to section 3 of Senate Jaint Resolution 139, except that no specific
provision would be made for a Presidential declaration of his own
inability which would temporarily displace him from the exercise of
his powers and duties. Rather, under this proposal, the method by
which the commencement of any period of inability is to be determined would be left for Congress to decide by ordinary legislation,
as explained below.
The section 4 that I propose would clarify the authority of Congress
to legislate on the subject of Presidential succession, both in cases of
removal, death, and resignation, and also in cases of inability. It
would permit Congress to declare "what officer shall be President"
where both the President and Vice President have been eliminated
by removal, death, or resignation. Then, if neither the President
nor the Vice President is able to discharge the powers and duties
of the Presidency due to their inability, the Congress would also be
enabled to declare what officer shallact as President * * * until a President shall be elected,
or * * * until the inability shall be removed.

Finally, the section 5 that I will offer would authorize Congress
to prescribe by law "the method by which the commencement and
termination of any inability shall be determined." This provision

is at the heart of the amendments I propose, and represents my chief
point of difference with Senate Joint Resolution 139 as reported.
Past efforts to frame a constitutional amendment on inability have
endeavored, like Senate Joint Resolution 139, to set out in detail the
procedure to determine commencement and termination of a period of
Presidential inability. At one time, I myself favored the inability
commission approach, and even at this late date there are quite a
number of bills and resolutions in Congress to set up a commission.
These proposals have varied greatly in detail as to the membership
of such a commission, but most of them provide for either Cabinet,
congressional, judicial, or medical representation, or a combination
of one or more of these. Every such proposal, however, has become
bogged down in argument as to whether, for example, Cabinet
members who presumptively owe their primary loyalty to the President would overcome reluctance to take action adverse to him; or
whether the service of legislators or judges on a commission would
violate the spirit of the separation of powers doctrine; or whether
doctors can be expected to participate wisely in the formulation of
what is, at bottom, a political decision.
At long last, and after much debate, Senator Kefauver and I,
simply as two Senators who had long sought a practical solution to
this problem, agreed that if anything was going to be done, all of
the detailed procedures which had been productive of delay and controversy had best be scrapped for the time being in favor of merely
authorizing Congress in a constitutional amendment to deal with
particular methods by ordinary legislation. This, we agreed, would
later allow Congress to pick and choose the best form among all
the proposals without suffering the handicap of having to rally a
two-thirds majority in each House to do it. Senate Joint Resolution
35 was introduced to carry out the consensus we had reached.
The language of Senate Joint Resolution 35 stemmed initially from
the New York Bar Association, and presently has the support of its
committee on constitutional law. Its basic provisions were also favorably recommended by the American Bar Association's Committee
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform in 1960, and in 1962 the American
Bar Association reaffirmed its endorsement of what is now Senate
Joint Resolution 35. At that time, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York endorse it, too. As recently as June of 1963, the
then president-elect nominee of the American Bar Association testified in behalf of the association before the Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee in support of Senate Joint Resolution 35.
Finally, the Deputy Attorney General, speaking for the Department
of Justice, who testified in 1963 and who has reaffirmed his earlier
testimony this year as still reflecting the Department's views, is in
favor of the approach of Senate Joint Resolution 35. In short, at
one time or another, Senate Joint Resolution 35 has had the approval
of all of the bar associations which had devoted years of careful study
and consideration to this problem. And while neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson chose to take a personal stand on any
particular proposal, it may be fairly said that the Justice Department's continued endorsement of Senate Joint Resolution 35 is closely
tantamount to an administration position.

As I understand it, the principal objection to the approach taken by
Senate Joint Resolution 35 has been that it would give Congress a
"blank check" in the area of presidential inability, and that State
legislators especially would balk at a "blank check" constitutional
amendment. Apart from the fact that the Constitution in major
part is full of "blank check" provisions-the enumerated powers of
Congress under article I provide the most noteworthy exampleand that, moreover, the States have previously ratified "blank check"
amendments such as, for example, the income tax amendment, and the
prohibition amendment which left all enforcement details to Congress, the short answer is that Congress here would not be left free
to do whatever it wishes. Here is what the Deputy Attorney General,
speaking for the Justice Department, had to say on that point:
One objection may be that this provision is a blank check
which, if abused, could upset the balance of power between
the legislative and executive branches, and place the President at the mercy of a hostile Congress. I think this danger
is quite remote, and at all events not great enough to outweigh the advantages of conferring this authority upon the
Congress which represents the national electorate over more
complex constitutional provisions. If the methods adopted
by Congress for dealing with the problem do not meet the
standards of the separation of powers or otherwise satisfy
the President, he may veto the bill, and his veto could be
overridden only by two-thirds of each House. Moreover, if
Congress enacts a measure which is approved by the President, and thereafter attempts to amend or repeal it, its action
will also be subject to approval or veto by the President.
It seems unlikely, therefore, that any bill would ever be
enacted into law which was not acceptable to the President,
and which did not afford adequate protection to the people
and to the office of President (1964 hearings, p. 201).
It should be added to this, of course, that the President's approval
is not required for a proposed constitutional amendment to go to the
States for ratification. In my judgment, it is very important, both as
a matter of substance and symbolically, that the Presidency as an
institution place its imprimatur upon whatever concrete procedures
on presidential inability are ultimately decided upon. Establishing
inability procedures by ordinary statute, as would be authorized by
my proposed section 5, would permit the President, in behalf of himself and the office he occupies, to participate in the process of setting
up proper inability procedures.
I cannot too enthusiastically join in the fine analysis of the Deputy
Attorney General as to the other overriding advantages of the flexible
approach embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 35. The DeputyAttorney General has stated:
* * * The wisdom of loading the Constitution down by
writing detailed procedural and substantive provisions into it
has been questioned by many scholars and statesmen. The
framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom of using broad
and expanding concepts and principles that could be adjusted
to keep pace with current needs. The chances are that sup-

plemental legislation would be required in any event. In
addition, crucial and urgent new situations may arise in the
changing future * * * where it may be of importance that

Congress, with the President's approval, should be able to
act promptly without being required to resort to still another amendment to the Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution 35 makes this possible.
Since it is difficult to foresee all of the possible circumstances in which the Presidential inability problem could
arise, we are opposed to any constitutionalamendment which
attempts to solve all these questions by a series of complex
procedures. We think that the best solution to the basic
problems that remain would be a simple constitutional
amendment, such as Senate Joint Resolution 35, * * *. Such
an amendment would supply the flexibility which we think
is indispensable and, at the same time, put to rest what legal
problems may exist under the present provisions of the
Constitution as supplemented by practice and understanding.
[Emphasis supplied.] (1964 hearings, p. 203.)
And finally, I repeat that the simpler amendment, so capable of
being readily understood by the people and by their representatives
in the State legislatures, is in the tradition of constitutionmaking.
The States have ratified a whole series of amendments giving Congress the power to enforce them "by appropriate legislation," including the 13th amendment prohibiting slavery; the 14th amendment's
due process, equal protection and other civil rights clauses; the 15th
amendment's voting guarantees; the 16th amendment's broad grant
of income-taxing authority; the 18th or prohibition amendment; the
19th or women's suffrage amendment; and the 23d or District of
Columbia vote amendment. .There is absolutely no reason why State
legislators should not wish to grant similar broad powers to Congress
here where, unlike as in many previous amendments, no fundamental clash is involved between the respective powers of the
Federal and State governments and the matter merely goes to the
-mechanics, although very important mechanics to be sure, of coping
with potential emergencies in the office of Chief Executive of the
Federal Government.
So that there may be no basis for misunderstanding, I intend to
-offer my proposed amendments not out of intransigent opposition to
Senate Joint Resolution 139 but out of a firm belief that the Senate
should be afforded an opportunity to exercise its best political judgIment in choosing between two reasonable alternatives. Most if not
all of us are well enough acquainted with our respective State legislatures to form a rough "guesstimate" as to which alternative will
fare better in the process of submitting an amendment to the States
for ratification. And all of us, I am sure, have our firm notions as to
the nature of constitutionmaking and how best to frame a provision
which the American people may have to live with for a long time.
If the amendments I intend to offer are approved by a majority of
the Senate, other members of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, we have agreed, will be prepared to endorse the new
sections and work for their approval m the States. On the other
hand, if my amendments are not approved here, I shall fully
and
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unreservedly vote for Senate Joint Resolution 139 as it presently
stands and do all within my power to finally bring about its adoption
as a solution to this most important and fundamental problem
of
American Government.
KENNETH B. KEATING.
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The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the resolution (S.J. Res. 1), proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends
that the resolution as amended be agreed to.
AMENDMENTS

On page 2, in line 14, strike "If the President declares in writing"
and insert in lieu thereof: "Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
On page 2, strike the entire text of section 4, and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments or such other body
as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.

On page 3, in lines 1 and 2, strike the word "Con- gress" and insert
in lieu thereof the following:
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives
On page 3, in line 5, strike the word "heads" and insert in lieu
thereof the following: "principal officers".
On page 3, in line 9, strike the words "will immediately" and insert
in lieu thereof "shall immediately proceed to".
PURPOSE OF AMENDMENTS

The text of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, requires, under
certain contingencies, for a written declaration to be made by the
President, under section 3, and by the Vice President and principal
officers of the executive departments under section 4, and by the
President, the Vice President and principal officers of the executive
departments under section 5. It is the intention of the committee
that for the best interests of the country to be served, notice by all
parties should be public notice. The committee feels that notice by
transmittal to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives guarantees notice to the entire country.
The committee is concerned about the possibility that such written
declaration might be transmitted during a period in which Congress
was not in session. In this event the committee feels that transmittal
of such written declaration to the presiding officers of both Houses,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, would be sufficient transmittal under the terms of this
amendment.
It is the opinion of the committee that, under the language of
section 5, Congress is empowered to reconvene in special session to
consider any disability question arising under this section. Furthermore, under the language of this section, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives would be required
to call a special session of the Congress to consider the question of
presidential inability whenever the President's ability to perform the
powers and duties of his office are questioned under the terms of
section 5. However, nothing contained in this proposed amendment
should be construed to limit the power of the President from exercising
his existing constitutional authority to call for a special session of
the Congress.
It is further understood by the committee that should the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives not be
found in their offices at the time the declaration was transmitted that
transmittal to the office of such presiding officers would suffice for
sufficient notice under the terms of this amendment.
It is the judgment of the committee that the language "principal
officers of the executive departments" more adequately conveys the
intended meaning of sections 4 and 5, that only those members of the
President's official Cabinet were to participate in any decision of
disability referred to under these sections. This language finds
precedent under article II, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution.
The pertinent language there reads as follows:
he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments,

In its discussion of the ramifications of section 5, the committee
considered it important to add additional stress to the interpretation
of two questions which might arise:
(1) Who has the powers and duties of the office of the President
while the provisions of section 5 are being implemented?
(2) Under what sense of urgency is Congress required to act in
carrying out provisions of this section?
Under the terms of section 3 a President who voluntarily transfers
his powers and duties to the Vice President may resume these powers
and duties by making a written declaration of his ability to perform
the powers and duties of his office and transmitting such declaration
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This will reduce the reluctance of the President to utilize
the provisions of this section in the event he fears it would be difficult
for him to regain his powers and duties once he has voluntarily
relinquished them.
However, the intent of section 5 is that the Vice President is to
continue to exercise the powers and duties of the office of Acting President until a determination on the President's inability is made by
Congress. It is also the intention of the committee that the Congress should act swiftly in making this determination, but with sufficient opportunity to gather whatever evidence it determined necessary
to make such a final determination. The language, as amended, reads
as follows:
Thereupon Congress shall immediately proceed to decide the
issue.
It was the opinion of the committee that the words "Thereupon",
"shall", and "immediately" were sufficiently strong to indicate the
necessity for prompt action.
Precedence for the use of the word "immediately" and the interpretation thereof may be found in the use of this same word, "immediately" in the 12th amendment to the Constitution. In the 12th
amendment, in the event no candidate for President receives a
majority of the electoral votes, the House of Representatives "shall
choose immediately,". The committee was of the opinion that the
same sense of urgency attendant to the use of the word "immediately"
in the 12th amendment when Congress was in fact deciding who
would be the President of the United States should be attendant in
proceedings in which the Congress was deciding whether the President
of the United States should be removed from his office because of
his inability to perform the powers and duties thereof.
The committee is concerned that congressional action under the
terms of section 5 should be taken under the greatest sense of urgency.
However, because of the complexities involved in determining different
types of disability, it is felt unwise to prescribe any specific time
limitation to congressional deliberation thereupon. Indeed, the
committee feels that Congress should be permitted to collect all
necessary evidence and to participate in the debate needed to make
a considered judgment.
The discussion of the committee made it abundantly clear that the
proceedings in the Congress prescribed in section 5 would be pursued
under rules prescribed, or to be prescribed, by the Congress itself.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION AS AMENDED

The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as amended, is to provide
for continuity in the office of the Chief Executive [in the event that
the President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the
office] and further, to provide for the filling of vacancies in the office
of the Vice President whenever such vacancies may occur.
STATEMENT

The constitutional provisions
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the executive
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a President. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the Office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5 reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,
death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change the
substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear that
this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately submitted
was a considerable alteration of the proposal which the Committee
had received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability.
As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention contain only one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with the

question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convention
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice President John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United States.
While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator
William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognized
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 31June 1, 1841).
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this
manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, or
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)
The Tyler precedent, therefore, has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
Where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as President, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the

office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency. This
interpretation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5 of the Constitution which provides that:
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States. [Italic supplied.]
The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed materially to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which he
performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be disposed of by the
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision,
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler and Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedly
included the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it would
be desirable for the Vice President to act but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them from
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. This
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as the Shantung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's
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wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screening
board on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impairment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "My Memoirs,"
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White House," pp.
105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
of the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such a possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "Woodrow
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents
involving the physical health of the President served to focus attention
on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in the
Constitution relative to Presidential inability, and he attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with Vice
President Nixon. The agreement provided:
1. In the event of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnson as did President Johnson with Speaker John
McCormack and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Such informal
agreements cannot be considered an adequate solution to the problem
because: (A) Their operation would differ according to the relationship between the particular holders of the offices; (B) a private
agreement cannot give the Vice President clear authority to discharge powers conferred on the President by the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for the situation in
which a dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers as well as Attorney
General Kennedy agree that the only definitive method to settle the
problem is by means of a constitutional amendment.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article
II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has
already presented.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain.
The

clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
which may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define
inability so that the existence of such a status may be open and
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails to
define the period during which the Vice President serves. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives
of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President has in fact recovered
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented from
doing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive authority is
more important today than ever before. The concern which has been
mainfested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized because
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested provision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the presidential inability
problem.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. They
point out that article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution authorized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication
Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the

situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and at what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
that article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the Congress the authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment isnecessary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
necessary. In addition to the American Bar Association and the
American Association of Law Schools, the following organizations
have agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York;
Passaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
Milwaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the commencement and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the Ofice of the President
While the records of the Consititutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing
days of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
was considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice and even a council
of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch
should
a
lapse of Executive authority come to pass.

On September 4, 1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recommended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties to
be performed by the occupant of the office. Although much deliberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice President to the office of President in case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and
(2) to discharge the-powers and duties of the President in case of his
death, resignation, removal, or inability.
While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, the
importance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparent
by article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provision
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Convention, however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appease
disappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in ensung years to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority and
disparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The death of
Johnson in 1963
executive branch
times the United
totaling 37 years

President Kennedy and the accession of President
pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
when there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen
States of America has been without a Vice President,
during our history.

As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did not,
however, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However,
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many individuals. We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
The argument that Congress can designate a Vice President by law
is at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is measured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6 which states thatthe Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor Vice President to act.
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of the
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer to that question is "Yes." The Constitution has given
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4,
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers
including a "President pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is very difficult to argue that a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the procedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22 can be, the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President
when it becomes vacant is to permit the person next in line to become

familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential succession law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
designates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations leading to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice-Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure whatever it be.
Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argument
in favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority concerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With this
division in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolute
legitimacy was needed.
ANALYSIS

Inability
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 embrace the procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.

By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes
clear that it is not the '"office" but the "powers and duties of the
office" that devolve onlthe Vice President and further clarifies the
status of the Vice President during the period when he is discharging
the powers and duties of a disabled President.
Section 4 is the first step, of two, that embraces the most difficult
problem of inability-the factual determination of whether or not
inability exists. Under this section, if a President does not declare
that an inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the President is disabled shall, with the written approval of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of the
powers and duties of the"Office as ActingPresident upon ;the transmission of such declaration to the Congress.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men" at the
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
President, both politically and physically, and presumably most
familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distinguished advocates for a specially constituted
group in the nature of a factfinding body to determine presidential
inability rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannot
declare his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relatively simple. No need would exist for a special factfinding
body. Nor is a factfinding body necessary if the President can and
does declare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dispute should not be determined by a special commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,
for example, if a commission of seven voted 4 to 3 that the President was fit and able to perform his Office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his Office? If the vote were the
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placed

in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience.
Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President
to resume the powers and duties of the office upon his transmission
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of his written declaration that no inability existed. However, should the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then
they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties
of the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days. Once the declaration of the President stating
no inability exists has been transmitted to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then the issue is
squarely joined. At this point the proposal recommends that the
Congress shall make the final determination on the existence of
inability. If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable, then the Vice President continues
as Acting President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner to cast a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the
position that the President was unable to perform the powers and
duties of his office, then the President would resume the powers and
duties of the office. The recommendation for a vote of two-thirds
is in conformity with the provision of article I, section 3, clause 6, of
the Constitution relating to impeachments.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.

Vacancies
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always possess a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person who meets the existing constitutional qualifications
to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office as Vice President once he had been
confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was observed that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important
positions in our country. The days are long past when it was largely
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out,
For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific and
important responsibilities in the executive branch of Government.
He has come to share and participate in the exe utive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy, there would be no
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterrupted
assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.

It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is compatible with the President. The importance of this compatibility
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political parties
in according the presidential candidate a voice in choosing his running
mate subject to convention approval. This proposal would permit
the President to choose his Vice President subject to congressional
approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice President of the same political party as the President, someone who would
presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the President.
CONCLUSION

This amendment seeks to remove a vexatious constitutional problem from the realm of national concern. It seeks to concisely clarify
the ambiguities of the present provision in the Constitution. In so
doing, it recognizes the vast importance of the office involved, and the
necessity to maintain continuity of the Executive power of the United
States.
The committee approved this prop osal after its subcommittee heard
testimony and received written statements from many distinguished
students on the subject. Last year the subcommittee also had the
benefit of considerable study reflected in congressional documents
previously published on this subject. In the light of all this material
and evidence, and for the fact that 76 Senators have sponsored Senate
Joint Resolution 1, the committee believes that a serious constitutional
gap exists with regard to Presidential inability and vacancies in the
office of the Vice President, and that the proposal which is now
presented is the best solution to the problem.
RECOMMENDATION

The committee, after considering the several proposals now pending
before it relating to the matter of Presidential inability, reports favorably on Senate Joint Resolution 1 and recommends its submission to
the legislatures of the several States of the United States so that it
may become a part of the Constitution of the United States.
COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER AND RETAINED WORDING

The committee amendments to the Senate joint resolution are shown
as follows: Provisions of the resolution as introduced which are
omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics,
provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
"ArticleSEC. 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President

who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
SEc. 3. [If the President declares in writing] Whenever the
President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
Office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting President.
SEc. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the]
Whenever the Vice President, [with the written concurrence
of] and a majority of the [heads] principal officers of the
executive departments or such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit[s] to the [Congress his] President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
SEC. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the [Congress] Presidentof the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a
majority of the [heads] principal officers of the executive
departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress
[will] shall immediately proceed to decide the issue. If the
Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to
discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
SENATOR EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN
When the Congress considers amendments to the Constitution, it
deals not with the problems of today, or yesterday, or tomorrow, but
in terms of the grand sweep of our Nation's history and future. The
Constitution is the basic charter of our Government. It is appropriate to keep its function separate from the various laws we derive
from it, laws that are designed to meet specific problems as they may
arise. The Constitution must meet the test of time. It can do this
only if it provides the means by which the Congress may meet the
needs of the moment, not the solution to specific problems.
The questions of Presidential succession and Presidential inability
are not new to the Senate. It has been wrestling with them for many
years. Time and again it has tried its hand at contriving an amendment to the Constitution to deal with the problems. But each time
when the Senate almost reaches a conclusion as to language for the
amendment it becomes aware that its labors have been so narrowly
directed to the problems arising out of particular events that it has
failed to think and write in the broad fundamental concepts which are
necessary to a constitutional amendment. And then, because it
realizes the dangers of a job half done, it does nothing at all.
Congress cannot go along that way any further. It must deal with
the problems of Presidential succession and Presidential inability by a
constitutional amendment. It is necessary that the pertinent provision of the Constitution dealing with vacancy or inability, article
II, section 1, that reads as follows:
In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of
the President and the Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected.
be amended to clarify whether the devolution is of the Office of the
President or only of his powers and duties. Presumably it is the
former in the case of death or resignation and the latter in case of
inability. Be that as it may, it has been the uncertainty of construction of this language that in the past has prevented Vice Presidents from assuming authority during the periods of disability of
various Presidents. Next, it is essential that the Constitution provide
a means of dealing with the other matters encompassed in Senate
Joint Resolution 1. But the amendment should not deal with details.
They can be handled by statute and rightly should be.

This solution was well laid out before this committee last year and 2
years ago by the then Deputy Attorney General of the United States,
Mr. Katzenbach. His entire statement in the 1963 hearings, incorporated again in the 1964 hearings, should be read by everyone who
is considering this problem. Let me only emphasize his concluding
thoughts:
Apart from the wisdom of loading the Constitution down
by writing detailed procedural and substantive provisions
into it has been questioned by many scholars and statesmen.
The framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom of using
broad and expanding concepts and principles that could be
adjusted to keep pace with current needs. The changes are
that supplemental legislation would be required in any event.
In addition, crucial and urgent new situations may arise
in the changing future-not covered by Senate Joint Resolution 28 1-where it may be of importance that Congress,
with the President's approval, should be able to act promptly
without being required to resort to still another amendment to the Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution 35 1
makes this possible; Senate Joint Resolution 28 1 does not.
Since it is difficult to foresee all of the possible circumstances in which the Presidential inability problem could
arise, we are opposed to any constitutional amendment
which attempts to solve all these questions by a series of
complex procedures. We think that the best solution to
the basic problems that remain would be a simple constitutional amendment, such as Senate Joint Resolution 35,1

which treats the contingency of inability differently from
situations such as death, removal, or resignation, which
states that the Vice President in case of Presidential inability succeeds only to the powers and duties of the Office
as Acting President and not to the Office itself, and which
declares that the commencement and termination of any
inability may be determined by such methods as Congress
by law shall provide. Such an amendment would supply
the flexibility which we think is indispensable and, at the
same time, put to rest what legal problems may exist under
the present provisions of the Constitution as supplemented
by practice and understanding.
Senate Joint Resolution 35, referred to by Mr. Katzenbach, now
the Attorney General, and modified in accordance with his suggestions
reads as follows:
ArticleIn case of the removal of the President from office or of
his death or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the
Vice President, in case of the inability of the President to
discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the said
powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President as
Acting President until the inability be removed. The Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice
188th Cong.

President, declaring what officer shall then be President,
or in case of inability, act as President, and such officer
shall be or act as President accordingly, until a President
shall be elected or, in case of inability, until the inability
shall be earlier removed. The commencement and termination of any inability may be determined by such method as
Congress shall by law provide.
I, therefore, propose that we adopt as a constitutional amendment
this proposal which not only bears the imprimatur of the two distinguished men who were then Members of the Senate, Senator Kefauver
and Senator Keating, but which was so persuasively supported by the
Attorney General. He has confirmed to me that he still holds those
views. And in his testimony this year he said only that he would
not insist on the preference he had expressed in the past.
But such a constitutional amendment would be only the beginning.
We must then prepare specific legislation to establish the mechanics
and the details of Presidential succession and inability. It could be
in much the same language as that proposed by the Senator from
Indiana for a constitutional amendment.
This course of action has one advantage above all others. It
removes the fear that we may embed in the Constitution procedures
which may not turn out to be workable. If they are in a statute we
can change them. If they become a part of the Constitution, it
would take another constitutional amendment to change them.
Indeed the events of the past few days have created a presumption
and perhaps a conclusive presumption that a constitutional amendment in the form reported will be ill advised. In testimony before
the Committee on the Judiciary of the other body, the Attorney
General has given further indication of doubts he holds about the
adequacy of the language of Senate Joint Resolution 1. Is section 3
permitting .the President to declare his inability if he transmits a
declaration in writing to the Senate and the House to be used when
the President is having a tooth pulled? Is it to be used when he is
out of the country on a visit to Mexico or to a NATO meeting, or
perhaps when he is in the air at any time? If so, then we have
imposed in the Constitution a very cumbersome procedure for him
to take back his powers and duties. We have provided the same
mechanics for an inability of a few minutes, or a few hours, as we
have for long periods of illness.
Then, too, as has been suggested by those who have studied Senate
Joint Resolution 1 in the form reported by the committee, there are
many things which are not covered by the detailed language of this
amendment which perhaps should be covered if we are going into such
detail instead of adopting broad constitutional language which can be
applied by statute to situations as they may arise. If one of the purposes of the amendment is to provide to the greatest extent possible
for the filling of the Office of Vice President, have we done so? What
happens if the President is disabled for many months and the Vice
President assumes his powers and duties as Acting President? Can
he appoint a Vice President, or must that Office remain empty?
Surely there is as much chance that some ill may befall the mortal
who is Acting President due to the disability of the President as there

would be if he succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the
President. By moving into this area with a constitutional amendment containing such specifics dealing with the one case we may have
foreclosed ourselves from dealing by statute with other parts of the
problem. On the other hand the broader language of Senate Joint
Resolution 35, 88th Congress, would permit us to deal with this whole
problem by statute.
And, let us never forget, that it is often argued that because situations of great variety and complexity may arise at any time in the
conduct of our foreign relations and in the administration of the laws
which we pass, we should not too tightly or too rigidly control the
exercise of discretion by those who must deal with the problems. But
by writing such specifics into the Constitution as are proposed by
Senate Joint Resolution 1 as reported, we are even more tightly and
more rigidly binding ourselves in dealing with the details of problems
of Presidential succession and inability.
We should certainly heed the wisdom of the Attorney General when
he testified on the merits of the various proposals last year and the year
before. And we should give thought to the implications of all the
assumptions the Attorney General felt constrained to make when he
testified this year. Let us see what he said:
First, I assume that in using the phrase "majority vote of
both Houses of Congress" in section 2, and "two-thirds vote
of both Houses" in section 5, what is meant is a majority and
two-thirds vote, respectively, of those Members in each House
present and voting, a quorum being present. This interpretation would be consistent with longstanding precedent (see,
e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919)).
Second, I assume that the procedure established by section
5 for restoring the President to the powers and duties of his
office is applicable only to instances where the President has
been declared disabled without his consent, as provided in
section 4; and that, where the President has voluntarily
declared himself unable to act, in accordance with the procedure established by section 3, he could restore himself immediately to the powers and duties of his office by declaring in
writing that his inability has ended. The subcommittee may
wish to consider whether language to insure this interpretation should be added to section 3.
Third, I assume that even where disability was established
originally pursuant to section 4, the President could resume
the powers and duties of his Office immediately with the
concurrence of the Acting President, and would not be
obliged to await the expiration of the 2-day period
mentioned in section 5.
Fourth, I assume that transmission to the Congress of the
written declarations referred to in section 5 would, if Congress
were not then in session, operate to convene the Congress in
special session so that the matter could be immediately
resolved. In this regard, section 5 might be construed as
impliedly requiring the Acting President to convene a special
session in order to raise an issue as to the President's inability
pursuant to section 5.

Further in this connection, I assume that the language used
in section 5 to the effect that Congress "will immediately
decide" the issue means that if a decision were not reached
by the Congress immediately, the powers and duties of the
Office would revert to the President. This construction is
sufficiently doubtful, however, and the term "immediately"
is sufficiently vague, that the subcommittee may wish to
consider adding certainty by including more precise language
in section 5 or by taking action looking toward the making
of appropriate provision in the rules of the House and Senate.
In my testimony during the hearings of 1963, I expressed
the view that the specific procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of the President's inability
should not be written into the Constitution, but instead
should be left to Congress so that the Constitution would
not be encumbered by detail.
The fact that we give heed and thought to these suggestions does
not mean that we do nothing about the problem of presidential
succession and disability. Indeed, we must do something. Let us
do it with the sweep of history in our mind and pen rather than the
shackles of specifics.
EVERETT

MCKINLEY

DIRKSEN.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR ROMAN L. HRUSKA
Agreements devised by the President and his Vice President in past
administrations to cope with an inability crisis are not satisfactory
solutions. Recent history has also made us very much aware of the
need for filling the Office of Vice President when a vacancy arises.
It is abundantly clear that, rather than continue these informal
agreements, the only sound approach is the adoption of a constitutional amendment.
The hearings, which have been held on this important subject in
recent years and in which this Senator has had the opportunity to
participate, have led me to prefer a different approach than the
present one. As in other legislative matters, the finished product
requires the refinement of individual preferences. In the spirit of
this simple reality, I shall support the proposed amendment. It is
my earnest hope that the Congress and the State legislatures will
approve and ratify it promptly. There is, however, one amendment
which I would urge, as discussed at a later point.
There are two major reasons for my acceptance of the proposed
amendment.
The first is the urgent need for a solution. Differences of opinion
in Congress have deprived us of a solution for far too long. It is
time that these constitutional shortcomings be met.
Secondly, the proposed language approaches the product which
would have resulted under the proposal which I had urged, so that
this amendment is acceptable.
Nevertheless, it is in order to state the bases of my earlier preference and the preference of three Attorneys General.
The proposed amendment would distinguish the inability situation
from the three other contingencies of permanent nature; death, resignation, and removal from office, and would recognize that, in the first
instance, the Vice President becomes Acting President only.
At this point, we encounter the first major difference of opinion.
Some would advocate spelling out the procedure for determining
inability within the language of the proposed amendment. I disagree with the method of locking into the Constitution those procedures deemed appropriate today but which, in the light of greater
knowledge and experience may be found wanting tomorrow.
The preferred course would be for the amendment to authorize the
Congress to establish an appropriate procedure by law. This practice
parallels the situation of Presidential succession, wherein the power is
delineated by the Constitution but the detail is left for later determnation.
I would also add one fundamental limitation to the process.
I refer to the doctrine of separation of powers. The maintenance
of the three distinct branches of Government, coequal in character,
has long been accepted as one of the most important safeguards for
the preservation of the Republic.
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The executive branch should determine the presence of and termination of the inability of the President. It is my view that a method
which would involve neither the judicial nor the legislative branch of
the Government would be the better course.
The determination of Presidential inability and its termination is
obviously a factual matter. No policy is involved. The issue is
simply whether a specific individual with certain physical, mental, or
emotional impairments possesses the ability to continue as the Chief
Executive or whether his infirmity is so serious and severe as to render
him incapable of executing the duties of his Office.
Injecting Congress into the factual question of inability does create
a secondary impeachment procedure, although limited, in which the
conduct of the President would not be the test.
The impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson affords a
clear illustration of the dangers presented when Congress performs a
judicial function. The intrigue and interplay within the Congress
during the impeachment trial serves as a warning of clear and present
dangers which exist when Congress is called upon to consider where to
place the mantle of the presidential powers.
An additional compelling argument for restricting this authority
to the executive branch is that this determination must be made with
a minimum of delay. Although this objection has been alleviated in
the present language, the executive branch is clearly best equipped to
respond promptly as well as effectively in the face of such a crisis.
Obviously, such a decision must rest on the relevant and reliable
facts regarding the President's physical or mental faculties. It must
be divorced from any thoughts of political advantage, personal
prejudice, or other extraneous factors. Those possessing such firsthand
information about the Chief Executive, or most accessible to it on a
personal basis, are found within the executive branch and not elsewhere.
We must be mindful that the President is chosen by the people
of the entire Nation. It is their wish and their right that he serve
as President for the term for which he was chosen. Every sensible and
sympathetic construction favoring his continued performance of
presidential duties should be accorded him. Indeed, were error to
be committed, it should be in favor of his continuation in office or,
were it interrupted by a disability, by his resumption of the office at
the earliest possible moment upon recovery. The members of the
executive branch are best situated to protect that interest.
What briefly has been developed is the basis of my view that
Congress should not be injected into the decisionmaking process in
cases of presidential inability or recovery.
Considerable reference has been made in the discussion of Senate
Joint Resolution 1 to the 76 cosponsors of the proposed resolution.
Cosponsorship of a proposal does not mean acceptance of detail and
the exact text. I am certain that cosponsors do not consider themselves bound by a proposal as introduced. Cosponsorship does not
indicate a desire to proceed without hearings, deliberation, and amendments in committee as well as on the floor of the Senate. Refinements made by the committee on this measure illustrate that whether
a proposal has a single sponsor or 99 cosponsors, it must be examined
in detail before it is considered by the Senate with a view to change
by amendment or substitution.

The refinements that have been made on the original language of
Senate Joint Resolution 1 will clarify the detailed procedure to be
followed in a case of disability.
The role of Congress is narrow. It is as an appeal open to the
President from the decision of the Vice President and the members
of the Cabinet. It will be brought into the matter only in those
limited circumstances where the Vice President, with a majority of
the principal officers of the executive departments, and the President
disagree on the question of inability. It is important to note that
Congress will not have the power to initiate a challenge of the President's ability.
The procedure by which Congress shall act is properly left to later
determination within rules of each branch thereof. A point of possible
conflict is resolved in the understanding that Congress shall act as
separate bodies and within their respective rules.
The language that "* * * Congress shall immediately proceed to
decide the issue" leaves to Congress the determination of what, in
light of the circumstances then existing, must be examined in deciding
the issue. Thus, the matter will be examined on the evidence available. It is desirable that the matter be examined with a sympathetic
eye toward the President who, after all, is the choice of the electorate.
It is apparent that Senate Joint Resolution 1 does have aspects
which alleviate the dangers attendant to a crisis in presidential
inability. Nevertheless, it is felt by this member of the committee
that caution and restraint will be demanded should this inability
measure be called into application.
A time does arrive, however, when we must fill the vacuum. The
points which I have emphasized and previously insisted upon are
important; but having a solution at this point is more than important,
it is urgent. For this reason, I support Senate Joint Resolution 1
and urge its passage. I hope that it will be given expeditious approval
by the other body and early ratification by the required number of
States.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Section 5 gives the majority of the Cabinet and the Vice President
only 2 days in which to challenge the President's declaration that his
inability has terminated.
This is not enough time considering the gravity of the situation and
the circumstances which might exist.
In the discharge of their duties, members of the Cabinet often travel
widely. There are also long periods of time in which they may not
have had an opportunity to observe and visit with the President so as
to judge whether he has recovered sufficiently to resume his duties.
Such periods of inaccessibility might even be longer, in the event of the
President's illness.
The 2-day period should be extended to properly allow for these
factors. I urge amendment of this point to provide additional time.
ROMAN L. HRUSKA.
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Mr. MCCULLOCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted
the following

REPORT
[To accompany H.J. Res. 1]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the joint
resolution (H.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the same,
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that
the joint resolution do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the
following:
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of
the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"Article -

"SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SEC. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmits a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
"SEC. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

"Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive
departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within
two days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide
the issue, immediately assembling for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within ten days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments,
or such other body as Congress .may. by law provide, determines by two-thirds
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as
Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and duties
of his office."
PURPOSE OF THE AMENDMENT

The principal purpose of the amendment is to distinguish between
inability voluntarily declared by the President himself and inability
declared without his consent. In the former case, the President can
resume his duties by making a simple declaration that the inability has
ceased; in the latter, the measure provides procedures for promptly
determining the presence or absence of inability when that issue is
present.
The amendment makes no changes in sections 1 and 2 of the constitutional amendment proposed by House Joint Resolution 1 as introduced; it does make changes in sections 3 and 4 and it eliminates
section 5 by merging the substance of that section with that of
section 4.
The changes made by the amendment in section 3 clarify the
procedure and clarify the consequences when the President himself
declares his inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
There are two: First, the amendment indicates the officials to whom
the President's written declaration of inability shall be transmitted,
namely the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. The committee deemed it desirable
to add this specification which was absent from the joint resolution as
introduced. Second, the amendment makes clear that, in case of
such voluntary self-disqualification by the President, the President's
subsequent transmittal to the same officials of a written declaration
to the contrary, i.e., a written declaration that no inability exists,
terminates the Vice President's exercise of the Presidential powers
and duties, and that the President shall thereupon resume them.
In short, it is the intent of the committee that voluntary self-disqualification by the President shall be terminated by the President's
own declaration that no inability exists, without further ado. To
permit the Vice President and the Cabinet to challenge such an
assertion of recovery might discourage a President from voluntarily
relinquishing his powers in case of illness. The right of challenge
would be reserved for cases in which the Vice President and Cabinet,
without the President's consent, had found him unable to discharge
his powers and duties.
Sections 4 and 5 of the amendment proposed by House Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, dealt respectively with the devolution upon
the Vice President, as Acting President, of the President's powers and

duties pursuant to a declaration of his inability made by the Vice
President and other officials, and with the procedure upon subsequent
declaration by the President that no inability exists.
The amendment places the substance of former section 5 into section
4, in order to emphasize the committee's intent that the procedure
provided by former section 5 relates only to cases in which Presidential
inability has been declared by others than the President. Two identical changes are made in former sections 4 and 5. First, the term
"principal officers of the executive departments" is substituted for the
term "heads of the executive departments" to make it clearer that only
officials of Cabinet rank should participate in the decision as to whether
presidential inability exists. The substituted language follows more
closely article II, section 2, of the Constitution, which provides that
the President may require the opinion in light "of the principal officers
in each of the executive departments * * *."

The intent of the com-

mittee is that the Presidential appointees who direct the 10 executive
departments named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive department established in the future, generally considered to comprise the President's Cabinet, would participate, with the Vice President, in determining inability. In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the head of any executive department, the acting head of the
department would be authorized to participate in a presidential
inability determination.
The second change made in former sections 4 and 5 is to specify
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives as the congressional officials to whom declaration
concerning Presidential inability shall be transmitted, as is done in
section 3.
The language of former section 5 of House Joint Resolution 1 is
further amended to make clear that if Congress is not in session at
the time of receipt by the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of a written declaration
by the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments contradicting a Presidential declaration that
no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble for the purpose of deciding the issue. Finally, the language of former section 5
is further amended by providing that in such event the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Congress within
10 days after receipt of such declaration of Presidential inability dedetermines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is in
fact unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
The committee deems it essential in the interest of stability of
government to limit to the smallest possible period the time during
which the vital issue of the executive power can remain in doubt.
Under the bill, following a Presidential declaration that the disability
previously declared by others no longer exists, a challenge to such
declaration must be made within 2 days of its receipt by the heads of
the Houses of Congress and must be finally determined within the
following 10 days. Otherwise the President, having declared himself
able, will resume his powers and duties. An unlimited power in
Congress might afford an irresistible temptation to temporize
with respect to restoring the President's powers. In this highly
charged area there is no room for equivocation or delay.

STATEMENT

For its report herein the committee adopts in substantial measure
the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany
Senate Joint Resolution 1, namely, Senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress, 1st session:
The constitutionalprovisions
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the Executive
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a President. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5, reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,
death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change
the substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear
that this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately
submitted was a considerable alteration of the proposal which the
Committee had received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability.
As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention contain only one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with the
question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)

The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convention
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice President John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United States.
While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator
William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognized
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 31-June 1, 1841).

This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this
manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, or
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability," North American Review,
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)

The Tyler precedent, therefore, has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
Where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as President, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency. This
interpretation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5, of the Constitution which provides that:
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States.

[Italic supplied.]

The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed materially to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which he
performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be disposed of by the
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision,
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler, and Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President- acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedly
included the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it would
be desirable for the Vice President to act but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them from
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. This
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as the Shantung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's
wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screening
board on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impairment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "My Memoirs,"
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White House," pp.
105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary

of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such a possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "Woodrow
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents
involving the physical health of the President served to focus attention
on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in the
Constitution relative to Presidential inability, and he attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with Vice
President Nixon. The agreement provided:
1. In the event of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnson as did President Johnson with Speaker John
McCormack and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Such informal
agreements cannot be considered an adequate solution to the problem
because: (A) Their operation would differ according to the relationship between the particular holders of the offices; (B) a private
agreement cannot give the Vice President clear authority to discharge powers conferred on the President by the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for the situation in
which a dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers as well as Attorney
General Kennedy agree that the only definitive method to settle the
problem is by means of a constitutional amendment.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The
clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
which may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define
inability so that the existence of such a status may be open and
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails to
define the period during which the Vice President serves. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives

of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President has in fact recovered
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented from
doing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of Exedutive authority is
more important today than ever before. The concern which has been
manifested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized because
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested pro
vision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the, problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the Presidential inability
problem.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. They
point out that article II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution authorized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication
Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).

Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and at what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
that article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Congress the authority
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is necessary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
necessary. In addition tQ the American Bar Association and the
American Association of Law Schools, the following organizations
have agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York;
Passaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
Milwaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the commencement and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the office of the President
While the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing
days of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
was considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and even a council of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch should a
lapse of Executive authority come to pass.
On September 4, 1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recommended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties to
be performed by the occupant of the Office. Although much deliberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little

thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice President to the office of President in case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Vice President., (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and
(2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of his
death, resignation, removal, or inability.
While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, the
importance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparent
by article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provision
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Convention, however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appease
disappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in
ensuing years to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority
and disparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE URGENCY OF AMENDMENT

The death of President Kennedy and the accession of President
Johnson in 1963 pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen
times the United States of America has been without a Vice President,
totaling 37 years during our history.
As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did not,
however, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional

amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However,
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many individuals. We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
The argument that Congress can designate a Vice President by law
is at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is measured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6, which states thatthe Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor Vice President to act.
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of the
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer to that question is "Yes." The Constitution has given
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4,
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers
including a "President pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is very difficult to argue that a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the procedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22, can be the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President
when it becomes vacant is to permit the person next in line to become
familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties
to

the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential successing law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
designates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations leading to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure whatever it be.
Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argument in
favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority concerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With this
division in existence it wouid seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolute
legitimacy was needed.
ANALYSIS

Inability
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.
Sections 3 and 4 embrace the procedures for determining the commencement and termination of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes clear
that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the office"
that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the status of
the Vice President during the period when he is discharging the
powers and duties of a disabled President.
The amendment to section 3 makes certain that in cases in which
a President himself declares his inability, the period of his disability
would be terminated by a simple Presidential notice to both Houses

of Congress. To permit the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge
such an assertion of recovery might discourage a President from voluntarily relinquishing his powers in case of illness. The right of challenge would be reserved for cases in which the Vice President and
the Cabinet, without the President's consent, had found him linable
to discharge his powers and duties.
Section 4 of the proposed constitutional amendment deals with the
most difficult problem of inability-the factual determination of
whether or not inability exists. It provides that whenever the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive
departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men" at the
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
President, both politically and physically, and presumably most
familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distinguished advocates for a specially constituted
group in the nature of a factfinding body to determine presidential
inability rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannot
declare his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relatively simple. No need would exist for a special factfinding
body. Nor is a factfinding body necessary if the President can and
does declare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dispute should not be determined by a special commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,
for example, if a commission of seven voted four to three that the President was fit and able to perform his office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his office? If the vote were the
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,

what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placed
in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience.
The second paragraph of section 4 of the proposed amendment
would permit the President to resume the powers and duties of the
office upon his transmission to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of his written declaration
that no inability existed. However, should the Vice President and
a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments feel
that the President is unable, then they could prevent the President
from resuming the powers and duties of the office by transmitting
their written declaration so stating to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days. Once
the declaration of the President stating no inability exists has been
transmitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, then the issue is squarely joined. At this
point the proposal recommends that the Congress shall make the
final determination on the existence of inability. If within 10 days
the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses that the
President is unable, then the Vice President continues as Acting
President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner to cast
a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the position
that the President was unable to perform the powers and duties of
his office, then the President would resume after the expiration of
10 days the powers and duties of the office. The recommendation
for a vote of two-thirds is in conformity with the provision of article I,
section 3, clause 6, of the Constitution relating to impeachments.
The committee contemplates that votes taken pursuant to the provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment will be conducted
in accordance with the rules of the House and Senate, respectively,
and that record votes may be taken when in conformity with such rules.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vacancies
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always possess a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person who meets the existing constitutional qualifications
to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office as Vice President once he has been
confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was observed that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important
positions in our country. The days are long past when it was largely
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
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For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific and
important responsibilities in the executive branch of Government.
He has come to share and participate in the executive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy there would be no
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterrupted
assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is compatible with the President. The importance of this compatibility
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political parties
in according the presidential candidate a major voice in choosing his
running mate subject to convention approval. This proposal would
permit the President to choose his Vice President subject to congressional approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice
President of the same political party as the President, someone who
would presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the
President.
The committee recommends adoption of the joint resolution as
amended.
COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER, AND RETAINED WORDING

The committee amendments to the House joint resolution are
shown as follows: Provisions of the resolution as introduced which
are omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in
italic, provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
ArticleSECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
SEC 3. [If the President declares in writing] Whenever the
Presidenttransmits to the PresidentPro Tem pore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits a written declaration
to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
SEC. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his]
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal
officers of the executive departments, or such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is

unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
5[SEC. 5.] Thereafter, when[ever] the President transmits
to the [Congress] President Pro Tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and
duties of his office unless the Vice President, [with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his] and
a majority of the principal officers of the executiz e departments,
or such other body as Congress may by law prof ide, transmit
within two days to the PresidentPro Tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall
[immediately] decide the issue, immediately assembling for
that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within ten
days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE
EDWARD HUTCHINSON
House Joint Resolution 1, as reported, would ratify the Tyler
precedent of succession to the office of President by the Vice President
upon the death of the President; it would provide for filling a vacancy
in the office of Vice President; and it would incorporate into the
Constitution a detailed procedure for the transfer of Executive power
from the President to the Vice President in times of the President's
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
THE TYLER PRECEDENT

No reasonable question any longer exists about the constitutional
succession to the office of President by the Vice President upon the
death of the President. Vice President Tyler's claim to the office
as well as its powers and duties, upon the death of President W. H.
Harrison in 1841, has without exception been asserted on every
subsequent like occasion. The country would not now accept any
different construction of the constitutional provision, nor would any
different construction be warranted. There is no disagreement over
section 1 of House Joint Resolution 1. It makes clear that whenever
a vacancy in the office of President occurs, whether by removal, death
or resignation, the Vice President will assume the office as well as its
powers and duties.
FILLING A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY

Section 2 of House Joint Resolution 1 would empower and direct
the President to nominate a Vice President when that office is vacant,
and the citizen so nominated would take office when confirmed by a
majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
While it is generally assumed each House would act separately,
the language employed requires a majority vote of both Houses, not
each House, to confirm. If, sometime in the future, pressure is brought
to bear for congressional confirmation in joint convention, as some
proponents of this measure now advocate, the language of section
2 may be construed to require only a majority of both Houses combined, in that way diluting the vote of Senators. In my opinion,
this possibility would be lessened if the language directed the majority
vote in each House instead of a majority vote of both Houses.
Although the section is silent on the point, it is expected that the
majority vote required, so long as each House acts separately, is a
majority of the votes cast in each House, a quorum being present.
There is no requirement for a record vote, but one-fifth of those
present could require it. A secret ballot could not be ordered over
their objections.
Procedure for confirmation of nominations by the President by
both Houses is unique in our experience. All other appointments are

submitted only to the Senate, for advice and consent. A good case
could be made for submission of this nomination to the Senate alone.
After all, the sole constitutional duty of the Vice President remains
that of President of the Senate; and within the purview of the Constitution, the President, by nominating a Vice President, is choosing
their Presiding Officer. Senate approval of his nominee, as in the
case of other Presidential appointments, certainly would have been
thought sufficient in earlier periods of our history, and may be sufficient
today.
The case for Senate action alone also can be buttressed by an
analogy. In those cases where a Vice President is not elected, because
of a failure of a majority of the electoral vote, the Constitution
directs the Senate to elect one from the candidates who received the
two highest numbers.
Finally, in the case for Senate confirmation alone, it may be observed
that our constitutional processes for the selection of our Presidents
and Vice Presidents are Federal in nature. Presidential electors,
chosen in each State in such manner as the legislature may direct,
meet in their respective States and there cast the votes to which their
State is entitled. The Senate, too, is a body Federal in nature. Each
State has an equal vote in the Senate. The Senate represents the
States in our legislative branch. It would be wholly consistent with
the preservation of the Federal structure if the Senate were vested
with power either to elect a Vice President to fill a vacancy, or to
advise and consent to the nomination of the President for that purpose.
Thus far in our history there has been a vacancy in the office of Vice
President during a part of 16 different terms. One vacancy was
caused by resignation of the Vice President. Seven died in office and
the other eight succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the
President.
On those occasions when the Vice President's office becomes vacant
through removal, death, or resignation, it is possible that some division
in Congress might occur over confirmation of a President's nomination
of a successor. But on those occasions when a vacancy is due to a
Vice President's succession to the Presidency, and the new President,.
so recently a Vice President himself, is called upon to nominate
another, the temper of the country and of the Congress is likely to
be such as to make congressional confirmation of the appointment
pro forma. Under such circumstances, how meaningful really is the
function of congressional confirmation? The new President might
as well be empowered to appoint a new Vice President outright.
Consider the terrible pressures that will immediately come to bear
on a newly elevated President to choose a Vice President. No time
is specified within which the nomination must be made, but it would
be a mistake to believe the new President could relieve the pressure
by putting the matter off. As soon as he enters the presidential stage,.
the new President will see prospective Vice Presidents and their supporters in the wings. In addition to all of the other cares, duties,.
and responsibilities thrust upon him, he will also have to deal with
those who aspire to the second highest office of the land-the largest
plum within his hands.
A better solution to the problem. of succession to the office of Vice
President would be to provide that the holder of some other office in

the administration should automatically succeed to the Vice.
Presidency.
It is hard enough for the country to go through the sad experience
of a change of administration at the time of the death of a President,
when the succession is automatic. That is the situation now and as
it has been. Since 1792 there has always been a known successor to
the office of President when there was no Vice President. But upon
the ratification of this proposed amendment, there will be an air of
uncertainty, at least for the time during which it takes a new President
to nominate and obtain confirmation of his choice-and this uncertainty will be experienced at a time when the country can least bear it.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

House Joint Resolution 1 would incorporate into the Constitution
a detailed procedure for the transfer of Executive power from the
President to the Vice President in times of the President's inability to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. Such transfer can occur
with the President's consent or over his protest. The language of the
resolution offers no hint that the determination of inability shall be
based on medical or psychiatric evidence. Instead, the determination
will be a political one; and here lies a danger in the proposal.
Words written into the Constitution in the past are now found to
have vested powers to extents and in ways not intended by their
authors. We should be extremely careful, lest we unwittingly provide tools of power we would ourselves oppose.
Do the provisions of section 4 of this resolution in effect create a
new way in which a President might be removed from office? Might
it be possible for a Vice President, sometime in the future, to form a
cabal with a majority of the President's Cabinet and size power from
him? Are we, by incorporating these words into the Constitution,
providing the machinery by which the stability of the office of President might be undermined? All it takes, under section 4, is for the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet to file their written
declaration of the President's inability with the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, and the Vice President
becomes Acting President. Then the President, dislodged by this
maneuver from his awesome powers, is put in the position of having
to win back his position by persuading Congress of his fitness. Here
again the decision will be a political one. There is no suggestion that
medical or psychiatric evidence even be considered. And, if an
unpopular President should fail to find support among at least a
third of the Senators and Representatives in Congress, he would
continue in name only, shorn of his powers and duties. He could
apparently make repeated attempts to regain the powers of his office
until his term expires. Would these circumstance lend stability to
the country or undermine it?
On the other hand, suppose an unpopular President is upheld by the
Congress with more than one-third, but less than a majority of the
Members sustaining his contention of ability to serve. Is it not
possible the same cabal might try again? The President would
break it up, if possible, by changes in his Cabinet, providing he could
win the advice and consent of the Senate for his new appointees, but
under such circumstances he might not obtain confirmation of his

Cabinet changes. Would these circumstances tend to lend stability
to the Government or undermine it?
Other assumptions might be made to illustrate further how the
machinery we now offer the country might sometime be used by men
ambitious for power.
We.should .keep in mind that we are fashioning .tools which could
be used to unsettle the stability of our Government while we mean to
promote it.
Section 4 is certainly not intended to provide the tools for power to
evil men. Its drafters had in mind an altogether different situation.
They suppose an ill President, physically unable to give his consent for
the assumption of power by the Vice President. Under these circumstances some alternative to his consent must be devised if the Government is to carry on. Thereafter, when the President has recovered
sufficiently to resume his duties, or thinks he has, the drafters wanted
to be sure of machinery whereby he could recover his powers from a
Vice President and Cabinet who might disagree with his own assessment of recovery.
Supporters of this proposal call the power of public opinion to their
defense and say a Vice President and Cabinet would not dare seize
power from a President physically and mentally able, nor withhold
power from him once recovered. But public opinion can be molded,
and some Presidents in our history have been most unpopular in
office, and probably there will be some in the future.
There is no definition of inability or disability in the proposed
amendment, nor is there any provision for the definition of this term.
If there has existed an uncertainty of congressional power to define
it under existing constitutional provisions, it is clear Congress will be
without power to define an inability after House Joint Resolution 1
is incorporated into the Constitution.
The proposal will leave to the President in section 3, and to the
Vice President and Cabinet majority in section 4, complete power to
treat any condition or circumstance they choose as a disability. It is
even conceivable, though I hope not likely, that some President might
declare himself unable, and state no reason therefor (since no reason is
required by the language) in order to avoid responsibility for some
unpopular act, devolving the powers of his office upon the Vice
President for the time being to accomplish that purpose. After
ratification of House Joint Resolution 1, the Congress definitely
cannot define by law what constitutes Presidential disability. I think
a good case can be made to vest that power of definition in Congress.
Here would be another check and balance in our system, built in to
guard against abuse of power.
It was suggested in the hearings that the President might declare
his inability because of absence from the country. It seems unlikely
that he would do so because he would want to go abroad with full
powers of his office, as Presidents have done in the past. But members
should know that in the minds of some, the language of this proposal
will permit a future President to relieve himself of the burdens of his
office, at will, by a declaration of inability due to absence.
The provisions of House Joint Resolution 1 leave many questions
unresolved. For example, it does not address itself to the problem of
what happens if an Acting President suffers an inability. It overlooks

the possibility of a Presidential inability at a time when there is no
Vice President, which might occur soon after a new President succeeded
to office and before he nominated a new Vice President. How could
the machinery of section 4 work then? Under the language of that
section, it would appear essential that there be a Vice President to
trigger the machinery of that section.
In my opinion it would be better to work out the answers to these
problems and others before submitting this proposed amendment for
ratification. There is no real urgency. We now have a Vice President,
and an executive understanding between him and the President-on the
matter of Presidential disability. We should not rush this proposal
on its way until it is as perfect as we can make it. These other
problems will remain unsolved and those who are concerned about a
certainty of succession and ability will continue to press for further
amendments.
It will be tragic if we have unwittingly deprived Congress of power
to move into any breach in the structure here being fashioned.
Respectfully submitted.
EDWARD HUTCHINSON.

DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES McC.
MATHIAS, JR.
I dissent from the views of the majority of the committee with
respect to the grant of power to the President to nominate his heir. I
oppose such power as being in conflict with the basic principles of the
Republic and the philosophy of the Constitution which tends to disperse, rather than to centralize, power.
The Presidency has always been considered an elective office, but it
will not be purely elective if this amendment is adopted.
The Constitutional Convention, as we know it through Madison's
Journal, would surely have rejected an appointed Vice President on
grounds of principle alone. Modern conditions, while compelling,
do not dictate that we abandone principle when we provide a modern
method of succession.
The Constitution seeks means to interpose legal safeguards between
the weakness, the temptations, and the evil of men and the opportunity
to injure the state. We do the same in private life when we ask an
honest debtor to execute a mortgage or an honorable man to state his
promise or covenant in writing.
By permitting the President to name a Vice President, House Joint
Resolution 1 operates on the opposite principle, assuming that a
President will always be enlightened and disinterested in naming a
Vice President. While this optimism reflects well on the 20th Century's opinion of itself in contrast to the pragmatic 18th century
estimate of human frailty, it may not be a prudent basis for constitutional law.
Congressional confirmation of a vice-presidential nominee would be
only a mild check and, in my judgment, would be a mere formality
in a period of national emotional stress. Most of us who were here
in the last dark days of November 1963 would confirm that almost
any such request made by President Johnson would have been favorably received by the Congress in our desire to support and stabilize his
administration.
Giving the President exclusive power to nominate a Vice President
has been justified by a false analogy to the broad discretion allowed
modern presidential nominees to express a preference for their running
mates. But a presidential nominee and an incumbent President are
very different men-even if they inhabit the same mortal frame-and
they may be moved by very different motives. A President secure
in the White House will have undergone a metamorphosis from his
earlier self, insecurely and temporarily occupying the presidential
suite at the Blackstone or the Mark Hopkins during the climax of a
national convention.
If the presidential nominee really is allowed a personal choice of
running mates, he will seek a candidate to complement his own candidacy and to strengthen the ticket. He will want an attractive,
vigorous, and patently able associate. The electability of the vice-

presidential candidate is a form of accountability for the head of the
ticket. By way of example, recall the probable motives of Senator
John F. Kennedy in choosing Lyndon B. Johnson for his running
mate and consider whether the same motives would have been decisive
with President John F. Kennedy.
Furthermore, the analogy used to justify this amendment would
crystallize contemporary political custom into organic law. Current
practice at national political conventions and conventions themselves
are the creatures of custom only. Customs can and should change as
social, political and technological changes affect our way of living.
The Constitution cannot and should not be so flexible.
The public today is all too ready to impugn the motives of a
President dealing with his Vice President. It is hinted that a President is constantly tempted to relegate the Vice President to a subordinate role in political life. If such motives are credible in daily
governmental relations, how much more would they be present in the
selection of an heir and successor.
Couple this consideration to the provisions of House Joint Resolution 1 with respect to Presidential inability and the considerations
that might move a President to nominate a respectable, but pallid,
Vice President. If the heir apparent is to gain certain powers of
deposition as well as natural succession, a President may indeed hesitate in seeking a vigorous and aggressive Vice President. Such a
danger would not have escaped examination by the framers of the
Constitution and should be considered by those who propose to
:amend it.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, Jr.

89TM CONGRESs
1st Session

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

I

REPORT
No. 564

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

JUNE 30, 1965.-Ordered to be printed

Mr.

CELLER,

from the committee of conference, submitted the
following

CONFERENCE REPORT
[To accompany S.J. Res. 11

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two
Houses on the amendment of the House to the joint resolution (S.J.
Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency
and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, having met, after full and free conference,
have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective
Houses as follows:
That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of
the House and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:
In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment insert the following:
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to. the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes
as part of the Constitutionwhen ratified by the legislatures of three-forrtls
of the several States within seven years from tie date of its submission
by the Conress:
"A RTICLE -

"SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the Presidentfrom office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"SEc. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President,
the President shall nominate a Vice Presidentwho shall take ofce upon
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SEC. 3. Whenever the Presidenttransmits to the Presidentpro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declarationto the contrary,

such powers and duties shall be dischargedby the Vice Presidentas Acting
President.
"SEc. 4. Whenever the Vice Presidentand a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice Presidentshall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
"Thereafter, when the Presidenttransmits to the Presidentpro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declarationthat no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties
of his office unless the Vice Presidentand a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit within four days to the Presidentpro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declarationthat the Presidentis unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration,
or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress
is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting
President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties
of his office."
And the House agree to the same.
EMANUEL CELLER,
BYRON G. ROGERS,
JAMES C. CORMAN,
WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH,
RICHARD H. POFF,

Managers on the Part of the House.
BIRCH E. BAYH, Jr.,
JAMES O. EASTLAND,
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,
EVERETT M. DIRKSEN,
ROMAN L. HRUSKA,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE
PART OF THE HOUSE
The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the
disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House
to the bill (S.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, submit the following statement in
explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conferees
and recommended in the accompanying conference report:
The House passed House Joint Resolution 1 and then substituted
the provisions it had adopted by striking out all after the enacting
clause and inserting all of its provisions in Senate Joint Resolution 1.
The Senate insisted upon its version and requested a conference; the
House then agreed to the conference. The conference report recommends that the Senate recede from its disagreement to the House
amendment and agree to the same with an amendment, the amendment being to insert in lieu of the matter inserted by the House
amendment the matter agreed to by the conferees and that the
House agree thereto.
In substance, the conference report contains substantially the
language of the House amendment with a few exceptions.
Sections 1 and 2 of the proposed constitutional amendment were not
in disagreement. However, in sections 3 and 4, the Senate provided
that the transmittal of the notification of a President's inability be to
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The House version provided that the transmittal be to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives. The conference report provides that the transmittal be to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
In section 3, the Senate provided that after receipt of the President's
written declaration of his inability that such powers and duties would
then be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. The
House version provided the same provision except it added the clause
"and until he transmits a written declaration to the contrary". The
conference report adopts the House language with one minor change
for purposes of clarification by adding the phrase "to them", meaning
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House.
The first paragraph of section 4, outside of adopting the language
of the House designating the recipient of the letter of transmittal be
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, minor change in language was made for purposes
of clarification.
In the Senate version there was a specific section; namely, section 5,
dealing with the procedure that when the President sent to the Congress his written declaration that he was no longer disabled he could
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President

and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments,
or such other body as the Congress might by law provide, transmit
within 7 days to the designated officers of the Congress their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. Thereupon, the Congress would immediately proceed to decide the issue. It further provided that if the Congress
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President would continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President would resume the powers and duties of his office.
The House version combined sections 4 and 5 into one section, now
section 4. Under the House version, the Vice President had 2 days
in which to decide whether or not to send a letter stating that he and
a majority of the officers of the executive departments, or such other
body as Congress may by law provide, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. The conference report
provides that the period of time for the transmittal of the letter must
be within 4 days.
The Senate provision did not provide for the convening of the Congress to decide this issue if it was not in session; the House provided
that the Congress must convene for this specific purpose of deciding
the issue within 48 hours after the receipt of the written declaration
that the President is still disabled. The conference report adopts
the language of the House.
The Senate provision placed no time limitation on the Congress for
determining whether or not the President was still disabled. The
House version provided that determination by the Congress must be
made within 10 days after the receipt of the written declaration of
the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law
provide. The conference report adopts the principle of limiting the
period of time within which the Congress must determine the issue,
and while the House original version was 10 days and the Senate
version an unlimited period of time, the report requires a final determination within 21 days. The 21-day period, if the Congress is in
session, runs from the date of receipt of the letter. It further provides
that if the Congress is not in session the 21-day period runs from the
time that the Congress convenes.
A vote of less than two-thirds by either House would immediately
authorize the President to assume the powers and duties of his office.
EMANUEL CELLER,
BYRON G. ROGERS,

JAMES

C.

CORMAN,

WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH,

RICHARD

H.

POFF,

Managers on the Part of the House.

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE
OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1964

U.S.

SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2228,
New Senate Office Building, Senator Birch Bayh presiding.
Present: Senators Bayh (presiding), Keating, and Fong.
Also present: Larry Conrad, counsel, and Clyde Flynn, minority
counsel.
Senator BAYH. The subcommittee will please convene.
We are here this morning to consider the problems of Presidential
succession and Presidential inability. Notice of these hearings has
been duly published in the Congressional Record of January 16, 1964.
It is certainly no stretch of the imagination to say that the subjects
that we are met to consider this morning are complex and significant
questions. They deserve our urgent attention. There are no quick
and easy solutions. But certainly the problems are not insoluble.
These are not new problems, to be sure. They have been the subject
of discussion from time to time since the adoption of our Constitution.
But they have a ringing urgency today with the tragedy of our
martyred President so fresh in our memory.
The first of our problems is that we have a void in the Vice Presidency today. It is an almost unbelievable fact of American history
that on 16 different occasions totaling more than 38 years in time we
have been without a Vice President.
In any one of those years something could have happened to the
President. This would have required an officer other than the Vice
President to act as President.
Eight times in our history a President has died in office and
has been succeeded by the Vice President. Each time this has happened, it has been a severe shock to the Nation. But each time, our
Government has withstood the test. We have had orderly transfer
of Executive authority. We pray we may never be faced, however,
with the supreme test-the loss of a President and Vice President within the same 4-year term of office. But we must prepare for such an
eventuality. For whatever tragedy may befall our national leaders,
the Nation must continue in stability, functioning to preserve a society
in which freedom may prosper.
It seems clear that the best way to assure this is to make certain that
the Nation always has a Vice President as well as a President. It is
significant that every measure placed before this committee since

President Kennedy's assassination agrees on one vital point-that we
shall have a Vice President.
Why have a Vice President? Hasn't this office been the object of
sharp satire since the Constitutional Convention created it as an afterthought? Isn't this the job that has been described as a one-way
ticket to political oblivion? Maybe so-once upon a time. But no
more-not in 20th century America.
Today the Vice Presidency is a sought-after office. It is, in fact, a
springboard to the Presidency. The Vice President is the President's
chief ambassador. When President Johnson was Vice President, he
traveled more than 75,000 miles aboard on missions for the Chief Executive, including top-level trips to Berlin and to Vietnam. Vice President Nixon spent more than twice as much time abroad as did President
Eisenhower during the 8 years of their combined administration.
It was when he was on official missions that Mr. Nixon confronted
surly youths in Latin America and met Mr. Khrushchev in the now
famous kitchen debate.
The Vice President is today an integral part of Cabinet meetings.
Modern-day Presidents seek the advice and counsel of their Vice
Presidents. The Vice President is a statutory member of the National Security Council. He is Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. He is Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council.
There are few more significant issues today than the security of our
Nation, the race for space, and the fight for equal rights. These are
among the paramount issues of our age, and the Vice President, by
virtue of his office, is in the thick of each of them. Last, but hardly
least, the Vice President is the man who is always one heartbeat away
from the most powerful office in the world.
There are those who would cloud the issue by criticism, not of the
succession law today, but of the distinguished Speaker of the House
of Representatives, who, under the present law, as we know, is next
in line of succession to the Presidency.
As junior Senator from Indiana and as chairman of this subcommittee I would like to say that those who criticize the Speaker's ability
to perform the powers of the Presidency should spend some time
watching the actions of the Speaker in the House Chamber or. better yet, in the semiprivacy of the Speaker's room. There can be little
doubt as to his capability.
Today the problem goes far deeper than the questions of age or
personality of the Speaker. It involves the traditional separation
of powers in our form of Government. It involves serious doubt about
what would happen if the President were disabled. Would the
Speaker, who has toiled for 40 years to reach his exalted position, give
it all up to act as President for a few weeks if the President were
temporarily disabled? If he did not, would we have a chief legislator also acting as Chief Executive? If the President were to die,
couldn't the Speaker be of the opposing political party? What implications would that have for the continuity of Executive policy?
Does the Speaker-any Speaker-have the constitutional right to
assist the President as a Vice President does? Can the Speaker-any
Speaker-possibly run the large and diverse House of Representatives
and, simultaneously, prepare properly for the Presidency?

I submit that reason dictates that we take steps to assure that the
Nation always have a Vice President. He would lift at least some
of the awful burdens of responsibility from the shoulders of the President. His presence would provide for an orderly transfer of Executive authority in the event of the death of a President-a transfer
that would win popular consent and inspire national confidence, which
is important in any political system.
He would be there to substitute as President, as Hamilton suggested, when events required him to do so.
Our obligation to deal with the question of Presidential inability
is crystal clear.
Here we have a constitutional gap-a blind spot, if you will. We
must fill this gap if we are to protect our Nation from the possibility
of floundering in the sea of public confusion and uncertainty which
ofttimes exists at times of national peril and tragedy.
The Constitution spells out in minute detail the procedures for
removing a President from office. Yet there isn't a word, not a hint
about what is meant by inability of a President. There is no clue as
to the method of determining disability, who would make such a
determination, what would happen once the determination is made,
how the period of inability would be terminated or whether the President would then resume his office or simply lose his job.
History has been trying to tell us something, it seems to me, and
it is high time that we listen.
President Garfield lay wounded 80 days before he died. His only
official act in that time was the signing of an extradition paper. The
Cabinet, without constitutional authority, ran the Government as
best it could.
For nearly 2 years after President Wilson collapsed with a stroke,
our Government was virtually run by Mrs. Wilson and the President's
personal physician-two well-meaning persons devoted to the President, but hardly individuals with constitutional authority to direct
our affairs of state.
Again, no one knew what to do when President Eisenhower suffered
a heart attack. Later, the President and Vice President Nixon set
a precedent with a mutual agreement on what to do in the event of the
future inability of the President.
But such informal agreements are unsatisfactory as permanent solutions, and both Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Nixon were among the first
to say so. Such agreements depend on good will between the President
and Vice President. They don't have the force of law. They could
be subjected to serious constitutional challenge. They open the door
for possible usurpation of power from the President. Yet they do
not protect the Nation from a President whose disability might involve
a mental illness.
These questions can be solved by amending the Constitution. Some
say they could best be solved by statute. Frankly, I disagree. Many
distinguished lawyers disagree. What most lawyers agree upon is
that if there exists a reasonable constitutional doubt, the best method
to eradicate any doubt is to amend the Constitution.
We have had three succession laws in our history. We may have
many more unless we remove succession from the arena of political
expediency and amend the Constitution to provide for a Vice Presi22-517 0 - 73 - 6

dent at all times. It might be remembered that our first succession
law, passed in 1792, placed the President pro tempore of the Senate
next in line after the Vice President. The recorded reason for this
was to avoid placing the Secretary of State too far up in the line of
succession. History shows us that Alexander Hamilton was fearful
that Thomas Jefferson might possibly ascend to the office of President.
Finally, the time to act is not when a President is lying ill and
there is no machinery to deal with the execution of Executive power.
If we act in those circumstances, we may come up with an expedientbut ill-conceived-answer to these pressing problems.
It seems to me the time to act is now when we still find it hard to
believe that President Kennedy is gone and when we have a President
in robust health.
I have made two principal points thus far. I have said that we
should provide a means to have a Vice President at all times, and I
have said that we must provide machinery for that Vice President
to act as President when and if the President is disabled.
I believe strongly that we can provide a Vice President for the
Nation by the relatively simple means of having a President nominate
an individual for Vice President, when the Vice Presidency is
vacant. Then the Congress should act on the President's recommendation by electing or rejecting the nominee.
The President must have a voice in the selection of a Vice President.
It would assure the selection of a man-or woman may I add-with
whom the President could work harmoniously. It would assure a
reasonable continuity of Executive policy, should the Vice President
become President. And it is in keeping with tradition, whereby a
party's presidential candidate generally has great influence and, at
the very least, a veto concerning his vice presidential running mate.
Our traditional system of checks and balances would dictate that
the people, through their elected representatives, have a voice in selecting a Vice President.
Under the Constitution, Congress could always call for a special
election. In our history, Congress has chosen not to. This has been
a wise decision. For a time of traumatic shock-such as a time when
we lose a President unexpectedly-is hardly conducive to a wellreasoned selection by popular vote.
On the other hand, the Congress is a body entrusted with making
fateful decisions at crucial times. It is the Congress that declares war
on behalf of us all. The Congress may elect or remove Presidents in
certain circumstances. Certainly, the Congress is the proper bodywith its hand on the pulse of public opinion-to elect a Vice President
upon the nomination of a President.
In the question of Presidential inability, we must take every precaution to safeguard the President from unwarranted usurpation of
his power.
Thus, the President must have the primary right to declare his own
disability, and the termination of his disability. But should the President not make known his disability, the Vice President, with the concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet, should have the authority to
determine Presidential inability. In such a case, the Vice President
would become acting President, just as he would if the President himself declared his own disability.

Again, the President should have the primary right to declare when
his disability had terminated. If the Vice President and a majority
of the Cabinet disagreed with the President, the continuing inability
of the President would be determined by a two-thirds vote of the
Members of each House of Congress.
The point of this is to safeguard the President-to give him every
advantage in any action or contemplated action. But, at the same
time, we want to provide checks and balances because our system of
Government recognizes no person-even the President of the United
States-as infallible.
A proposed constitutional amendment to accomplish these goals has
been introduced by myself and Senators Pell, Randolph, Bible, Moss,
and Burdick.
There are other suggestions, some of which have been presented
by my learned colleagues here. Frankly, those of us who presented
the previously suggested resolution disagreed with the suggestion for
two Vice Presidents which has been proposed by my good friend from
New York, and we are going to have the opportunity to study this and
to discuss it fully.
Basically, we disagreed with the suggestion for two Vice Presidents
because we have just reached the stage in our history when the Vice
President has become a figure of political significance, and it seems
to us to divide the Vice President's duties between two men would perhaps nullify this advancement. We want to be careful we do not
nullify this advancement by spreading the duties too thin.
To have one Vice President whose duties would be confined to presiding over the Senate would.be to invite men of small political stature
and questionable qualifications to stand for one of the highest political
offices in the land.
We disagreed with proposals to have the electoral college elect a
Vice President upon the President's nomination. The electoral college is not chosen, as is Congress, to exercise any considered judgment
or reasoning. Its members are chosen merely to carry out the will
of the voters in their respective States. The electoral college is not
representative, really, of their respective States. As far as exercismg considered judgment is concerned, the electoral college is not
equipped, nor should it be equipped, to conduct hearings on the qualifications of the nominee submitted by the President. It would be a
cumbersome body to try to assemble quickly and to get to act quickly
in emergencies. Much of the general public has no earthly idea who
their State's electors are. In fact, this morning, we had a group of
constituents in my office and I asked-it was a sizable group-if
anyone in the room knew any one member of the electoral college
from our State. Not surprisingly, there was not one who knew the
members of the electoral college. They have no earthly idea who
their State's electors are and would be understandably hesitant to
allow any such unknown quantity to make an important decision like
confirmation of a Vice President of the United States.
This does not reflect upon the individual qualifications of the electors but rather points up the fact they have just not been accepted
by the public as 'a body to make a considered judgment.
It is apparent that I feel strongly on this subject.
It is a
vital subject and I have devoted a great deal of time to it.I do.
I want this

panel to consider my proposals carefully, and I want it to consider
the proposals that will be laid before us by several of our distinguished
colleagues. The important thing is to find a reasonable solution
acceptable to the Congress and the several States.
I am grateful to the number of writers and interested groups whose
concern about this problem will aid this committee in its deliberations.
I want to express particular gratitude to the American Bar Association, which assembled a special group of experts in the past 2 days to
study this problem. I am hoping that many of the distinguished
panelists will appear individually at subsequent hearings on this
question.
I am referring to men who met with this committee of the bar
association like the Honorable Herbert Brownell, former Attorney
General of the United States; the Honorable Ross Malone, former
Deputy Attorney General of the United States; Prof. Paul A. Freund
of Harvard Law School; Walter E. Craig, president of the American Bar Association; and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., president-elect of
the American Bar Association.
One member of this distinguished panel, Prof. James C. Kirby, Jr.,
of Vanderbilt University, chief counsel of this subcommittee, some
time ago, will testify before this committee today. Others on the panel
were John D. Feerick, former editor-in-chief of the Fordham Law
Review; Jonathan C. Gibson of Chicago; Richard Hansen of the University of Nebraska; Dean Charles B. Nutting of George Washington
University; Sylvester Smith, past president of the American Bar Association; Martin Taylor of New York City; and Edward Wright,
chairman of the house of delegates of the American Bar Association.
I wish at this point to insert in the record, if there are no objections.
the consensus report released yesterday by the American Bar Association's Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession.
If there are no objections, I would ask that this be submitted for
the record.
(The report referred to follows:)
CONSENSUS ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND SUCCESSION, JANUARY 20 AND

21, 1964

The Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession was convened by the
American Bar Association at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., on January
20 and 21, 1964. The conferees were Walter E. Craig, president, American Bar
Association ; Herbert Brownell, president, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, and a former Attorney General of the United States ; John D.
Feerick, attorney, New York ; Paul A. Freund, professor of law, Harvard University ; Jonathan C. Gibson, chairman, Standing Committee on Jurisprudence
and Law Reform, American Bar Association ; Richard H. Hansen, attorney,
Lincoln, Nebr.; James C. Kirby, Jr., associate professor of law, Vanderbilt University, and a former chief counsel to the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, Senate Judiciary Committee; Ross L. Malone, past president of
the American Bar Association, and a former Deputy Attorney General of the
United States ; Charles B. Nutting, dean of the National Law Center ; Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., president-elect, American Bar Association ; Sylvester C. Smith, Jr.,
past president, American Bar Association ; Martin Taylor, chairman, Committee
on Federal Constitution, New York State Bar Association ; and Edward L. Wright,
chairman, house of delegates, American Bar Association.
The members of the conference reviewed as a group the following statement at
the close of their discussions. Although there was general agreement on the
statement, the members of the conference were not asked to affix their signatures;
and it should not be assumed that every member necessarily subscribes to every
recommendation included in the statement.

The conference considered the question of action to be taken in the event of
inability of the President to perform the duties of his office. It was the consensus
of the conference that :
1. Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next
in line of succession provide a partial solution, but not an acceptable permanent solution of the problem.
2. An amendment to the Constitution of the United States should be
adopted to resolve the problems which would arise in the event of the
inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
3. The amendment should provide that in the event of the inability of
the President the powers and duties, but not the office, shall devolve upon
the Vice President or person next in line of succession for the duration of
the inability of the President or until expiration of his term of office.
4. The amendment should provide that the inability of the President may
be established by declaration in writing of the President. In the event that
the President does not make known his inability, it may be established by
'action of the Vice President or person next in line of succession with the
concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet or by action of such other body
as the Congress may by law provide.
5. The amendment should provide that the ability of the President to
resume the powers and duties of his office shall be established by his declaration in writing. In the event that the Vice President and a majority of
the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may by law provide shall not
concur in the declaration of the President, the continuing inability of the
President may then be determined by the vote of two-thirds of the elected
Members of each House of the Congress.
The conference also considered the related question of Presidential succession.
It was the consensus that:
1. The Constitution should be amended to provide that in the event of
the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice President or
the person next in line of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term.
2. It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at all
times. An amendment to the Constitution should be adopted providing that
when a vacancy occurs in the office of Vice President, the President shall
nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority of the elected Members
of Congress meeting in joint session, shall then become Vice President for
the unexpired term.

STATEMENT OF HON. HIRAM L. FONG, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF HAWAII
Senator FONG. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a brief statement in
support of Senate Joint Resolution 1 proposing a constitutional
amendment on the related problems of Presidential disability and VicePresidential vacancies.
Two years ago, the tragic assassination of President Kennedy pointed up once again the urgent need to resolve these two critical gaps in
the U.S. Constitution.
First, the Constitution does not say anything about what should
be done when there is no Vice President. No one in America today
doubts that the Vice-Presidency is an office of paramount importance.
The Vice President of the United States today carries very vital functions of our Government. Besides his many duties, he is the only man
who is only a heartbeat away from the world's most powerful office.
Yet, on 17 different occasions in our history the Nation has been without a Vice President.
The security of our Nation demands that the office of the Vice President should never be left vacant for long, such as it was between
November 22, 1963, and January 20, 1965.
Second, the Constitution does not say anything about what should
be done when the President becomes disabled, how and who determines his disability, when the disability starts, when it ends, who determines his fitness to resume his office, and who should take over during
the period of disability.
In short, there is no orderly constitutional procedure to decide how
the awesome and urgent responsibility of the Presidency should be
carried on.
Third, the Constitution also is unclear as to whether the Vice President would become President, or whether he becomes only the Acting
President, if the President is unable to carry out the duties of his office.
Mr. Chairman, as a member of the subcommittee, I have studied
very carefully all the various proposals submitted by other Senators
during the 88th Congress and in this current session of the 89th Congress. I have considered the testimony submitted to the subcommittee
in previous hearings, including those of the distinguished experts who
have testified. I have read the data collected and have read the research done by the subcommittee's staff.
I believe that any measure to resolve these very complex and perplexing problems must satisfy at least four requirements:
1. It must have the highest and most authoritative legal sanction. It must be embodied in an amendment to the Constitution.
2. It must assure prompt action when required to meet a national crisis.
3. It must conform to the constitutional principle of separation
of powers.
4. It must provide safeguards against usurpation of power.
I believe Senate Joint Resolution 1 best meets each of these requirements.

Senate Joint Resolution 1 deals with each of the problems of vicepresidential vacancy and presidential inability by constitutional
amendment rather than by statute.
This proposal provides for the selection of a new Vice President
when the former Vice President succeeds to the Presidency within
30 days of his accession to office; the selection is to be made by the
President, upon confirmation by a majority of both Houses of
Congress present and voting.
This proposal makes clear that when the President is disabled,
the Vice President becomes Acting President for the period of disability. It provides that the President may himself declare his
inability and that if he does not, the declaration may be made by
the Vice President with written concurrence of a majority of the
Cabinet.
The President may declare his own fitness to resume his powers
and duties, but if his ability is questioned, the Cabinet by majority
vote and the Congress by a two-thirds vote on a concurrent resolution
resolve the dispute.
These provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1 not only achieve the
goals I outlined earlier, but they are also in consonance with the
most valued principles established by our Founding Fathers in the
Constitution.
They observe the principle of the separation of powers in our
Government. They effectively maintain the delicate balance of
powers among the three branches of our Government. Most important of all, they insure that our Nation's sovereignty is preserved in
the hands of the people through their elected representatives in
the national legislature.
Mr. Chairman, this is the first time since 1956, when a full-scale
congressional study of the problems was conducted, that wide agreement has been reached on these enormously complex constitutional
problems.
Last September a measure similar to Senate Joint Resolution 1
was passed by the Senate by the overwhelming vote of 65 to 0. It was
sent to the House, but Congress adjourned before any further action
could be taken.
Last January, at the call of the American Bar Association, a
dozen of the Nation's leading legal authorities meeting in Washington came up with a consensus. This consensus, subsequently endorsed by the ABA house of delegates, is essentially embodied in
the p rovisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1.
Yesterday President Johnson heartily endorsed this proposal.
And earlier this month, the Research and Policy Committee of
the Committee for Economic Development released an able study
of these questions. Its recommendations closely parallel the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1.
I am most delighted and pleased to cosponsor this proposal
with the. distinguished chairman of this subcommittee as sponsor,
and I will commend it highly to the Senate as a meritorious measure
that should be enacted promptly into law.

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, I move
that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union for the consideration
of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice Presidency and to cases where the President
is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office.
The motion was agreed to.

backs. It is well-rounded, sensible, and
efficient approach toward a solution of
a perplexing problem-a problem that
has baffled us for over 100 years.
As to attaining perfection, let me call
your attention to a very pertinent remark made by Walter Lippmann in the
New York Herald Tribune of June 9,
1964, when he referred to this proposed
amendment. He said:
It Is a great deal better than an endless
search for the absolutely perfect solution,
which will never be found and, indeed, is not
IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Accordingly, the House resolved itself necessary.
into the Committee of the Whole House
As was said by the distinguished former
on the State of the Union for the con- Attorney General of the United States,
sideration of House Joint Resolution 1, the honorable Herbert Brownell-I comwith Mr. FASCELL in the chair.
mend his words indeed to the gentleThe Clerk read the title of the joint man from Ohio [Mr. BROwN]-speaking
resolution.
for himself and speaking for the AmeriBy unanimous consent, the first read- can Bar Association:
ing of the joint resolution was dispensed
Certainty and prompt action are * * *
with.
built into this proposal-namely, House
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Joint Hesolution 1. * * * During the 10gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER] year debate on Presidential disability * * *
will be recognized for 2 hours and the many plans have been advanced to have the
of disability decided by different
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. MCCULLOCHI existence
types of commissions or medical experts,
will be recognized for 2 hours.
by the Supreme Court, or by other comThe Chair recognizes the gentleman plicated ad hoc procedures. But upon
from New York [Mr. CELLER].
analysis, * * * they all have the same fatal
Mr. CELLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield flaw, * * * they would be time consuming
and divisive.
myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this resolution, House
We tried to avoid freighting down this
Joint Resolution 1, has bipartisan sup- amendment with too much detail. We
port. I particularly offer praise to the leave that to supplementing, implementgentleman from Ohio [Mr. MCCULLOCH]
ing legislation. We make the provisions
and the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. as simple yet as comprehensive as posPOFF] who participated in the fashioning sible.
and polishing of this resolution. They
This is certain: we have trifled with
did so most wisely and painstakingly. fate long enough on this question of
They immersed themselves into the in- Presidential inability. We in the United
tracacies of the legislation. Their help States have been lucky, but luck does not
was immeasurable. By naming them, last forever. The one sure thing about
Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to detract luck is that it is bound to change.
from the constructive work done by most
Sir Thomas Brown once said:
of the members of our committee, DemoCourt
not felicity too far and weary not
crats, and Republicans alike. I want to the favorable
hand of fortune.
point out particularly likewise in that

regard the gentleman from Colorado
[Mr. ROGERS], the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. RODINO], the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. BROOKS], the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. DONOHUE],
the
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KASTENMEIER], the gentleman from California
[Mr. CORMAN], the gentleman from New
York [Mr. LINDSAY], and the gentleman
from Florida [Mr. CRAMER]. To them I,
indeed, offer an accolade of distinction
for genuine service.
This is by no means, ladies and
gentleman, a perfect bill. No bill can be
perfect. Even the sun has its spots.
The world of actuality permits us to
attain no perfection. Admirable as is
our own Constitution, it had to be
amended 24 times. But nonetheless,
-this bill has a minimum of draw-

We can no longer delay. Delay is the
art of keeping up with yesterday.

We

must keep abreast of tomorrow. Let us
stop playing Presidential inability roulette. Let us pass this measure, which
has the approval of the American Bar
Association and the American Association of Law Schools. This measure has
the approval of 36 State bar associations,
including, incidentally, the bar association of the distinguished gentleman on
the Rules Committee, the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. BROWN].
Let me read the roster of State bar
associations which have approved this
measure. The bar associations of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisi-

ana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri-one of the gentlemen from that distinguished State had
some doubts about it, according to his
question, but his bar association approved this measure-New Mexico, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming.
If I were perplexed and baffled over a
legal question, I would not be likely to
go to the gentleman from Ohio. More
than likely I would go to a lawyer. The
gentleman from Ohio is not a lawyer.
This is a constitutional legal question.
I would not go to Attorney General
Brown; I would go to Attorney General
Brownell. What did Mr. Brownell have
to say on this subject, as to the need for
a constitutional amendment and the
fact that it would be dangerous to offer
a mere statute? Mr. Brownell said:
The number of respected constitutional
authorities have argued that there can be
no temporary devolution of Presidential
power on the Vice President during periods
of Presidential Inability.
And whatever we may think of that argument, I think a statute would not protect
the Nation adequately with the doubts that
have been raised, which have been raised
too persistently. As long as there is doubt,
lingering doubt, concerning the constitutionality of the statute, as long as there is
a question concerning the disabled President's constitutional stature after the recovery, I do not believe any inability, as a
practical matter, however severe it may be,
would be recognized lest recognition of that
disability would oust the disabled President
from office. Moreover, if the President's inability were severe * and prolonged, you
should note that devolution of the Presidential power on the Vice President would be
somewhat of a crisis itself.

Beyond that, the present Attorney

General, a very erudite scholar and a
very practical Attorney General, similarly before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate gave eloquent testimony as to the need for a constitutional amendment. I shall not burden you at this moment with his words
but shall insert them in the RECORD.
A host of city bar associations all over
the country have asked for this bill.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
chambers of commerce throughout the
Nation have likewise asked for this bill
in the form of a constitutional amendment and not a statute. When this body
is asked to adopt a constitutional amendment, the recommending committee must
establish an imperative need for such action. Everyone will agree that amending the basic document, the charter, if
you will, of our Nation is not a task to be
undertaken lightly. Today, however, we

are faced with filling a gap which has existed since our beginnings, and this gap
becomes more threatening as the complexity of the domestic and foreign policy grows.
Article II, section 1, clause 5, of the
U.S. Constitution reads:
In case of the Removal of the President
from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties
of the said Office, the same shall devolve on
the Vice President, and the Congress may by
Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.

Now, even a cursory reading reveals
that it raises a host of questions. How
do we distinguish between temporary and

permanent vacancies? Who determines
the inability? Iri what capacity does the

Vice President act in the event of a temporary inability? No distinction is made
or even intimated between a voluntary
and involuntary inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties
of his office. In the event of an inability
which a President refuses to acknowledge, who shall declare such inability
and, once declared, how does the President recover Executive authority if he be
fit to do so? Precedent itself answered
the question of the capacity in which a
Vice President acts when the President
dies. John Tyler took the oath as President of the United States when President
William Henry Harrison died, and so it
has been ever since because of this precedent that Presidents have been reluctant to declare a temporary inability
since it has been feared, and rightly so,
that a Vice President might take the
oath of office as President even though
the inability were of a temporary nature.
On the other hand, Vice Presidents
have been reluctant to move forward
without precise definition from Congress
to undertake the powers and duties of
the Office when a President has been temporarily incapacitated lest he, the Vice
President, be accused of unwarranted
seizure of power. That was the case, you
may remember, after the assassination
-of President Garfield. Vice President
Arthur was most reluctant to assume the
powers of the Presidency because he
feared he might be deemed a rogue, he
might be deemed a usurper, and therefore was most hesitant and reluctant to
assume that power.
And so it was with the lingering illness,
after the stroke that laid low President
Wilson, when Vice President Marshall
likewise was very reluctant to go forward.
In the meanwhile, what? We had no
President, we had no Acting President,

and things went into the doldrums, as it
were, from an executive standpoint.
Foreign potentates came to this country
and could not be received and many bills
became law without the signature of the
President. Many other inadequacies developed because of that lack which we
now seek to fill.
House Joint Resolution 1 answers as
many questions as it is humanly possible
in drafting a proposal to meet contingencies as yet unforeseen. We cannot
meet every conceivable contingency.
That is impossible, because sometimes
if you try to meet some improbable contingency you open, as it were, a can of
worms and you create more difficulties
and inequities than you create equities.
Therefore it is most difficult even for my
colleagues on the committee, wise as they
are, to be able to envisage every conceivable eventuality that might be conjured
up by the imagination of man. We do
not propose to do that. We are simply
trying to meet the practical human problems with reference to Presidential inability. Foreseen contingencies have, in
my opinion, been succinctly and adequately covered. The language is clear,
the procedures sharply in focus.
House Joint Resolution 1 also fills another vacuum. It makes provision for
a Vice President in the event there is a
vacancy in that office.
Sixteen times the United States has
been without a Vice President; or, to put
it another way, 37 years of our existence
have seen the Office of Vice President
vacant. Now the Office of Vice President
is assuming more and more importance
in this atomic age and in this age of jet
planes and spaceships. The Vice President is part of the official family of the
President. He is involved with the National Aeronautics and Space Agency; he
is involved with the Fair Employment
Practices Commission; he is involved in
many other activities of the President,
including the National Security Council.
He attends Cabinet meetings. He represents the President in many functions.
He is essential, I would say, in presentday government. He is no longer a
"Throttlebottom." He is an important
personage. We dare not longer trifle
with this situation by neglect. If there
is a vacancy, the vacancy must and
should be filled.
How the course of history was changed
when, for example, as I said before, President Garfield died after lingering for so
many days we shall never know.
Again, when President Wilson suffered
the severe stroke in 1919, when he was
laid low for many months, no effort was
made to insure the stability of government. We had petticoat government
then. I say that with all due respect to

the ladies, because Mrs. Wilson sought
to run the show at that time. I do not
know how well she ran it. I do not know
whether the show was run at all. It was
a dangerous situation. We dare not let
that happen again.
So, Mr. Chairman, again a negative
factor made affirmative history.
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration there was temporary incapacity on the part of the President. And, to President Eisenhower's
credit, he attempted to minimize the
danger of executive lapse by means of a
private agreement with Vice President
Nixon. Such private agreements,. we
can all agree, are hardly adequate to
meet the situation. There can be as
many private agreements as there are
differences in the varying temperaments
of Presidents and Vice Presidents.
Mr. Chairman, as I said on the opening day of our hearings on Presidential
inability on February 9, 1963:
I for one have had a deep and probing
interest in solving the problem which arises
from the vague language of article II of
section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution relating to Presidential inability.
In 1955 the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee ordered a staff study into this
problem and I appointed a special subcommittee of the ranking members to further
the study. This study sought out the views
of a select group of leading constitutional
law professors and leading political scientists by way of a questionnaire. These answers and analysis were published by this
committee in 1957. While that study and
the subsequent hearings did not result in
a definite legislative proposal, I am convinced
that it laid a sound groundwork for the
future congressional activities which have
taken place in this field.
As a result also of the activity of the press
and the public and professional groups, the
public has been educated to the seriousness
of the situation. There can be no doubt
in anybody's mind that this Nation cannot

permit the Office of the President to be va-

cant even for a moment. Opposition of
world leadership demands that we avoid the
terrible crisis which would result if a vacancy existed in the Office of President for
even a short time. The President stands
for the sovereignty and unity of the American people. He leads the national administration and he is the Commander in Chief
of all the Armed Forces. In this nuclear
age his finger rests upon the trigger. He
is the sculptor, the administrator of our
foreign policy. One would have to be blind

not to see and acknowledge the danger and

the risk we are faced with at this very moment, lacking a constitutional procedure
for the smooth transition of the successor
to the office and to the powers and duties
of the President.

Fate has been most kind to Americans,
but we should not continue to tempt it.
I believe that the provisions of House
Joint Resolution 1 are classic in their

simplicity, classic in their clarity.
First. In case of the removal of the
President from office by death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President. Whenever there is a vacancy
in the Office of Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of the
Congress.
The President selects his vice-presidential running mate before the convention. He should have the right to do
so after the convention, and after the
election. In the event there is no Vice
President he can fill that vacancy.
There has been some talk about the
degrading of Congress, that Congress
does not play a part. Congress does play
a part because the President cannot select anyone to become Vice President
without the consent of both Houses of
the Congress. It has been said we should
let the Congress, the Members of Congress, select the Vice President. We
would have a Donnybrook affair then,
indeed. We would have a kind of wheeling and dealing. How would you select
a man to be Vice President? The whole
Congress? No. He would be chosen by
a few select Members of Congress, and
a few select Members of the Senate, convening in a caucus, either a Republican
caucus or a Democratic caucus. Our
method is more democratic. We would
have to put the seal of approval upon
the man who is selected by the President.
The whole Congress does that, not a
mere select few, not the elite, I may put
it, of either the House or the Senate.
Second. Section 3 deals with, a situation where the President voluntarily declares his inability. When the President
transmits his written declaration to the
President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office. such
powers and duties are to be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting Presi-

dent until the President so transmits in
a written declaration to the contrary.
I would ask the gentleman from Ohio,
where in the Constitution is there a provision, the present wording of the Constitution, any kind of provision, that
would permit an Acting President? The
term is never used. The statute would
be utterly worthless, as worthless as a
2-foot yardstick. We must have a constitutional amendment in that. regard.
This provision removes the reluctance
of both the President and Vice President to move when necessity so dictates.
The President is assured of his return
to office. The Vice President, as Acting
President, will not face the charge that
he is usurping the flice of President.
We are thus assured of the continuity of
Executive authority, which is highly important, the continuity of Executive authority. Once the President says "I am
cured, I am able to function again," he
goes back to his former position and assumes all of the powers and duties of the
President which temporarily devolved
upon the Vice President.
Section 4, as distinguished front section 3. This is a situation where the
President is unwilling or unable to declare his inability. In that event the
Vice President, plus the majority of the
principal officers of the executive departments, act. We name them executive
departments rather than Cabinet for
safety's sake, because the word "Cabinet"
is never used in the Constitution. In the
event that the Vice President, plus a
majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments, transmit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President immediately assumes the
powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROMAN L. HRUSKA, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF NEBRASKA
Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Chairman, agreements devised by the President and his Vice President in past administrations to cope with an
inability crisis are not satisfactory solutions.
It is abundantly clear that, rather than continue these informal
agreements, the only sound approach is the adoption of a constitutional amendment. This amendment would distinguish the inability
situation from the three other contingencies of permanent nature,
death, resignation, and removal from office, and would recognize that,
in the first instance, the Vice President becomes Acting President
only.
At this point, we encounter the first major difference of opinion.
Some would advocate spelling out the procedure for determining
inability within the language of the proposed amendment. I disagree. The logic of locking into the Constitution those procedures
deemed appropriate today but which, in the light of greater knowledge and experience may be found wanting tomorrow, escapes me.
The preferred course would be for the amendment to authorize the
Congress to establish an appropriate procedure by law. This practice parallels the situation of presidential succession, wherein the
power is delineated by the Constitution but the detail is left for later
determination.
The purpose of the cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 6 is
to add one fundamental limitation to the process. Language which
simply enables the Congress to prescribe by law the method by which
the commencement and termination of any inability shall be determined is open to serious criticism and contains dangerous pitfalls.
Without any limitation upon the method, the Congress might adopt
a procedure that would violate constitutional doctrines of the most
essential character. Throughout our history, these principles have
been proven wise and of inestimable importance.
I refer primarily to the doctrine of separation of powers. The
maintenance of the three distinct branches of Government, coequal in
character, has long been accepted as one of the most important safeguards for the preservation of the Republic. However, one does not
have to look long to find instances in which this doctrine is threatened. Some of the pending proposals on presidential inability
illustrate how seriously the doctrine can be impaired if care is not
exercised.
This is the rationale behind the limitation contained in Senate
Joint Resolution 6 which provides that the executive branch shall
determine the presence of and termination of the inability of the
President. It is essential that the method ultimately selected shall
have the executive branch determine the commencement and termination of any inability. Stated another way, Congress must be prohibited from prescribing a method which would involve either the
judicial or the legislative branch of the Government. This is a significant limitation, as those who propose it will acknowledge. But
it is an indispensable prohibition if our efforts to resolve the problem
of presidential inability are to be successful.

The determination of presidential inability and its termination is
obviously a factual matter. No policy is involved..- The issue is
simply whether a specific individual with certain physical, mental,
or emotional impairments possesses the ability to continue as the
Chief Executive or whether his infirmity is so serious and severe as
to render him incapable of executing the duties of his office.
To inject Congress into the factual question of inability would be
to create a secondary impeachment procedure in which the conduct of
the President would not be the test. Such a determination would be
fraught with uncertainties. It would require no specific charge. It
would not define the proof which is required. It would be a determination of facts with no guidelines against which to measure them.
The impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson affords a
clear illustration of the dangers presented when Congress is allowed
to perform a judicial function. The intrigue and interplay within
the Congress during the impeachment trial serves as a warning of
clear and present dangers which exist when Congress is called upon
to consider where to place the mantle of the presidential powers.
An additional compelling argument for restricting this authority
to the executive branch is that this determination must be made with
a minimum of delay. In an age of advanced weapons and an accelerated pace in national and international affairs, the luxury of
weeks or even days to assemble a quorum prior to reaching a decision
cannot be afforded. The executive branch is clearly best equipped
to respond promptly as well as effectively in the face of such a crisis.
Obviou-ly. such a decision must rest on the relevant and reliable
facts regarding the President's physical or mental faculties. It must
be divorced from any thoughts of political advantage, personal prejudice, or other extraneous factors. Those possessing such firsthand
information about the Chief Executive, or most accessible to it on a
personal basis, are found within the executive branch and not elsewhere.
We must be mindful that the President is chosen by the people of
the entire \ation. It is their wish and their right that he serve as
President for the term for which he was chosen. Every sensible and
empathetic construction favoring his continued performance of
presidential duties should be accorded him. Indeed, were error to be
committed, it should be in favor of such a continuation in office or,
were it interrupted by a disability, by his resumption of the office at
the earliest possible moment upon recovery. The members of the
executive branch are best situated to protect that interest.
From what briefly has been developed, it is readily apparent that
neither the judiciary nor the legislative branch should be injected
into the decisionmaking process of declaring Presidential inability or
recovery. As if in confirmation of the point, we have the expression
of Chief Justice Warren that it would be inadvisable for the Court
or any of its members to assume such a role. Our personal awareness
of the acutely political role pursued by Members of Congress likewise
forbids injection of this branch into that process.
It is for these reasons, Mr. Chairman, that Senate Joint Resolution
6 is offered for your subcommittee's consideration. I look forward to

the opportunity of working with the subcommittee in its notable
effort to devise a sound and acceptable solution to one of the most
delicate constitutional issues facing our country today. Events of
the last few weeks argue against further delay.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chairman's desire to confine these
hearings to as reasonably a short period of time as is possible. It cannot be denied, however, that we are considering a very, very important
subject. I do think that we should not throw everything to the winds
just for the purpose of expediting action on this matter.
Senator BAYH. And the Senator does not care to do it.
Senator HRUTSKA. I know that is not your intention. I should like
to make a brief summary of the position which I had assumed and declared last year and ask permission to file a more extended statement.
Senator BArr. May I clarify what I said a moment ago? The reason the Senator from Nebraska was not asked to make a statement earlier was because we discussed this matter, as you recall, and you suggested that in deference to the Attorney General, we forgo our statements. As I remember, what I said was not very concise and specific
at all in presenting the proponents' arguments, because I thought the
Attorney General should have the opportunity to make his statement.
There is no desire on the part of the chairman to limit the length of
this hearing. Certainly, the reason that we are trying to concentrate
the time which is spent in the hearings by hearing others who might
be in opposition to Senate Resolution 1 is for this very purpose. We
have had a complete array of testimony supporting it and we want to
make absolutely certain that everyone who objects, who has a clarifying thought or alternative solution, has a complete opportunity to be
heard. This could very well be helpful to us.
Senator HRusKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is customary, the chairman realizes and recalls, that we always
defer to members of the Cabinet first before we get into the testimony
by members of the committee and then later by Members of the Senate
at large.
Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that the hearings of this committee last year and this year and the wide public discussion of this subject, climaxed by the President's message which the Congress received
yesterday-all of these things augur well for prompt and favorable
action on a much-needed constitutional amendment. The Senator
from Nebraska would like to say that by and large, he is in agreement
with Senate Joint Resolution 1. Certainly I am in full agreement
with sections 1 and 2.
Section 3, provides that "if the President declares in writing that he
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as acting President." In that regard, I shall just make the suggestion that the committee consider some language-it can be very concisely stated, I am
sure-which would enable the President to provide for a brief and
limited transfer of Presidential powers to the Vice President as acting
President during periods of the President's absence from the country, or otherwise out of realiable communication. I shall not press
the point any further than to make that suggestion.
It is fortified somewhat by the statement made by former Attorney

General Herbert Brownell a year or two ago before this subcommittee.
Sections 4 and 5, however, are subject to two observations. The
first is that section 5 violates the doctrine of separation of powers,
as I understand it. Second, it details procedures in a way which is
better left for legislation by Congress.
In regard to the separation of powers, section 5 provides that in
disagreement between the President on the one hand and the judgment of the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet on the
other, Congress will then decide the issue by a two-thirds vote and
will do it immediately. I shall not at this time go into the question
of what "immediately" means and what difficulties would be encountered in regard to construing "immediately." That has been
pretty well covered. But I do suggest that it is customary for the
Congress to proceed by way of hearings. They would want evidence.
They would be entitled to it. They would be entitled to have members of the Cabinet come before it to express their opinions and their
report on observations of the President's condition, health, and so
on. Certainly there would be debate in the Senate and in the House
as well. When we say "debate," then of course, we might get into
some difficulty as to the length of that debate.
It is my suggestion, that the Cabinet should decide the factual
issue as to whether or not their appraisal of the situation is correct or whether the President, in saying "I am once again able to
resume the duties of the Presidency," is right.
There are several points to be made on this question. One is, as
I have already said, that it is a factual issue rather than a policy
issue. The policy issue has already been decided in the preceding
election. They want Mr. X as President of this country. Every
fair intendment should be given to see that the continuance of that
man in office should not be subverted.
Who is the best informed to resolve and decide this factual question $ It would be those who are close to the President. Those who
see him, talk to him, and observe him. Those who have had a chance
to talk to his physicians and to members of his family.
This factual issue should be resolved by those who are loyal to the
President and sympathetic to him. It should be at the hands of
people who would give him every fair intendment for his continuation of service as President. If doubt exists, they should resolve 'it
in favor of the President. But if there is a flagrant case of disability,
then certainly they should act and I feel confident would act firmly.
There is one other tremendous advantage that Senate Joint Resolution 6 would have over the provisions of section 5 of Senate Joint
Resolution No. 1. That is that the Cabinet could act expeditiously
without being so hurried in their decision that they would sacrifice
-tubstance and merit for a decision.
If they do not act and do not support the Vice President, then, of
course, the issue is automatically resolved. The President resumes
the discharge of the duties of his office.
Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal of public discussion
of this amendment. I want to congratulate the chairman for the
fashion in which he has held these hearings this year and last year.

The hearings and the fine fashion in -which he arranged them contributed greatly to the public discussion of this problem, which is
so wholesome and so healthy. I should like to place in the record
at this point some of the printed reactions to these proceedings.
One is a New York Times editorial of January 5, 1965, which
comments on the report of the Committee for Economic Development under the chairmanship of Marion B. Folsom. That report is
a splendid report. It is very thoughtful and very thorough. I quote
only briefly:
The group proposed some revisions in the Bayh amendment, most importantly a shift in the main burden of responsibility for declaring a President's disability from the Vice President to the members of the Cabinet.
This would be an improvement.

That was from the New York Times article.
There was another one in the Washington Post, an editorial entitled "An Achilles Heel?" There they dwell in particular upon this
matter of time:
What does the word "immediately" mean? Would it require both Houses
of Congress .to vote without debating the issue? Would it permit any filibustering in the Senate?

Then they go on into the matter of saying would it be wise to
prescribe a 10-day period or maybe a 15- or 30-day period, whatever
it may be? In that respect this editorial is a very enlightening one.
There was another one in the Washington Post on January 8, Mr.
Chairman, which I would like included. An article appeared in
the Quarterly of the American Interprofessional Institute, entitled
"The Year We Had No President" written by Richard H. Hansen,
who is the author of a book by that same title and a great student
of this problem.
I should like to ask unanimous consent that these documents be incorporated into the record at the conclusion of my remarks and
that I then be given permission to file the statement which will be
more definitive and more particular as I have described before.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD M. NIXON, FORMER VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. NIXoN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee and
having been a member of Senate investigating committees as well as
committees conducting hearings as this committee in terms of legislation, I know that at about this time in your proceedings witnesses
begin to repeat as far as the various statements that they make. I
have taken the liberty of reading summaries of the testimony that has
been given to this committee to date, and consequently, I will try not
to bore you by repeating those particular ideas that have already been
expressed by others.
I think perhaps the best service I could render to the committee in
the hearings is to present to you those areas where I might disagree
with proposals that might be considered by the committee and any
new proposals that I might have that have not already been presented
to you.
I would like to begin by stating that in my opinion the hearings
being conducted by this committee are the most important hearings
from the standpoint of the country that are being conducted in Washington today.
Others are more sensational, others may have greater, shall we say,
political effect, but these hearings involve the future of the United
States as no other hearings perhaps in recent years have.
It involves the Office of the Presidency and. the powers of the
Presidency, and as I will point out in my remarks with regard to
disability, it involves, the defense of the United States of America.
As I appear before you, I want to make it clear that I don't have
any pet idea here to sell. I naturally have strong convictions that the
proposals I have made with regard to succession and disability are perhaps the best approach.
But what is important is not that this committee adopt my proposals,
what is important is that this committee make a recommendation to
the Congress, to the Senate, and to the Nation which will get action
on these two problems, the problem of succession and the problem of
disability.
I say that because when we look at the American Constitution, a
very remarkable document, it has very few weaknesses or flaws in it.
The major weakness was that with regard to disability, which, as the
chairman has pointed out in his opening statement, has caused concern in this country several times since the Constitution was adopted.
With regard to succession, we all know that there has been a shifting idea as to how that problem should be handled. But now it seems
to me that, as I am sure it does to the members of this committee who
have been participating in these hearings, the time has come to remedy
the constitutional flaw with regard to the Office of the Presidency itself in respect both to succession and to disability.
I say the time has come because the American people, as a result
of the assassination of President Kennedy, and as a result prior
to that time of President Eisenhower's illnesses, I think are aware
of the problem. They believe that something should be done about
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it but the more time that is allowed to elapse between those events the
less urgency for it will be felt by the American people and, of course,
by the Congress to get action to deal with these problems.
So, the time is now, and I would urge the committee to proceed as
effectively as possible in getting a united proposal, backing it and
getting action on it.
I would say further in the general sense, that while these hearings
deal with succession and while succession, as I note from the reports
in the papers and the reports of the committee's hearing, seems to
attract the most attention and the most interest, in my opinion, the
major problem, and the problem that needs most urgent attention is
not succession but disability.
We do have a succession law at the present time. There is, on the
other hand, as far as disability is concerned only an informal agreement which has no standing as far as law is concerned between President Johnson and Speaker McCormack who is the next in line in succession, the same agreement that President Eisenhower had with me
and that President Kennedy had with Vice President Johnson.
So, I would agree in this instance with the position that Senator
Keating, I understand, has taken very strongly before this committee
of which he is a member, that disability is the more urgent of the
two problems.
However, I would say that this is the time to deal with both problems, succession and disability, and to strike, in effect, while the iron
is hot.
Now, turning to specific proposals, I would like to discuss first the
problem of succession.
I have set forth my views on succession in an article which I wrote
for a magazine and, with the chairman's permission, I would like to
submit that article for the record and thereby save the time of the
committee by reading it into the record.
Senator BAYH. Without objection we will include it at this point in
the record and the Chair would like to compliment the author for
his very incisive argument which I read with a great deal of interest.
(The magazine article referred to follows:)
[From Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 1, 1964]
WE NEED A VICE PRESIDENT Now
(By Richard M. Nixon)
We must fill the office of Vice President immediately, says a man who held the
job 8 years. Here is his compelling proposal.
The 8 weeks that have passed since the assassination of President Kennedy
have been a period of great soul searching for the American people. We have
asked ourselves how this tragic act of violence could have happened in our country. We have urged that steps be taken to provide better protection for our Presidents in the future.
We have also a new, hard look at the question of Presidential successionAnd we have concluded that there is a serious deficiency in an otherwise remarkable constitutional process.
While everyone knows that eight Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of an incumbent, it is not so well known that another seven
Vice Presidents of the United States have died in office, and one has even resigned. The Office of the Vice President has been vacant 16 times. In other
words, during over 40 years of our history, this Nation has not had a Vice Presi-
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dent and there has been no constitutionally elected successor to the President.
Three times the Congress has dealt with 'thisproblem.
The first law, passed in 1792, made the President pro tempore of the Senate
and then the Speaker of the House of Representatives the next in the line of Presidential succession after the Vice President. These congressional officers were put
ahead of the President's Cabinet because Hamilton, the Federalist Party leader,
wished to block the path of Secretary of State Jefferson.
This law was changed in 1886, during the Democratic administration of Grover
Cleveland. His Vice President had died the year before, and the Senate was
controlled by the Republicans. To prevent the possible elevation of a member of
the opposition party to the White House, the line of succession was given to the
Cabinet, starting with the Secretary of State.
The last change was proposed by President Truman in 1945. He requested
Congress to make the Speaker of the House his successor. Some observers at the
time suggested that he was motivated by the belief that Speaker Rayburn would
make a better President than Secretary of State Stettinius. And so, since 1947,
when this law was enacted, the line of succession to the Presidency has run : Vice
President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, President pro tempore of the
Senate, the Secretary of State, and finally the other members of the Cabinet.
Assuming that a law should be written for all time and not just to deal with a
temporary siiation, the conclusion is inescapable that the laws of Presidential
succession have in the past been enacted for the wrong reasons.
Now is the time to make a change for the right reason.
The right reason is not that a Speaker of the House is always less qualified to
be President than a Secretary of State. Sam Rayburn, for example, would have
been a better President than Edward Stettinius. And the present Speaker, John
W. McCormack, is a man with a distinguished record of 40 years' service to our
Nation, who has always stood in the forefront of the fight against communism both
at home and abroad.
Yet, as recent Presidents have rightly given more and more responsibilities to
their Vice Presidents, the present system now raises to what has truly become
the second office in the land a man who already holds one of the most burdensome
offices of government-the Speaker of the House. Moreover, it is not unlikely that
a Speaker could be of a different party from the President's. This was the case
during the 80th Congress when President Truman would have been succeeded
by Republican Speaker Joseph Martin.
So, putting present personalities aside, we must write a new law of Presidential
succession. And as did the framers of our Constitution, we must write for posterity, not merely for the moment.
There have been three serious proposals recently made for changing the law of
Presidential succession.
First. It has been proposed that we go back to the old system of putting the
Secretary of State and the Cabinet ahead of the Speaker of the House in the line
of succession. But a good Secretary of State doesn't necessarily make a good
President. While a particular Secretary of State might be an excellent choice,
just as a particular Speaker might be, this proposal offers us .no such guarantee.
It is significant to note that no one ivho has held -the office of Secretary of State
has been elected to the Presidency since James Buchanan. And, as President
Truman suggested in 1945, I believe, there are advantages in elevating a man to
the Presidency through the elective, rather than the appointive, office.
Second. It has been proposed that the Congress elect a new Vice President. A
similar plan would have the President appoint a Vice President with the consent
of the Congress. Both of these proposals, however, could create grave difficulties
if the Congress happened to be controlled by the opposition party, which has been
the case during the terms of 16 Presidents.
Third. Senator Kenneth Keating, of New York, has introduced a constitutional
amendment to provide for the election of two Vice Presidents. First in the line
of succession would be an Executive Vice President who would have no other
constitutional duties. The second Vice President, or Legislative Vice President,
would then follow in the line of succession, and would have the constitutional
duties of presiding over the Senate and breaking tie votes. The major disadvantage of this novel proposal is that by dividing the already limited functions
of the office, we would be downgrading the Vice-Presidency at a time when it
is imperative that we add to its prestige and importance.

How can we best design a new law which will not have these objections? I
believe the trouble in the past was that changes in the law of succession have
been male to deal with an immediate, personal situation. Because it was thought
that a particular individual should not be President, the plan was changed to
block that man. Instead of trying to devise a plan which will promote or block
a particular man, what we need to do is to direct our thoughts generally to the
question of the kind of man who would be best fitted to succeed to the Presidency
of the United States and then design a plan which will find that man.
What qualifications should a Vice President have?
He should be a man qualified to be President.
He should be a full-time Vice President with no other official duties.
He should be a member of the same political party as the President.
He should have a political philosophy which is close to that of the President,
particularly in the field of foreign affairs.
He should be personally acceptable to the President, but since he may poten.
tially hold the highest office in the land, his selection should reflect the elective,
rather than the appointive, process.
What kind of plan will allow the selection of such a man?
I believe there is one proposal that has not been given adequate consideration
to date and that would best accomplish this purpose. It would take the form of
an amendment to article II, section 1, of the Constitution and would read as
follows:
"Within thirty days after a vacancy occurs in the office of Vice President,either
because of death, removal, or the elevation of the incumbent to the Presidency,
the President shall reconvene the electoral college for the purpose of electing
a Vice President of the United States."
This proposal, as is the case with Senator Keating's, recognizes that merely
changing the law of succession does not necessarily fill the office of the Vice
President. And the office of Vice President itself, apart from the question of
succession, has become necessary to the country.
By using the electoral college as the instrument for selecting a new Vice President, we would be relying on a popularly elected constitutional body which in
contrast to the Congress always reflects the will of the people as of the last
presidential election. While it is true that the electoral college is now a constitutional anachronism, this important new function would upgrade the body
and would bring about the selection of more responsible persons to serve on it.
Besides filling the Vice Presidency and reflecting the will of the electorate,
this plan assures continuity of programs and the selection of a Vice President
who can work with the President. For, as in the case of the nominating conventions, where the presidential candidate has the greatest voice in selecting
his running mate, so too could we expect the President to have the greatest influence in the deliberations of the electoral college. He would probably recommend the man most acceptable to him as the new Vice President.
But the fact that the electoral college would have the final authority to make
the decision would be a safeguard against arbitrary action on his part. Most
important, it would mean that whoever held the office of President or Vice
President would always be a man selected by the people directly or by their
elected representatives, rather than a man who gained the office by appointment.
We now come to the most critical question of all-how do we get action on this
or one of the other proposals which have been made to deal with the problem of
presidential succession?
The failure of the Congress to act on the equally important question of Presidential disability is a case in point. The Constitution does not set forth a procedure as to how and when the Vice President shall assume the duties of President when the President is unable to serve because of illness. Fifty years ago
the country could afford to "muddle along" until the disabled President either
got well or died. But today when only the President can make the decision to
use atomic weapons in the defense of the Nation, there could be a critical period
when "no finger is on the trigger" because of the illness of the Chief Executive.
After his heart attack in 1955, President Eisenhower asked the Congress to
correct this situation. When the Congress failed to act, he took matters in his
own hands and in 1958 wrote me a letter the key paragraphs of which follow:
"The President and the Vice President have agreed that the following procedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of Article 2, Section 1, of
the Constitution, dealing with Presidential inability. They believe that these

procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves only, are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but are consistent with its present provisions
and implement its clear intent.
"1. In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so inform the
Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the office until the inability had ended.
"2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such consultation
as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the
devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as Acting
President until the inability had ended.
"3. The President, in either event, would determine when the inability had
ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers and duties
of the office."
This historic document was later adopted by President Kennedy, and most
recently by President Johnson. But it must be remembered that this procedure is merely a stopgap. It does not have the force of law. I strongly believe
that either legislation or a constitutional amendment should be enacted to
solve this problem on a permanent basis.
The time :has come to give top priority to the consideration of proposals to
deal with both Presidential succession and Presidential disability. The most
effective way to get action is to set up a bipartisan Presidential Commission,
such as the famed Hoover Commission on the Reorganization of the Executive
Branch of Ggvernment. President Johnson might appoint to the commission
to serve as public members our three former Presidents, Hoover, Truman and
Eisenhower. The Speaker and the President pro tempore of the Senate would
appoint the six other Members from the House and Senate. The recommendations of such a distinguished, blue-ribbon panel would not only be of great merit ;
they would, with the backing of the President, be almost sure to become the
law of the land.
It is a tragic fact that it took a terrible crime in Dallas to remind us of a serious defect in our constitutional process. The murder of our President has
forced us to reassess our law of succession and the office of the Vice President.
Both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy recognized the importance of the
Vice Presidency as no other Presidents had done before them. The extensive
duties assigned to Vice President Johnson and myself, at home and abroad,
were unprecedented in our history. The country now feels safer and more confident because of the experience that Mr. Johnson gained while serving under
President Kennedy. Clearly there can be no reversal of this trend toward
greater duties and responsibilities for the Vice President.
When a President dies in office, the man in his party who has been best trained
for the Presidency should succeed him. The Vice Presidency today, as a result
of the way both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy upgraded the
position, is the only office which provides complete on-the-job training for the
duties of the Presidency.
We have swiftly and dramatically been reminded again that when we choose
a man for Vice President we may also be choosing a man who will become
President. This means that our Presidential nominating conventions can no
longer fall back on the politically cynical formulas of "balancing the ticket"of choosing a Western for Vice President only because the Presidential candidate is an Easterner, or a conservative because the standard-bearer is a liberal
From now on it is absolutely essential that both political-party conventions
nominate two Presidents-candidates for both national offices, President and
Vice President-who have the ability and experience to lead the United States
of America in these perilous times.

Mr. NIXoN. With regard to the article I have written and the pro-

posals I have made, I again emphasize that I do not insist that this
is the only way to handle the problem.

In my opinion as far as succession is concerned there are several
general principles that this committee, the Congress, and the Nation
should have in mind.
First, the new law or the constitutional amendment, whichever the

committee decides is appropriate, should be written not for the problem of the moment, but for posterity. The great difficulty in the past
has been that every time the problem of succession has come up, the
law has been changed because a particular administration of a particular President didn't like the situation as far as his own successor
might be concerned.
Therefore, this committee, I am sure, is looking at that from the
long-range standpoint.
Now, the second point I would make is the considerations that the
committee should attempt to deal with in writing either a law or a
constitutional amendment, are these:
First, we should be looking for the qualifications that the Nation
needs in a President of the United States. Now, those qualifications
sometimes may exist in a man who currently may be Speaker of the
House. They may sometimes exist in a man who may be currently
the Secretary of State. But other times there might be some other
individual whom the President of the United States, the people of
the country generally, would feel was better qualified at a particular
time to be the second in the line of succession.
The second point I would make is that the man that I think who
generally is best qualified to succeed to the Presidency in the event
that something happens to the President is the Vice President of the
United States.
I say this particularly in view of the record with regard to the
transition from President Kennedy to Vice President Johnson. It
was a smooth transition. This was a credit, of course, to President
Johnson, and his handling of that situation. But it is also a credit
to the system. The Vice President, particularly in recent years, is cut
in, in effect, on all of the major decisions and, therefore, he is prepared
to take over as President as no one else, not the Speaker, not the
Secretary of State, no one else in the country, is prepared to take over.
Therefore, I believe that this committee should adopt a proposal
which will fill the office of Vice President.
A second reason I believe this is important is that this country now,
I think, needs a Vice President. This could not have been said perhaps even 25 years ago. But it can be said today, and clearly apart
from the fact that the Vice President is the man that I think is best
qualified to be President in the event the President became incapacitated. I think that the Vice President serves a very useful function
in Government.
I think President Johnson, for example, today, could well use the
services of a Vice President to handle some of the many problems that
he handled as Vice President before he succeeded to the Presidency.
Now, we come, of course, to the critical point: how do we find a new
Vice President, having in mind the fact that that office has been vacant
not only eight times as a result of the Vice President succeeding to
the Presidency, but eight other times when the Vice President either
died in office and one, of course, resigned the office.

Now, on this score my proposal is that the electoral college be reconvened and that the electoral college, with the recommendation
of the President, select a new Vice President.
From reading these hearings, I find that there are many who find

objections to that proposal, and like any proposal it has its weaknesses.
I think its merits are, first, that the electoral college as distinguished
from the Congress will always be made up of a membership a majority
of which is of the President's own party.
The Congress 20 percent of the time during the history of our country has been under the control of a party other than that of the President of the United States. It seems to me then that the electoral college has that advantage over the Congress as the elective body which
will select or approve the selection of the new Vice President.
A second point that I should make, however, in this respect, is that
I feel that it is most important that the new Vice President come from
the elective rather than the appointive process.
I do not mean by that that I would oppose or that this committee
should oppose a proposal whereby the President of the United States
recommends to either the electoral college or the Congress a name
for approval as Vice President, but in the final analysis whoever is
to hold the Executive power in this Nation should be one who represents and has come from and has been approved by the electoral process
rather than the appointive process.
Now, going to the problem with regard to the selection of a Vice
President and his approval by the Congress, I would say that in this
instance, that it should be made clear either in the hearings or perhaps even in the law, that the President of the United States has a
right to have as his Vice President a member of his own party; that
he has a right also to have as Vice President a man who is compatible
with his views.
Now, naturally, those objectives will be. reached if the committee
adopts a proposal of having the President recommend the man that
he wants for Vice President, either to an electoral college or the
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I feel very strongly that should be, therefore, the proper procedure.
Rather than having the Congress, if it is to be given the authority,
consider several names, I think it is much better to have the President
of the United States make the recommendation of one name and the
Congress either accept it or reject it.
This is the way, of course, in practice that our Vice Presidents
are selected now, and I believe that that way, while it has some weaknesses, is the best way in view of the factors that I have mentioned.
Now, turning from the question of succession and turning to the
question of disability, I mentioned a moment ago that I considered
the question of disability more important, more urgent at the present
time than the question of succession.
Looking at the problem of succession, I would like to say I think it
has been most unfortunate that so much of the discussion with regard
to succession has been with regard to personalities; the article downgrading Speaker McCormack, for example, I heartily disapprove of.
The articles suggesting, well, a Secretary of State is always better
qualified to be President than a Speaker or vice versa, I think those
articles make no sense at all, and those arguments I do not think are
appropriate ones.
I think the moment that you get into the personalities you are writing for the moment rather than writing law for the ages.

Looking at disability, which is a problem that has not been dealt
with, let me point up the difficulties with the present situation. There
is a letter, a letter whose contents this committee, of course, is familiar
with, written by the President of the United States to the next in line
of succession, indicating what would happen and what procedures
would go into effect in the event of disability.
But that letter has no force in law whatever, and if an argument
developed, and if you will read some of the books that presently have
come out with regard to those tragic last moments of Woodrow Wilson
in the White House, such arguments can develop, if an argument
should develop between the President's personal family and the President's official family, a letter that the President may have written to
the next in line of succession wouldn't mean anything at all, in my
opinion.
Therefore, it is imperative that this problem be dealt with and
dealt with now. That brings me then to the one point at issue with
regard to how this problem should be dealt with. Let me say that I
approve generally of the proposals that have been made by former
Attorney General Brownell, former Attorney General Rogers, as well
as President Eisenhower, with regard to disability.
Those proposals represent, as this committee is aware, the considered conclusions of those of us who went through the Eisenhower
disability periods, and I believe that those proposals are sound.
I will not elaborate on them at this time.
This is one area, however, of disagreement in which I will take a
position which differs to an extent from that taken, I understand, by
President Eisenhower in his letter to this committee.
The critical point arises when a Vice President has taken over the
powers and duties, not the office of the Presidency, because the President has been disabled, and then at the point where the President believes he has recovered sufficiently to take the duties back, and an
argument occurs as to whether he is able to do so or whether he is not
able to do so.
In that particular case it is my belief that where the Vice President,
together with the approval of the majority of the members of the
Cabinet, determine that the President is not able to take over the
powers and the duties of the office, to regain them again, and where the
President declares that he is able to do so, that then that conflict
should be decided by the Congress of the United States, and not by a
commission.
I take a very dim view of referring major constitutional problems
of this type to commissions. Commissions are not responsive, and
they do not have to, of course, account to the electorate, and I believe
that the Congress, with its committee system, could much better handle
this situation than a commission.
Let's suppose, for example, that a commission of seven were to consider this problem, and the vote were 4 to 3 or 5 to 2 that a President
was or was not able to assume the duties of the office.
Certainly whoever held the office after that kind of a commission
hearing, men who were not elected by the people, certainly whoever
held that office would hold it under a cloud, whereas, if that decision
were made by the Congress, after a hearing set up under the proper

circumstances, then at least even if the vote were close in the Congress,
it would represent a vote of the people's representatives.
I think, in other words, that the commission approach should not
be adopted by the committee. I think it would simply confuse the
situation.
With regard to the whole problem of disability, it seems to me that
we have to have in mind one fundamental new fact. The chairman recounted the history of disability, and that history itself is a warning
of what can happen when we have a man in the office of the Presidency
who is unable to carry on the powers and the duties.
But looking back to the period of Woodrow Wilson, I would like to
say that I happen to be, despite my difference in partisan affiliation,
always been one who was a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson. I
-think he was one of the great Presidents of this country, and yet in
that critical period after he went to the Peace Conference and returned
to the United States, I think it could probably be said today that. the
peace was lost after his leadership had helped to win the war.
For 17 months we had no President of the United States in the real
sense.
Now, let's look at the situation today. Today only one man in this
world, in the free world, can defend the security of the free world in
the event of attack. Only one man's finger is on the trigger.
The United States and the free world can't afford 17 months or 17
weeks or 17 minutes in which there is any doubt about whether there
is a finger on the trigger, and that brings me to my last point.
I know there is argument, as there always is, between constitutional
lawyers as to whether this should be handled by a constitutional
amendment or by legislation.
I, personally, favor a constitutional amendment dealing with both
succession and disability.
On the other hand, I would suggest that because a constitutional
amendment may take 2, 3, 4 years for enactment, that this committee
might well adopt legislation dealing with disability, interim legislation, the same proposal, as a matter of fact, that you might eventually
include in the constitutional amendment because the legislation can
then be passed and the legislation would be effective in the interim
period in the event there was a disability problem.
That, Mr. Chairman, concludes all of the remarks that I think have
not previously been covered by other witnesses before the committee,
and I would simply say at the conclusion, reemphasize what I said at
the beginning: Having been in many sensational hearings in this room
as a Senate investigator and in the House caucus room as a House
investigator, I can imagine that members of this committee sometimes
wonder whether these hearings will ever produce anything, whether
there is enough public interest, whether they are worthwhile.
I emphasize what I said before, the country may not be interested
enough in what is going on in these hearings, but there is no decision
that is more vital to the future of this country than the decision this
committee, and this Congress, will make to deal now with the problem,
first, of disability, and, second, of succession.
Senator BAYH. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President.
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I would like to note at this time the presence of the senior Senator
from Hawaii, Senator Fong, and if there is no objection, we will proceed to ask you a few questions, if you do not object.
Mr. NIXON. Certainly.
Senator BAi. To close the session, I am going to ask Senator Fong,
who is a coauthor of one of the proposals, to make a statement.
Mr. Vice President, one of the witnesses before the committee earlier
said it was his opinion that although the informal agreement on inability that is presently in effect, which you and President Eisenhower
initiated, would, in fact, with the passage of time, become common law
precedent and would have the force and effect of law and would be
much simpler than involving the other bodies which both you and I
seem to think should be brought into this picture.
Would you care to comment, sir, as to whether you think a commonlaw-precedent approach would be sufficient?
Mr. NIXON. I do not believe it is sufficient, and I would suggest that
for the President of the United States making decisions, decisions that
affect not only the foreign policy of this country but affect business
relationships of immense complexity, that I can imagine what a field
day this would be for lawyers if this common-law-decision or this
common-law-practice argument were to be made.
Speaking as a lawyer, and not downgrading the profession but recognizing its great skill in raising questions whenever there is any
technical constitutional problem, I would urge the committee to reject
that argument and, at the very least, see that that or its essence be
written into law. I would prefer a constitutional amendment.
Senator BAYH. Could I ask you, sir, to compare the approach which
is suggested by the two specific amendments which are presently before this committee. One has been offered by the distinguished Senator from New York, Senator Keating, from whom we read a
statement in the record prior to your presence, specifying that he was
very sorry he was unable to be here because of the tragic death of Mrs.
Wagner which required him to be in New York.
The other approach is the approach which Senator Fong and' I
have espoused and which has been suggested as an approach by the
American Bar Association and some other organizations. I don't
want to argue about the specific proposals but rather the general approach to constitutional amendments which you would deem preferable. One approach is a very simple approach which would not spell
out any specifics whatever but would merely say to the Congress,
"You have the authority to act."
The other approach specifies specifically chapter and verse point
by point what would be the actual law in the event of a tragedy
or disability.
The feeling is, on the one hand, that only a simple solution giving no specific points at all would be adopted by the majority or
three-fourths of the legislatures.
The other argument for the more complicated and specific amendment is that really the legislatures would rather have a point-bypoint specification of what would be the law rather than a blank
check given to Congress to act in this area.
Could you give us your opinion as to which approach you would
prefer in the constitutional amendment form?
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Mr. NIxoN. The approach I would prefer is the one that this committee finally concludes has the best chance to success. I think either
approach insofar as workability is concerned in handling the problem
would be effective.
In other words, I emphasize again that all of the nit-picking arguments as to whether it should be this way or that way make very
little impression on me. What I think is-I think our major concern must be-is to find a solution that will be least controversial but
will get at the major problem.
Now, as far as I personally am concerned, looking at it as a
lawyer, I would say that I would prefer the simpler approach rather
than the one spelling out the procedure. I find that, I am just thinking
now, of what I think might get across and what would be explained
to the State legislatures that have to approve a constitutional amendment?
My own evaluation of that political problem would be that the
simpler approach would raise less questions.
The more you spell out the proposal, the more chance you raise
for arguments and disagreements with regard to it.
The other thing I would say is this: That by not-when you are
writing the Constitution, you are, of course, dealing with a document in which changes cannot be made very easily. I would say that
with a simple approach then, the Congress, as it developed its procedures to deal with this particular problem might then have more
flexibility to change those procedures where it found that one was
too rigid.
Senator BAYH. In the simple approach which you describe would
you have us write the basic fundamental-of procedure? That the
President would, in writing, specify his disability, that the Vice
President would, in fact, be Acting President and would assume the
powers and duties but not the office, that the Vice President would
assume these duties if the President were unable himself to make
this declaration? Would these be specifics that you would include?
Mr. NixoN. By all means. Of course, I assume that all of those
particular items would be included in the constitutional amendment.
ut what I was referring to was the procedure that the Congress
would go through in the event there were an argument between the
President and the Vice President as to whether or not a President
had recovered from disability.
In that respect I would not attempt to spell out the procedure that
the Congress should follow.
Senator BAYH. You pointed out, if I may change directions just a
bit, the importance of the Vice Presidency today. The Vice President
is one heartbeat away from the Chief Executive authority of this land,
and the best successor to the President is indeed the Vice President.
You pointed out also that the Vice President does have a job to do
today. There has been some conflict as to whether we actually need
a Vice President to perform duties to relieve the burdens presently
resting on the shoulders of the President. Could we call on your experience, sir, to give us a general idea of what these duties are? How
this constitutes an active, vigorous, working office today?
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Mr. NIxoN. Well, it is rather difficult to summarize the duties of the
Vice President because, of course, those duties vary with everyone
who holds the office. I would say that the least burdensome duty is,
of course, the one that is included in the Constitution, of presiding
over the Senate, and breaking tie votes.
For example, in the 8 years that I was Vice President, I cast a tie
vote on only eight occasions, one a year, on an average.
I think that the important duties of the Vice President are: first, his
participation in the deliberations of the National Security Council;
his participations in the deliberations of the Cabinet; and then the increasingly great use of the Vice President as a troubleshooter and as
a representative of the President abroad in the field of foreign policy.
Apart from those duties, we, of course, have those specific commissions that the President has on occasion called upon the Vice President
to perform. For example, the Committee on Government Contracts
in President Johnson's case, the Space Committee and others.
What I would like to suggest here is perhaps a little different approach. I believe that now that the pattern has begun of a President
giving more functions to the Vice President, I see that that pattern
can be very greatly expanded in the years ahead, because the burden
of the Presidency, particularly with the foreign policy problems becoming more acute than they had been previously, are so great that
the Vice President can and should be used more even than he has been
in either the Kennedy or the Eisenhower administration.
That brings me, of course, to the other key point: the fundamental
reason why the President should in effect name or have a veto power
on who holds the office of Vice President is that a Vice President can
only be as useful as a President has confidence in him, and only when
a Vice President is compatible with the President's views can that be
the case. That is why, for example, that I oppose in these modern
times, as the Vice Presidency has assumed these new proportions, the
so-called ticket balancing theory in national conventions.
I would hope, for example, that both national conventions this year,
both the Republican and the Democratic Conventions would think in
terms of nominating two Presidents, in effect, having in mind that
either of the men nominated for Vice President on either ticket could
be President, but more than that, having in mind the fact that it is
most essential to nominate for the second spot a man who as nearly as
possible represents the views of the President, so that he can carry out
the functions of the Presidency in the event he succeeds to that office,
but more than that so that as Vice President the President can trust
him in foreign policy and domesic policy to take very important
assignments.
Let me say in that connection, I know that Senator Keating has a
proposal for setting up the two Vice Presidents. I would prefer that
proposal incidentally over those that would change the succession law
back to the Speaker of the House or something like that. But one of
the reasons I oppose that proposal, and I have great respect for Senator Keating-we came to the Congress together and I consider him one
of the top constitutional lawyers in the country-but one of the
reasons I oppose it, right at this period, when the office of Vice President has come to mean something, we shouldn't downgrade
it.
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I had a little amusing incident on that in New York a couple of
nights ago. There is an organization which is somewhat like the
Gridiron Club in Washington, was giving a party in honor of a former Vice President, and the speaker or the chairman of the meeting
said that this organization in previous years had honored many former
Presidents of the United States and Secretaries of State but this is the
first time they had ever honored a Vice President.
Everybody cheered, of course, at that particular reference and then
the next speaker who was- who had the duty of getting up to introduce
me, who was, of course, the guest of honor said-well, he happened to
be the president of a -major New York bank, and he said, "Well, I can't
say that I am a bit impressed about the fact we are honoring a. Vice
President today."
He said, "After all, I head an organization that has 243 vice presidents. [Laughter.]
Now, I know that in traveling abroad, for example, the United Arab
Republic has four Vice Presidents. Several Latin American republics
have two, and the moment that you have more than one Vice President,
the usefulness of the Vice President to the Nation has been greatly
reduced.
Senator BATH. May I ask you one other question in this regard? I
personally share your feeling about the importance of not decreasing
the significance which has been attached to the Vice Presidency.
Do you see a possibility of decreasing the significance of the Vice
President? Is there a possibility, with human beings being what they
are, and conflicts being what they are, of a conflict between two Vice
Presidents? And is there a possibility of a conflict arising between
the President and his Vice Presidents?
Mr. NixoN. Well, as a matter of fact, that is not only the reason
I oppose the proposal for two Vice Presidents but I also do not. approve of the proposal that I understand has been made by Governor
Rockefeller for setting up the First Secretary, a position of First
Secretary of the Cabinet.
The trouble with the position of First Secretary of the Cabinet
who would be next in line in succession to the Vice President is that
first his would be an appointive office, and I do not like the idea of an
appointive office succeeding to the Presidency, but the second point
that I would make is this: the moment you set up a First Secretary of
Cabinet you are going to downgrade, in the field of foreign affairs particularly, the Secretary of State, and at the present time, for example,
I feel strongly that the Office of Secretary of State rather than being
downgraded ought to be upgraded.
A strong Secretary of State in these times is very important to the
country and particularly to the President of the United States, and
the moment that nations abroad, diplomats abroad, get the impression
that the Secretary of State is not a strong member of the administration, and close to the President, and the President's top foreign
policy adviser, his effectiveness is greatly reduced.
Senator BArh. I don't mean to monopolize this question-andanswer session.
Senator Fong, do you have any questions to ask the Vice President?
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Senator FONG. Mr. Vice President, I am very happy to get you
again in Washington. I want to thank you for appearing before this
committee. You have given us great prestige by your presence here
this morning. You certainly have shown us the necessity for urgency
of the enactment of this type of legislation.
I want to congratulate you and commend you for the very clear, positive, definite, and comprehensive statement you have made to us
this morning.
I want to say that you have given to this committee a lot of prestige
and honor by your presence, and you have given to this proceeding
great competence.
I have no questions of you. You have given us a very clear picture
and I want to thank you for- coming here today. I hope your stay
in Washingon will be permanent.
Mr. NiXON. Thank you, Senator. I want to say I am in a very new
position in this respect. This is the first time in this room I have ever
been on this side of the table and I am glad that I am here voluntarily
and not under subpoena. [Laughter.]
Senator BAYH. Mr. Vice President, may I hold you long enough for
another question or two?
Mr. NIxoN. Yes, sir.

Senator BAYH. Are we agreed that in the event of disability that
the powers and duties only would fall upon the Vice President?
Mr. NIXON. Exactly. I am glad the chairman raised this point.
That is the proposal that has been made as I understand it by Attorney
General, former Attorney General Rogers and former Attorney General Brownell and it is my position.
The office of the Presidency cannot devolve and the powers
the
duties only should. Let me give one other reason why that, Iand
think,
is vitally important. Let us suppose that at a particular time a President was not completely disabled, but that he himself felt that his illness was so serious that it would be in the best interests of the country
that, for, say, a short period of time, a week or so, that the Vice President undertake the powers and duties of the Presidency.
The President then would feel free to turn over those powers and
duties to the Vice-Presidency if he knew at the end of that period he
would be able to come back and assume the office.
I think it would be a great mistake to have the office devolve; only
the powers and duties should.
Senator BAYH. One witness we had earlier in the hearings, Mr. Vice
President, was primarily in agreement with the statement
made. He went one step further to say that in the event of you just
a certain
kind of illness, a certain severity of illness
Mr. NixoN. Yes.
Senator BAYH (continuing). That the
President would no
longer then be acting President but would Vice
in
fact
assume the duties
of the President.
His argument was that foreign policy being
benefit to be derived from the fact that there iswhat it is, there is some
when a decision is made, and that uncertainty an ultimate authority
Do you see a time in light of your experience would be avoided.
be so severe that the Vice President should when the illness would
in fact assume the office
rather than just become acting President?
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Mr. NIXON. Well, let's look back, I think we can only look to history
to know. I would say that in President Wilson's period had Vice
President Marshall assumed the powers and duties of the Presidency at
that time, that he would have been recognized, perhaps, as the President in the full sense of the word.
But I don't believe that this still changes the attitude that I feel
the committee should take with regard to whether the office or the
powers and duties should devolve upon the Vice President.
Because of the uncertain nature of illnesses it will always depend on
each case, and I think that by precisely pointing out that only the
powers and duties devolve on the Vice President that gives the flexibility in each instance to handle the situation to deal with the particular problem.
There might be, I see possibilities, for example, like this, that the
degree of powers and duties that devolve might vary depending upon
the nature of the illness and I think that should be left open as well.
Senator BAYH. From your testimony as to the procedure and the
safeguards and the checks and balances that you feel should be attendant in any legislation such as this, I trust that you agree that this
business of removing even temporarily, the President of the United
States is something not to be taken lightly and this is a serious matter.
Mr. NIxoN. You can't treat the relationship of the United States
like the relationship between the Governor and Lieutenant Governor
of a State. As the committee knows, when a Governor leaves the
State the Lieutenant Governor then has the power to commute sentences and do a lot of other things of that sort and then when the Governor comes back in the situation reverts to the previous state.
I believe that where the Presidency is concerned, this power is so
awesome, and particularly where foreign policy is involved so decisive and critical that you naturally cannot move lightly from the
position where a Vice President steps in and steps out. It can't be
musical chairs, in other words, and I would say, I would suggest, too,
this, that no Vice President is going to get the approval of the members of the Cabinet for this momentous step unless it is a very serious
situation, and no President, for example, is going to turn over the
powers and duties of the Presidency. A man, for example, who is
unmersed in all the problems of our foreign relations and our domestic
problems is not going to, every time he gets a stomache ache, say, "Well,
I am going to resign for a week," or "Resign the powers and duties and
let the Vice President take over."
What I visualize here is that this proposal would only come into
effect as a practical matter when the President's condition was desperately serious, and when because of that condition he honestly concluded or if he was unable to do so, the Vice President and the members of the Cabinet concluded that the country required a new hand
on the wheel for a period of time.
Senator BAYH. Let me ask you one final question.
Mr. NIxON. Yes, sir.
Senator BAYH. Permit me to think out loud just a bit. On none
of these questions do I take any issue with what you have said, but
I think Senator Fong will agree that we are trying to get a solution
when we come up with a final bill.
We would like to get more detail about some of the arguments which
-have been advanced.
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Mr. NIXON. Yes.
Senator BAYH. You mentioned two ideas for ratifying bodies to
ratify or confirm the nomination of a new Vice President.
Would you care to discuss very briefly the two main stumbling
blocks that seem to be in the minds of most people as far as both of
these alternatives are concerned? First, 20 percent of the time we
have had a divided Congress, divided in political authority and
responsibility from the President.
Do you feel that tradition has shown that even in these incidents
that the Congress has not been reluctant, by and large, to confirm nominations that have been made by the Executive? That public pressure
would be great and certainly it would be difficult for even a President
of the United States to become involved or the Congress to become
involved in political interparty play?
If you feel it would still be more desirable to use the electoral college, how would you go about upgrading the electoral college in the
eyes of the people? If this were upgraded in the immediate future,
would it again be downgraded if, as we hope, we did not need it for
this purpose for a long time? How would you fill vacancies which
might exist in the electoral college?
These are things which you might just touch on briefly. This would
be the final question.
Mr. NIXON. Yes. Briefly, I would say as far as the Congress is
concerned, and this is the reason that I made the electoral college
suggestion, there have been 16 administrations in which a President has
had an opposition Congress.
Now, being quite specific, let's think of what might have happened
in 1946 when the 80th Congress, with an overwhelming Republican
majority, came in, when Mr. Truman was President of the United
States. It would seem that there could have been problems there
particularly where the Congress and the President were at odds.
Now, I will have to, however, also take into account more recent
history, I think of the very proper but also outstanding manner in
which the Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, accepted the
transition from President Kennedy to President Johnson.
What we have to have in mind here is that when this appointment is
made, when the Presidency, when the office of Vice President, becomes vacant, it is made in one of two circumstances. It is made when
a Vice President dies or when a President dies. Now, when a President
dies, I would say that the feeling in the country, the immense emotional
impact at the death of a President, certainly by assassination and even
by normal causes, is such that his successor would probably get broad
support even from an opposition Congress.
Being a lawyer, of course, what I was trying to do was to find another electoral device where there was no problem at all, and, of
course, we know the electoral college is always, a majority of the
electoral college is, of the President' own party.
But looking more closely at more recent events, I would say that the
likelihood of a Congress bucking a President, a new President of the
United States, even if it were an opposition Congress, probably is not
as great as many of us would have feared. Now, the second point,
however, it might be a little more difficult. Let's suppose a Vice
President died in office, then there isn't the emotional impact on the
country that there would be if the President dies.
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In this instance, I would say that the opposition Congress factor
might be a more real one, a more serious one. But going a step further, I still believe that the important thing here is not whether it is
the electoral college or the Congress, but the important thing is to get
one or the other, which is the consensus of the members of this committee and which this committee thinks will get the broadest public
approval . Either solution is a great improvement over what we have
at the present time and either, I think, over a period of time would
work.
I happen to believe the electoral college system would work better.
How about vacancies in the electoral college? Those would be
filled by State law, the United States Code so provides today and, for
example, we have that situation today.
The members of the electoral college, of course, are selected months
before the time when the electoral college convenes in the various
States, and they would be filled in the event of vacancies by State law
now, and if, for example, they were called upon for this extraordinary
function, State law would again provide, would again prevail.
As far as what would happen on the electoral colleges' approval
of the choice of a President, I have already indicated that there is a
certainty in this instance, because of the very nature of the electoral
college which you do not have with regard to the Congress.
But all in all, in summary, I get back to my original proposition
that the electoral college, the Congress, the two Vice President proposals, all of these are before this committee. The important function
of this committee, a's I see it, is to get action, to consider the recommendations and the pet ideas of the many witnesses you have heard,
and to seize the idea that in your opinion, is to get the best idea in your
opinion, and to get the public support and go forward with it.
And speaking as one individual, whatever this committee recommends I will support because I believe the important thing is to get
action and to get it fast.
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STATEMENT OF HON. NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL-DESIGNATE OF THE UNITED STATES; ACCOMPANIED
BY NORBERT SCHLEI, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE
OF LEGAL COUNSEL
Attorney General KATZENBACH. Thank you very much for your
statement. I have a prepared statement here. It is likely to take
about 15 minutes for me to read it. Would you like me to do that or
would you prefer to have me answer questions?
Senator BAYH. We shall let you use your own judgment. We are
most anxious to have your thoughts, because in addition to having been
Assistant Attorney General, you have studied this problem in some
detail and I would rely on your judgment completely as to how you
want to present your testimony before the committee. You may read
your statement, paraphrase it, expand upon it; however you prefer.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like also to note that I am accompanied by Mr. Norbert
Schlei, who is the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office.
of Legal Counsel.
Senator BAYL. We are glad to have Mr. Schlei with us.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. I am privileged to appear before
this subcommittee in support of Senate Joint Resolution 1, a proposal
which would amend the Constitution in order to remedy two critical
deficiencies. The proposed amendment would, first, clarify the situation that would exist in the event that the President should become
disabled and, second, provide a means for filling vacancies in the
office of Vice President.
The subcommittee may recall that in 1963, I testified on several
proposed amendments to the Constitution relating to cases where the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Last year the subcommittee continued its efforts and approved a bill
identical with Senate Joint Resolution 1 which was passed by the
Senate. Since the subcommittee has already made a comprehensive
study of this matter, I shall do no more today than to state fairly
briefly what we understand Senate Joint Resolution 1 proposes to
do and what the Department's views are respecting it.
At the outset, before considering the specific provisions of Senate
Joint Resolution 1, I want to reaffirm my prior position that the only
satisfactory method of settling the problem of Presidential inability
is by constitutional amendment, as Senate Joint Resolution 1 proposes. The same of course is true of the problem of filling vacancies
m the office of Vice President. I recognize that there are distinguished
scholars who are of the opinion that Congress has power to act in the
matter of Presidential inability under the "necessary and proper"
clause (art. 1, sec. 8, clause 18), and that a statute would-therefore
suffice as a solution. There is, however, equally distinguished opinion,
including that of the last three Attorneys General, for the proposition
that the problem can be adequately resolved only by constitutional
amendment. And as a practical matter, if what we want is to assure
continuity in Executive leadership-and if what we want to avoid is
uncertainty, confusion, and dissension at the very time of crisisthen in my judgment a statute would not provide a satisfactory solution. So I fully agree with the constitutional amendment route
marked out by Senate Joint Resolution 1.
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THE PROBLEM OF PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

Article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution provides as
follows:
In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.

It is generally agreed that this provision no longer poses any
legal problem in the event of the death of a President. As a matter
of historical practice, first established by John Tyler -and followed
by seven other Vice Presidents, the Vice President becomes President in such a contingency. Section 1 of the Senate Joint Resolution 1 confirms this practice in the case of death and extends the
same principle to the case of removal of, or resignation by, the President. Under section 1, therefore, the Vice President would become
President and be sworn in as President in the event of the latter's
removal, death, or resignation. I can see no objection whatever to
section 1.
With respect to the problem of presidential inability, there is no
similar settled practice because, of course, so far in our history no
Vice President has ever exercised the powers and duties of the Presidency during a period of Presidential inability. It is true that the
identical Eisenhower-Nixon, Kennedy-Johnson, Johnson-McCormack, and Johnson-Humphrey understandings as to these matters,
supported as they are by the views of the last three Attorneys General, have gone far toward establishing a settled practice. These
informal understandings, however, leave much to be desired as a
means of resolving such fundamental questions, and in any case they
make no provision for the situation that would exist if the President
and Vice President were to disagree on the question of inability.
Accordingly, it is clear that what we need at this time is a lasting
and complete solution to the key questions which are apt to arise
under the ambiguous language of article II, section 1, clause 6 of
the Constitution when a President suffers inability. The first is
whether it is the "Office" of the President, or the "Powers and
Duties" of that Office, which devolve upon the Vice President in the
event of presidential inability. The second is who shall raise the
question of "Inability" and make the determination as to when it
commences and when it terminates.
The great majority of constitutional scholars have expressed the
opinion that upon a determination of Presidential inability, the Vice
President succeeds only temporarily to the powers and duties of the
office and does not permanently become President. This has been
the unanimous view of Attorneys General of both Republican and
Democratic administrations for at least the last decade. Similarly,
the majority of scholars are agreed that the Vice President has constitutional authority to make the initial determination of Presidential
inability, and that the President has the authority to determine when
his inability is at an end. My own judgment and that of many Attorneys General is that this is so. However, enough doubt has
existed on these subjects in the past that several Vice Presidents
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have been deterred from acting as President when the President was
temporarily disabled. As you will recall, this happened most dramatically during the prolonged illnesses of Presidents Garfield and
Wilson, when the country was left without leadership and decisions
were made, to the extent that they were made at all, in a questionable manner.
The events of the last decade show us all too clearly how quickly
disability can strike. We cannot afford to assume that our good
fortune in the past will continue in the future. If a similar tragedy
should occur while section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 1 is in effect,
it would not only fix beyond dispute the status of the Vice President
as Acting President when he is discharging the powers and duties
of a disabled President, it would also give the President a firm constitutional guarantee that he could reassume these powers and duties
as soon as his inability has ended. On this basis, a President who
is sick, or about to undergo an operation which will temporarily
incapacitate him, will not hesitate to announce his inability, nor
will a Vice President be unduly slow to act if an emergency situation of this kind demands it.
The extraordinary situations-where the President cannot or does
not declare his own inability, or where a dispute exists between the
President and Vice President as to whether inability exists-are
covered by sections 4 and 5 of Senate Joint Resolution 1.
Section 4 provides that if the President does not declare his inability, the Vice President with the written concurrence of a majority
of the heads of the executive departments (that is, the members of
the Cabinet) or such other body as Congress might by law provide,
may transmit to Congress his written declaration that the President
is disabled, and immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President. Section 5 provides that the President
can resume the powers and duties of his office by transmitting to the
Congress his written declaration that his inability has ended. If,
however, the Vice President does not agree that the President's
inability has ended, section 5 further provides that the Vice President
can, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the
executive departments or such other body as Congress might by
law provide, within 2 days so advise Congress. Thereupon Congress
would be required immediately to decide the issue. A two-thirds
vote of both Houses would be necessary to keep the President out
and permit the Vice President to continue to act as Acting President.
If the Vice President could not muster a two-thirds vote in each
House in favor of a determination of continuing Presidential inability the President would resume the powers ana duties of his office.
Is the subcommittee knows all too well, the factual situations with
which Senate Joint Resolution 1 is designed to deal are numerous and
complex. Inevitably, therefore, some aspects of Senate Joint Resolution 1 will raise problems of ambiguity for some observers. As the
chairman noted at the outset, it is almost impossible to please everyone
with respect to every problem that can come up in this situation. In
order to assist in minimizing any such ambiguity, I would like to set
forth the interpretations I would make of the proposed amendment in
several difficult areas so that the subcommittee may have an opportunity to consider whether clarification is needed.
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First, I assume that in using the phrase "majority vote of both
Houses of Congress" in section 2, and "two-thirds vote of both Houses"
in section 5, what is meant is a majority and two-thirds vote, respectively, of those Members in each House present and voting, a quorum
being present. This interpretation would be consistent with longstanding precedent (see, that is, Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248
U.S. 276 (1919)).
Second, I assume that the procedure established by section 5 for
restoring the President to the powers and duties of his Office is applicable only to instances where the President has been declared disabled
without his consent, as provided in section 4; and that, where the
President has voluntarily declared himself unable to act, in accordance with the procedure established by section 3, he could restore himself immediately to the powers and duties of his Office by declaring
in writing that his inability has ended. The subcommittee may wish
to consider whether language to insure this interpretation should be
added to section 3.
Third, I assume that even where disability was established originally
pursuant to section 4, the President could resume the powers and duties of his Office immediately with the concurrence of the Acting President, and would not be obliged to await the expiration of the 2-day
period mentioned in section 5.
Fourth, I assume that transmission to the Congress of the written
declarations referred to in section 5 would, if Congress were not then
in session, operate to convene the Congress in special session so that
the matter could be immediately resolved. In this regard, section 5
might be construed as impliedly requiring the Acting President to
convene a special session in order to raise an issue as to the President's
inability pursuant to section 5.
Further in this connection, I assume that the language used in
section 5 to the effect that Congress "will immediately decide" the
issue means that if a decision were not reached by the Congress immediately, the powers and duties of the Office would revert to the President.
This construction is sufficiently doubtful, however, and the term "immediately" is sufficiently vague, that the subcommittee may wish to
consider adding certainty by including more precise language in section 5 or by taking action looking toward the making of appropriate
provision in the rules of the House and Senate.
In my testimony during the hearings of 1963, I expressed the view
that the specific procedures for determining the commencement and
termination of the President's inability should not be written into the
Constitution, but instead should be left to Congress so that the Constitution would not be encumbered by detail. There is, however,
overwhelming support for Senate Joint Resolution 1, and widespread sentiment that these procedures should be written into the
Constitution. The debate has already gone on much too long.
Above all, we should be concerned with substance, not form. It is to
the credit of Senate Joint Resolution 1 that it provides for immediate,
self-implementing procedures that are not dependent on further congressional or Presidential action. In addition, it has the advantage
that the States, when called upon to ratify the proposed amendment
to the Constitution, will know precisely what is intended. In view
of these reasons supporting the method adopted by Senate Joint
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Resolution 1, I see no reason to insist upon the preference I expressed
in 1963 and assert no objection on that ground.
I might add, Mr. Chairman, it would be a courageous man who
would take issue with 75 Senators.
FILLING THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT

Related to the problem of Presidential inability is the equally
critical problem of a .vacancy in the office of Vice President. Too
often it is overlooked that the country has been without a Vice President 16 times-in almost half of the 36 administrations in the history
of the Nation. In an age marked by crisis, we can no longer afford
such a gap in the high command of the executive branch of the Government. Today more than ever, the working relationship between
the President and Vice President has become increasingly close; the
burdens of the Presidency and the exigencies of our time leave no
other alternative. The need is therefore manifest for a constitutional
amendment to assure that the office of Vice President will never again
remain vacant.

In my opinion, Senate Joint Resolution 1 embodies a highly satisfactory solution to this problem. Section 2 would amend the Constitution to provide that whenever there is a vacancy in the office of
Vice President the President shall nominated a Vice President who
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses
of Congress.
Permitting the President to choose the Vice President, subject to
congressional approval, in the event of a vacancy in that office, will
tend to insure the selection of an associate in whom the President has
confidence, and with whom he can work in harmony. Participation
by Congress in the procedure should help to insure that the person
selected would be broadly acceptable to the people of the Nation.
At this time, I wish to pay my respects to the members of this subcommittee, whose combined effort and scholarship have resulted in
this important measure. Also, I wish to commend the Special Committee on Presidential Inability of the American Bar Association,
and similar committees of State and city bar associations, who have
in recent years helped to focus attention and to rally public support
for resolving these problems promptly.
It seems clear that Senate Joint Resolution 1 represents as formidable a consensus of considered opinion on any proposed amendment to the Constitution as one is likely to find. It may not satisfy
in every respect the views of all scholars and statesmen who have
studied the problem. For that matter, I doubt that any proposal
could ever fully satisfy everyone in this troublesome area. But, it
seems to me evident that, as President Johnson said yesterday, Senate Joint Resolution 1 "would responsibly meet the pressing
need

*

*

*

I understand that 47 State legislatures will be in session this year.
Given the opportunity, I believe that many of these State legislatures
will be able to ratify the necessary constitutional amendment if Congress acts without delay. I earnestly recommend such action.
Senator BAYI. Thank you, very much, Mr. Attorney General, for
your statement. I am sure that this will add a great deal not only
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to the record but to our study of this amendment as we try to go
further to find imperfections which can be improved.
In my haste in trying to get the committee underway, I have
breached a bit of committee etiquette by not making introductions of
my colleagues, the distinguished Senators from Illinois, Nebraska,
Hawaii, and Maryland. They have all made a contribution and I
am sure they will all want to make a statement, but because of the
press of time on the Attorney General I have moved right ahead.
We may ask a question or two based on this very enlightening
testimony.
First, without objection, I would like to suggest that the very
articulate message sent to Congress by the President yesterday be
submitted into the record at this time.
(The statement of President Johnson, previously referred to
follows:)
[Released by Office of the White House Press Secretary, Jan. 28, 19651
THE WHrrE HOUsE.
To the Congress of the United States:
In 1787, Benjamin Franklin remarked near the conclusion of the Constitutional
Convention at Philadelphia, "It * * * astonishes me, sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does * * *."

One hundred seventy-eight years later the relevance of that Constitution of
1789 to our society of 1965 is remarkable. Yet it is truly astonishing that, over
this span, we have neither perfected the provisions for orderly continuity in the
executive direction of our system nor, as yet, paid the price our continuing inaction
so clearly invites and so recklessly risks.
I refer, of course, to three conspicuous and long-recognized defects in the
Constitution relating to the office of the Presidency:
1. The lack of a constitutional provision assuring the orderly discharge
of the powers and duties of the President-Commander in Chief-in the
event of the disability or incapacity of the incumbent.
2. The lack of a constitutional provision assuring continuity in the office
of the Vice President, an office which itself is provided within our system for
the primary purpose of assuring continuity.
3. The lack of a constitutional provision assuring that the votes of electors
in the electoral college shall without question reflect the expressed will of the
people in the actual election of their President and Vice President.
Over the years, as I have noted, we have escaped the mischief these obvious
omissions invite and permit. Our escape has been more the result of Providence
than of any prudence on our part. For it is not necessary to conjure the nightmare of nuclear holocaust or other national catastrophe to identify these omissions as chasms of chaos into which normal human frailties might plunge
us at any time.
On at least two occasions in our history, and perhaps others, American
Presidents-James Garfield and Woodrow Wilson-have, for prolonged periods,
been rendered incapable of discharging their Presidential duties. On 16
occasions, in our 36 administrations, the office of Vice President has been vacant
And over the two perilous decades, since the end of the Second World War, that
vital office has been vacant the equivalent of 1 year out of 4. Finally, over
recent years, complex but concerted campaigns have been openly undertakenfortunately without success, as yet-to subvert the electoral college so that it
would register not the will of -the people of individual States but, rather, the
wishes of the electors themselves.
The potential of paralysis, implicit in these conditions, constitutes an indefensible folly for our responsible society in these times. Commonsense impels,
duty requires us to act, and to act now, without further delay.
. Action is in the tradition of our forebears: Since adoption of the Bill of
Rights-the first 10 amendments to our Constitution-9 of the 14 subsequent
amendments have related directly either to the offices of the Presidency and Vice
Presidency or to assuring the responsiveness of our voting processes to the will of
the people. As long ago as 1804, and as recently as 1964, Americans have
amended their Constitution in striving for its greater perfection in these most
sensitive and critical areas.
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I believe it is the strong and overriding will of the people today that we
should act now to eliminate these unhappy possibilities inherent in our system
as it now exists. Likewise, I believe it is the consensus of an overwhelming
majority of the Congress-without thought of partisanship-that effective action
be taken promptly. I am, accordingly, addressing this communication to both
Houses to ask that this prevailing will be translated into action which would
permit the people, through the process of constitutional amendment, to overcome
these omissions so clearly evident in our system.

I.

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

Our Constitution clearly prescribes the order of procedure for assuring continuity in the office of the Presidency in the event of the death of the incumbent.
These provisions have met their tragic tests successfully. Our system, unlike
many others, has never experienced the catastrophe of disputed succession or
the chaos of uncertain command.
Our stability is, nonetheless, more superficial than sure. While we are prepared for the possibility of a President's death, we are all but defenseless against
the probability of a President's incapacity by injury, illness, senility, or other
affliction. A nation bearing the responsibilities we are privileged to bear for our
own security, and the security of the free world, cannot justify the appalling
gamble of entrusting its security to the immobilized hands or uncomprehending
mind of a Commander in Chief unable to command.
On September 29, 1964, the Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 139, pro-posing a constitutional amendment to deal with this perplexing question of
Presidential disability as well as the question, which I shall discuss below, of
filling vacancies in the office of Vice President. The same measure has been introduced in this Congress as Senate Joint Resolution 1 and House Joint Resolution 1. The provisions of these measures have been carefully considered and
are the product of many of our finest constitutional and legal minds. Believing,
as I do, that Senate Joint Resolution 1 and House Joint Resolution 1 would
responsibly meet the pressing need I have outlined, I urge the Congress to
approve them forthwith for submission to ratification by the States.
II.

VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE

VICE

PRESIDENT

Indelible personal experience has impressed upon me the indisputable logic and
imperative necessity of assuring that the second ollce of our system shall, like
the first office, be at all times occupied by an incumbent who is able and who is
ready to assume the powers and duties of the Chief Executive and Commander
in Chief.
In our history, to this point, the office of the President has never devolved
below the first clearly prescribed step of constitutional succession. In moments
of need, there has always been a Vice President ; yet, Vice Presidents are no less
mortal than Presidents. Seven men have died in the office and one has resigned,
in addition to the eight who left the office vacant to succeed to the Presidency.
We recognized long ago the necessity of assuring automatic succession in the
absence of a Vice President. Various statutes have been enacted at various
times prescribing orders of succession from among either the presiding officers
of the Houses of Congress or the heads of executive departments who, together
comprise the traditional Cabinet of the President. In these times, such orders
of succession are no substitute for an office of succession.
Since the last order of succession was prescribed by the Congress in 1947,
the office of the Vice President has undergone the most significant transformation and enlargement of duties in its history.
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy have successively expanded
role of the Vice President, even as I expect to do in this administration. the
Once only an appendage, the office of Vice President is an integral part of the
chain of command and its occupancy on a full-time basis is imperative.
For this reason, I most strongly endorse the objective of both Senate Joint
Resolution 1 and House Joint Resolution 1 in providing that, whenever
there is
a vacancy in the office of Vice President, provision shall exist for that office
to
be filled with a person qualified to succeed to the Presidency.
III. REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL CoLLEGE SYSTEM

We believe that the people should elect their President and Vice President.
One
of the earliest amendments to our Constitution was submitted
and ratified in
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response to the unhappy experience of an electoral college stalemate which
jeopardized this principle. Today, there lurks, in the electoral college system, the ever-present possibility that electors may substitute their own will for
the will of the people. I believe that possibility should be foreclosed.
Our present system of computing and awarding electoral votes by States is
an essential counterpart of our Federal system and the provisions- of our Constitution which recognize and maintain our Nation as a Union of States. It supports the two-party system which has served our Nation well. I believe this system should be retained. But it is imperative that the electoral votes of a State
be cast for those persons who receive the greatest number of votes for President
and Vice President-and for no one else.
At the same time, I believe we should eliminate the omission in our present
system which leaves the continuity of the offices of President and Vice President
unprotected if the persons receiving a majority of the electoral votes for either
or both of these offices should die after the election in November and before the
inauguration of the President. Electors are now legally free to choose the President without regard to the outcome of the election. I believe that if the President-elect does under these circumstances, our laws should provide that the Vice
President-elect should become President when the new term begins. Conversely,
if death should come to the Vice-President-elect during this interim, I believe
the President-elect should, upon taking office, be required to follow the procedures
otherwise prescribed for filling the unexpired term of the Vice President. If
both should die or become unable to serve in this interim, I believe the Congress
should be made responsible for providing the method of selecting officials for
both positions. I am transmitting herewith a draft amendment to the Constitution to resolve these problems.
Favorable action by the Congress on the measures here recommended will, I
believe, assure the orderly continuity in the Presidency that is imperative to the
success and stability of our system. Action on these measures now will allay
future anxiety among our own people, and among the peoples of the world, in
the event senseless tragedy or unforeseeable disability should strike again at
either or both of the principal Offices of our constitutional system. If we act
now, without undue delay, we shall have moved closer to achieving perfection
of the great constitutional document on which the strength and success of our
system have rested for nearly two centuries.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THE WHrrE HoUsE, January 28,1965.
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STATEMENT OF HERBERT BROWNELL, PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
Mr. BROWNELL. Mr. Chairman and Senator Keating, I have a brief
statement. Is it all right if I read it?
Senator BAY.

Fine.

Mr. BROWNELL. Presidential disability and the related question of
presidential succession constitutes major constitutional problems.
Every thoughtful citizen will welcome the intensive efforts of your
committee to resolve them. Our very survival in this age may rest
upon the capacity of the Nation's Chief Executive to make swift and
unquestioned decisions in an emergency. Therefore, it becomes of
critical importance to provide the machinery for such decisions at
the time of temporary presidential inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the Presidency.
As has been mentioned before this morning, students of the Constitution have differed for many years over the meaning of the paragraph in the U.S. Constitution which deals with presidential disability. The Senate Judiciary Committee has in the past collected
the data from relevant researches which have been carried on, from
which I believe it is reasonably clear that it was the original intention of the framers of the Constitution to have the Vice President
on his own initiative assume only powers and duties of the Presidency,
not the Office of President, during any period of presidential disability. But one cannot ignore the fact that a division of opinion has
existed and still exists over the constitutional validity of a temporary
devolution of presidential power.
In other words, some persons insist that the Vice President takes
over as President for the balance of the presidential term. It is probable, certainly it is possible, that in any future crisis concerning
presidential disability the same conflicts in opinion would arise. History and logic demonstrate that if a Vice President is to take the
monumental step of assuming the powers of the Presidency even for
a specific temporary period, he must do so by reason of unquestioned
authority that satisfies public opinion.
Ordinary legislation, without a constitutional amendment, would
only throw one more doubtful element into the picture for the validity
of such a statute could not be tested until the occurrence of the presidential disability, at the very time at which uncertainty must be precluded. The simple faat is that no mere statute can alter, transfer, or
diminish vested constitutional power. Even a statute which sought
to. do nothing more than declare the original intent of the framers
would have to be construed in the light of previous constitutional interpretations and the precedents based on those interpretations, and
would therefore be valueless in resolving doubt and uncertainty.
The first point I would make, therefore, is that a constitutional
amendment, not merely a new statute, is necessary to solve the presidential disability problem.
Many persons who have considered this problem have assumed that
its most important aspect is the factual determination of presidential
inability. But the history of 170 years shows no real difficulty attends
the determination of when or whether a President is unable to perform
the duties of his Office. The crux of the constitutional problem has
been, and I believe will be, to insure that the Vice President
can take

117
over with unquestioned authority for a temporary period when the
President's disability is not disputed, and that the President.can resume
Office once he has recovered.
So long as there is a lingering doubt as to whether the Vice President, in the event of presidential disability, assumes not merely the
powers and duties of the Presidency, but the Office itself, our history
has shown that a Vice President will not in fact act to assume the
powers and duties of the Office for fear that he will be accused of illegally ousting the President from Office during the'balance of his
term.
I support the proposed solution of this problem as presently set
forth in Senate Joint Resolution 139 by Senator Bayh, which states
that if the President shall declare in writing that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his Office, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Here I might interpolate the point sometimes overlooked, that the
President may be en route abroad or otherwise out of reliable communication for meeting an unexpected emergency and in such event he
may wish for national security reasons to transfer to the Vice President the powers of his Office for a specified period, perhaps even for
only a few hours.
Senate Joint Resolution 139 further provides that if the President
does not so declare in writing, the Vice President, if satisfied that such
inability exists, shall, with the written approval of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments in office, assume the discharge of
the powers and duties of the Office of Acting President. I also support
the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 139 as to the detailed machinery by which the President would resume the discharge of the
powers and duties of his Office at the end of the period of disability.
The Vice President with the written approval of the heads of the
executive departments may, however, declare that the disability has
not terminated, whereupon Congress shall consider and decide the
issue under the procedures that are set forth in Resolution 139.
I would like to make this point also: That ultimately the operation
of any constitutional arrangement depends on public opinion and
upon the public's possessing a certain sense of what might be called
"constitutional morality." Absent this feeling of responsibility on the
part of the citizenry there can be no guarantee against usurpation. No
mechanical or procedural solution will provide a complete answer if
one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of the parties are rogues
and in which no popular sense of constitutional propriety exists.
I believe that the combination of the judgment of the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to furnish the
most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental checks and
balances between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
the Government.
By way of contrast, the advocates of some specially constituted group
or commission to determine Presidential inability face many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that it is obvious that he
cannot declare his own inability, no need exists for a factfinding body.
Nor is a factfinding body necessary if the President can and does
declare his inability.
If, however, in a most unusual situation, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from a disability which
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dis-
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pute should not be determined by a special commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission almost regardless of its makeup runs a good chance of coming out with a split
decision. What would be the effect, for example, if a commission of
seven voted four to three that the President was fit and able for the
time being, to perform the powers and duties of his office? What
power could he exert during the rest of his term, by common knowledge, a change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet
deny him the right to exercise the powers of his office? If the vote
were the other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting
President, what powers could he exert when everyone would know that
one vote the other way could cause him summary removal from the
exercise of. Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were
placed in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position,
the effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the
international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
To summarize, my reasons for supporting the principles of Senate
Joint Resolution 139 on Presidential disability are:
(1) It deals with the question by constitutional amendment rather
than statute:
(2) It makes abundantly clear that when the President is disabled
the Vice President takes over the powers and duties of the Presidency
only as the Acting President for the period of the disability;
(3) It provides that the President may voluntarily declare his inability and that if he does not, the initial determination of fact shall
be made within the executive branch-that is by the Vice President,
on the written approval of a majority of the heads of the executive
departments in office:
(4) The President may resume the powers and duties of the Presidency upon his own declaration that he is again able to handle them;
the Vice President and majority of the heads of the departments in
office may so certify, and in such event, Congress, in the final analysis,
shall settle the disagreement.
Most important, this proposal achieves these goals in consonance
both with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and
in consonance with the balance of powers among the three branches of
our Government which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
I have also been asked to comment on the proposed solutions for
the problem of succession to the Presidency in the event that neither
the President nor the Vice President is in office and able to exercise
the powers and duties of the office. This problem, too, is a most important one and calls for prompt action. In my opinion it would be
advisable to provide in the same'constitutional amendment which deals
with the question of Presidential disability, a provision that when a
vacancy occurs in the Vice Presidency, steps shall be taken immediately, in a manner to be defined in the amendment, to fill the vacancy
in the Vice Presidency for the unexpired term.
This would minimize the risk that our Nation will be faced with a
situation where neither the President nor the Vice President is available. Of the various suggestions that have been made as to how to fill
the Vice Presidency vacancy I support the solution set forth in Senate
Joint Resolution 139 that the President shall nominate a person who,
upon the approval of Congress, shall serve as Vice President for the
unexpired term.
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We are all familiar with the fact that at the regular quadriennial
national conventions of our political parties, it is the practice of the
conventions to turn to the newly nominated presidential candidate to
ask him to choose the vice presidential candidate subject to convention
approval. Under Senate Joint Resolution 139 the President would
likewise be called upon to choose his second in command, but subject to
congressional approval. In this way the public would be assured that
the Vice President would be of the same political party as the President and would be someone who could presumably work in harmony
with the basic policies of the President.
I am aware of the fact that suggestions have been made that the
new Vice President should be chosen by the electoral college and, in
theory, this plan has merit.
However, I am of the opinion that there are enough hazards involved
in such a proposal as to make it an impractical solution. The use of
the electoral college machinery would mean that the various States
would have to work out methods of filling the vacancies which had
occurred in the college since the preceding presidential election.
Many procedural problems would also be involved in organizing an
emergency convemng of the electoral college. These would be cumbersome and time consuming and subject to legal challenge at a time
when prompt action was called for. Presumably, some of the difficulties which I mention could be eliminated by careful framing of
a plan to use the electoral college, but I see no way of eliminating
two basic objections: (1) The delay would be greater than under the
proposal set forth in Senate Joint Resolution 139, and (2) the person
chosen by use of the electoral college machinery might not be compatible with the then President.
If the plan envisaged in Senate Joint Resolution 139 is adopted,
that is, the President shall nominate a Vice President subject to approval by Congress, a major aspect of the succession problem will
have been satisfactorily solved. There remains the possibility, however, that the Nation might be faced with a cataclysm under which
neither a President nor Vice President is constitutionally available
to discharge the powers and duties of the offices of President.
I believe, therefore, that the constitutional amendment covering the
succession problem should provide that in such event, succession shall
devolve upon the heads of the executive departments in the order of
their establishment. This plan of succession was in effect during
much of our national history until 1947. It has the advantage over
the post-1947 succession plan of not involving the contemporaneous
disruption of leadership of the legislative branch of the Government
at a time when there is disruption in the leadership in the executive
branch.
I recently participated in the Conference on Presidential Inability
and Succession convened by the American Bar Association on January 20, 1964, the one that Professor Freund mentioned. This conference was composed of persons familiar with the constitutional problems we are discussing today. In the beginning, they differed widely
in their views just as individual Senators probably do. But they all
agreed that the dire necessities of promptly solving the problems outweighed their individual preferences. They agreed on the principles of a solution which are basically contained in the solution I
have recommended. Their recommendations were later approved by
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the house of delegates of the American Bar Association and, as I
understand it, have also been approved by the Association of American Law Schools.
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STATEMENT OF LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., PRESIDENT-ELECT,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Mr. PowFLL. Thank you, Senator Bayh, Senator Keating.
My purpose this morning will be merely to supplement Craig's
statement to the extent of presenting some of the reasons which led to
the principal conclusions in the consensus report.
Mr. Craig has read the seven paragraphs in the consensus. I will
not again read those.
First, I will deal with the five paragraphs which relate to presidential inability.
The first conclusion in the consensus requires no comment. It makes
the obvious point that agreements between the President and the Vice
President, while desirable under the circumstances, are not acceptable
as a permanent solution to the inability problem.
The second consensus conclusion is an important one; namely, that
an amendment to the Constitution should be adopted to resolve these
problems. It is true that scholars differ as to whether a constitutional
amendment is necessary, as many believe that the Congress now has
the requisite authority to act, but a question of this magnitude and
importance should not be resolved on a balancing of opinions. It
would be unwise to follow a course which could leave the status of
the Presidency subject to doubt and possible litigation, especially
when another course is available.
We are concerned here with the very fundamentals of our Government, the office of President, and the exercise and continuity of Executive power.
These should be dealt with by an amendment to the Constitution
itself.
The next three paragraphs of the consensus deal in principle with
the provisions of such amendment to the Constitution. First, it
should be made perfectly clear that in the event of the inability of
the President, the powers and duties, but not the office, shall devolve
upon the Vice President or person next in line of succession.
Such powers and duties shall so devolve for the duration of the
inability of the President or until the expiration of his term of office.
The committee, of course, is familiar with the ambiguities in the
sixth clause of section 1 of article II. Certain of these ambiguities
have always been a source of difficulty and doubt. When President
Tyler succeeded in 1841 to the office of President upon the death of
William Henry Harrison, he set a precedent which has since been followed without question.
But such a precedent is of little value in the event of the inability,
rather than death, of an incumbent President. The two noticeable
instances of this inability, with which this committee is familiar, are
in the cases of Presidents Garfield and Wilson. For eighty-some days
preceding Garfield's death, and for perhaps as much as a year during
Wilson's illness, there was a virtual void in Executive leadership.
The Vice Presidents then in office, Arthur and Marshall, were unwilling to assume the powers of President because of grave questions
both as to their rights and as to the consequences of such an assumption. They were fearful, of course, that the Tyler precedent might be
held to apply to inability as well as death.
1t hardly ieed be said that in the current age, in which our country's responsibilities and dlangels are incomparably greater, we can-
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not afford to run the risk of a Garfield or Wilson situation. This
awesome possibility was in the mind of every thoughtful person when
the news was first flashed on November 22 that President Kennedy
had been badly wounded.
In view of t.iis recent and profoundly shocking experience, there is
now widespread agreement that the constitutional amiendnenit should
at least clarify all doubts as to the development of the powers and
duties. There is somewhat less agreement as to whether other provisions should be included in the constitutional amendment itself or

should be left to legislation by Congress implementing the amendment.
Various proposals have been made and many of these have merit.
The consensus report, following a careful review of alternatives by
the conferees concluded that it was desirable for the amendment to be
self-implementing on the basic points. The specific questions relate
to determination of the fact of inability, when it commences and when
it ends. In some instances, especially involving possible mental inability, these could be difficult and delicate questions..
The consensus report suggests that the amendment itself deal with
these questions as folloivs:
In the event that the President does not make known his own inability by a declaration in writing, it may be established by action of
the Vice President or the person next in line of succession, with the
concurrence of a. ma jority of the Cabinet or by action of such other
body as the Congress may by law provide.
It will be noted that this recommended procedure leaves the responsibility, in the absence of further action by the Congress, in the executive branch of the Government.
The conferees were strongly of the opinion that this is compatible
with the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution.
This procedure also has important practical advantages. It would
enable prompt action by the persons closest to the President, and presumably most familiar with his condition. It would also tend to assure
continuity and the least disruption of the functioning of the executive
branch.
It is possible, of course, to have an independent commission make
the decision rather than the Cabinet. This possibility was considered
by the conferees, and a consensus was reached (for the reasons indicated above) that action by the Vice President with the concurrence
of a majority of the Cabinet has significant advantages over other
methods presented.
In the interests of providing flexibility for the future, the amendment would authorize the Congress to establish a different procedure
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience.
The determination of when inability ends may be even more difficult
than determining its commencement. If there is general agreement
that the President has recovered, and he so declares in writing, there
is no problem. But in the event the Vice President. and a majority of
the Cabinet (or such other body as the Congress may provide) should
not agree with the President, the proposed amendment would then
require that the question be determined by the vote of two-thirds of
the elected members of each House of Congress.
It will be noted that if the President has declared in writing his
ability to resume the powers and duties of his office, it is presumed that
he is right. Thus, it would require the vote of two-thirds of the mem-
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bers of each House of Congress 'to overrule such a Presidential
declaration.
Obviously, vital principles of government are involved. The independence of the executive branch must be preserved, and a President
who has regained his health should not be harassed by a possibly hostile
Congress. Yet, there must be a means to protect the country from
the situation (however remote) where a disabled President seeks to
resume office. It is believed that the recommendation provides appropriate safeguards for and a proper balancing of the interests involved.1
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

In the past, the American Bar Association has concerned itself primarily with the problem of Presidential inability. But in the discussions of the January conference, it became apparent that the subject of
Presidential succession was of equal importance and also merited solution by constitutional amendment. The consensus contains the following recommendations, both of which have not been endorsed by the
American Bar Association:
(a) The Constitution should be amended to provide that in the event of the
death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice President or the person
next in line of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term.
(b) It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at all times.
An amendment to the Constitution should be adopted providing that when a
vacancy occurs in the office of Vice President, the President shall nominate a
person who, upon approval by a majority of the elected Members of Congress
meeting in joint session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired
term.

The first recommendation merely confirms long-established precedent; namely, that in the event of death, resignation, or removal of
the President, the Vice President (or the person next in line of succession) succeeds to the office of the President for the unexpired portion
of the current term.
The second recommendation would provide, by constitutional amendment, for the prompt filling of the office of Vice President in the event
it should for any cause become vacant.
It would provide, quite simply, that when a vacancy occurs in the
Vice Presidency, the President shall nominate a person who, upon the
approval by a majority of the elected Members of Congress meeting
in joint session, shall become Vice President for the unexpired term.
It is true that this procedure would give the President the power
to choose his potential successor. But with the safeguard of congressional approval, it is believed that this is sound in theory and in
substantial conformity with current nominating practice. It is desirable that the President and Vice President enjoy harmonious relations and mutual confidence. The importance of this compatibility
is recognized in the modern practice of both major parties in according the presidential candidate the privilege of choosing his running
mate subject to convention approval. In the proposed amendment,
the President would choose his Vice President subject to congressional
approval.
-- arious other plans have been proposed, and several of these were
1The President may be removed by impeachment "for treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors" (sec. 4 of art. II). The Senate tries impeachments,
with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present necessary for conviction (clause
3 of
art. I). But impeachment is hardly an appropriate proceeding
in which to determine
physical or mental inability.
22-517 0 - 73 - 9
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considered by the conferees and also by the American Bar Association
committee. It has been suggested that the electoral college be reconvened to fill the vacancy. But the electoral college today performs
functions which are largely, if not wholly, ministerial. Unless there
was a major revison in the electoral college system it is unlikely that a
decision by it would command the requisite respect and support of the
people. Moreover, the prompt filling of such a vacancy is desirable,
and the reconvening of the electoral college might well involve significant delay.
It has also been suggested that a special election to fill the office of
Vice President might be desirable. Here, again, there could be a serious question of delay. A special election by the people would be a new
and drastic departure from our historic system of quadrennial presidential elections and would introduce various complications into our
political structure.
In considering any proposal on this subject, it is well to keen in
mind that ila office of Vice President has indeed become one of the
most import ti positions in our country. The days are long past when
it was largely honorary and of little importance in itself. For more
than a. decade the Vice President has borne specific and important
responsibilities in the executive branch of Government. In addition,
he has to a. large extent shared and participated in the executive
functioning of our Government, so that, in the event of tragedy, there
would be no break in the informed exercise of Executive authority.
As stated in the most recent report of the American Bar Association's Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform:
This committee concurs in the view of the Washington conference that it is
highly desirable that the ofmee of Vice President be filled at all times. We
regard it as essential in this atomic age that there always be a Presidential
successor who would be fully conversant with domestic and world affairs and
who would be prepared to step into the higher office on short notice and to
assume its full responsibilities with a minimum of interruption of the conduct
of affairs of state.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it seems to the
American Bar Association that the vital need is for action which will
solve these grave problems of Presidential inability and succession.
Discussions of these problems have recurred down through the
years, especially following events in history which dramatized the
need for solutions. But even the interest aroused by the illnesses of
President Eisenhower was not sufficient to bring about action. There
has been a resurgence of interest, and indeed leep concern, since the
assassination of President Kennedy, and once more responsible voices
throughout America are calling for appropriate action. There has
been little disagreement as to the need. The difficulty has been in
obtaining a consensus as to how best to meet the need. Many proposals have been made, and many of these have undoubted merit.
But surely thle time has come when reasonable men must agree on
one workable ri; ;od. It is not necessary, as the 'Washington conference agreed, ti,
e find a solution free from all reasonable objection
or which cover
cy conceivable situation. It is unlikely that such a
solution will em
found, as the problems are inherently complex and
difficult.
It is the hope and strong recommendation of the American Bar
Association, which we know is shared by this subcommittee, that past
.e
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differences be reconciled and that a solution be initiated by this session
of the Congress. We urge that the solution be in the form of a proposed constitutional amendment, although this would not preclude
interim legislation pending ratification of the amendment.. We do not
say that the amendment must follow the Washington consensus. 2
There are other worthy proposals which merit your thoughtful consideration. We do think this consensus, which is now supported by
the American Bar Association and a considerable body of the most
knowledgeable scholars in the field, contains provisions which are
sound and reasonable, and consistent with the basic framework of our
Government.
We respectfully commend these proposals to this subcommitte with
the hope that they will assist you and the Congress in initiating at
this session an appropriate constitutional amendment.
Senator BAH. Thank you very much, both of you, for your concise
statements on the overall problem and your detailed discussion of the
consensus report.
I would also like to thank both of you and, through you, the members of the American Bar Association, for the time and effort that you
have expended over the past several weeks on this problem. I would
like to thank the witnesses for the initiative that the American Bar
Association has taken in its efforts to reach a consensus and convening
this consensus group. I think that this is typical of the traditions of
the American Bar Association and its spirit of public service.
I would also like to thank you for the consideration which was given
the consensus subsequently by the house of delegates at your national
meeting in Chicago. This shows that you not only are willing to
talk about it, but that you are willing to put the great influence of
the American Bar Association behind this effort.
I would like to echo the words of our second witness to the extent
that this problem is not going to be solved at all unless we can get a
meeting of the minds of the Members of Congress as well as the public
in general. When we have so many different ideas varying m approach but with the same goal in mind, it is difficult to do.
I hope that those of us who are studying this problem will realize
the great effort that you have made within your organization to reach
a meeting of the minds. Although I am certain that at the start
there was as much disagreement in your group as there is probably in
the subcommittee, the full committee, and in the Congress, still you
put any personal pride of authorship secondary to the need to reach
a consensus or a plan which could be accepted by the group.
You pointed out, I thought very well, the importance of this problem. To further exemplify the importance of this problem the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress has provided us
with a rather detailed list of the 16 times in which the office of Vice
President has been vacant, the names of the Vice Presidents, and the
time of the vacancies.
If there is no objection, I would like to put this in the record at
this time.
(The material referred to follows:)
tIt is to be noted that the proposals in the consensus are not expressed in the definitive
form of a constitutional amendment. Rather, they are Intended primarily as statements
of the substance of the prineiples involved.

Instances when the United States has been without a Vice President
Vice President

Termination of office

George Clinton----.....
Elbridge Gerry ... -John C. Calhoun --John Tyler-----Md ihiard Fillmore
William R. King
Andre w JohnsonHenry Wilson-------Chester A. Arthur --Thomas A. llendricks..
Garret A. Hobart... Theodore Roosevelt_ James S. Sherman.
Calvin Coolidge-...
Harry S. Truman...

Died Apr. 20, 1812.-..---.---....-----.--Died Nov. 23,1814-.--------------------Resigned Dec. 28,1832, to take seat in Senate -Took oath of office as President, Apr. 6, 1841-Took oath of office as President, July 10,1850-- Dicd Apr.18, 1853-------------- --------Took oath of oiilee as President, Apr. 15, 1S05_ Di:d Nov. 22,1875---------------------Took oath of office as President, Sept. 20.1881-Died Nov. 25, 1885
---------------------- .------Died Nov. 21, 1899--....
Took oath of office as President, Sept. 14,1901
Died Oct. 30, 1912-.....................
Took oath of o!lice as President, Aug. 3, 1923_'Took oath of ofIlcc as President, Apr. 12, 1945..

Term for which elected
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
M ar.
Mtar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Jan.

4,1809-Mar.
4, 1813-Mar.
4, 1829-Mar.
4, 1841-Mar.
5,1849-Mar.
4,1853-Mar.
4, 185-Mar.
4, 1873-Mar.
4,1881-Mlar.
4, 18. -\1ar.
4, 1897-NI ar.
4,1901-Mar.
4,1909-Mar.
4, 1921-Mar.
20, 1915-Jan.

Sources: Congresional Directory, 83d Cong., 2d sess., February 1954, p. 299.
graphical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1949, Washington 1950.

Bio-

3, 1813
3,1817
3, 1833
3.1S45
3,1853
3, 1857
3,1869
3, 1877
3, 1885
3, 1889
3, 1901
3, 1905
3,1913
3,1925
20, 1949

Length of time office vacant
Apr.
Nov.
Dec.
Apr.
July
Apr.
Apr.
Nov.
Sept.
No v.
Nov.
Sept.
Oct.
Aug.
Apr.

20, 1812-Mar.
23,1814-Mar.
28, 1832-Mar.
6, 1841-Mar.
10, 1850-Mar.
18.1853-Mar.
15, 1865-Mar.
22, 1875-Mar.
20, 1881-Niar.
25, 1885-Mar.
21, 1599-Mar.
14, 1901-Mar.
30. 1912--Mar.
3, 1923-Mar.
12, 1945-Jan.

3, 1813
3,1817
3, 1833
3, 1845
3, 1853:
3, 1857
3, 1869
3, 1877
3. 1885
3, 1889
3, 1901
3, 1905
3, 1913
3, 1925
20, 1949

President
James Madison.
Do.
Andrew Jackson.
William H. Harrison. died Apr. 4, 1841.
Zachary Taylor, died July 9, 1850.
Franklin Pierce.
Abraham Lincoln, died Apr. 15, 1865.
Ulysses S. Grant.
James A. Garlield, (lied Sept. 19, 1881.
Grover Clevelnd.
William McKinley.
William McKinley, died Sept. 14, 1901.
Williami 1f. Taft.
'Warren G. Ifarding, died Aug. 2, 1923,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, died Apr. 12, 1945.

Prepared by Norman D. Burch, History and General Research Division, Oct. 26, 1954'
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STATEMENT OF HON. MARION B. FOLSOM, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
FOR IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Mr. FOLSOM. Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, your invitation to testify on the vital subject of a constitutional amendment designed to
solve the problem of presidential succession and inability is much
appreciated, both by me personally and-I am certain-by my fellow
trustees of the Committee for Economic Development, and by all
members of the CED's Committee for Improvement of Management in
Government.
This is the first occasion, so far as I recall, on which any representative of CED has appeared before this subcommittee of the Senate.
Perhaps it is appropriate at this time to outline briefly CED's interests,
activities, and composition.
The Committee for Economic Development was established in 1942.
It has been actively engaged over the intervening years in the development of national policy positions best suited to encourage the economic
well-being of the United States and of the free world. Policy statements on such matters as taxation, Federal expenditures, foreign trade,
and monetary management have been issued frequently and distributed
widely. Many of these have received a favorable reception, on their
merits, in the business community, in university faculties, and in other
influential circles, leading eventually to broad public acceptance of
their basic principles.
The Committee for Economic Development consists of 200 trustees
representing a broad spectrum of business and university leadership in
the United States. Its several subcommittees are supported in their
work by advisory groups of the best scholarly minds in the Nation.
About 2 years ago, several top officials of the Kennedy administration and former officials of the Federal Government approached me
and others active in CED, proposing that we apply the same approaches to improvement of our governmental institutions that have
been used in formulating national economic policies in the public
interest. With financial support from Carnegie Corp. and several
other foundations, CED has established the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government. The 25 CED trustees with most
experience in Government were appointed to it, and 10 additional
members were added from outside CED to provide the broadest possible balance for our work.
Four of our thirty-five members had served as heads of Cabinet Departments, five had been Assistant or Under Secretaries, thirteen
chairmen or members of Federal regulatory or advisory commissions,
and thirteen were former bureau chiefs or directors, or special assistants to the President or to Cabinet members.
You might say one was a former Senator, Senator Benton.
Our committee's work has benefited greatly from the counsel of our
advisory board, men with wide experience in governmental affairs, as
well as in university and business circles. These 15 advisers are listed
on page 6 of the document I think you have before you.
The Committee for Improvement of Management in Government
regards the subject of Presidential succession and inability as one
commanding highest priority. We recognize and commend the constructive work done by you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues of the
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Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, in
drafting and gaining Senate approval for a constitutional amendment which-if finally adopted-would do much to correct serious
deficiencies in our present constitutional system. The thought and effort devoted to these problems are a great service to the Nation.
The second policy statement issued by our committee deals with these
matters in some depth, and I am pleased to submit copies of that statement for your examination. Our committee has deliberated at length
on every facet of this complex series of issues, in consultation with our
advisers.
We have also had the benefit of Mr. Brownell's Committee of the
American Bar Association. They met with us and his staff met with
us extensively in our discussions.
Both the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government and the CED Research and Policy Committee have approved
the policy positions set forth in this document. Of some 60 members
of these 2 committees, only 2 have expressed reservations and 1 has
dissented, in footnotes contained in the document. The members of
the two committees are listed on pages 5 and 6 of the policy statement.
I emphasize the strength of our concensus because there are some
distinct differences between positions taken by CED and the provisions
of the proposed constitutional amendment as it was approved by the
Senate in its last session.
We do agree, wholeheartedly, that any vacancy in the Office of
Vice President should be promptly filled, through nomination by the
President and with congressional confirmation.
*We also concur, of course, on authority for the 'Vice President to act
as President in situations where both President and Vice President
are in agreement on the need.
We regard clarification of other situations, involving presidential
inability, as an immediate imperative-as Members of the Senate do,
also-but we believe that certain modifications of the proposal, as
approved by the Senate last year, would prevent possible ambiguity
and confusion in future situations that might conceivably arise. It
may be well to identify, in quite specific terms, the points at which
we depart in any substantial way from the previous thinking of this
committee.
First, we believe that congressional confirmation of a Presidential
nomination to fill a vacancy in the Vice-Presidency should be through
a joint session of the two Houses, requiring approval by a majority
of all Senators and Representatives present and voting.
I understaie that was along the line that the Senator from Iowa
was just sugg-t ing in his amendiment--a joint session.
We favor this method, as opposed either to confirmation by the Senate alone, or to approval by the two Houses acting separately, for three
primary reasons: (1) The joint session corresponds to voting strength,
State by State, in the electoral college: (:,) action-pro or con-would
be more expeditious than could be expected through separate consideration by the two Iouses or under normal Senate procedures; and
(3) the Senate and the House of Representatives might be. in disagreement, with unfortunate effects. We acknowledge that formal action
in joint session would require establishment of riles of procedure for
that body but this would seem to be a relatively simple problem.
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Second, we believe that the initiative in determination of an undeclared presidential inability should lie with the Cabinet and not with
the Vice President. In other words, we feel that such determination
should be by the Cabinet, the Vice President concurring, as was provided in the amendment as passed by the Senate last year. Our reasoning rests upon repeated experience; for example, during the Garfield
and Wilson illnesses, showing that the Vice President is likely to be
most reluctant to proclaim the Nation's need for him to assume the
presidential powers and duties, no matter how urgent or obvious
the necessity, so long as the President lives.
The Vice President should never be forced to accept authority under
conditions permitting unfair charges of usurpation against him, nor
should his natural feelings of deference and loyalty to a disabled Chief
Executive be allowed to absolve him from his proper responsibility.
The Committee for Improvement of Management in Government has
taken a strong position on this point, perhaps because four of us were
members of the Cabinet during one or more of President Eisenhower's
several periods of illness.
If Members of the Congress were to visualize clearly the realities
in cases of this kind, we believe they would conclude, as we have, that
initiative should rest with the Cabinet, and not with the Vice President.
Further, we oppose creation of any alternative group as a substitute
for the Cabinet in determination of presidential inability, on grounds
fully explored in our policy statement. The Cabinet is best situated,
through the intimate knowledge its members have of major issues of
state and by reason of their day-to-day association with the President,
both to judge presidential inability and to assess the urgencies in the
national situation at any moment.
Third, we are much concerned that the Nation avoid any possibility
of doubt, dispute, or delay concerning termination of any conceivable
presidential inability. That is why we urge that this matter also be
decided by the Cabinet, subject only to presidential concurrence. The
amendment proposed last year opens-in our view-opportunity for
confusion and dispute over who may hold legitimate authority to
exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency in some future time
of trial and trouble.
The principle of separation of powers among the three branches of
government appears to us to be eminently sound. We cannot agree
that it is wise to place a conceivable future difference of opinion between President and Vice President over the termination of a presidential inability before the Congress for decision, especially if the result is to depend upon two-third majorities in both Houses.
This subject deserves renewed attention and closest scrutiny. Under the language previously proposed, it would be possible for a
President to terminate his own disability, against the judgment of the
Vice President supported by the entire Cabinet and a unanimous vote
of the Senate, if only one-third of the House of Representatives were
to agree with the President. We may hope that no such disagreement
would ever occur but some better arrangement than this should be made
for the possibility, however remote it may now seem to be. We
strongly reaffirm the merits of Cabinet decision on this delicate matter,
subject only to presidential concurrence.
Finally, although corrective action would not require a constitutional amendment, our committee strongly prefers the terms of the
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1886 statute on presidential succession, as opposed to those of the
1947 statute. If early provision is made for filling vice-presidential
vacancies, the need for revision of the present arrangement would be
lessened but it would still exist. The reasons for this position are
noted in our policy statement and they bear great weight. One fact
alone should be decisive here: For 8 of the past 18 years, the Speaker
of the House has been of the political party in opposition to that of the
President. Surely, we do not wish to permit a change in the partisan
complexion of the executive branch through some accident of death or
disability.
In summary, I would emphasize the criteria used by our committee
in arriving at its choices among the various possible alternatives.
They were: (1) Continuity in the exercise of Presidential powers
and duties; (2) legitimacy and public acceptability; (3) certainty,
leaving no doubt who-and who alone-may exercise these powers:
(4) stability in policy; (5) speed and simplicity in procedures used
to determine the issues; and (6) preservation of the separation of
powers.
Above all, we hone and trust that the best and wisest remedy may
be fonpd for each defect in our present system. The Constitution is
not easily amended, nor should it be. The process requires the kind of
careful deliberation being given in this case.
I would conclude by quoting a key paragraph in our CED policy
statement:
The urgency of national action, to resolve the doubts and uncertainties clouding

Presidential succession and inability, cannot be overly stressed. Failure to correct the deficiencies will subject the Nation to risks and hazards that are avoidable. Prompt action is imperative.

In view of the discussions between the Senator from Nebraska and
the Attorney General, I would just like to call your attention to one
passage from our statement, about the question of bringing Congress
into the picture. It begins with the words, "The disadvantage of a
Senate-approved arrangement goes too far"
Senator Bar. Could you tell me what page it is on?
Mr. FoLsom. That is on page 31 in the middle of the page. It ends
with the sentence:
Given a Congres with a hostile two-thirds majority such as existed during
the Presidency of Andrew Johnson, it could be used to deprive the President
of his powers and duties, without resorting to the circumscribed impeachment
procedures.

In summary, our main concern-I might say that if the committee
finds that they get better agreement on your resolution without any
change, we eitainly feel that you should go ahead and pass the legislation as it is wwithout any changes. But we do feel, as indicated in our
statement, that we think it would improve with these three somewhat
minor differences. In some ways, it could be very easily changed, but
on the other hand, we think they are quite important.
The first is that we think to authorize Congress to decide this dispute
really alters the constitutional separation of powers. By providing
this to Congress, we think you are apt to get into a period of indecisioni
and confusion where the people would not know who was going to be
President. As the Senator from Nebraska indicated, this might last
quite awhile.
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STATEMENT OF CLINTON ROSSITER, PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN
INSTITUTIONS, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
Mr. RossrrER. Thank you, Senator.

I am honored indeed to appear before this subcommittee and to voice
my support of its laudable efforts to provide workable solutions to the
persistent problems of Presidential ability and succession.
As you say, I have submitted for the record two statements, one on
inability, and the other on succession and the filling of a vacancy in the
Vice Presidency and from these I would like, if you will permit me, to
extract several points for emphasis.
First, I would like to say in all seriousness that this problem is not
a shadow, but a very real problem, indeed. It is, as you say, real in
history in the disability particularly of Presidents Garfield and Wilson. It is even more real in the threat of demoralized chaos that it
constantly poses.
May I put it this way: Perhaps the most pressing requirement of
good Government in the United States today is an uninterrupted, unchallengeable exercise of the full authority of the Presidency. We
need a man in the Presidency at all times who is capable of exercising
this authority, and we need one, moreover, whose claim to that authority is undoubted. No man should be expected to, no man should be
permitted to, wield the power of the Presidency without the clearest
of titles to it. And whatever arguments may exist for the great doctrine on which our system of constitutional government is based, that
all power must be, first of all, legitimate, apply with a kind of double
severity to the power that is lodged in the American Presidency.
My second point is to praise, as an interested citizen, the simple, sensible arrangement worked out by President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon in 1958, and since reconfirmed by Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson.
My third point is to state that we need something more than this
arrangement which has been a useful stopgap, but can be pushed just
so far, and however compelling a precedent it may be for future
Presidents.
At the same time, I think we need something less than one of the
grandiose complicated systems presented for our consideration in the
past few years and, indeed, before this subcommittee in the past few
weeks.
I say something more than the Eisenhower-Nixon or now JohnsonMcCormack arrangements, because there are simply too many people
of good will, of influence, of decision, who remain in doubt about this
question.
I say something less because it would be either feckless or reckless
to lay out an elaborate plan to solve a problem that in one sense is not
much of a problem at all and in another is quite insoluble.
Next, I would agree with those Congressmen, Senators, and scholars
who think that most of what we can reasonably hope to do can be done
by a joint or perhaps even a concurrent resolution of Congress in
support of the presidential and vice presidential arrangements. Such
a resolution could end debate on at least five doubtful issues, and the
rest could probably be left to the men of good will and good sense we
expect to govern us in the years to come, and these briefly, are the
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points that such a resolution could make with conviction principally
because they express what has always been the most thoughtful opinion
on the matter.
I think we can agree on these things: First, that the President of
the United States has the right to declare his own disability, and to
bestow his powers and duties upon the Vice President or in the event
there is not a Vice President upon the next officer in line of succession.
Two, if the President is unable to declare his own disability, the
Vice President is to make this decision on his own initiative and responsibility. I assume all this incidentally in writing.
Third, in the event of disability, the Vice President shall only act
as President. His original oath as Vice President shall be sufficient
to give full legitimacy to his orders, proclamations, and other official
actions in behalf of the disabled President.
Fourth, the President may recover his powers and duties at any
time simply by informing the Vice President that his disability no
longer exists.
And, finally, disability, to use the words of Professor Silva, means
any de facto inability, whatever the cause, whatever the duration, if
it occurs at a time when the urgency of public business requires executive action.
Now these points, sir, add exactly nothing in my opinion to the
situation as it now exists, and as it was so honestly put in the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement.
But, if a resolution of the Congress incorporating them would help
clear the air of doubt, let us by all means have it. For the benefit of
those who would still have doubts, let us consider declaring these
principles in an amendment to the Constitution. However, I would
inject the opinion that, I don't know how you feel, but I don't much
like constitutional amendments. I don't know if I should say that
before this subcommittee because I don't want to put it out of business.
Senator BAYH. That is why you are here; we want it straight from
the shoulder.
Mr. RossITER. But I think, in general, the less we load up the venerable Constitution with extra words the better off we are.
However, if you think it absolutely necessary, if the peace of mind
of the country would be greater, then let us put on top of the executive arrangement a resolution, on top of the resolution a constitutional
amendment.
But, sir, my next point, let us be careful to do no more than that.
Let us not write a law or amendment that tries to provide for all the
eventualities that might arise, let us, like the framers of the Constitution and of the best laws under which we live, not trap our descendents
in a snare of technicalities.
In particular, I would advocate, with President Eisenhower, that
we think very carefully before we go beyond the President and the
Vice President in search of machinery to decide doubtful cases of
disability. I think we should consider perhaps bringing Congress
into the picture but I hope that we will not construct, if I may call
it that. a monstrosity that raises more doubts than those it is supposed
to settle.
I owe it to you, sir, in all candor to say that I see almost nothing
to give us confidence. Rather a great deal to give us pause in the
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various schemes that would bring Congress or the Cabinet or the
Court or the Governors of the States or former Presidents into the
picture.
A judgment of Presidential disability is in both great senses of the
word a political decision, a high determination of policy, and the men
who count politically in this country, whether in the Congress or in the
Cabinet, are going to -have their say, they are going to be consulted,
and I think we should leave it to them and to the men who take action
with the President or the Vice President to decide how best to hear that
said.
Above all, I would be deeply distressed and troubled as a citizen if
in any way the Court or the Chief Justice were brought into this
picture.
As to this general proposal of a special tribunal, a Presidential disability commission, the notion that it could lay our doubts to rest seems
to me quite unsubstantial.
The last thing we would want to do is to provide some method resembling a trial, complete with expert witnesses and cross-examination in the face of the Nation's difficulty. In circumstances that call
for action, it would use up too much time. In a crisis that called for
unity, it would open up needless wounds.
Another point I would make is we should be careful not to provide
a method that would make it too easy for a President to surrender
his powers temporarily. We have labored, sir, for generations to
preserve the great essence of the Presidency, which is unity, and I
would be unhappy to see us open the door even a little way to pluralism
in this great office. I do not need to tell you that we are not talking
about an ordinary office, the generalship or the headship of a corporation. We are talking about an indisposed President of the United
States, the greatest constitutional office the world has ever known, and
there is surely a qualitative difference between it and all others in and
out of the Government.
I am led by these considerations to repeat my observation that in one
sense, perhaps the most important sense, the problem of disability is
quite insoluble. We may solve it legally by framing and understanding in law and custom or in the Constitution that leaves no doubt
about the terms on which power is to be transferred from a really
ailing President to a healthy Vice President, and we could perhaps do
away with the practical difficulties we met in 1881 when we had a Vice
President who was an outsider, or in 1919 when we had a President
who was an authentic giant.
But a period of clearly established Presidential disability in any case
is going to be a messy situation, one in which caution, perhaps even
timidity, must mark the posture of an Acting President; a period of
doubt, a period in which a Roosevelt declines or an Eisenhower recovers will be even messier, and I don't think it is any help at all to ask
why a Truman or a Nixon should not take over in such a situation.
My answer, sir, is that he cannot. That the Presidency is an office
governed by almost none of the ordinary rules, that a wise custom of
the American people command us at all reasonable costs to guard the
unity of the Presidency and of the dignity of the man who holds it.
Now, sir, may I say a few words on the problem of succession?
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On this problem I am aware of the reluctance now felt in the Congress to amend the act of 1947, and to return to the rather more simple
solution of the act of 1886, by placing the succession in the Cabinet.
Nevertheless, I am bound to say in my opinion that the act of 1947
is a poor one, in many ways one of the poorest ever to emerge from
this stately and distinguished body. I am not even sure, Senator,
that it is a constitutional act, and soonor or later it will have to be
amended, if not scrapped.
In the meantime, I am willing to settle for less. In particular, I
would agree with the carefully worked out views of yourself, at least
part of the views of the American Bar Association conference on Presidential inability and succession, and with those expressed in the letter
from former President Eisenhower.
In particular, I think that we should go against this problem today
and solve it, except in the most ghastly and unforeseen of circumstances, by providing a dignified, open and conclusive means of filling
the Vice Presidency whenever it has been vacated.
If we could be sure that there would always be or almost always be
a Vice President then perhaps we would not need to worry our heads
too much over the really quite unanswerable question whether the Secretary of State or the Speaker of the House at any particular time
would make a better president or acting president.
With all due respect to my Senator, if I may describe him that way,
Senator Keating, I do not think the proposal of a Second Vice President to be elected with the President and Vice President on the same
ticket is a happy one.
Not many of our able men, I fear, would be candidates for a position
of even less power and promise than the Vice Presidency itself. We
have labored long and hard to make the Vice Presidency a distinguished position which our most able politicians seek. I think we
would have to start our labors all over again.
With all due respect to my Governor, if I may describe him that
way, Governor Rockefeller, I do not see much that gives me confidence
in the proposal of a super Secretary standing between the President
and his great officers of state with the line of succession vested in him,
and if I may say so, sir, I pointed this out in a report to President
Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals in 1960. I am sorry to
see that Governor Rockefeller has revived this idea.
Several methods have been proposed, as you know, to fill the vacant
Vice Presidency. We could have, first of all, some kind of convening
in the States or in Washington of the electoral college, especially for
that purpose. We could have designation of a Vice President by the
President alone. We could have his election by one or both Houses of
Congress. We could have, I suppose, a specially called national election because Congress clearly has that power.
Finally, we could have nomination by the President and confirmation by one or both Houses of Congress.
The first of these methods, sir, I think is inadmissible, because the
electors are very rarely men of national standing, and the electoral
college is simply not designed for this kind of action.
The second method, designation by the President, is
because no President should be permitted to act entirely oninadmissible
his own in
choosing a successor.
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The third is equally inadmissible because no Congress should be
permitted to shove a successor upon a President against his will and
judgment especially if the President's party is in minority in Congress.
The fourth is inadmissible because I think it would be simply too
much turmoil and chaos and expense to have a special nationwide
election to choose a new Vice Presdent.
It is this final method, sir, which would join the three great political
branches of our Government-President, Senate, and House-in a
solemn and responsible act which strikes me as much the most sensible
and convenient way to handle this delicate and vital problem.
There would be, I think, a clear burden on the President to nominate a man of the highest stature and abilities. There would be a
clear burden on the Congress to withhold its approval unless such a
man were nominated, and to give its approval if such a man were nominated. Because the President disposes, we could expect the promise
of continuity in the executive branch, and because Congress, as it were,
disposes, we could assume the fact of legitimacy. We would have
once again that doublecheck, that system of checks and balances, that
has made our system so great and lasting.
I think we could expect the President and the joint session of Congress to work together in this vital area of the national interest and
indeed expect a real display of statesmanship.
Senator, in my opinion, an amendment to the Constitution would
be necessary in this instance to fix this particular reform firmly in the
American system of government. But I see no reason, political or
constitutional, why we should not have Congress enact a temporary
law for the time being creating the office of Acting Vice President
of the United States, providing for filling it in the manner described
above in the event the Vice Presidency is vacated, and designating its
occupant, as Congress has a right to do, as first in line of succession,
and would recommend to you with all humility this double step, a
proposal of an amendment to the Constitution to fill the Vice Presidency when it becomes vacant, on the nomination of the President,
and the confirmation of a joint session of Congress and at the same
time a, if you wish to call it that, stopgap law.
This, I think, is the surest way to solve the enduring problem of
which we have been so dramatically reminded by the tragic death of
President Kennedy.
One final point, Senator: I would like to point out to you that there
are yet other loopholes in our system. We do not, in fact, know what
we would do if we were to lose our elected President, our popularly
elected President between, as it is this year, November 3, when we all
go to the polls, and December 14, when the electoral colleges meet in
the several States to cast their ballots; we do not know what would.
happen if we were to lose the President between December 14 and then
January 6 when you meet with your colleges in House and Senate to
open the ballots and to register them, so to speak.
May I remind you, Senator, that in the 20th amendment, the famous
Norris, or lame duck amendment, in sections 3 and 4 there is a definite
plea for congressional action on this point.
Myself, I think that perhaps-I know you have studied this with
great care but if you feel that this is at all possible, it might be a useful
thing, that a special commission, a bipartisan commission, a commis-
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sion chosen by the President and the leaders of Congress, with Members of the Congress, members of the executive, and citizens in whom
we can have confidence, perhaps even a professor or two, for that matter, might well be set up to study and to report on all these problems,
on all the obvious loopholes we have in this part of our constitutional
system.
I am grateful, Senator, for having been offered this opportunity to
express my views, and I welcome any questions you may wish to put
to me.
(The statement of Mr. Rossiter follows:)
STATEMENT BY CLINTON RossITER
THE PROBLEM OF DISABILITY IN THE PRESIDENCY

The problem of disability is, then, a real problem, real in history and even
more real in the threat of demoralized chaos it constantly poses. Perhaps the
single most pressing requirement of good Government in the United States today
is an uninterrupted exercise of the full authority of the Presidency. We need a
man in the Presidency at all times who is capable of exercising this authority ;
we need one, moreover, whose claim to authority is undoubted. No man should be
expected or permitted to wield the power of the Presidency without the clearest
of titles to it. Whatever arguments may exist for the grand doctrine of constitutional Government that all power must be first of all legitimate apply twice
as severely to the power that is lodged in the American Presidency.
In my opinion, we need something more than this arrangement, however compelling a precedent it may be for future Presidents, and something less than one of
the grandiose schemes presented for our consideration in the past few years. I
say "something more" because there are simply too many people of influence who
remain in doubt about this question, "something less" because it would be either
feckless or reckless to lay out an elaborate plan to solve a problem that in one
sense is not much of a problem at all and in another is quite insoluble.
I would agree with those Congressmen and scholars who think that most of
what we can reasonably hope to do can be done by a joint or even concurrent
resolution of Congress.
Such a resolution could end debate on at least five doubtful issues; the rest
could properly be left to the men of good will and good sense we expect to govern
us in the years to come. And these are the points it could make with conviction,
principally because they express what has always been the most thoughtful
opinion on the matter:
(1) The President of the United States has the right to declare his own disability and to bestow his powers and duties upon the Vice President or, in the
event there is not a Vice President, upon the next officer in line of succession.
(2) If the President is unable to declare his own disability the Vice President
is to make this decision on his own initiative and responsibility.
(3) In the event of disability, the Vice President shall only act as President ; his original oath as Vice President shall be sufficient to give full legitimiacy to his orders, proclamations, and other official actions.
(4) The President may recover his powers and duties simply by informing
the Vice President that his disability no longer exists.
(5) Disability, to repeat Professor Silva's words, means "any de facto inability, whatever the cause or duration, if it occurs at a time when the urgency
of public busines requires Executive action."
These points add exactly nothing, in my opinion, to the situation as it now
exists, and as it was so honestly put by President Eisenhower ; but if a resolution incorporating them would help clear the air of doubt, let us by all means
have it. And for the benefit of those who would still have doubts, let us at the
same time move to declare these principles in an amendment to the Constitution.
Let us be careful to do no more than that. Let us not write law that tries
to provide for all the eventualities that might arise, lest we trap a
descendants
in a snare of technicalities. Let us not go beyond the President our
and
Vice President in search of machinery to decide doubtful cases of disability,
lest we
construct a monstrosity that raises more doubts than those it is
supposed
to
settle.
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As to the proposal of a special tribunal, a Presidential Disability Commission, the nation that it could lay our doubts to rest seems quite unsubstantial.
The last thing we should do is to provide a method that resembles a trial,
complete with expert witnesses and cross-examination. In circumstances that
called for action it would use up too much time ; in a crisis that called for unity
it would open up needless wounds.
I am led by all these considerations to repeat my observation that in one
sense, probably the most important sense, the problem of disability is quite
insoluble. We may yet solve it legally by framing an understanding in law and
custom that leaves no doubt about the terms on which power is to be transferred from an ailing President to a healthy Vice President ; we can even do
away with the practical difficulties we have met in the Vice President who is an
outsider or the President who is a giant, not to mention the President who is
mentally alert but physically confined.
A period of clearly established Presidential disability will always be a messy
situation, one in which caution or even timidity must mark the posture of the
the acting President.
THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY

The problem of succession could best be solved, except in the most ghastly
and unforeseen of circumstances, by providing some dignified and conclusive
means of filling the Vice-Presidency whenever it has been vacated. If we could
be sure that there would always, or almost always, be a Vice President, then
we would not need to worry our heads too much over the really quite unanswerable question of whether the Secretary of State or Speaker of the House
would make a better President.
The proposal of a second Vice President, to be elected with the President
and Vice President on the same ticket, is not a happy one. Not many of our
able men, I fear, would be candidates for a position of even less power and
promise than the Vice-Presidency itself.
Several methods have been proposed to fill a vacant Vice-Presidency :
(1) A vote of the electoral college, especially convened for this purpose.
(2) Designation by the President.
'(3) Election by one or both Houses of Congress.
(4) Nomination by the President and confirmed by a joint session of Congress.
The first of these methods would be inadmissible because the electors are
rarely men of national standing, the second because no President should be
permited to act entirely on his own in choosing a successor, the third because
no Congress should be permitted to shove a successor upon a President against
his will and judgment-especially if the President's party is in the minority
in Congress.
The fourth method, which would join the three great political branches of
our Government together in a solemn and responsible act, strikes me as much
the most sensible and convenient way to handle this delicate and vital problem.
The burden would rest upon the President to nominate a man of the highest
stature and abilities, upon the Congress to withhold its approval unless just such
a man were nominated. Because the President proposes we could expect the
promise of continuity in the executive branch ; because Congress disposes we
could assume the fact of legitimacy.
An amendment to the Constitution would be necessary to fix this reform firmly
in the American system of government, but I see no reason, political or constitutional, why Congress could not enact a temporary law creating the office
of "Acting Vice President," providing for filling it in the manner described
above in the event the Vice Presidency itself is vacated, and designating its
occupant as first in line of succession. This double step, a proposal of an
amendment to the Constitution accompanied by a stopgap law, is the surest
way, in my opinion, to solve the enduring problem of which we have so dramatically been reminded by the tragic death of President Kennedy.
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STATEMENT OF PAUL A. FREUND, PROFESSOR OF LAW, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Mr. FREUND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Paul A. Freund,
professor of law at Harvard University.
Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to respond to
the invitation to present my views on the subject of Presidential
inability and succession. I had the privilege of participating in the
consultations of the American Bar Association group last month, and
my views are in substantial accord with.the recommendations of that
group.
Presidential inability and Presidential succession are two distinct
problems, but they are interrelated. In considering both of them, our
aim should be threefold: to assure prompt action when required in an
emergency; to avoid an abrupt shift in administration policy; and to
provide safeguards against intrigue or other extraneous motivations.
I would suggest that in considering any of the proposals before the
committee, these three criteria be used to judge them.
Presidential inability is, to be sure, a delicate and distasteful subject
to contemplate but in all prudence it must be faced. The Constitution leaves the subject in a state of uncertainty in two crucial aspects:
What is the status and tenure of the officer who serves during the disability of the President, and how is the disability to be determined
in its onset and its termination ? Article II juxtaposes death, resignation, removal, and inability as occasions for a vacancy in the office of
President. Although the historic evidence seems to have pointed the
other way, consistent practice since the accession of John Tyler has
established that upon the death of the President, the Vice President
succeeds to the office and title for the unexpired term, and not simply
to the exercise of the powers and duties of the office.
There can hardly be disagreement that this was a wise interpretation, but it poses a problem in the case of mere inability of a living
President. President Truman, for example, has expressed himself
as believing that the Vice President or other office next in line of succession suceeds to the office itself for the remainder of the term even
in the case of the President's inability. So long as this uncertainty
persists it ought to be resolved in the most authoritative way, through
a constitutional amendment. To treat temporary inability in the same
way as death for purposes of succession would, it seems clear, cause
great reluctance on all sides to transfer the responsibilities of the
office where the inability appears to be curable within the term. Such
an inhibition on placing the responsibilities of the office in active,
responsible hands would be highly unfortunate in the periods of crisis
which have become more and more the staple of our national life.
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The first requisite, therefore, is a provision by way of constitutional
amendment to differentiate the position of one who succeeds to the
office on the death of the President from that of one who assumes the
powers and duties of the office during the President's inability.
The next question obviously concerns the determination of inability.
Does a provision on this subject require a constitutional amendment,
or might it be effected through ordinary legislation? To this question the answer is unclear. If we were concerned simply with the
inability of a President who had himself suceeded to the office through
the death of the former President, leaving no Vice President, so that
the line of succession next to be invoked would be that prescribed by
the act of Congress, a good case could be made that Congress could
provide the procedure for determining inability, as an adjunct to its
constitutional power to provide the line of succession after the Vice
President. But the problem is broader than this and extends to the
case where the President may be disabled while a Vice President is in
office.
In favor of a congressional power to deal with this case of inability,
the necessary-and-proper clause might be invoked; that is, arguably
Congress could legislate to enable the President and Vice President
more effectively to discharge their powers and duties with regard
to the filling of the office. But against this construction there is the
strong countervailing principle of separation of powers, particularly
as it affects the two highest Executive offices. The power to determine
disability is vested in the President and Vice President by implication,
just as the power of removal of high executive officers is vested in
the President by implication from his power of appointment. When
Congress undertook to require the President to submit removals to
the Senate for its approval, in the case of officers for whose appointment their approval had been required, the Supreme Court in a celebrated decision declared the law to be an unconstitutional intrusion
on the province of the Executive (Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
Even apart from the serious constitutional doubt concerning the authority of Congress in this sphere, it seems appropriate that so fundamental a matter as a transfer of powers in the highest Executive
Office should be dealt with in our fundamental law.
The President, of course, has the primary responsibility for determining his own disability. But occasions may arise when he is not
in a position to make such a declaration or even to recognize its necessity. In that case the responsibility would f all on the Vice President;
but that officer should be spared the task of shouldering the responsibility alone. Leaving aside actual self-interest, the very appearance
of self-interest might impel him to refrain from a decision which by
objective standards ought to be taken. An advisory body to share
the responsibility should be designated, and the heads of the executive
departments would seem to be the most appropriate existing group for
the purpose. A constitutional amendment should so provide.
There is much to be said, as ai alternative, for a special Presidential
Disability Commission, which would be appointed by the President
at the beginning of his term and which would undoubtedly include
very distinguished citazeins, among them perhaps former Presidents,
certain members of the Cabinet, representatives from the Congress,
and possibly a medical expert. It would be rather awkward to provide
for such a commission in the Constitution-that is to say, in any
detail-but authority should be given to Congress to provide through
22-517 0 - 73 - 1Q
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regular legislation for the appointment by the President of such a
body. In this way the constitutional amendment would first fill
the void by specifying the heads of the executive departments; and,
second, would introduce a measure of flexibility by empowering
Congress--with the approval of the President through the lawmaking
process-to set out in detail a plan for a different and more specialized
body. The Commission would have the advantage of being a disinterested group, designated by the President himself, and prepared
to take action without any hint of extraneous motivations.
A contingency might conceivably arise when the President would
disagree with the Vice President and a majority of the heads of
departments or of the alternate body. In that unhappy eventuality
the office ought not to be at the hazard of an incapable President, and
he would be relieved of his powers and duties upon the action
of the factfinding group. But such a controversy ought not to
be left unresolved. It could be dealt with when the President declares
the termination of his disability. If the Vice President and the factfinding body concur with the President, the matter is ended. If there
is disagreement, the question should be placed before the Congress.
For this purpose it seems advisable that the Congress meet in joint session, and that a two-thirds vote of all the elected Members be required
to resolve the difference against the President. This procedure would
be taken by analogy to the process of impeachment. Meanwhile, it
should be noted, the office itself would not left unfilled or filled by one
whose capacity was in serious doubt, since the Vice President would
continue to serve until the final action of Congress was taken.
I turn now to the question of the succession to the Presidency. It
hardly needs to be said that this problem cannot be profitably considered by envisaging the personal qualifications of individuals who
may hold various offices, whether as Speaker of the House, President
pro tempore of the Senate, Secretary of State, or whatever, in the
unforeseeable future for which we must necessarily provide. The
problem is a structural, an institutional one.
The key to the assurance of continuity of administration policy and
the avoidance of extraneous considerations in deciding whether to
make a transfer of power lines, in my judgment, is keeping the Office
of Vice President filled at all times. This is important in itself, given
the increased usefulness of the office in recent years, and for the sake
of orderly transition, whether temporary or for the remainder of the
term.
Of the several methods which have been suggested for the selection
of an interim Vice President, the most satisfactory, in my judgment,
would be election by Congress with the approval of the President.
This could be done by the President's submission of one or more
noC :.,:
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Pr.esidenev.x. -1houkl have a popular base and at the 'same time be in harmony with the Presidency.
These objectives can best be achieved by associating the Congress and
the President in the selection, with the opportunity for informal consultation to be expected in such a process.
Senator BAYR. Thank you very much, sir. That was certainly a
very concise statement.
If I might hastily ask a question or two, keeping one eye on the
clockMr. FumN. Do not bother about that, Senator; I can make my
arrangements.
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Senator BAYS. We have a police escort waiting, if that will make
it a little easier to get there on time.
Do you see some possibility of conflict of interest as far as the
judgment of the Cabinet? This is a question which has been raised
previously and which Professor Burns raised appropriately. Do you
feel that there would be other circumstances which would cause the
Cabinet, because of its familiarity with the President and the job
he is doing, or for other reasons, to avoid making a decision?
Mr. FRuEn. Of course, in all of these alternative proposals, one is
trying to steer a course between two polar risks: One, that the body
will be motivated agressively by self-interest, and the other that the
body will be too passive, too negative, in order to avoid the appearance
of self-interest. I think that the role of the Cabinet as the factfinding
body is closely tied in with the question of succession. This is one of
the respects in which, as I noted at the beginning of my statement, the
two problems-that of determining disability, and that of successionare interrelated.
Now, Professor Burns, as I understand it, envisages or advocates a
return to succession through the Cabinet. I could well understand that
if that is to be the line of succession, particularly if the Vice-Presidency is not to be filled, then one might hesitate to make the Cabinet
the factfinding or advisory body on disability.
My suggestion, however, and that of the bar association, is that the
problem of succession be circumvented for practical purposes by
keeping the Office of Vice President filled and thus the Secretary of
State would have a highly remote interest in the office.
Senator BAYS. Do you feel that the timidity that has been expressed in the past by Vice Presidents to assume this role is related
to at least some extent to the standby procedure he has followed in
the past?
Mr. FREJND. I do, decidedly. I think that a solemn constitutional
responsibility, spelled out in our fundamental law, would impel the
Vice President and the heads of departments to act on the matter objectively, more so than they would if the arrangement were a purely informal extraconstitutional one, as it has been in the past.
Senator BAYS. Senator Keating may have a question or two to pose
to you. I am most anxious that you be able to catch that plane.
Senator KEATING. I do not believe I have. I was necessarily called
away. I know Professor Freund's point of view. I can only say that
my chief reason for differing with him is very largely a practical one.
Senator BAYS. I have not discussed the professor's thoughts on our
mutual concern about the State legislatures.
Senator KEATING. I would be happy to hear you say how you are
going to successfully get through all the State legislatures anything
more than a simple authority to the Congress to act.
Mr. FRUNqD. Well, Senator, I wonder if this question of specificity
versus generality does not cut both ways so far as popular acceptance
is concerned. That is to say, I should find it rather embarrassing,
myself, to go before State legislatures with something in the nature
of a blank check to the Congress. Legislatures might suggest all
sorts of possible and, to them, horrendous mechanisms which will pass
the Congress and which might even get the approval of the President,
which might even get the reluctant approval of the President,
because
something is.needed and we do not have anything.
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Now, it seems to me the merit of the bar association proposal is that
it tries to make the best of both worlds; that is to say, it sets up a
specific and what seems to me a reasonable and appealing procedure,
but at the same time leaves it to Congress through the lawmaking
process to set up a different mechanism if a better one is seen and
approved. But meanwhile, the void is filled.
I, myself, see a good deal of merit in the inability commission idea,
particularly if the commission is appointed by the President at the
beginning of his term. Yet such a commission could be spelled out
very awkwardly at best in the constitutional document. I think that
is the kind of thing to leave to Congress. But if you simply gave
Congress a general power, would not the State legislatures say, "Well,
suppose Congress will take the power on itself to decide when the
President is disabled. Are we really voting for that?" Or they
might say, "Why has not Congress acted in the past ? Is it so clear
that they do not have this power?"
In short, I am as troubled by the skeletonized version so far as the
State legislatures are concerned, as you are, Senator, by this, as I
would see it, middle-of-the-road version, which is both specific and
flexible.
Senator KEATING. Well, I have no doubt that some of those views
would be voiced in some of the State legislatures. But we have considerable precedent in the income tax amendment and in the prohibition amendment, where Congress was just about given blank check
power to legislate; that is, there is some precedent for it. It would
be my political judgment that there would be less likelihood of fullfledged debate and defeat in State legislatures for a simple authority
to the Congress to legislate than there would be in such a long and not
particularly involved, but somewhat involved proposal such as is embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 139, which I would assume-I have
not researched this, but I would assume if anything of that kind was
made a constitutional amendment, it would be the longest one in history. You are more of a student of the Constitution than some of the
members of this committee, but I do not offhand think of any constitutional amendment which is as involved as this one.
Mr. FREUND. Well, for one thing, Senator, this would deal with two
topics-disability and succession-which could be in the; form of two
amendments. Furthermore, the Presidency has been a very complicated textual part of the Constitution, as you know. The 12th amendment is quite complex.
Senator KEATING. Well, I respect your viewpoint.
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of the United States does not contain any procedure
THEfor Constitution
dealing with a case of either presidential inability or vice-presidential vacancy. Between 1789 and 1965, several Presidents of the United
States have become disabled in office, and the Vice-Presidency has been
vacant on sixteen different occasions totaling more than thirty-seven
years.1 Within the last twenty-one years, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
suffered a fatal stroke, President Harry S. Truman was the object of an
attempted assassination, President Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered a
heart attack from which he recovered, and President John F. Kennedy
was assassinated. The Vice-Presidency was vacant for approximately
twenty per cent of this period. These situations pointed up the glaring
defects in our system of presidential succession. After years of unsuccessful attempts to agree on a proposed solution to the problems of presidential
inability and vice-presidential vacancy, the United States Congress was
finally jolted into action by the assassination of President Kennedy. On
Tuesday, July 6, 1965, Congress proposed the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, designed to solve these problems once and for all.
The proposed amendment, which is now under consideration by the
state legislatures, provides:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Sec. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by
a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits
to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no
* Member of the New York Bar; member, American Bar Association Conference on

Presidential Inability and Succession.
1. See generally Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 Fordham L. Rev. 457, 459 & nn.6-8 (1964).
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inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twentyone days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in
session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by
two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as
Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of
his office. 2

The purpose of this article is to relate briefly the history behind the
proposed amendment, to describe its legislative development, and to
analyze its provisions.3
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

A. PresidentialInability
There was little discussion at the Constitutional Convention of 1787
regarding presidential succession. The only reference to the matter of
presidential inability was the unanswered question of John Dickinson of
Delaware: "What is the extent of the term 'disability' & who is to be
the judge of it?" 4 As adopted, the Constitution provided in article II,
section 1, clause 6:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation,
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case
of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

When President William Henry Harrison died on April 4, 1841, a great
deal of attention was focused on this provision. There was some difference
of opinion as to the meaning of the clause. Vice-President John Tyler
asserted his right to the office and title of President for the remainder of
Harrison's term. This unprecedented action was not without opposition.
Several political leaders and newspapers argued that the Constitution
2. H.R. Rep. No. 564, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1965).

3. This subject is treated extensively by the author in his book, From Failing Hands:
The Story of Presidential Succession (1965) [hereinafter cited as From Failing Hands], and
in his articles, The Problem of Presidential Inability-Will Congress Ever Solve It?, 32
Fordham L. Rev. 73 (1963); The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of Presidential Suc-

cession and Inability, 32 Fordham L. Rev. 457 (1964); Presidential Inability: The Problem
and a Solution, 50 A.B.A.J. 321 (1964).
4. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 427 (Farrand ed. 1937).
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intended for him to remain Vice-President and discharge the powers and
duties of President. They said that the words "the Same," in article II,
section 1, clause 6, had reference to the powers and duties of the office
and not the office itself.' John Quincy Adams stated at the time:
I paid a visit this morning to Mr. Tyler, who styles himself President of the United
States, and not Vice-President acting as President, which would be the correct style.
But it is a construction in direct violation both of the grammar and context of the
Constitution, which confers upon the Vice-President, on the decease of the President,
not the office, but the powers and duties of the said office. 6

When Congress assembled in special session in May 1841, disagree-

ments were voiced over Tyler's status.7 Congress, however, acquiesced in
his claim to the Presidency, and the precedent was set. It was followed,
in turn, by Vice-Presidents Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Chester
A. Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry S. Truman, and
Lyndon B. Johnson.'
On July 2, 1881, when the Nation was confronted with its first case
of presidential inability, the Tyler precedent became a formidable obstacle to the Vice-President's acting as President. On that day President
James A. Garfield was shot by an assassin, and for -the next eighty days
he wavered between life and death. Although it appeared at times that
he would recover, he had frequent relapses and suffered periods of hallucinations. Toward the end of this period, he saw a few members of his
Cabinet, but not once did he see Vice-President Chester A. Arthur.
President Garfield's only official act during the eighty days was the
signing of an extradition paper. The members of the Cabinet tried to
keep the wheels of government turning, but there was much they could
not do. Important matters such as the prosecution of post office swindlers
and the handling of foreign affairs were neglected.
During the Garfield inability, scholars and politicians discussed the
procedure to be followed in a case of presidential inability. Many contended that, if Vice-President Arthur undertook to discharge the powers
and duties of President, he would become President for the remainder
of the term whether or not Garfield recovered, since the Constitution
provided the same result for inability as for death. Garfield's Cabinet
5. From Failing Hands 94-95.
6. 10 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams 463-64 (C. Adams ed. 1876).
7. From Failing Hands 95-96.
8. It is interesting to note that, shortly after Lyndon B. Johnson became President,
Leonard C. Jones, a New Mexico attorney, unsuccessfully requested Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to institute a suit
to try President Johnson's right to the office. In June 1964, Jones instituted his own suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an ultimate determination that Johnson's becoming President was unlawful, illegal and unauthorized by the
Constitution. The suit was dismissed in September 1964.

147
discussed the matter and unanimously agreed that an Acting President
was necessary. It divided four to three, however, on the question of the
Vice-President's status if he assumed the President's duties. A majority,
which included Attorney General Wayne MacVeagh, felt that, if Arthur
acted, he would become President, as did Tyler, for the remainder of
the term. The debate came to a close on September 19, 1881, when Garfield died and Arthur became President.9
Twelve years later, another President of the United States suffered an
inability. On the night of June 30, 1893, President Grover Cleveland
boarded a yacht in New York City and for the next five days cruised
in Long Island Sound. Unknown to the public and to practically every
member of the Government, including Vice-President Adlai Stevenson,
was the fact that during that cruise President Cleveland was operated
on for the removal of a cancerous growth on the roof of his mouth.
Cleveland left the yacht on July 5 at his summer home where he convalesced until July 17, when he again boarded the yacht for a second
operation to remove suspicious tissue which had been observed after
the first operation.
Aside from an article appearing in the PhiladelphiaPress on August
29, 1893, there was no public reference to the operations. The article
was condemned as a hoax and the substance thereof was refuted by the
doctors and members of the Government. It was not until the publication
of an article in the Saturday Evening Post in 1917 by one of the doctors
involved in the operation that the public became aware of this inability."
According to the doctor, the operation had been performed under complete secrecy because a financial panic existed in the country, and it was
believed that, if the public were informed, a greater crisis would result."
This concealed inability was followed by another case of presidential
inability. On September 6, 1901, President William McKinley was shot.
The same day, he was operated upon while under the influence of ether.
During the ensuing week, he remained confined to bed unable to perform
his presidential duties. At first his condition seemed to improve, but after
a few days it began to deteriorate, and on September 14, 1901, at 2:00
A.M., President McKinley died.
The next case of presidential inability became the most notorious in
our history.'2 On September 25, 1919, President Woodrow Wilson, while
on a speaking tour of the United States to gain support for the League
of Nations, fell ill. His condition grew worse and, on the following day,
9.
10.
Post,
11.
12.

See generally From Failing Hands 117-39.
Keen, The Surgical Operations on President Cleveland in 1893, Saturday Evening
Sept. 22, 1917, p. 24.
Ibid. See generally From Failing Hands 147-51.
See id. at 162-80. See generally Smith, When the Cheering Stopped 89-261 (1964).
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the tour was cancelled, and the presidential train was ordered to return
to Washington. The public was informed that Wilson had suffered a
complete nervous breakdown. On October 2, 1919, President Wilson
suffered a stroke which paralyzed the left side of his body.
From September 25, 1919, until the inauguration of President Warren
G. Harding on March 4, 1921, the United States was without the services
of an able President. For more than six months after the occurrence of the
stroke, very few persons had any contact with the President. The medical
bulletins regarding his health merely said that he was suffering from
nervous exhaustion. As a result, rumors about his condition were circulated. Some supposedly authoritative sources stated that he had had an
abscess of the brain; others, that he had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage;
and still others, that he had gone mad.
The facts of the inability were concealed not only from the public, but
also from the members of the Cabinet. Vice-President Thomas R.
Marshall was dependent for his information on the newspapers and the
grapevine. He resented being kept in the dark and remarked that it would
be a tragedy for the people if he had to act as President under such circumstances.13 Edith Bolling Wilson, the President's wife, and Dr. Cary
Grayson, his physician, were practically alone in their knowledge of the
truth.
In an effort to keep the executive branch functioning, the Cabinet met
over twenty times under the direction of Secretary of State Robert Lansing. For this initiative, Wilson dismissed Lansing in February 1920, on the
ground that he had assumed presidential authority. Despite its efforts,
there were many matters which the Cabinet could not handle. It could not
sign bills into law, or make presidential appointments, or answer important letters sent to Wilson. Nor could it agree to amendments to the
Charter of the League of Nations which would enable the United States
to gain entry. As a result of the absence of presidential leadership by
Wilson or a legitimate Acting President, United States participation in
the League of Nations was defeated in the Senate, numerous governmental vacancies went unfilled, twenty-eight bills became law by default
of any action by the President, foreign diplomats were unable to submit
their credentials to the President as required, and, in many other respects,
the operation of government was suspended. Anyone who wished to communicate with the President had to do so through Mrs. Wilson. She
decided what matters were important enough to be brought to his
attention.14
13. 2 Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet 37 (1926).
14. Mrs. Wilson stated: "Woodrow Wilson was first my beloved husband whose life I
was trying to save, fighting with my back to the wall-after that he was the President
of the United States." E. Wilson, My Memoir 290 (1939).
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On September 24, 1955, thirty-six years after the Wilson inability,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered a heart attack. During the
next few months, a small group consisting mainly of members of the
Cabinet and the White House Staff carried on the affairs of government
while the President convalesced. 5 On two other occasions during the
Eisenhower administration, the President suffered disabilities (an attack
of ileitis and a speech impairment). In "each of these . . . instances," said

Eisenhower, "there was some gap that could have been significant in which
I was a disabled individual-from the standpoint of carrying out the
emergency duties pertaining to the office-I was fortunate that no crisis
arose."' 6
The tragic death of President Kennedy on November 22; 1963, revived
the question of presidential inability.
B.

Vice-Presidential Vacancy

The Vice-Presidency was created in the closing days of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and appears to have been an afterthought of
the framers.' 7 What discussion occurred centered on the Vice-President's
position as President of the Senate. Some of the delegates argued that
the office, in combining the functions of succeeding to the Presidency and
presiding over the Senate, would violate the principle of separation of
powers. Others felt that, unless the Vice-President were President of the
Senate, he would be without a job and that, if he were not President of the
Senate, some member of the Senate, by being made President, would be
deprived of his vote, except in cases of ties. There were those who thought
the office unnecessary altogether.18 The office was created by a vote of
eight states to two.
The Constitution gave the Vice-President only two duties: (1) to
preside over the Senate, in which capacity he could cast tie-breaking votes
and open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors,"
and (2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of
death, resignation, removal or inability. 20 His office was unique, combining
legislative and executive functions.
The Vice-President, like the President, was to hold office for four
years. 2' He was to be elected at the same time and in the same manner as
15. See From Failing Hands 217-22; Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate
for Change 1953-1956, at 535-46 (1963).
16. Address by General Eisenhower, American Bar Association National Forum on
Presidential Inability, May 25, 1964, in 50 A.B.A.J. 638, 640 (1964) (partial text).
17. See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 535-37 (Farrand ed. 1911).
18. See From Failing Hands 51-56.
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3.
20. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
21. Ibid.
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the President. He was to be subject to impeachment but, while the Constitution provided that the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court would preside at a trial of the President, no presiding officer was
mentioned for a trial of the Vice-President. The Constitution prescribed
no oath of office for the Vice-President. Nor did it mention any qualifications for the Vice-Presidency; but since, under the original method of
election, the Vice-President would be the presidential candidate who
received the second highest number of votes after the choice of the President, he would have the same qualifications as President (i.e., be a natural
born citizen, at least thirty-five years of age, and fourteen years a resident
within the United States).22
The original method of election was designed to insure that the VicePresident be a person comparable in stature to the President. Its purpose
was soon frustrated because the electors, each of whom had two votes for
President, would cast one vote for the candidate they wanted as President
and the other for their vice-presidential choice. 23 In the election of 1800,
most of the Republican electors voted for Thomas Jefferson and Aaron
Burr, intending Jefferson for President and Burr for Vice-President. Burr
received as many votes as Jefferson so that the House of Representatives
was required to choose between them for President. This occurrence
caused the mode of election to be modified in 1804 by the adoption of the
twelfth amendment, which provided that the electors would cast two distinct votes-one designated for President and one for Vice-President. In
order to insure that the Vice-President would have the same qualifications
as the President, the words "no person constitutionally ineligible to the
office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President . . ." were

inserted in the amendment. 24
Following the adoption of the twelfth amendment, the Vice-Presidency
rapidly declined in prestige. 25 Candidates for the office were now selected
with a view to balancing the ticket and appeasing dissident elements in
the presidential candidate's party. Little attention was given to the vicepresidential candidate's suitability for the Presidency. It was not until
the twentieth century that this decline was arrested and the office began to
take on greater significance in the framework of government.
Today, the Vice-President is a vital part of the executive machinery. He
sits as a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council; he is
Chairman of the -Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, of the
National Aeronautics Space Council, and of the Advisory Council of the
Peace Corps; he coordinates various government programs, acts as a
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ibid.
Ibid.
U.S. Const. amend. XII.
See From Failing Hands 79-88.
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liaison between the executive and legislative branches and as a representative of the President at home and abroad.
While the Vice-President's duties have been relatively few during much
of our history, the office proved to be of vital importance on several
occasions. Eight Vice-Presidents succeeded to the Presidency upon the
death of the President and successfully led the country through these
crises.2" Yet the Vice-Presidency has been vacant often. This has been the
case each of the eight times when a Vice-President succeeded to the
Presidency. It has also been the case when Vice-Presidents George Clinton, Elbridge Gerry, William R. King, Henry Wilson, Thomas A. Hendricks, Garret A. Hobart, and James S. Sherman died, and John C. Calhoun
resigned. Between July 9, 1850, and March 4, 1857, the office was occupied for less than two months; and between September 19, 1881, and
March 4, 1889, for less than nine months. In each of James Madison's two
terms as President, the Vice-President died.
Despite the vacancies which have occurred in the Vice-Presidency
through the years, no serious effort was made to devise a means for filling
such vacancies until after the assassination of President Kennedy. It was
then that politicians and scholars alike finally recognized the necessity of
having a Vice-President at all times, since he is the official best able to
prepare himself for succession to the Presidency in the event of an
emergency.

II.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
A.

1881-1962

During the inabilities of Presidents Garfield and Wilson, attempts by
Congress to find an acceptable method of handling the inability problem
were unsuccessful because of diverse views on the subject.27 From 1921
to 1955, Congress gave practically no attention to the problem. In 1955,

Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, Chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, ordered the Committee's staff to undertake
a study of the inability problem. In November 1955, during the course
of this study, the staff prepared and distributed to various jurists, political
scientists, and public officials a questionnaire comprised of eleven fundamental questions. 28 Among these were: "What was intended by the term
'inability' as used in ... the Constitution?" "Shall a definition be enacted
into law?" "Who shall initiate the question of the President's inability
to discharge the powers and duties of his office?" "Once raised, who shall

make the determination of inability?" "If temporary, who raises the ques-

tion that the disability has ceased to exist?" "Once raised, who shall make
26. See generally id. at 3-20, 89-233.
27. Id. at 133-39, 179.
28. Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Presidential
Inability 2-3 (Comm. Print 1956).
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the determination of cessation?" "In the event of a finding of temporary
disability, does the Vice President succeed to the powers and duties of the
office or to the office itself?" "Does Congress have the authority to enact
legislation to resolve any and all of these questions, or will a constitutional
amendment of amendments be necessary?" 29
The replies to this questionnaire were extremely varied. 0 The Eisenhower heart attack prompted the House Committee on the Judiciary to
set up a special subcommittee to look into the matter. Hearings were held
in April 1956, and more opinions, similarly varied, were heard.31 In
April 1957, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, appeared before the
Subcommittee and, on behalf of the Eisenhower Administration, proposed
a constitutional amendment containing the following provisions: 2 If the
President declared his inability in writing, the Vice-President would
thereupon discharge the powers and duties of the office. If the President
failed to declare his inability or was unable to do so, the Vice-President,
"if satisfied of the President's inability, and upon approval in writing of a
majority of the heads of executive departments who are members of the
President's Cabinet . .

.""

would act as President. In either case the

President would resume his powers and duties upon his written declaration
of recovery.
Since this proposal allowed the President to declare the cessation of his
inability, it was criticized on the ground that it would be ineffectual if a
disabled President were unwilling to relinquish his powers and duties. It
was pointed out that in such a case the President could nullify the action
of the Vice-President and Cabinet by immediately declaring his recovery.
Various other proposals were made involving either separately or in combination the Vice-President, Cabinet, Congress, Supreme Court, and an
Inability Commission.3 4 After much consideration, the Subcommittee was
unable to reach agreement on an approach and so indicated to the full
committee on May 16, 1957, which, in turn, made no recommendations
to the House of Representatives.
In January and February 1958, the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, under the chair29. Id. at 3.
30. Ibid; Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., An Analysis
of Replies to a Questionnaire and Testimony at a Hearing on Presidential Inability (Comm.
Print 1957).
31. Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the Study of Presidential Inability
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 20 _(1956).
32. Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the Study of Presidential Inability
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, at 7-8 (1957).
33. Id. at 8.
34. See Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability-Will Congress Ever Solve It?,
32 Fordham L. Rev. 73, 112-20 (1963).
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manship of Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, held hearings on the
subject."- A number of constitutional experts were heard and many others
submitted their views in the form of memoranda and letters. Attorney
General William P. Rogers testified and endorsed the Brownell proposal,
adding a provision to cover the possibility of a President's disagreeing
with a determination of inability made by the Vice-President and Cabinet.
He suggested that in such a case the Vice-President, with the approval of
a majority of the Cabinet, could bring the disagreement before Congress,
which then would decide the matter. If a majority of the House of Representatives voted that the President was disabled and if the Senate concurred by a two-thirds vote, the Vice-President would then discharge the
powers and duties of the President until a majority of both Houses
decided that the inability had ended or until the end of the term."6
The Brownell proposal, thus modified, was approved in substance by
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments on March 12, 1958, but
Congress adjourned without considering the matter, and it took no action
in 1959 or 1960. Why did Congress fail to solve this problem after the
most concerted effort in history? Although there was general agreement on
the need for a constitutional amendment as distinguished from a statute,
considerable disagreement had manifested itself on a procedure for determining the existence and termination of an inability. Of the numerous
proposals advanced, each had its adherents and critics. None was able to
muster enough support for passage.
A significant development during this period occurred on March 3,
1958, when the White House released the text of an informal agreement
between President Eisenhower and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon,
under which the Vice-President would act as President in a case of inability." In the event of an inability, the President would, if possible,
inform the Vice-President. If he were prevented from communicating with
the Vice-President, the Vice-President could decide, after such consulta35. Hearings on S.J. Res. 100, 133, 134, 141, 143 & 144, S. 238 & 3113 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
36. Id. at 136-40, 155-56.
37. See generally Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 233-35 (1965).
This extra-constitutional agreement has since been followed by President Kennedy and
Vice-President Johnson, President Johnson and Speaker John W. McCormack, and President Johnson and Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. Its only application to date occurred
when President Johnson entered the Bethesda Naval Hospital in October 1965 for the
removal of his gall bladder. It was announced by the White House that Vice-President
Humphrey would be standing by while the President was under anesthesia, and for an
indefinite period thereafter, and during the period would be ready to make a presidential
decision if any situation arose requiring such action. The operation took place without any
decisions having to be made by the Vice-President. See N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 7, 8, 9
& 10, 1965, p. 1.
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tion as seemed to him appropriate, that there was an inability. In either
case the President would be empowered to declare the end of his inability.
This understanding was intended only as a temporary measure pending
action by Congress. Since the agreement did not have the force of law and
since it depended entirely on the good will of the President and VicePresident, it was recognized that it was not a permanent solution to the
inability problem.
B. 1963-1964
With the election of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency, the problem of
presidential inability receded from general congressional and public
consciousness. Only a few members of Congress continued to press for
action. The Administration seemed little concerned about a permanent
solution to the inability problem. Early in 1963, Senators Estes Kefauver
and Kenneth B. Keating, having decided to put aside their previous proposals, joined in sponsoring a resolution (S.J. Res. 35)38 which, by constitutional amendment, would clarify the Constitution on the status of the
Vice-President in a case of inability and would empower Congress to
legislate on the matter of inability. Senator Keating stated:
.

.

. Senator Kefauver and I .

.

. agreed that if anything was going to be done, all

of the detailed procedures which had been productive of delay and controversy had
best be scrapped for the time being in favor of merely authorizing Congress in a
constitutional amendment to deal with particular methods by ordinary legislation.
This, we agreed, would later allow Congress to pick and choose the best from among
all the proposals without suffering the handicap of having to rally a two-thirds majority
in each House to do it.39

In an effort to revive interest in the problem, Senator Kefauver commenced hearings of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments on
June 11, 1963.40 Testimony was taken from seven witnesses. The then
Deputy Attorney General, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, and others testified
in support of S.J. Res. 35. Subsequently, on June 25, 1963, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments favorably reported S.J. Res. 35 to
the full Committee, but the sudden death of Senator Kefauver in August
1963 brought the progress of the movement virtually to a halt. The
Kennedy tragedy revived the inability problem once again. As Senator
Keating stated: "As distasteful as it is to entertain the thought, a matter
of inches spelled the difference between the painless death of John F.
Kennedy and the possibility of his permanent incapacity to exercise the
duties of the highest office of the land.""'
38.
39.
40.
ments
41.

S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
S. Rep. No. 1382, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1964).
Hearings on S.J. Res. 28, 35 & 84 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, 28, 35, 84, 138, 139, 140, 143 & 147 Before the Subcom-
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Following President Kennedy's death, there descended on Congress a
flurry of proposals dealing with the problems of presidential inability and
the vice-presidential vacancy. Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, Kefauver's
successor as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, announced in December 1963 that the Subcommittee would hold
hearings on these problems early in 1964. Senator Bayh, together with
several other Senators," introduced a proposal (S.J. Res. 139)43 containing provisions on inability, the vice-presidential vacancy, and the line of
succession beyond the Vice-Presidency. The inability provisions were
essentially the same as those embodied in the revised Eisenhower Administration approach.
Meanwhile, the internal machinery of the most powerful legal group in
the country-the American Bar Association-went into operation. President Walter E. Craig of the ABA sent out special invitations to twelve
lawyers familiar with the problem of presidential inability, inviting them
to attend a Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession at the
Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., January 20 and 21, 1964."4
From this two-day Conference emerged a consensus that the Constitution should be amended to provide:
(1) In the event of the inability of the President, the powers and duties, but not
the office, shall devolve upon the Vice President or person next in line of succession
for the duration of the inability of the President or until expiration of his term of
office;
(2) The inability of the President may be established by declaration in writing of
the President. In the event that the President does not make known his inability, it
may be established by action of the Vice President or person next in line of succession with the concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet or by action of such other
body as the Congress may by law provide;
(3) The ability of the President to resume the powers and duties of his office shall
be established by his declaration in writing. In the event that the Vice President and a
majority of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may by law provide shall
mittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1964):.

42. They were Senators Alan Bible of Nevada, Quentin N. Burdick of North Dakota,
Frank E. Moss of Utah, Claiborne deB. Pell of Rhode Island and Jennings Randolph of
West Virginia.
43. S.J. Res. 139, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
44. The conferees were former Attorney General Herbert Brownell; Walter E. Craig
and Lewis F. Powell of the American Bar Association; Professor Paul A. Freund of Harvard
Law School; former Deputy Attorney General Ross L. Malone; Dean Charles B. Nutting
of the National Law Center; Sylvester C. Smith, Jr., former President of the American
Bar Association; Jonathan C. Gibson of Chicago, then Chairman of the Committee on
Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the American Bar Association; James
C.
Jr.,
former chief counsel of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of Kirby,
the Senate
Judiciary Committee; Martin Taylor of New York, chairman of the Committee on Federal
Constitution of the New York State Bar Association; Edward Wright of Arkansas,
then
chairman of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association; and the author.
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not concur in the declaration of the President, the continuing disability of the President
may then be determined by the vote of two-thirds of the elected Members of each
House of the Congress;
(4) In the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice
President or the person next in line of succession shall succeed to the office for the
unexpired term; and
(5) When a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President the President shall
nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority of the elected Members of
Congress meeting in joint session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired term.4

The consensus was immediately released to the press. It was endorsed
by the ABA on February 17, 1964,46 and formally presented to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments on February 24 by President
Walter E. Craig and President-elect Lewis F. Powell of the ABA.47
At the Senate hearings held during the months of January, February,
and March 1964, a number of witnesses, including the author, expressed
their support for the ABA consensus. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower indicated his basic agreement with the proposal in a letter to Senator Birch Bayh, dated March 2,1964. He said:
Many systems have been proposed but each seems to be so cumbersome in character
as to preclude prompt action in emergency. My personal conclusion is that the matter
should be left strictly to the two individuals concerned, the President and the Vice
President, subject possibly to a concurring majority opinion of the President's
Cabinet. 48

Almost all of the witnesses who testified at these hearings expressed great
concern about the glaring flaws in our system of presidential succession
and emphasized the necessity for their early elimination. Senator Bayh
stated:
Our obligation to deal with the question of Presidential inability is crystal clear.
Here we have a constitutional gap-a blind spot, if you will. We must fill this gap
if we are to protect our Nation from the possibility of floundering in the sea of public
confusion and uncertainty .

. ..

a

The hearings of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
ended on March 5, 1964. On May 27, 1964, the Subcommittee favorably
reported to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary a revised S.J. Res. 139,
embodying the recommendations of the ABA Conference."
45.

Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, 28, 35, 84, 138, 139, 140, 143 & 147, supra note 41, at 87.

See Kirby, A Breakthrough on Presidential Inability: The ABA Conference Consensus, 17
Vand. L. Rev. 463 (1964).

46. Special Committee on Presidential Inability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy, 89 A.B.A.
Rep. 613 (1964).
47. Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, 28, 35, 84, 138, 139, 140, 143 & 147, supra note 41, at 84-106.
48. Id. at 232.
49. Id. at 3.
50. 110 Cong. Rec. 22288 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1964).
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On August 4, 1964, the revised S.J. Res. 139 was unanimously approved
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 1 On Monday, September 28,
1964, the Senate passed the proposal by voice vote. 2 Since there were
fewer than a dozen Senators on the floor at the time of the vote, Senator
John Stennis of Mississippi moved, the following day, to reconsider the
vote. He supported the proposal but felt that it would set a dangerous
precedent to have a proposed constitutional amendment approved by voice
vote and without a sufficient number of legislators present. 3 A roll call
was taken, and the sixty-five Senators in attendance all voted in favor
of the Bayh plan." This unique achievement represented the first time in
history that a House of Congress passed a proposal to deal with presidential inability or vice-presidential vacancy. Congress adjourned without
any action having been taken by the House of Representatives. 5
C. 1965

S.J. Res. 139 was reintroduced in January 1965 as S.J. Res. 1 by
Senator Birch Bayh and more than seventy other Senators. It was also
introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Emanuel
Celler as H.R.J. Res. 1. Representatives Richard H. Poff of Virginia and
William M. McCulloch of Ohio, ranking Republican member on the
House Committee on the Judiciary, introduced similar proposals56 with
the difference that, if there were a disagreement, between the President on
the one hand and the Vice-President and Cabinet on the other, as to
whether the President had recovered from an inability, Congress would
have ten days in which to decide the issue. If it failed to do so within
such period, the President would automatically resume his powers and
duties. In contrast to their proposals, S.J. Res. 1 and H.R.J. Res. 1 merely
required Congress to decide the issue "immediately."
On January 28, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a special
message to Congress endorsing S.J. Res. 1 and H.R.J. Res. 1, and urging
prompt action on them. The President stated:
Favorable action by the Congress on the measures here recommended will, I
believe, assure the orderly continuity in the Presidency that is imperative to the
success and stability of our system. Action on these measures now will allay future
51. S. Rep. No. 1382, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1964),.
52. 110 Cong. Rec. 22288 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1964). See Appendix A infra.
53. Id. at 22337 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1964).
54. Id. at 22341.
55. This was due to a good deal of resentment in the House over the criticism directed
at Speaker John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, who in his early seventies was the
immediate successor to President Lyndon Johnson. His ability to act as President, should
it become necessary, was questioned in various quarters, largely because of his age. As a
result, it was felt that to consider the subject (particularly the vice-presidential vacancy
aspect) would be a great insult to the Speaker.
56. H.R.J. Res. 3, 119, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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anxiety among our own people, and among the peoples of the world, in the event
senseless tragedy or unforeseeable disability should strike again at either or both
of the principal Offices of our constitutional system. If we act now, without undue
delay, we shall have moved closer to achieving perfection of the great constitutional
document on which the strength and success of our system have rested for nearly
two centuries.5 7

On the following day, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings at which Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, President Lewis F. Powell of the ABA, and others testified in
support of S.J. Res. 1. Mr. Katzenbach presented his interpretation of
the proposed amendment in several areas and concluded by stating that
"Senate Joint Resolution 1 represents as formidable a consensus of considered opinion on any proposed amendment to the Constitution as one is
likely to find.""
On February 1, 1965, the Subcommittee unanimously approved S.J.
Res. 1 and reported it to the full Judiciary Committee, which approved it
on February 10, 1965, with several changes. 9 On February 19, 1965, the
measure was debated in the Senate.60 There was practically unanimous
agreement on the part of all who participated in the debate on the need
for an amendment to solve the inability and vice-presidential vacancy
problems. Disagreement was expressed over whether the amendment
should set forth specific procedures for dealing with them, as did S.J. Res.
1, or merely empower Congress to enact procedures by legislation. Senator
Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, Republican minority leader, offered
a substitute amendment providing: "The commencement and termination
of any inability shall be determined by such method as Congress may by
57. White House Press Release, Jan. 28, 1965, in Hearings on S.J. Res. 1, 6, 15, 25 &28
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1965).
58. Id. at 11.
59. S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). It was specified that all written
declarations be sent to the "Speaker of the House of Representatives" and the "President
of the Senate" rather than "Congress," so as to provide a basis for Congress being called
into session, if out of session, to consider a disagreement issue. The Speaker and President
pro tempore would be required to call a special session if the President's declaration of
resumption were questioned and the Vice-President acting as President did not call a
special session.
The expression "principal officers of the executive departments" was substituted for
"heads of the executive departments" in order to make it clear that only those who are
members of the Cabinet would be permitted to participate in any decision regarding inability,
and also to make the language of the amendment consistent with that used in Article II,
Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, i.e., the President "may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments ...

60. See 111 Cong. Rec. 3167-204 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965).

." See note 144 infra.
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law provide."" He said that "it has been pretty much of a rule in our
constitutional history that we do not legislate in the Constitution. We try
to keep the language simple. We ... offer some latitude for statutory
implementation thereafter, depending upon the events and circumstances
that might arise."6 2 Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina opposed the
Dirksen Amendment, noting that it "totally ignores one of the crucial
questions which has brought this matter to the floor of the Senate. That
is the fact that vacancies occur in the office of Vice President."63 He
argued that the Dirksen proposal "would place dangerous power in the
hands of Congress,"* since it would give Congress a new power over the
President by which "any time that power-hungry men in Congress were
willing to go to the extremes that men were willing to go to in those days
[i.e., when radical Republicans sought to remove President Andrew
Johnson], they could take charge of the Presidency."6 Only by setting
out specifics in the Constitution, Senator Ervin said, would the President
be sufficiently protected.66 Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, the floor
leader of the measure, agreed and pointed out that the Constitution was
quite specific in its provisions regarding the Presidency, namely, article
II and the twelfth amendment.6 7 The thrust of Bayh's argument was that
the principle of separation of powers would be violated if this specificity
were not maintained. He said that the state legislatures would prefer to
deai with an amendment containing a specific proposal, and that, unless
the amendment were specific, Congress might never settle on a procedure
since interest would wane once the amendment had been ratified.68 Upon
the conclusion of this debate, a vote was taken on the Dirksen substitute
amendment, and it was defeated 60 to 12.*69

An amendment by Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina to
establish the electoral college as the method of filling a vacancy in the
Vice-Presidency was rejected by voice vote.70 Senator Roman L. Hruska
of Nebraska then proposed an amendment to change from two to seven
the number of days that the President would be required to wait before
resuming his powers and duties after his declaration of recovery from an
inability. Senator Hruska stated:
In these days when much traveling is done by members of our Cabinet, and when on
61.

Id. at 3175.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at
Id. at
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

3183.
3187.

3170-71, 3189.
3190.
3192.
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occasion the Vice President also travels frequently, if there would be .

..

a declaration

by the President in the absence of these parties the 48-hour period would obviously
prove to be much too small.
. .. I feel that 7 days would be an appropriate and adequate time for the members
of the Cabinet to . . . inform themselves of the actual condition of the President,

perhaps visit with him, perhaps visit with his personal physician.71

This amendment was accepted.72
Senator John O. Pastore of Rhode Island urged that the amendment
should require Congress to decide a disagreement issue without transacting any other business in the interim. " [W] e ought to stay here," said
Pastore, "until we decide that question, even if we must sit around the
clock, or around the calendar, because this problem involves the Presidency of the United States." 73 Senators Hruska and Ervin remarked that
such a restriction would be unwise as evidence might have to be taken in
committee, or the President examined, before a decision could be
reached.74 While this was going on, an urgent situation could arise necessitating Congressional action.7" The force of this reasoning led to the
rejection of Pastore's suggestion.7"
Senator Ross Bass of Tennessee referred to the possibility of Congress'
delaying in filling a vacancy in the Vice-Presidency in an effort to keep
the Speaker first in line of succession.77 He, therefore, offered an amendment which would require the President to nominate "immediately" a
person to fill the vacancy. His amendment, however, was rejected by voice
vote.78 S.J. Res. 1, as amended, was then unanimously approved by a vote
of 72 to 0.79

Meanwhile, the House Committee on the Judiciary had held hearings
on February 9, 10, 16, and 17, 1965, during which support was expressed
for the McCulloch-Poff ten-day time limitation with respect to congressional action on a disagreement issue. It was maintained that a limitation
was essential because of the possibility that Congress might delay unreasonably in deciding the issue or make no decision at all, with possible
disastrous consequences to the country. On the other hand, it was pointed
out that situations might arise where ten days or any other time limitation
would be insufficient time for testimony to be heard and a considered
71.
72.
73.

Ibid.
Id. at 3194.
Ibid.

74. Id. at 3195.
75.

Id. at 3195-97.

76. Id. at 3197.
77. Ibid.
78.

Id. at 3199.

79. Id. at 3203.
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decision reached.80 Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell testified
that the possibility of a disagreement was remote, but that, if it did occur,
Congress would act with all due speed. He stated: ".

.

. I have always

found in my experience that men under the pressure of national or international crisis do act responsibly, but if the occasion arose when they
didn't, I think public opinion would force them to do it, or destroy their
usefulness as public officials thereafter." 8
H.R.J. Res. 1 was approved by the House Committee on the Judiciary
on March 24, 1965.82 Several changes were made. Section 3 was clarified
to permit the President, in a case where he had voluntarily declared his
inability, to resume his powers and duties upon his declaration of
recovery.83 The ten-day time limitation was adopted, and words were
added requiring Congress to assemble immediately, if not in session, to
pass on a disagreement issue.84 The Committee retained the two-day provision relating to the President's resumption of his powers and duties
after his declaration of recovery where he had been involuntarily declared
disabled.
H.R.J. Res. 1 was cleared by the House Rules Committee on March
31,85 and it was considered by the House of Representatives on April 13.
In his opening remarks to the House, Representative Emanuel Celler
observed that "everyone will agree that amending .

.

. the charter .

.

. of

our Nation is not a task to be undertaken lightly. Today, however, we are
faced with filling a gap which has existed since our beginnings, and this
80. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1,
at 234-36, 244-45 (1965). Compare id. at 4, 169.
81. Id. at 243.
82. 111 Cong. Rec. 5621 (daily ed. March 24, 1965).
83. In his statement to the House Committee on the Judiciary, Attorney General
Katzenbach urged that there be a provision "which would clearly enable the President
to terminate immediately any period of inability he has voluntarily declared." Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, at 107 (1965).
The language of the Senate proposal was unclear whether the President, in a case
where he had declared himself disabled, would have to follow the recovery procedure
prescribed for situations where an inability was declared by the Vice-President and Cabinet.
See S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-14 (1965); S.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§§ 2-5 (1965), as amended. Senator Birch Bayh said that, under S.J. Res. 1, a President
did not have to follow this procedure in a case of voluntary disability. 111 Cong. Rec.
3188-89 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) ; id. at 14830 (daily ed. June 30, 1965).
84. See H.R. Rep. No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). Certain language changes made
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in S.J. Res. 1, see note 59 supra and accompanying
text, were also made in H.R.J. Res. 1. "President pro tempore of the Senate," however, was
used instead of "President of the Senate."
85. The vote was six to four. Representative William Colmer of Mississippi disliked
the method for declaring a President disabled, saying that it might lead to a coup headed
by the Vice-President. Representative James J. Delaney of New York expressed a preference
for a means of filling a vacancy in the Vice-Presidency through the elective route. N.Y. Times,
April 1, 1965, p. 20, col. 1.
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gap becomes more threatening as the complexity of the domestic and
foreign policy grows." 8 8 Representatives Celler, McCulloch, Poff, and
others forcibly urged the adoption of the proposal endorsed by the Judiciary Committee. They underscored the great need for the amendment
and argued that it represented as good a solution as can be found to the
problems of presidential inability and the vice-presidential vacancy. In
the words of Representative Celler:
This is by no means . . . a perfect bil [sic]. No bill can be perfect. . . . The world
of actuality permits us to attain no perfection. . . . But nonetheless, this bill has

a minimum of drawbacks. It is [a] well-rounded, sensible, and efficient approach
toward a solution of a perplexing problem-a problem that has baffled us for over
100 years. 87

Relying on Walter Lippmann's words regarding the proposed amendment,
Representative Celler added:
It is a great deal better than an endless search for the absolutely perfect solution,
which will never be found and, indeed, is not necessary. 88

Representative McCulloch stated:
We must provide the means for an orderly transition of Executive power in a manner
that respects the separation of powers doctrine, and maintains the safeguards of our
traditional checks and balances. I believe that House Joint Resolution 1, as amended
... answers these needs, and will undoubtedly correct the shortcomings of the Constitution with respect to presidential inability and succession.89

There was some opposition, however, to H.R.J. Res. 1. Representative
Clarence J. .Brown of Ohio thought it unwise and unnecessary. He criticized its method of filling a vacancy in the Vice-Presidency. He said that
the amendment would take away "from the House a constitutional right it
now has to select a President" 90 (by selecting the Speaker who is the
successor to the President when there is no Vice-President) and that "the
man named Vice President could be an individual who was never elected
to any public office." 91 Representative Roman C. Pucinski of Illinois
moved to strike the vice-presidential vacancy section from the measure."
The motion was rejected by a vote of 140 to 44.93 Representative Charles
M. Mathias, Jr. of Maryland moved to substitute a new vice-presidential
vacancy section, as follows:
Sec. 2. The Congress may by law provide for the case of a vacancy in the office
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

111 Cong. Rec. 7668 (daily ed. April 13, 1965).
Id. at 7667.
Id. at 7668, citing N.Y. Herald Tribune, June 9, 1964, p. 20, col. 5.
Id. at 7673.
Id. at 7664.
Ibid.
Id. at 7690.
Id. at 7693.
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of Vice President and for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability both
of the President and the Vice President, declare what official would then act as
President and such official would act accordingly until disability be removed or a
President would be elected.9 4

The amendment was rejected by voice vote.95
Representative Arch A. Moore, Jr. of West Virginia sought to amend
that part of the measure under which the Vice-President would continue
to act as President, pending resolution by Congress of a disagreement as
to the President's restoration to capacity. Moore, and several others, felt
that the President should act during this period. "[A] 11 presumptions," he
said, "should be in favor of the President of the United States."" If the
Vice-President is permitted to act during this period, Moore added, "he
could resort to many manipulations that would never permit the President
of the United States . . . to present his case to the Congress of the United

States."97 In answer to this objection, the argument was made that, since
the capacity of the President would have been seriously challenged, it
was the wiser and less hazardous course not to have him act during this
period.98 The Moore Amendment was rejected by a vote of 122 to 58.**
Representative H. R. Gross of Iowa proposed an amendment to H.R.J.
Res. 1, requiring a roll-call vote whenever Congress voted on the President's nominee for Vice-President, and said that he would make the same
proposal regarding a vote on a disagreement issue in the inability situation. 00 Representative Celler opposed this amendment. He argued that the
House or Senate could demand such a vote under its rules and that it,
therefore, was unnecessary.'01 Thereupon, the Gross Amendment was
defeated by votes of 102 to 92 and 130 to 115.102
Representative Richard H. Poff successfully amended the proposed
amendment by inserting words under which Congress, if not in session,
would have to assemble within forty-eight hours after receiving a challenge, from the Vice-President and a majority of the Cabinet, directed
at a presidential declaration of recovery. 0 3 The debate concluded with
94. Ibid.
95. Id. at 7694.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.

98. Representative Peter W. Rodino of New Jersey pointed out that the matter
might never get to Congress if the President immediately resumed his powers and duties

and discharged the Cabinet before a declaration of challenge could be sent to Congress.
Id. at 7695. See note 156 infra.
99. 111 Cong. Rec. 7696 (daily ed. April 13, 1965).
100. Id. at 7696-97.
101. Id. at 7697.
102. Ibid. A roll-call vote requirement may be found in the Constitution with respect to
Congress' overriding of a presidential veto. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
103. 111 Cong. Rec. 7697-98 (daily ed. April 13, 1965). The "forty-eight hour"
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Speaker John W. McCormack giving his full support to the measure. He
stated:
I have lived for 14 months in the position of the man who, in the event of an unfortunate event happening to the occupant of the White House, under the law then
would have assumed the Office of Chief Executive of our country. I can assure you,
my friends and colleagues, that a matter of great concern to me was the vacuum
which existed in the subject of determining inability of the occupant of the White
House, if and when that should arise.
I have in my safe in my office a written agreement. As has been well said,.it is
outside the law. It is an agreement between individuals. But it was the only thing
that could be done under the circumstances, when we do not have a disability law
in relation to the President in existence.
We have made a marked contribution by this resolution, and particularly by section 3 and section 4.104

He added:
We cannot legislate for every human consideration that might occur in the future.
All we can do is the best that we can under the circumstances. The considerations
of the committee and the deliberations of the members of both parties have resolved
the problem confronting us in the best manner possible, having in mind the fact that
with all our strengths we have weaknesses as human beings.105

A vote was then taken, and H.R.J. Res. 1, as amended, was approved
368 to 29.10"
In order to resolve the differences between the House and Senate
versions of the amendment, a Conference Committee was appointed.'07
It met several times during the following weeks and was divided, along
House and Senate lines, on whether a time limitation should be placed
upon Congress in deciding a disagreement issue. The House conferees
insisted on a ten-day limitation, while the Senate conferees wanted no
limitation at all.108 On June 23, 1965, after a two month deadlock, agreement was reached on a twenty-one day limitation.109 In addition, the
Conference Committee accepted the House version of section 3, permitting
the President, in the event of a voluntary declaration of inability, to
resume his powers and duties immediately upon transmitting his declaration of recovery to the President pro tempore and Speaker." 0 The Comamendment was introduced at the suggestion of Speaker McCormack. Letter from Representative Richard H. Poff to Donald E. Channell of the American Bar Association,
April 15, 1965.
104. 111 Cong. Rec. 7698 (daily ed. April 13, 1965).
105.

106.
107.
Everett
Rogers,
108.
109.
110.

Ibid.

Id. at 7699. See Appendix C infra.
The conferees were Senators Birch E. Bayh, James O. Eastland, Sam J. Ervin,
M. Dirksen and Roman L. Hruska, and Representatives Emanuel Celler, Byron G.
James C. Corman, William M. McCulloch, and Richard H. Poff.
H.R. Rep. No. 564, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
Ibid.
Id. at 3.

165
mittee compromised on a four-day period within which the Vice
President
and Cabinet could challenge a President's declaration of recovery
where
the inability determination had not been made by the President."'
It
also agreed to accept the provision in the House version requiring
Congress to convene within forty-eight hours, if not in session, to settle
a
disagreement." 2 The expression "the Vice President and a majority of
the
principal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as
Congress may by law provide" was changed to "the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of
such other body as Congress may by law provide."" 3 This change was
made at the suggestion of Senator Hruska in order to make it clear that,
when and if Congress designated another body to replace the Cabinet, it
could not eliminate the Vice-President."4
The Conference Report was passed by voice vote in the House of
Representatives on June 30, 1965."1 It was considered in the Senate
later that same day. Senators Robert F. Kennedy of New York and
Eugene J. McCarthy of Minnesota expressed reservations about the
method prescribed for determining inability. Senator Kennedy said a
President might discharge his Cabinet. A conflict could arise, he said, as to
whether the President had, in fact, fired the Cabinet at the time they had met and
decided to put in a new President. What we could end up with, in effect, would
be
the spectacle of having two Presidents both claiming the right to exercise the powers
and duties of the Presidency, and perhaps two sets of Cabinet officers both claiming
the right to act.'1 6

The concern of these two Senators was lessened by virtue of the provision
allowing Congress to establish a body to replace the Cabinet in functioning with the Vice-President. Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, referring
to this "other body" provision, argued that it would permit the Vice-President to choose between the Cabinet and the other body created by
Congress." 7 He said that the use of the expression "either/or" put the
two groups on a par.s Senator Bayh, pointing to the abundance of legislative history on the point, said that under the proposed amendment, the
Cabinet would have the responsibility unless Congress passed a law
appointing another body, in which case the "newly created body and not
111. Id. at 4.
112. Ibid.
113. Id. at 2.
114. This statement is based on information given to the author by persons who worked
with the Conference Committee.
115. 111 Cong. Rec. 14668 (daily ed. June 30, 1965).
116. Id. at 14832.
117. Id. at 14834-39.
118. Id. at 14834.
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the Cabinet would act with the Vice President.""* Senator Jacob Javits of
New York remarked that, if the power to establish another body were
exercised, he would interpret it "to give exclusivity to the other body,"
since it would be "completely contrary to the purpose of Congress to
create two bodies which could compete with one another.""' Senator Gore
requested and obtained postponement of further discussion in order to
study the point in greater detail."'
On Tuesday, July 6, 1965, the measure again came up for consideration
in the Senate. Senator Gore reiterated his objection to the proposed
amendment because of the "either/or" expression. By virtue of this wording, argued Gore, "a Vice President would be in a position to 'shop around'
for support of his view that the President is not able to discharge the
duties of his office."' 2 2 Senator Birch Bayh said that the language was
clear-that, if Congress designated another body, that body would supersede the Cabinet.' Senator Dirksen agreed and said that he could not
imagine a Vice-President acting in this manner, but that if he did, the
people would not tolerate it and his political future would be ruined."'
Dirksen noted:
[L]anguage is not absolute.

. .

. [I]nterpretations of all kinds can be placed upon

language ....
Fashioning language to do what we have in mind, particularly when we are subject to the requirement of compression for constitutional amendment purposes, is
certainly not an easy undertaking.125

He added: "I believe we have done a reasonably worthwhile job insofar
as the feeble attributes of the language can accomplish it." 26 Senator
Ervin observed that "the conference report . . . would submit to the

States the very best possible resolution on the subject obtainable in the
Congress of the United States as it is now constituted." 2 7
At the conclusion of the debate, the Senate approved the measure by a
vote of 68 to 5,128 and a few days later it was on its way to the state
legislatures for ratification as the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
Frank
Tower

Id. at 14835.
Id. at 14838.
Id. at 14838-39.
Id. at 15023 (daily ed. July 6, 1965).
Id. at 15029.
Id. at 15027.
Id. at 15026.
Id. at 15028.
Id. at 15030.
Id. at 15031-32. The five Senators who voted against it were Senators Gore,
J. Lausche of Ohio, McCarthy, Walther F. Mondale of Minnesota, and John G.
of Texas.
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III.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

A.

Section 1

In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the
Vice President shall become President.

This section would specifically confirm the Tyler precedent whereby a
Vice-President becomes President when there is a vacancy in the presidential office because of the President's death. It would also extend the
precedent to cover vacancies in the Presidency due to resignation12' and
removal, neither of which has occurred in American history. In any of
these cases, the Vice-President would serve as President for the remainder
of the unexpired term.
B. Section 2
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall
nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.

This section is designed to cover the situation where the Vice-President
succeeds to the Presidency upon the President's death, resignation or
removal, or where the Vice-President dies, resigns, or is removed. 30 The
President would nominate the person that he would like to have for his
Vice-President. Congress would then vote upon the nomination. If a
majority of each House confirmed the nomination, the person would
become Vice-President for the remainder of the President's term.' The
nominee would have to be a natural born citizen of the United States, at
least thirty-five years of age, and a resident within the United States for
a minimum of fourteen years.132 The Houses of Congress would vote
separately on the nomination, and the vote required would be a majority of
those members present and voting, provided a quorum were present.' 33
129. See 3 U.S.C. § 20 (1964),, which sets out the procedure for resignation.
130. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 1, at 87, 196, 246 (1965).

131. Confirmation by Congress is necessary so that, if a vacancy occurs when Congress
is out of session, it could not be filled until the next regular session or at a special session
called for that purpose by the President. Id. at 45, 49. Until a vacancy is filled, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, or whoever might be first in the line of succession at the
time, would be the heir apparent. The proposed amendment leaves intact the power of
Congress to establish a line of succession beyond the Vice-Presidency. U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 1. The present succession law, 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1964), would be operative if there
were simultaneous vacancies in the offices of President and Vice-President. See 111 Cong.
Rec. 3200 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (remarks of Senators Bayh and Holland); id. at 7682
(daily ed. April 13, 1965) (remarks of Representatives Mathias and Poff).
132. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 1, at 48 (1965).
133. That separate sessions are called for under § 2 and under § 4 as well, see 111
Cong. Rec. 3203 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (remarks of Senator Hruska); id. at 7675-76
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Before making a nomination, the President probably would seek the
advice and views of the congressional leaders. His nominee might be
asked to undergo hearings in the House and Senate. If the nomination were not confirmed, the President would nominate another VicePresidenf 13"
Since the-House of Representatives has never had any constitutional
vote in approving presidential nominees, that being reserved for the
Senate, the amendment would give the House a different type of function
to perform. In so doing, the amendment would elevate the Vice-Presidency
above executive appointments and would give the people a greater voice
in the selection of a Vice-President than if the power of confirmation were
given to the Senate alone.
In giving the President a dominant role in filling a vacancy in the VicePresidency, the proposed amendment is consistent with present practice
whereby the presidential candidate selects his own running mate who must
be approved by the people through their representatives. It is practical
because it recognizes the fact that a Vice-President's effectiveness in our
Government depends on his rapport with the President. If he is of the
same party and of compatible temperament and views, all of which would
be likely under the proposed amendment, his chances of becoming fully
informed and adequately prepared to assume presidential power, if called
upon, are excellent.
C. Section 3
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting President.

This section would provide for an Acting President in a case of presidential inability.135 Under section 3, a President would be authorized to
(daily ed. April 13, 1965) (remarks of Representatives Celler and Basil L. Whitener);
id. at 7677-78 (remarks of Representatives Celler, Poff and Edward Hutchinson); Hearings
on S.J. Res. 1, 6, 15, 25 & 28 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965) ; Hearings Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, at 45, 60, 106 (1965). See
also Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919).
134. There is no limit on the number of nominations which can be made. Hearings
Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, at 50 (1965).
135. The legislative history indicates that the term "inability" is intended to cover any
state of facts preventing the President from discharging the powers and duties of his
office. It might be due to physical or mental illness, kidnaping, capture by an enemy, etc.
As was stated by Senator Birch Bayh: "[T]he intention of this legislation is to deal
with any type of inability, whether it is from traveling from one nation to
another,
a breakdown of communications, capture by the enemy or anything that is imaginable.
The inability to perform the powers and duties of the office, for any reason is inability
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declare his own disability, and he would be encouraged to do so, since,
if he did, his declaration of restoration to capacity could not be challenged. 36 "A President would always hesitate to utilize the voluntary
mechanism if he knew that a challenge could be lodged when he sought
to recapture his Office."' 3 7
The Vice-President would become Acting President under this section
as soon as the President transmitted a written declaration of inability to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.' 3 The Vice-President would cease to be Acting President
as soon as the President transmitted his declaration of recovery to these
two officials.139
This is the section that can be expected to be used in most future cases
of presidential inability. Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell
has said:
under the terms that we are discussing." Hearings on S.J. Res. 1, 6, 15, 25 & 28, supra note
133, at 20. "[T]he word 'inability' and the word 'unable' ... mean that he is unable either to
make -or communicate his decisions as to his own competency to execute the powers
and duties of his office." 111 Cong. Rec. 3200 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (remarks of
Senator Bayh). See id. at 14832-33 (daily ed. June 30, 1965) (remarks of Senators
Robert F. Kennedy and Bayh).
136. Id. at 7669 (daily ed. April 13, 1965) (remarks of Representative Celler); id. at
14667 (daily ed. June 30, 1965) (remarks of Representative Poff); id. at 14830 (remarks
of Senator Bayh)'; see S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); H.R.
Rep. No. 203,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965). See also note 83 supra.
Although, in this situation, there could be no challenge to the President's
restoration,
the Vice-President and the Cabinet would not thereafter be precluded from declaring
the President disabled under § 4 of the proposed amendment.
137. 111 Cong. Rec. 7672 (daily ed. April 13, 1965).
138. Whenever the Vice-President acted as President, he would lose his title as
President of the Senate. Id. at 3188 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965).. The President pro tempore
would become President of the Senate. The question of whether the Vice-President would
have to take the presidential oath before becoming Acting President is left for future
resolution. It would seem that he should not, since the duty of acting as President
would be encompassed in his vice-presidential oath to perform faithfully his duties. See
23 Stat. 22 (1884), 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1964), for the form of oath taken by the Vice-President
and other officials in the government. The legislative history on this point is inconclusive.
See Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 1,
at 87 (1965).
139. The intention of Congress regarding written declarations was summarized
in the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: "It is the intention of the
committee that for the best interests of the country to be served, notice by all parties
should be public notice. The committee feels that notice by transmittal to the President
[pro tempore] of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives guarantees
notice to the entire country. . . . It is further understood by the committee that
should
the President [pro tempore] . . . and the Speaker . . . not be found in their offices
at the

time the declaration was transmitted that transmittal to the office of such presiding
officers would suffice for sufficient notice under the terms of this amendment." S. Rep. No.
66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
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A typical situation that is covered by this section is one in which the President is
physically ill and his doctors recommend temporary suspension of his normal governmental activities, to facilitate his recovery. Other situations that have been visualized
are those where the President might be going to have an operation, or where he was
going abroad and might be out of reliable communication with the White House for
a short period.140

This section can be viewed as sufficiently broad to permit the President to
declare himself disabled either for an indefinite or a specified period of
time, and to name the hour when the Vice-President is to begin as Acting
President."' It can be argued that his declaration could be conditional,
stating, for example: " '[I]f in the event I am under anesthesia or similarly
unable, I wish you to assume those duties .... ' ""* The legislative history

indicates that this section should be broadly interpreted. 43
D. Section 4

Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit
to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no
inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not
in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and
duties of his office.

This section also provides for an Acting President in a case of inability.
It covers the most difficult case, that is, where the President cannot or
140. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 1, at 240 (1965).
141. Id. at 98-99, 240; see Hearings on S.J. Res. 1, 6, 15, 25 & 28, supra note 133, at
20-21, 64-65.
142. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 1, at 99 (1965) (remarks of Attorney General Katzenbach). Once the Vice-President
had commenced his role as Acting President, the proposed amendment contemplates that
he would continue in such capacity until the President terminated it by a subsequent
declaration.
143. See notes 140-42 supra.
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refuses to declare his own inability. In that event the Vice-President and
a majority of the "principal officers of the executive departments""
(popularly known as the Cabinet) would be empowered to declare the
President disabled by transmitting a written declaration of this fact to the
President pro tempore and the Speaker. Although it need not be, the
declaration would most probably be a joint one. 45 The question of
whether an inability had occurred could be initiated for discussion
purposes by the Vice-President or any member of the Cabinet."
The President could announce his own recovery but he would then have
to wait four days before resuming his powers and duties. 4 7 In the meantime, the Vice-President and the Cabinet would have an opportunity to
review the situation. They could agree to the President's taking over
immediately or at any time short of four days.'4 8 If they disagreed with
144. The expression refers to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense; the Attorney General; the Postmaster General; and the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare, and Housing and Urban Development. See note 59 supra. For clear manifestations of congressional intent on the point,
see 111 Cong. Rec. 3175, 3200-01 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (setting out the study of the
Library of Congress' Legislative Reference Service); id. at 7669, 7676 (daily ed. April
13, 1965); id. at 14835 (daily ed. June 30, 1965); H.R. Rep. No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1965); Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 1, at 52-55, 103, 256 (1965). The House Committee on the Judiciary stated in
its report: "In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the head of any
executive department, the acting head of the department would be authorized to participate
in a presidential inability determination." H.R. Rep. No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1965). See 111 Cong. Rec. 14833 (daily ed. June 30, 1965) (remarks of Senator Robert F.
Kennedy). But see id. at 3202 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (remarks of Senators Bayh and
Hart). The expression "executive departments" is used in § 4 in both the singular and the
plural. The plural was what was intended. The use of the singular was inadvertent.
145. Id. at 14837 (daily ed. June 30, 1965) (remarks of Senators Bayh and Javits);
see id. at 14831, where Senator Hruska states that Congress itself has no right to initiate
action.
In answer to the question of how a written declaration might be prepared under § 4,
former Attorney General Brownell stated: "Undoubtedly the Justice Department would
prepare the papers, and the action would be taken at a joint meeting of the Vice President
and the Cabinet members. It might not even be a matter of public knowledge as to who
signed first. That particular point would fade into insignificance in getting the group
action." Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1,
at 247 (1965).
146. Id. at 79, 82 (remarks of Senator Bayh).
147. 111 Cong. Rec. 7670-71 (daily ed. April 13, 1965) (remarks of Representative
Celler); id. at 14667 (daily ed. June 30, 1965) (remarks of Representative Poff); id. at
14830 (remarks of Senator Bayh); Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, at 58 (1965); S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1965); H.R. Rep. No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
148. 111 Cong. Rec. 3203 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (remarks of Senator Bayh) ; Hearings
Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, at 243 (1965)
(remarks of former Attorney General Brownell).
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the President's declaration, they would send a written declaration of this
fact, within four days, to the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the
House, and Congress would be required to decide the issue. If Congress
were not then in session, it would be obliged to assemble within forty-eight
hours from the time the Vice-President and Cabinet transmitted their
declaration to the President pro tempore and Speaker. It would be incumbent upon the Vice-President who is acting as President to fix a time
certain within forty-eight hours as to when Congress must assemble. If he
failed to do so, the President pro tempore and Speaker would be obliged to
call their respective Houses into session within the forty-eight hour
period."* Upon their failure to do so, Congress would have to come into
session within forty-eight hours on its own initiative.
Congress would have twenty-one days from the time of the transmittal,
or from the time it is required to assemble, as the case may be, in which
to decide the disagreement. The Vice-President would continue to act as
President, pending the decision of Congress, so that the powers and duties
of President would never be in the hands of a person whose capacity had
been seriously challenged."5 0
Congress would have three choices under the twenty-one day limitation: to decide in favor of the President or the Vice-President or to reach
no decision at all. 1 5 1 If Congress failed to reach a decision within this
time, or if more than one-third of either House sided with the President,152
the President would immediately resume his powers and duties. If twothirds of both Houses supported the Vice-President and a majority of
the Cabinet, the Vice-President would continue as Acting President.15 3
In deciding the issue, Congress could proceed as it thought best. It might
request the President to undergo medical tests and examinations, or to
submit to questioning at hearings. 5 4
149.
150.
151.
uphold

111 Cong. Rec. 7697-98 (daily ed. April 13, 1965).
See text accompanying notes 96-99 & note 147 supra.
"Circumstances may be such that the Congress by tacit agreement may want to
the President in some manner which will not amount to a public rebuke of the

Vice President who is the Acting President. . . . [This] . . . option furnishes the grace-

ful vehicle." 111 Cong. Rec. 7673 (daily ed. April 13, 1965) (remarks of Representative
Poff).
152. Id. at 14667 (daily ed. June 30, 1965) (remarks of Representative Poff). "[Ilf
one House voted but failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority, the other House
would be precluded from using the 21 days and the President would immediately resume
the powers and duties of his office." Id. at 14831 (remarks of Senator Bayh).
153. A two-thirds vote was decided upon so as to weight the procedure as heavily
in favor of the elected President as practicable. Id. at 3187 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965)
(remarks of Senator Ervin). It takes only a majority vote in the House of Representatives
to impeach a President and two-thirds in the Senate to remove him. U.S. Const. art. I,

§i 2, 3.

154. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1, 6, 15, 25 & 28, supra note 133, at 21-23, 29, 35; 111 Cong.
Rec. 3195-96 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (remarks of Senators Ervin and Hruska).
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The Vice-President's participation in determining presidential inability
is proper. Since he is the person who would act as President in a case of
inability, he should have a voice in determining when to act. As Representative Richard H. Poff said during the debates in the House of
Representatives:
The Vice President, a man of the same political party, a man originally chosen by
the President, a man familiar with the President's health, a man who knows what
great decisions of state are waiting to be made, and a man intended by the authors
of the Constitution to be the President's heir at death or upon disability, surely should
participate in a decision involving the transfer of presidential powers.' 5 5
There are several reasons why responsibility in inability determinations

was placed upon the Cabinet. Since they are appointed by the President,
they would not be likely to take steps to have him declared disabled
unless he actually were disabled. Since they work closely with the President and meet with him frequently, they would be more readily aware
than some other body of his condition and of whether there was a need
for an Acting President. The chances of the Cabinet's acting unanimously
on a matter of this importance, which would add weight to any decision
and encourage public acceptance of it, are greater than with another
group, particularly a group having members of different political parties.
Since it has come to be considered an integral part of the executive branch
of government, its selection is consistent with the fundamental principle
of separation of powers.
History indicates that the Cabinet would not decline to exercise this
power if an occasion arose requiring it to do so. The Cabinet of President
James Garfield was unanimous in deciding that the President was disabled
but did not have the power to declare disability and hesitated to take any
initiative because of the fear that the Vice-President would become President for the remainder of the term. During the Wilson inability, the
Cabinet sought to ascertain whether the President was disabled, and it
seems in retrospect that, if they had had the power to declare him disabled, they would have used it in a responsible manner. It seems clear
that the Cabinet would use this power if, and only if, it were necessary.
If, however, future circumstances indicated that the Cabinet was not
a workable body, Congress would have the power under the proposed
amendment to entrust to another body the responsibility of determining,
with the Vice-President, presidential inability.'
155. Id. at 7672-73 (daily ed. April 13, 1965).
156. One of the points frequently made during the hearings and the congressional
debates was that the President could discharge his Cabinet before it had a chance to
declare him disabled, thus nullifying the prescribed method. See id. at 3198, 3201 (daily
ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (remarks of Senator Hart); text accompanying note 116 supra; Hearings on S.J. Res. 1, 6, 15, 25 & 28, supra note 133, at 28. This is certainly possible but, if
a President were to act in such a manner, Congress could cope with the situation under
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IV. CONCLUSION
Several times in our history, the Government has been paralyzed
because the President was disabled. Similarly, if the President had died
or become disabled on occasions when there was a vacancy in the VicePresidency, chaos and confusion would have been likely to result. The
deficiencies in the Constitution which permitted the existence of these
situations must be remedied. It is of critical importance to the Nation's
security that a President's illness should not be allowed to halt the work
of government, and that there should be available at all times a VicePresident of the United States.
The proposed twenty-fifth amendment, which would provide procedures
both for determining a President's inability and for filling vacancies in
the Vice-Presidency, is desperately needed. This has been demonstrated
time and again in our history. Despite widespread recognition of the
serious need for a method of determining presidential inability and, despite a long search for an acceptable method, none has ever been found
which could command enough strength to be proposed by Congress, much
less ratified by the state legislatures. Finally, a method commanding widespread support as an acceptable and workable procedure has been found
and proposed by Congress. It is doubtful that a better proposal could
be devised, considering the complexity of the problems involved and the
great diversity of views. The proposed twenty-fifth amendment has been
made possible because of the willingness of Democrats and Republicans
alike to compromise in the best interests of the Nation. It remains for
the state legislatures to ratify it and to make it a permanent part of the
the proposed amendment by exercising its power to establish another body. Of course,
this exercise, which would have to be by statute, would be subject to the President's veto.
On balance, however, it seems clear that the advantages of having the Cabinet participate
in an inability determination far exceed the disadvantages.
A Vice-President who has become Acting President would have the power to appoint
and remove members of the Cabinet during his tenure as Acting President. If he used this
power to stack the Cabinet in his favor, the President, if he had declared himself disabled,
could regain his powers and duties immediately by a declaration of recovery. If he
had been declared disabled by the Vice-President and Cabinet, he could declare himself
able and, assuming he is challenged by the Vice-President and Cabinet within four days,
get Congress to pass on the issue. Congress certainly would not look favorably on a
Vice-President who had acted in an irresponsible manner. It should also be pointed out
that Congress could eliminate the Cabinet as the body to participate in an inability determination. The legislative history of the "other body" provision clearly shows that, when
Congress designates another body, that body replaces the Cabinet. See, e.g., 111 Cong.
Rec. 7670 (daily ed. April 13, 1965) (remarks of Representative Celler); Hearings Before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, at 84-85, 93 (1965);
Hearings on S.J. Res. 1, 6, 15, 25 & 28, supra note 133, at 97-98. Congress could not replace
the Vice-President. 11 Cong. Rec. 14830, 14835 (daily ed. June 30, 1965) (remarks of Senator
Bayh). See also pp. 194-95 supra.
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Constitution."' The nature of the subject dictates that this be done with
all due speed.
APPENDIX A
(S.J. Res. 1 &H.R.J. Res. 1 as introduced in January, 1965 (same as
S.J. Res. 139 as passed Senate in September, 1964))
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Sec. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Sec. 3. If the President declares in writing that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting President.
Sec. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
Sec. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads
of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon
Congress shall ["will" in S.J. Res. 1] immediately decide the issue. If the
Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall
continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the President
shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
APPENDIX B
(S.J. Res. 1 as passed Senate on February 19, 1965)
Section 1. Same as above.
Sec. 2. Same as above.
Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
157. As of this writing, the proposed amendment has been ratified by Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Arizona, Michigan, Kentucky, California,
Indiana, Arkansas, New Jersey, and Delaware. The Colorado legislature refused to ratify
the measure at a special session in July 1965 called to consider emergency flood legislation.
Colorado is expected to ratify the measure at its next legislative session. Since a number of
state legislatures will not be meeting in 1966, the proposed amendment is not likely to be
ratified by the necessary thirty-eight state legislatures until early 1967. It is to be noted that
the proposed amendment, as did the eighteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second,
twenty-third and twenty-fourth, specifies a seven year time limit for ratification.
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unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of the principalofficers
of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Sec. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits within seven days to the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the president is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress
shall immediately proceed to decide the issue. If the Congress determines by
two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and
duties of his office.
APPENDIX C
(H.R.J. Res. 1 as passed House of Representatives on April 13, 1965)
Section 1. Same as above.
Sec. 2. Same as above.
Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmits a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President and a majority of the principalofficers of the executive
departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit
within two days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall
decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in
session. If the Congress, within ten days after the receipt of the written declara-
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tion of the Vice Presidentand a majority of the principalofficers of the executive
departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers
and duties of his office.*
* The italicized words represent the changes made in the basic proposal (appendix A) in
the Senate (appendix B), and in the House of Representatives (appendix C).
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VICE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
A CRITICISM OE THE BAYH-CELLAR PLAN
GEORGE D. HAIMBAUGH,

JR.*

A. Introduction
Section 2: Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of
the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice
President who shall take office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of both Houses of Congress.1
The above provision for vice presidential succession is contained in a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution which is being sponsored in the Congress by Senator Birch
Bayh, Jr., of Indiana and Representative Emanuel Celler of
New York. It is argued that this constitutional change is urgently needed, that the presidential initiative is necessary to insure
continuity of executive policy, and that the requirement of congressional ratification will secure a proper voice to the representatives of the people. This article seeks to demonstrate the

unreality of these arguments by an examination of present law,
political history and traditional constitutional doctrine.

B. The Myth of Urgency
The matter of vice-presidential succession is presented by the
proponents of the Bayh-Celler plan as an urgent one. There is
ritual restatement of the statistics :2 As a result of the resignation
of one Vice President, the deaths of seven and the succession to
the Presidency of eight others, the office of Vice President has
been vacant on sixteen different occasions or for thirty-nine out
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School
of Law; A.B.,
DePauw University; J.D., Northwestern University;
J.S.D., Yale University.
1. This provision is the second section of a proposed
which has
been introduced in the 89th Congress by Senator Bayh asamendment
Senate Joint Resolution 1 and by Representative Celler as House Joint Resolution
1. Other sections
which deal with cases where the President is unable to discharge
the powers
and duties of his office are beyond the scope of this article.
See 111 CONG. REC.
3168 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965).
2. See for example, "Message from the President
on Succession to the
Presidency and Vice Presidency, and
Presidential Inability," 111 CoNG. REC.
1511 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1965); Birch
Jr., "Our Greatest National
Danger," LooK, April 7, 1964, pp. 74, 76;Bayh,
Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Constitutonal Amendments of the Senate
88th Cong., 2d Sess., on S.J. Res. 13, S.J. Res. Committee on the Judiciary,
28, S.J.
35, S.J. Res. 84,
S.J. Res. 138, S.J. Res. 139, S.J. Res. 140, S.J. Res. 143, Res.
S.J. Res. 147 at 1-2,
58, 78, 95 etc., (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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of 176 years of national existence under the Constitution. The
dangers thus conjured up, however, fade away when existing constitutional and legal provisions are recalled. Article II, section 1
of the Constitution grants Congress the power to provide by law
"for the case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both
of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall
then act as President.

. .

." Congress exercised this authority

in 1792 and since that time there has always been at least half
a dozen officers in the line of succession to the Presidency. Today,
the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 as amended in 19473
fixes the order of succession, when there is no Vice President,
as follows: Speaker of the House of Representatives, President
pro tempore of the Senate, the Secretaries of State, Treasury,
and Defense, Attorney General, Postmaster General, the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor and Health,
Education and Welfare. 4
Arguments in favor of the Bayh-Celler plan for vice presidential succession also include a ritual reference to the dangers
of the thermonuclear age. For example, President Lyndon B.
Johnson, in a recent message to Congress urging it to approve
and pass on to the states the Bayh-Celler proposed amendment,
called attention to the "lack of constitutional provision assuring
continuity in the office of the vice president." He added that
it was not necessary "to conjure up the nightmare of nuclear
holocaust" to identify such an omission as a "chasm of chaos."
It is true that modern weapons make possible an attack on Washington in which Congressional leaders and the Cabinet might all
perish simultaneously. But provision for presidential succession
in such an eventuality may be made under the present Constitution. A simple act of Congress could extend the line of succession
to include officers whose work is outside Washington. In case of
such a disaster, the succession could pass, for example, to the
United States Ambassador to the United Nations followed by
the United States Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Chief Judges of the ten numbered United
States Courts of Appeals in the numerical order of the circuits
in which they sit.
But in these times, the President says, such orders of succession
are no substitute for an office of succession." "Can the Speaker3. 3 U.S.C.A. § 19 (1948).
4. See also, Amendment XX, section 4.
5. Message, supra note 2, at 1510.
6. Id. at 1511.
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any Speaker," Senator Bayh asks, "possibly run the large and
diverse House of Representatives and, simultaneously, prepare
properly for the Presidency?" 7 If the voters are sometimes willing to entrust the Presidency to a man who has not been Vice
President-to a Senator, a NATO commander, a Governor of
New York or New Jersey or a Springfield lawyer, for example,
would they have such qualms about seeing the office go to a
Speaker of the House of Representatives who had been attending
meetings of the Cabinet and the National Security Council? Is
the Vice Presidency so surely the better apprenticeship for the
Presidency? John Nance Garner who held both offices described
the Speakership as a "potent office regardless of who is President," 8 and the Vice Presidency as not being worth a "pitcher of
warm spit."9 Other men who held or were to hold the office of
Vice President have given similar descriptions of it. To Theodore
Roosevelt, the vice presidency was a burial,10 to Thomas R.
Marshall it was a cataleptic state," to Alben Barkley four years
of enforced silence12 and to Hubert Humphrey a job "in which
you stand around waiting for someone to catch cold."' 8 And
John C. Calhoun's resignation from the Vice Presidency to become a Senator was, of course, an action that spoke louder than
words.
But since the order of succession was prescribed in 1947, President Johnson has told Congress, "the office of the Vice-Presidency has undergone the most significant transformation in
history. . . . Once only an appendage, the office of Vice President is an integral part of the chain of command and its occupancy on a fulltime basis is imperative."14 That the Vice Presidency has become a full-time "chain of command" job is belied
by the months of foreign travel which both Mr. Johnson and
his predecessor, Richard Nixon, accomplished while holding that
office. Lyndon Johnson, for example, made numerous trips
7. Hearings, supra note 2, at 2.
8. BASCOM N. TIMMONS, GARNER OF TEXAS 168 (1948).
9. THEODORE WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960 211 (1961).
10. Bayh, op. cit. supra note 2, at 74. Sen. Platt of New York referred to
Roosevelt's inauguration as Vice President as T.R.'s taking the veil.
11. DWIGHT MACDONALD, HENRY WALLACE: THE MAN AND THE MYTH 63
(1948). "The Vice-President of the United States," Tom Marshall once observed, "is like a man in a cataleptic state: he cannot speak; he cannot move;
he suffers no pain ; and yet he is perfectly conscious of everything that is going
on about him." Ibid.
12. Bayh, op. cit. supra note 2, at 74.
13. TIME, September 4, 1964, p. 21.
14. Message, supra note 2, at 1511.
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abroad traveling in. thirty-three countries on five continents
during the less than three years that he was Vice President.15
While the subject of vice presidential succession was being considered in 1964 by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, the following perceptive
view of the proper place of the Vice President in our constitutional system was presented by the Pulitzer Prize winning historian, Sydney Hyman:
I know,- for example, that a Vice President now sits on the
National Security Council, in the Cabinet, presides over
both in the absence of the President, and takes good will
trips. But to say all of this is to say nothing intelligible.
A chair also sits. A metronome also presides. A bird also
takes good will trips.
The real test of what has happened to the Vice Presidency
is to ask whether the Vice President who sits, presides, takes
trips, or even is put in charge of an executive commission or
agency, is in a position to make the yes or no decision in any
great matter of State, without leave of the President.
The simple truth is that no Vice President, not Mr. Nixon,
nor Mr. Johnson in his time, has been able to do that, or
would even dare to do that. Nor should he ever be permitted to, in any maner except in a clear case covered by
any Presidential disability laws that have yet to be framed.
The Vice President, in our system of government, is, and
should remain the equivalent of England's constitutional
Monarch. Apart from the functions specifically vested in
him as the President of the Senate, the only additional
rights he is entitled to, is the right to warn the President, to
inform the President, to be informed by the President-all
of which comes down to nothing more than the rights of
consultation.16
15. MOONEY, THE LYNDON JOHNSON STORY 165-170 (1964).
16. Hearings, supra note 2, at 181. Mr. Hyman is the author of "THE

AMERICAN PRESIDENT, BECKONING FRONTIERS, and ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS."
See also the statement of Clinton Rossiter, Professor of American Institutions,
Cornell University, at p. 228 in which he pointed out to Senator Bayh that
the jobs that a Vice President can perform are "jobs that don't have to be
done as we are demonstrating at the moment when we don't have a Vice
President of the United States."
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C. Continuity or Victory?
The President must have a voice in the selection of a Vice
President . . . It would assure a reasonable continuity of

Executive policy, should the Vice President become President.
And it is in keeping with the tradition whereby a party's
presidential candidate generally has great influence and,
at the very least, a veto concerning his vice presidential
running mate.-Senator Birch Bayh, Jr. 7
The above testimony of Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of which
he is chairman, is a typical statement of one of the principal
arguments on behalf of the Bayh-Celler plan for vice presidential succession. Thus the constitutional power of initiative in
the filling of a vacancy in the office of Vice President is being
sought for the President on the gratuitous assumption that he
will use such power for the purpose of assuring continuity of
his policies in the event that he, the President, should die, become disabled or be impeached and removed from office. It
would seem that the Senator's apparent desire to follow the
traditions of national political conventions would prompt him to
leave the nominating initiative with the Congress since the candidate's customary "great influence" is exerted at the convention
without any formal-much less constitutional-authority. There
is, in fact, such aptness to his convention analogy that a review
of the history of Twentieth Century national political conventions at which successful tickets have been chosen would seem
to be in order. The inquiry with regard to each such convention
will be: Was the candidate for Vice President picked for the
purpose of insuring continuity of the policies of the presidential
nominee should the latter not serve out his term, or was he
selected in order to strengthen the ticket?
1900-Theodore Roosevelt, wrote Hanna biographer Thomas
Beer, was forced on the Administration by Finance and Westerners. Although President McKinley felt little political affinity with the New York Governor, he prudently accepted him as a
running-mate so as not to offend either the Westerners who
17. Hearings, supra note 2, at 4. The "continuity"
was made by
many who testified at the committee hearings as well asargument
by
several
participants
in the Senate debate. See 111 CONG. REc., February 19,
1965,
especially
the
remarks of Sen. Ervin at p. 3173 and of Sen.
Fong at p. 3180.
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wanted the Rough Rider on the ticket or the Wall Streeters
who sought thus to unseat him in Albany. 18
1904-Charles Warren Fairbank's place on the Republican
national ticket of that year is generally ascribed to a conservatism which balanced Roosevelt's progressivism and to residence
in Indiana, a state the chronically doubtful political nature of
which had made it "the home of vice presidents."19
1908-The selection of Congressman James Schoolcraft Sherman of New York state brought personal and private disappointment to William Howard Taft who would have preferred to run
with "some westerner who has shown himself conservative and
at the same time represents the progressive movement." 2 0 The
ticket was deemed to be well balanced, however, with the addition
of Sherman whose nomination was described by Alice Roosevelt
Longworth in her reminiscences of that Chicago convention as
"a bone allowed the reactionaries." 2 1
1912-In Baltimore the Democrats nominated Governor Thomas Riley Marshall of Indiana whose progressivism was more
18. THOMAS BEER, HANNA 223-228 (1929); Frederic Logan Paxon, "Theodore Roosevelt," XIV DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIoGRAI-AY 137 (1935);
HARCLD L. ICKES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A CURMUDGEON 43-47 (1943) ;
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 332-333 (1913).
19. John D. Hicks, "Charles W. Fairbanks," VI DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 248 (1931) ; 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 35 (1963) ; CLAUDE G.
BOWERS, BEVERIDGE AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 210 (1932). Other Hoosiers
nominated for the. Vice Presidency were George W. Julian who ran on the

Free Soil Party ticket with John P. Hale in 1852, Schuyler Colfax with
Ulysses S. Grant in 1868, Thomas A. Hendricks with Samuel Tilden in 1876,
William H. English with Winfield Scott Hancock in 1880 and with Grover
Cleveland in 1884, and Thomas R. Marshall with Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and
1916. The Republican ticket was headed by Benjamin Harrison, an Indianian,
in 1888 and 1892 and by Wendell Willkie, a native Hoosier, in 1940.
On the opening day of the Republican National Convention in Chicago, correspondent Louis Brownlow telegraphed his paper, the Nashville Banner:
"The choice of a candidate for Vice-President-the only thing graciously left
to the delegates by the imperious and imperial Roosevelt-is not of enough
importance to stir emotions and when questions are asked the reply is generally,
'Fairbanks, I suppose-if he will have it.'"
This passage is quoted in Brownlow's autobiography, A PASSION FOR
POLITICS, volume

I, 357 (1958).

20. HENRY F. PRINGLE, I THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
354-5 (1939).
21. ALICE ROOSEVELT LONGWORTH, CROWDED HoURS 151 (1933). See also
J. HAMPTON MOORE, ROSEVELT AND THE OLD GUARD, 217 (1925); Edward
Conrad Smith "James Schoolcraft Sherman," XVII DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 83 (1936).
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like Taft's than Wilson's.22 A Wilson biographer tells how it
happened:
[Burleson] telephoned Wilson that Underwood had refused the nomination and that the convention was leaning
toward Thomas R. Marshall. "But, Burleson," Wilson protested, "he is a very small caliber man." Burleson agreed,
but argued that since Marshall was from the Midwest and
from a doubtful state, his candidacy would supplement Wilson's. "All right, go ahead," Wilson agreed. He did not
know that McCombs had traded the vice-presidential nomination to Indiana in return for her votes! McCombs accordingly delivered the nomination to Marshall.23
1916-Incumbents re-nominated and re-elected.
1920-Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts was nominated at Chicago when it became obvious that the Senate leaders
who had planned and won the nomination of Warren G. Harding
intended to have their way with regard to the vice presidential
nomination too. "Then," in the words of a Kansas delegate
William Allen White, "the revolt of the mob came quickly and
with amazing directness . . . . The Convention leaders were appalled but powerless. The thing came out of the air like lightning.
The resulting ballot gave 674 for Coolidge with the Convention
bosses able to assemble only 146 for Lenroot."24
1924-President Coolidge wanted to share the ticket with
Borah of Idaho but the party leaders gave him Dawes of
Illinois.2" William Allen White described it this way:
Charles G. Dawes was nominated by Congressional leaders,
the men who nominated Harding. It is interesting to note
22. An OUTLOOK report on the Democratic nominees stated that Marshall's
"attitude toward governmental powers, the authority of the Executive, the relation of the courts to the people, the direct primary and the like, has been
expressed in terms similar to those used by President Taft; in other words
his "Progressivism" is of the cautious sort." THE OUTLOOK, July 13, 1912, p.
559; see also pp. 522-3 and 558 of the same issue. After his nomination, Marshall described himself as a "Progressive with the brakes on." THE LITERARY
DIGEST, July 13, 1912, p. 45.
23. ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON: ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 462-3 (1947).
See also Mary H. Drout, "Thomas R. Marshall," THE INDEPENDENT, July
11,
1912, p. 79.
24. WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE, A PURITAN IN BABYLON: THE STORY OF CALVIN
COOLIDGE 214 (1938).

See also Allen Nevins, "Calvin Coolidge," XXI DICTION-

ARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 195 (1944); EDWARD ELWELL
WHITING,
DENT COOLIDGE A CONTEMPORARY ESTIMATE

25.

WASHINGTON

MERRY-GO-ROUND

PRESI173-180 (1923).
(published anonymously) 255 (1931).
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that when a majority in a Republican convention, or at
least when amalgamated minorities, have nominated a Presidential candidate, almost invariably they have turned the
nomination of Vice President over to some unexpected and
often unorganized minority. It is the way of politics.2e

1928-The choice of Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas was a
move to dissipate farm discontent which had been engendered
by the nomination for the Presidency of Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover, a member of the Coolidge administration which
had successfully opposed the McNary-Haugen farm parity bill.27
Also, in the words of Senator Walter Edge of New Jersey, a
Hoover delegate at the Kansas City convention, "Curtis was
selected because he was very 'regular' in his party affiliation and
was thereby supposed to offset any disadvantages arising from
Hoover's 'irregularity.' "28
1932-The naming at Chicago of Speaker of the House of Representatives John Nance Garner is described in the political
recollections of James A. Farley, the Roosevelt field marshall:
Pat Harrison called Rayburn at my request .

. .

. I said

we needed the Lone Star State to win; that the alternative
was a victory-sapping deadlock, and that we could swing
the vice-presidential nomination to Garner . . . Sam merely
said, "We'll see what can be done." That was good enough
for me. ..

29

1936-Incumbents renominated and re-elected.
1940-The President's surprising30 insistence on having Secretary of Agriculture Henry Agard Wallace of Iowa, "a pure
26. WHITE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 305.
27. LITERARY DIGEST, June 23, 1928, p. 8-4; TIME, June 18, 1928, p. 9 and
June 25, 1928, p. 10, 14-15. See also JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR., MY FIRST FIFrY
YEARS IN POLITICS 147-8 (1960).
28. WALTER E. EDGE, A JERSEYMAN'S JOURNAL 145 (1948). Edge added, "I
had felt ...

that Hoover's record would attract many independent voters, and

I was amused as I recalled the occasion when President-elect Harding had
asked my advice on naming Hoover to a Cabinet post. Within eight years, we
had definitely made Hoover a Republican."
29. JAMES A. FARLEY, JIM FARLEY'S STORY: THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 23
(1948). See also BASCOM N. TIMMONS, GARNER OF TEXAS: A PERSONAL
HISTORY 159-168 (1948); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION
AND THE FOx 134-138 (1956); FRANK GRAHAM, AL SMITH: AMERICAN, 217
(1945); EDWARD J. FLYNN, YOU'RE THE BOSS 104-5 (1947); ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER
304-311 (1957).
30. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOx 428
(1956). "Until now he had not announced his choice, partly because he had
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liberal,"31 named as his running-mate in Chicago in mid-July
may be best understood in the light of two events of the preceding month-namely, the fall of France and the nomination in
Philadelphia of Wendell Willkie and Charles McNary by the
Republicans who thus presented their most liberal ticket in many
years. 32 Citing the war in Europe in justification of his disregard
of the no-third-term tradition, Roosevelt planned to hold himself above the campaign and, as Commander-in-Chief, 3 to occupy himself with re-armament and production. Wallace was
expected to appeal to labor 3 4 and to help the ticket in the isolationist farm belt.35
hoped that Hull would accept, partly because his own draft movement was
stronger the longer he held the vice-presidential prize open as bait. The night
of his nomination Roosevelt began notifying Hopkins and other party leaders
that his choice was Wallace." Ibid. See also SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN, WORKING
WITH ROOSEVELT 212-3 (1952): "That evening [the night of his nomination,
July 17, 1940], for the first time, the President definitely stated that he favored
Wallace."
31. Term used by Roosevelt in a letter sent to George Norris in July 1940.
See REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE DEMOCRATIC ROoSEvELT: A BIOGRAPHY OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 533 (1957).
32. Frances Perkins wrote, "Wendell Willkie, I think, was more disturbing
to Roosevelt as a rival than anyone who ran against him." He recognized
that the elements which forced Willkie's nomination were not old-line Republicans but people with some progressive ideas, who, under other circumstances,
might have been converted to the Roosevelt cause." FRANCES PERKINS, THE
RooSEvELT I KNEW 116 (1946). In the months preceding Willkie's unexpected death, Roosevelt had been in touch with him concerning the possibilityof forming a new "liberal" party. Judge Rosenman describes the part he
played in the negotiations in his book WORKING WITH ROOSEvELT in Chapter
XXIV: See also BURNS, op. cit. supra note 30, at 466-70; TIMMONS, JESSIE
H. JoNES 276 (1956); and GRACE TULLY, F.D.R. MY Boss 279 (1949).
33. In his acceptance speech, Roosevelt said, "Lying awake, as I have, on
many nights, I have asked myself whether I have the right, as Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy, to call on men and women to serve their
country or train themselves to serve, and, at the same time, decline to serve
my country in my own capacity, if I am called upon to do so by the people of
my country." See, JAMES F. BYRNES, ALL IN ONE LIFETIME 118 (1958).
And see TUGWELL, op. cit. supra note 31, at 534: "Speaking in political

terms,
Franklin had now the most satisfactory enemy of all his career [i.e. Hitler].
Very early in the campaign he made a "non-political" appearance at the Norfolk Navy Yard in company with Secretary Knox. He was, it could be inferred, appearing as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. What civilian
competitor could match that position?"
34. BURNS, op. cit. supra note 30, at 428; BYRNES, op. cit. supra note 33, at
124: "... the _President told me that Hopkins had been conferring with labor
leaders, especially Philip Murray of the CIO and William Green of the
AF of L, and had reported that they all favored Wallace's nomination for
Vice President."
35. BURNS, op. cit. supra note 30, at 428. "[Wallace] would appeal in the
farm states, where isolationist feeling was strong." Ibid. BYRNES, Op. cit.
supra note 33, at 124; FARLEY, op. cit. supra note 29, at 294; FLYNN,
op. cit.
supra note 29, at 157: "He had been a good administrator of the Department
of Agriculture and had brought to the President a certain strength among the
farmers. This was important in 1940, because, by that time, the President was
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1944-"Franklin must have figured," Rexford Tugwell has
written, "that more was to be gained than lost when Truman was
substituted for Wallace .

.

. His [Roosevelt's] approach to poli-

tics had always been strategic."e
1948-Senator Alben Barkley was nominated at Philadelphia
after four Southern states had walked out over the adoption of
a civil rights plank stronger than that recommended by the
majority of the platform committee. "The Senator," a national
news magazine reported, "has been delicately treading a tight
rope on the civil-rights question. As Democratic leader of the
Senate, he could not oppose the President's program. As a Kentuckian, well liked in the South, he could not conveniently endorse it. So he said nothing. That left him "available" as a man
both the New Dealers and much of the south could support."37
1952-California Senator Richard M. Nixon's youth, familiarity with domestic issues and Republican Party regularity combeginning to lose his popularity in the country districts." ROSENMAN, op. Cit.
supra note 30, at 206: "Wallace had made a good record as Secretary of
Agriculture, and it was assumed that politically he would help in the farm
states."
36. See FLYNN, op. cit. supra note 29,.at 180: "The President asked me to
make certain inquiries. It was most important for us to hold such states as
New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey, and California. In the trip
I made over the country I formed the opinion that we would not carry those
states if we nominated Wallace, notwithstanding the fact that the PAC was
very strong in those states and was favorable to Wallace.... In a subsequent
meeting with the President I told him of my conclusion that Wallace would
be a serious handicap to him on the ticket. The problem was to find a man
who would hurt him the least .

..

We went over every man in the Senate to

see who would be available, and Truman was the only one who fitted." See
also GEORGE E. ALLEN, Chapter 10 ("The Conspiracy of the Pure in Heart"),
PRESIDENTS WHO HAVE KNOWN ME 118-136 (1950); BYRNES, Op. Cit. Supra
note 33, Chapter 13 ("Clear It with Sidney") -at 216-237; and RoSENMAN,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 440-452 in which Judge Rosenman tells how he was
dispatched by the President to tell Vice President Wallace "that I'd like to
have him as my running mate, but I simply cannot risk creating a permanent
split in the party by making the same kind of fight for him that I did at the
convention four years ago."
During the Democratic National Convention in Chicago National Chairman
Robert Hannegan made public a letter which he had received from the President and which read as follows:
Dear Bob:
You have written me about Harry Truman and Bill Douglas. I should
of course, be very glad to run with either of them and believe that either
one of them would bring real strength to the ticket.
Always sincerely,
Franklin Roosevelt
37. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, July 23, 1948, p. 42-3. See HARRY S.
TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 191 (1956): "I had long
respected him as one of the ablest debaters on the floor of the Senate. He was
a hard-working, honest politician and one of the most popular men in the
Democratic party. As a thoroughly acceptable candidate to the South, Barkley
made an ideal partner to run with me in 1948."

22-517 0 - 73 - 13
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plemented General Eisenhower's age, international experience
and high service under two Democratic Presidents. But, more
importantly, Nixon was "regarded as an ideal 'bridge' between
the seriously divided Eisenhower and Taft wings of the party."8 8
1956-Incumbents re-nominated and re-elected.
1960-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas was, in the words
of Richard Nixon, "the best available bridge for Kennedy between the Northern liberals and the Southern conservatives."8 9
1 964-Senator
Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota was described
in the Time coverage of the Atlantic City Democratic convention
as one who would "balance the ticket almost to perfectionNorthern Hubert with his pure liberalism and appeal
to labor,
along with Southwesterner Lyndon with his more conservative
bent and appeal to the business community."40
A survey of the selection of men for the second place on winning national tickets during this century should thus suffice to
demonstrate that the influence which a presidential candidate
is
able to bring to bear on the selection of his running mate is
used
basically not in the interest of continuity of policy but
in the
interest of victory at the polls. And when it is remembered
that
in this century every President who has survived his first
term
38. EARL MAZo, RICHARD NIXON: A POLITICAL AND PERSONAL
PORTRAIT
92 (1959). See also U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, July 18, 1952, p. 36;
SHERMAN ADAMS, FIRST HAND REPORT 34-36 (1961)
; MERLO J. PUSEY, EIsENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 23 (1956); MAZO, op.
cit. supra at 89.
39. RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 313 (1962).
Conf., NEWSWEEK, July
25, 1960, p. 21: "As

one of its own, Johnson
Democrats by calming fears over civil rights could save the South for the
and
Catholicism. As it looks now the ticket should any furor over Kennedy's
BOOTH MOONEY, THE LYNDON JOHNSON STORY keep the South." See also
could count electoral votes as well as anyone else, 159 (1964) : "[Kennedy]
better than most, and his
count showed him that he needed assurance that
he
could carry the South in
the November election..." And see THEODORE H. WHITE,
THE MAKING OF
THE PRESIDENT 1960 208 (1961) in which White relates
how
Kennedy, on the
morning after his nomination in Los Angeles, arranged
to meet Lyndon Johnson and how press secretary Salinger and tactician
Kenneth O'Donnell were
then "put to work on the simple arithmetic of
electoral
votes: add the votes
of New England to the votes of the Solid South,
and how many more would
be needed to carry the election ?"
40. TIME, September 4, 1964, p. 21. Similarly, NEWSWEEK,
September 7,
1964, P. 19, lists the contents of Humphrey's
"kit bag of ticket-balancing
credentials: a Northern address, a liberal
reputation, an intellectual bent,
special popularity in the possibly critical Middle
West." And see U.S. NEWS
& WoRLD REPORT, March 23, 1964,
p. 43-44. The NEWSWEEK story also reported the following at p. 19: "'I don't know
what all the fuss is about,' the
President [Johnson] told staffer Kenneth
O'Donnell at the crest of the wave
of Vice Presidential dope stories. 'I ain't gonna
die in office.' . . John Kennedy had told the same thing to the same
staffer
at almost the same point in
time four years ago."
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has been a candidate for re-election, it is reasonable to expect
that if a Vice President-just-become-President is empowered to
nominate a new Vice President, his motivations will not differ
from those of a presidential candidate and that he too will be
thinking in terms of a ticket-strengthening running-mate. The
argument that the President must have the initiative in a procedure for mid-term vice presidential succession in order that he
can insure the continuity of his executive policies is a fallacy
for the simple reason that such a power would not be used for
such a purpose.
D. Congressional Abnegation
.

.

. Congress is a body entrusted with making fateful

decisions at crucial times. It is Congress that declares
war on behalf of us all. The Congress may elect or remove Presidents in certain circumstances. Certainly, the
Congress is the proper body-with its hand on the pulse
of public opinion-to elect a Vice President upon the
nomination of a President.-Senator Birch Bayh, Jr.4 1
The above apostrophe to the importance of Congress is the
seductive flattery which precedes the kiss of death. Although
the confirmation power of Congress is played up, it is the nominating role of the President that almost certainly would be the
dominant one. Congress is being asked to transmit to the states
the proposal of a highly unusual constitutional doctrine which,
if ratified by them, would transfer to the President most of
Congress' say in the matter of vice presidential succession.
The Bayh-Celler plan's provision for nomination by the President would wipe out the reform effected at the instigation of
President Harry S. Truman by the Presidential Succession Act
of 194742 which replaced the Secretary of State with the Speaker
of the House as first in the line of succession to the Presidency
in the event of vacancies in both that office and the vice presidency. President Truman believed that this arrangement would
be a more democratic one because, whereas the Secretary of State
is nominated by the President, the Speaker is elected to Congress
by the people of his district and to the Speakership by the biennially elected representatives of the people of each of the Con41. Hearings, supra note 2, at 4.
42. 3 U.S.C.A. § 19 (1948).
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in the selecgressional districts.43 The theory that the initiative
with the
tion of the next-in-line to the Presidency should remain
with referrepresentatives of the people was eloquently stated
ence to the convention process by Adlai Stevenson. Addressing
the Democratic National Convention of 1956, he said:
... the selection of the Vice Presidential nominee should
be made through the free processes of this convention so
that the Democratic Party's candidate for this office may
join me before the nation-not as one man's selection-but
as one chosen by our great party, even as I have been
chosen.

. .

. The choice will be yours. The profit will be

the nations.43 a
The Bayh-Celler plan's provision for nomination by the President would be a break not only with the spirit of the Truman
plan but contrary to the constitutional doctrine almost universally'observed among representative governments. In parliamentary regimes which account for the largest number of governments throughout the world, initiative for the selection of a
prime minister's successor lies generally with members of the
lower chamber. In presidential regimes there may or may not
be constitutional provision for a vice president but presidents
are not granted constitutional power to nominate an officer who
is their next in line of succession. Even in the presidential regimes of French-speaking black Africa-Ivory Coast, Dahomey,
Niger, Guinea, Mauritania, Togo and the Central African Republic-which changed constitutions in 1960 in favor of their
own versions of Gaullist presidentialisme for the purpose of
granting a preponderance of governmental power to the executive, presidents are not given the constitutional power to nominate their potential successors.44
43. Hearings, supra note 2, at 58, 257.
43a. The New York Times, August 17, 1956, p. 7. Attention is also called
to the view of another Democratic standard bearer. In a well publicized letter
to Senator Samuel Jackson of Indiana, permanent Chairman of the Democratic
National Convention of 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (after damning
Vice President Wallace with faint praise and announcing that, if he were a
delegate, he would vote for Wallace for Vice President) wrote "... I do not
wish to appear in any way as dictating to the convention. Obviously the convention must do the deciding. And it should-and I am sure it will-give great
consideration to the pros and cons of its choice." ROSENMAN, Op. Cit. supra
note 30, at 449.
44. DMITRI G. LAVROFF, LES CONSTITUTIONS AFRICAINES, L'AFRIQUE NOIRE
FRANCOPHONE ET MADAGASCAR 23-29 (Paris, 1961), and J. Y. BRINTON, CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW AFRICAN STATES: A CRITICAL STUDY 84-86 (Alexandria, 1962).
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The Bayh-Celler plan for vice presidential succession was
formulated in the face of repeated predictions that to place the
nominating initiative in the hands of the President would be
virtually to grant him the power to appoint a Vice President.
For example:
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana. I have more faith in the
Congress acting in an emergency in the white heat of publicity, with the American people looking on. The last thing
Congress would dare to do would be to become involved in
a purely political move.
Senator Ross Bass of Tennessee. The election of the President is just as political as anything can be, under our
American system . . . Under our system, it must be that
way.4 5
Senator Frank Church of Idaho. This [the mere role of ratification] is frequently the role assigned to a legislative body
in a country where legislatures do not really have important
powers. I cannot conceive of a situation, though one might
possibly occur, it is hard to conceive of a situation where
the Congress would not almost automatically ratify a Presidential choice, for to do otherwise would be to repudiate
a President who has just assumed office . . . Therefore, if
the role assigned to the Congress is merely that of ratification, we give to it nothing more than a formality in the kind
of situation that you and I could foresee. It is difficult to
foresee a situation where this would be otherwise.4
Senator A. S. Mike Monroney of Oklahoma. I question one
bit of philosophy in the selection of the successor by the
Among the more traditional, tri-partite, check-and-balance presidential
systems of the American continents, some countries not only deny a President
the formal authority to nominate a successor but have also acted to prevent
activity to that end on his part in favor of his close relatives or in-laws. This
is accomplished by making such members of the family of an incumbent
President ineligible to hold the offices of President (in Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Honduras, Peru, El Salvador and Nicaragua) and Vice President (in Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Peru). In 1923 the United States announced its
"most hearty accord" with the Central American Treaty signed that year in
Washington which prohibited the recognition of revolutionary governments
which might come to power in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatamala, Honduras
or Nicaragua or the elected successors to such regimes if headed by an
"ascendant, descendant or brother" of one of the leaders of the predecessor
revolutionary regime. 1 HACKWORTH'S DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 188190 (1940).
45. 111 CONG. REc. 3193 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965).
46. Hearings, supra note 2, at 81.
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nomination of one man, placing in the Supreme line of
authority over 180 million Americans one man chosen absolutely by the President by sending the nomination to Congress, and saying, "This is my man. I choose him for my
successor."
I feel that this was one of the reasons why Congress wanted
to get away from the Cabinet members in designating the
line of succession; and get away from having the President
or the Vice President choose his successor.47
Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York. [W]ith the initiative
placed with the President, the Congress would undoubtedly
be reluctant in such a crisis to exercise more than the most
perfunctory consent process. This would amount to no more
than appointment by the President of his successor, the very
reason on which President Truman based his request for the
1947 change in the then-existing succession law, under which
the Secretary of State appointed by the President would
have been the successor.48
Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York. If, as is likely,
the President has just assumed office as a former Vice President succeeding a deceased President, congressional confirmation is likely to be meaningless at best and divisive
at worst. Meaningless, if the country is in its usual mood of
rallying behind the new President, and giving him his way
during more or less of a "honeymoon" period, in which case
confirmation would be expected as a matter of rote. Or
divisive, if the presidential nomination of a potential successor is looked upon by his opposition as an opportunity to
make real trouble from the start.49
Richard M. Nixon, former Vice President of the United
States. Now when a President dies, I would say that the
feeling in the country, the immense emotional impact at the
death of a President, certainly by assassination and even by
normal causes, is such that his successor would probably
get broad support even from an opposition Congress. 0
James C. Kirby, Jr., Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt
University. If it [Congress] rejected a succession of nom47. 110 CONG. REC. 22277 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1964).
48. Hearings,supra note 2, at 53.
49. Hearings, id., at 28-29.
50. Hearings, id., at 249.
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inees, it would soon be apparent to an outraged public that
individual Members of this congressional majority party
were obstructing efficient government by causing a continuation of the vacancy in the Vice Presidency. We could depend upon public opinion to correct this. 1
Clinton Rossiter, Professor of American Institutions, Cornell
University. I am assuming for this point that politics, petty
politics would be pretty well laid aside but in addition
remember that the onus then is placed on the Congress, they
can confirm under the system that you and I have agreed
on, the President's nomination, but they can't then reject
and then put someone else in.
Senator Bayh. There would beMr. Rossiter. Simply the vacancy would continue and the
burden would be on Congress for continuing this vacancy,
do you see what I mean 2
Lest we forget the nature of the "intense emotional impact"
deriving from the potent compound of one President's funeral
and his successor's political honeymoon, the following late November 1963 items are presented from a leading newspaper on
each coast:
(1) From Herb Caen's columns in the San Francisco
Chronicle:
BLACK FRIDAY

...

And so you cried .

.

. You cried for every stupid joke

you had ever listened to about him, and you cried for the
fatuous faces of the people who had told them. You cried
for the Nation, and the despoilers of it, for the haters and
the witch-hunters, the violent, the misbegotten, the deluded.
You cried because all the people around you were crying,
in their impotence, their frustration, their. blind grief.November 24, 1963.
THE LONGEST WEEKEND

... Gray Skies, and the constant gray and black of the TV
screen. For the first time, in these unprecedented hours,
there was Total Television. You were irresistibly drawn to
51. Hearings, id., at 42.
52. Hearings, id., at 226.
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the screen . . . You were immersed in a fantasy world of
honor guards standing at attention in the rain . . . For hour

after hour, through the marvel of electronics, we saw the
President as though for the first time. His life, compressed
onto the small screen, passed before our eyes, and we marveled at his spirit, his warmth, his humor, his brilliance .. .
We drew strength from him . . . But the lump in the throat
refused to be drowned.-November 25, 1963.
LET US BEGIN

.

.

. On Friday the Bingo game went on as usual in a local

church, and a woman enthused to her best friend the next
morning, "I won $25.00." Her friend replied, "I never want
to speak to you again."
... It will be hard to shake the memory of the four Senators

discussing the new administration before the cameras Sunday, laughing inanely, cracking jokes, acting like ward
politicians at the lowest level.-November 26, 1963.
(2) From the Washington Post
FLAGS FLYING AT HALF STAFF FOR MONTH-November
PRESS STOPPED ON LASKY BOOK ABOUT KENNEDY

23, 1963.

Victor Lasky, author of "JFK: The Man and the Myth,"

said, "I've cancelled out of everything. As far as I'm concerned Kennedy is no longer subject to criticism on my part."

-November

23, 1965.

ONE ON THE AISLE by Richard L. Coe . . .

Yesterday's dastardly crime lay in the atmosphere, unthinking, selfish, wasteful. Around us, every day, we all
have heard the talk, small and mean, which created the poisonous air .

.

. Will this tragedy teach us anything to ex-

piate our meanness . . . ?-November 23, 1963.
THE NATION LIVES

. .. All tributes have been tendered except that final tribute
that John Fitzgerald Kennedy would have coveted mostthe tribute of a people and a government going forward
with the tasks he had so far advanced . .

The people, having made their proper obeisance at catafalque and bier, at altar and temple, now must turn to the
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less ceremonial reverence they can pay to a departed leader
. .. in commitment to the noble purposes and ideals that

were the object of John Fitzgerald Kennedy's lifelong
devotion.-November 26, 1963.
TEXTS OF REMARKS GIVEN AT ROTUNDA

. . .

Chief Justice Earl Warren. Is it too much to hope that
the martyrdom of our beloved President might even soften
the hearts of those who would themselves recoil from assassination, but who do not shrink from spreading the venom
which kindles thoughts of it in others?-November 25, 1963.
MOURNERS FILL CITY'S CHURCHES TO OVERFLOWING

The Very Reverend Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Dean of the
Washington Cathedral. Surely we all do repent that shallow
and divisive contentiousness which bred an atmosphere in
which some ignorant sharpshooter would one day execute
our careless threats.
The Reverend Edward Hughes Pruden of the First Baptist Church. Those with a hand on the trigger include whoever encourages blind and irresponsible partisanship.- November 25, 1963.
At such a time do we need a weaker Congress?
E. Conclusion
The arguments that the Bayh-Celler plan for vice presidential
succession is urgently needed do not seem to be justified when
it is remembered that:
1) Presidential succession does not depend upon the office
of Vice President being filled. Acting pursuant to Article II,
section 1 of the United States Constitution, Congress first pro.
vided for presidential succession in 1792 and there are, under
present legislation, twelve officers in the line of succession after
the Vice President.
2) The possibility of the simultaneous death of all in the line
of succession is a nuclear age reality, but the Bavh-Celler plan
does not meet this danger. Under Article II Cop cress now has
the power to extend the line of succession to include high ranking
officials who work outside the Washington area.
3) The contention that the next-in-line to the Presidency must
serve as Vice President because that office provides the best ap-
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prenticeship for the Presidency is a dubious one in view of the
fact that his activities in the executive branch cannot be of a
policy-making nature lest the authority of the President be
fragmentized.
The argument that the power to nominate a Vice President
would be used by a President for the purpose of assuring continuity of executive policies does not square with American
political history which demonstrates that a man seeking election
or re-election to the Presidency wants a teammate who can
strengthen the ticket with groups not too enthusiastic about the
presidential nominee.
The argument that the requirement of Congressional confirmation of the President's nomination is a guarantee of an important
role for the representatives of the people in the process of vice
presidential succession is another weak argument. The President
would, in any event, have opportunities for consultation with
members of Congress. The addition of a constitutional power to
nominate a Vice President would, under the circumstances of
the tragic termination of one presidential administration and the
honeymoon atmosphere attending the advent of another, tend
to reduce the role of Congress in the matter to little more than a
formality.
For these reasons it would be undesirable to have the BayhCeller plan for Vice Presidential succession incorporated into
the Constitution of the United States.
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VICE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: IN SUPPORT
OF THE BAYH-CELLER PLAN
JoHN D. FEmacI*

A. Introduction
In the April, 1965, issue of the South Carolina Law Review
there appeared an article by Professor George D. Haimbaugh,
Jr., entitled "Vice Presidential Succession: A Criticism of the
Bayh-Cellar [sic] Plan."1 Professor Haimbaugh sought to demonstrate what he claimed was the "unreality" of certain arguments advanced in favor of the vice presidential succession
feature of the proposed twenty-fifth amendment to the Constitution.2 The arguments to which he addressed himself were "that
this constitutional change is urgently needed, that the presidential initiative is necessary to insure continuity of executive
policy, .and that the requirements of congressional ratification
will secure a proper voice to the representatives of the people."3
This article attempts to answer the criticisms made by Professor Haimbaugh by showing that they are invalid, inapplicable,
and unrealistic.
B. The Truth of Urgency
Professor Haimbaugh states that the Vice Presidency has been
vacant for thirty-nine out of 176 years of our existence under
the Constitution due to the resignation of one Vice President,
the death of seven and the succession of eight others.4 He then
*

Member, New York Bar; author of FROM FAILING HANDS:
(Fordham University Press, 1965).

THE STORY OF

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

1. 17 S.C.L. REv. 315 (1965).
2. Section 2, the vice presidential succession provision, provides:
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
The proposed amendment passed the House of Representatives by voice vote on
June 30, 1965 (111 CONG. REC. 14668 (daily ed. 1965)), and the Senate by a vote
of 68 to 5 on July 6, 1965 (111 CONG. REC. 15031-32 (daily ed. 1965)). The
same basic measure previously had passed the Senate on February 19, 1965 by
a vote of 72 to 0 (111 CONG. REC. 3203 (daily ed. 1965)), and the House on
April 13, 1965, by a vote of 368 to 29 (111 CONG. REC. 7699 (daily ed. 1965)).
As of this writing (December, 1965), it has been ratified by Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Arizona, Michigan, Indiana, California, Arkansas, New Jersey, and Delaware.
3. 17 S.C.L. REv. 315 (1965).
4. John C. Calhoun resigned; George Clinton, Elbridge Gerry, William E.
King, Henry Wilson, Thomas A. Hendricks, Garret A. Hobart, and James
S. Sherman died; and John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Chester
A. Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry S. Truman, and
Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded.
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says that the "dangers thus conjured up, however, fade away
when existing constitutional and legal provisions are recalled,"
pointing to Congress' power to establish a line of succession and
to the Succession Laws of 1792, 1886 and 1947 which were passed
pursuant to this power.5
The existence of a line of succession beyond the Vice Presidency does not obviate the need for a Vice President in the least.
Indeed, the present succession law demonstrates the need for a
Vice President at all times." There are objections of both policy
and law to the 1947 Act which have been completely overlooked
by Professor Haimbaugh.7 From the standpoint of policy, the
presence of the Speaker and President pro tempore, respectively,
as the immediate successors after the Vice President leaves much
to be desired.
First, it would permit a political party different from that of
the President and Vice President to take control of the Executive
in the event of the death, resignation or removal of both the
President and Vice President. The possibility of a Congress
dominated by a different party is by no means remote. For about
eight of the thirty-seven years when there was no Vice President
the immediate successor to the President was of the opposite
political party. This was true for much of the time when Presidents John Tyler, Millard Fillmore and Harry S. Truman were
serving out the terms of Presidents William H. Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, respectively. During
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's entire second term, Congress
was controlled by the Democrats. Presidents William H. Taft,
Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Hoover were confronted by Congresses controlled in one or both Houses by the opposite party.
Second, the experience of Speakers and Presidents pro tempore
is almost strictly legislative in nature. Since they arrive at their
positions of leadership after many years of service in Congress,
5. 17 S.C.L. REv. 315, 316 (1965).
6. The line of succession after the Vice President is as follows: Speaker of
the House of Representatives, President pro tempore of the Senate, Secretary
of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Postmaster General, Secretary of Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of
Commerce, and Secretary of Labor. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
7. Professor Haimbaugh is factually incorrect in saying that "there has always been at least half a dozen officers in the line of succession" since 1792.
17 S.C.L. REv. 315, 316 (1965). From 1792 to 1886 the line of succession beyond the Vice Presidency consisted only of the President pro tempore and the
Speaker (see 1 Stat. 239 (1792)), and there were times when there was neither
a President nor a Speaker. Moreover, Professor Haimbaugh errs in including
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the present line of succession.
This official has never been added to the line..
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they are usually well on in years when they do so. Following the
death of President John F. Kennedy the public clamor for a
change in the present succession law and for a method of filling
a vacancy in the Vice Presidency was due in large part to the
ages of the Speaker, who was then seventy-one, and the President
pro tempore, who was then eighty-six. There seemed to exist at
the time a general feeling that considering the present day requirements of the Presidency, this law is impractical. Speakers
and Presidents pro tempore are not selected for their positions
with a view to possible succession to the Presidency. The same
is not true of the Vice President.
From the legal standpoint, there is reason to believe that the
present law is unconstitutional. First, there is real doubt as to
whether the Speaker or President pro tempore is an officer of
the United States. Professor Ruth C. Silva, who has studied this
matter in great detail, states that "the Constitution does not contemplate the presiding legislative officers as officers of the
United States" (as is required by the succession clause of the
Constitution).*8 She adds that this view is "supported by all the
commentators."9
Second, under the 1947 law, the Speaker and President pro
tempore must resign their positions and seats in Congress in
order to act as President in a case of presidential inability. Many
constitutional authorities maintain that Congress can attach the
powers and duties of the Presidency only to an existing office,
which the occupant continues to occupy while acting as President. 10 The succession provision of Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution appears to support this by providing that the officer
in the line of succession shall act as President "until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected," implying
that he is to retain his office while so acting.
In addition, the 1947 law provides that where a Cabinet officer
acts as President, he may be superseded by a Speaker or President pro tempore. This is subject to objection because the Constitution provides that the officer appointed by Congress shall
act "until the Disability [of the President or Vice President] be
removed, or a President shall be elected." Therefore, the "officer"
8. Silva, The PresidentialSuccession Act of 1947, 47 MicH. L. REV. 451, 463
(1949).
9. Id. at 464. See e.g., Kallenbach, The New Presidential Succession Act,
41 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 931, 939-41 (1947) ; Wilmerding, Jr., Washington Post,
December 8, 1963, p. 1, cols. 2-3.
10. Silva, supra note 8, at 464-66.
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acting as President should not be replaced except by the President or Vice President whose disability had ended or by a newly
elected President.
Clinton Rossiter, Professor of American Institutions at Cornell
University and a noted authority on the Presidency,"' said in his
statement to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
in 1964:
I am bound to say in my opinion that the act of 1947 is a
poor one, in many ways one of the poorest ever to emerge
from this stately and distinguished body. I am not even
sure . .. that it is a constitutional act, and sooner or later

it will have to be amended, if not scrapped.12
He was of the view that:
The problem of succession could best be solved, except in
the most ghastly and unforeseen of circumstances, by providing some dignified and conclusive means of filling the
Vice-Presidency whenever it has been vacated. If we could
be sure that there would always, or almost always, be a Vice
President, then we would not need to worry our heads too
much over the really quite unanswerable question of whether
the Secretary of State or Speaker of the House would make
a better President.13
In view of the foregoing objections, if a Speaker or President
pro tempore took over the duties of the Presidency under the
1947 law, there undoubtedly would be much confusion at the
11. Professor Haimbaugh fails to give the context of the quotations he extracted from Professor Rossiter's and Sidney Hyman's testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. 17 S.C.L. REv. 315, 318
and n. 16 (1965). The context would show that both men were registering their
objections to the proposal of having two Vice Presidents at the same time. See
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. J. Res. 13, S. J. Res.
28, S. J. Res. 35, S. J. Res. 84, S. J. Res. 138, S. J. Res. 139, S. J. Res. 140,
S. J. Res. 143, S. J. Res. 147 at 181, 228 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
Rossiter, who strongly favored the adoption of a method of filling a vacancy in
the Vice Presidency (see text accompanying note 13, infra), said about the
two Vice Presidents' proposal:
[W]e have spent literally generations getting the Vice Presidency up to
a place where it has real distinction, and first-class men are willing to
accept it, as they certainly were not 50 or 60 years ago, and I think we
ought to do everything within our power to keep it that way, and I think
that to try to institute a second Vice President would get us right back to
where we were before.
Hearings, supra, note 11, at 228.
12. Hearings, supra note 11, at 217.
13. Id. at 220.
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time regarding his legal status, with the likelihood of challenge
through the courts. Needless to say, this would not be conducive
to stability when it would be most needed. On the other
hand,
under the proposed twenty-fifth amendment, there could not be
any doubt whatever as to the legal status of the successor.
Professor Haimbaugh criticizes the view that the Vice Presidency is the "best apprenticeship" for the Presidency. He refers
to the months of foreign travel spent by Vice Presidents Richard
Nixon and Lyndon B. Johnson and concludes that the Vice Presidency has not become a "full-time 'chain of command' job."' 4
Since World War II, the United States has taken on an increasingly active role in world affairs. The recent policy of
having the Vice President travel to foreign countries cannot be
disassociated, as Professor Haimbaugh would have it, from the
job of Vice President. This type of activity is not a waste of
time but rather prepares the Vice President even more for the
day when he might be called upon unexpectedly to lead the Nation. As the Nation's second officer, the Vice President, by word
and deed, is in a position to improve the image of the United
States abroad, and to acquaint himself with world problems by
direct contact with the leaders and people of foreign countries.
William White points out in his authoritative book on President
Johnson that his foreign tours as Vice President
were not good-will missions or the cornerstone-laying sort
of thing. They were vital trips in which Johnson went for
broader purposes than to estimate and to report on nearly
all the foreign crises which arose in the almost three years
of his vice-presidency. Kennedy gave his Vice-President wide
powers to negotiate and to act on behalf of the United
States.15
It cannot be disputed that for much of our history the Vice
President was an anomaly. He had few duties to perform and
seldom participated in the councils of government. Yet four
times in the last century and four times in this century, Vice
Presidents were suddenly called upon to serve as President when
the President died. Each time the Vice President led the country
through the crisis occasioned by the death of the President.
During this century the death of William McKinley propelled
Theodore Roosevelt into the Presidency; the death of Warren
14. 17 S.C.L. REv. 315, 317 (1965).

15.
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Harding, Calvin Coolidge; the death of Franklin Roosevelt
Harry S. Truman; and the death of John F. Kennedy, Lyndor
B. Johnson. It is questionable whether any other office of succession could have provided comparable or better Presidents.
In judging the type of apprenticeship a person receives in the
Vice Presidency, the present rather than the past, upon which
Professor Haimbaugh places so much reliance, must be a guide.
Today, the Vice President serves in the Cabinet and National
Security Council. He participates in the inner councils of government in the making of the great decisions of the day. He is
chairman of executive committees and overseer for the President
of various government programs. He is President of the Senate,
and, as such, a liaison between the Executive and Legislative
Branches of Government. He represents and undertakes special
assignments for the President abroad and at home. In brief, he
has become a fully informed, consulted and working member of
the Government.' 6 There is no other officer in our Government
who has the same opportunity to prepare himself for possible
duty as President. Certainly the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who has scores of legislative duties to perform, is not
in such a position.
Professor Haimbaugh states that "the possibility of the simultaneous death of all in the line of succession is a nuclear age
reality, but the Bayh-Celler plan does not meet this danger."17
This criticism is wholly unjustified, since Congress now has the
power to extend the line of succession. There is no reason whatever for a constitutional amendment to deal with this matter,
since it can be done by statute. There is every reason for dealing
with vice presidential succession by constitutional amendment,
since Congress does not now have the power to fill a vacancy in
the Vice Presidency. The proposed twenty-fifth amendment
meets this danger.
C. Continuity
Professor Haimbaugh says: "the argument that the power to
nominate a Vice President would be used by a President for the
16. The author describes the development of the Vice Presidency in his book,
FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
It
is interesting to note that, after becoming President, Johnson asked(1964).
Speaker
McCormack to sit in on meetings of the National Security Council and "other
key decision-making meetings" provided they were not "inconsistent
with his
legislative responsibilities." N.Y. Times, December 4, 1963,
p.
24.
His
status
as
a member of Congress prevented him from receiving a Cabinet
invitation.
17. 17 S.C.L. REV. 315, 332 (1965).
18. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1, para. 6.
FROM
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purpose of assuring continuity of executive policies does not
square with American political history which demonstrates that
a man seeking election or re-election to the Presidency wants a
teammate who can strengthen the ticket with groups not too
enthusiastic about the presidential nominee." 19
This criticism is completely inapplicable. The proposed amendment does not deal with the selection of a running mate with a
view to a forthcoming election, and there is thus no question of
choosing the nominee on the basis of his ability to attract votes.
The amendment, it should be stressed, deals with filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. Such a vacancy may result upon
the happening of two sets of contingencies: (1) the death, resignation or removal of the President and the succession of the Vice
President; and (2) the death, resignation or removal of the
Vice President. Surely, at a time of death in office of either the
President or Vice President, the President would nominate for
Vice President a person of presidential timber, especially since
the Nation's attention would be focused on the presidential qualifications of any nominee. There is no relevant experience to suggest the contrary.
There can be little quarrel with Professor Haimbaugh's statement that a presidential candidate "thinks in terms of a ticketstrengthening running-mate." 20 But, as recent history shows, he
does not overlook the qualifications of his running mate to succeed to the Presidency. In recent elections only first-class men
have succeeded in being elected Vice President. Professor Haimbaugh, unfortunately, omits some pertinent data in his account
of recent national political conventions. Thus:
1952-In his memoirs, President Dwight D. Eisenhower says
he recommended Richard M. Nixon for the Vice Presidency for
these reasons:
First, through reports of qualified observers I believed that
his political philosophy generally coincided with my own.
Next, I realized that before the election took place I would
have attained the age of sixty-two. I thought we should
take the opportunity to select a vice-presidential candidate
who was young, vigorous, ready to learn, and of good
reputation.2 1
19. 17 S.C.L. REv. 315, 333 (1965).
20. Id. at 326.

21. EISENHOWER,

22-517 0 - 73 - 14

MANDATE FOR CHANGE:

1953-1956, at 46 (1963).
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During the campaign Eisenhower indicated to Nixon that he
believed the Vice President should be trained and prepared so
as to be able to "take over the presidency smoothly and efficiently should the need arise."2 2
1960-In early 1960 John F. Kennedy said of Lyndon B.
Johnson:
I think I am equipped for the job [of President]. Lyndon
Johnson is the only other man I can think of with the equipment for the job of President.2 3
Presidential candidate Richard Nixon favored Henry Cabot
Lodge as his running mate
not because he was from the East and I was from the West,
nor because on some domestic issues his views were more liberal than mine, but because on the all-important issues of
foreign policy we were in basic agreement. I felt that his
experience in the Senate and at the United Nations qualified
him to lead the Free World in the event that responsibility
should come to him.24
1964-Time after time in the months leading up to his recommendation of a running mate, President Johnson said his criteria
were: Who would serve "the best interests of the country and
who would make the best President of the United States in the
event he were called upon to be President ?"2
The death of President Roosevelt, the attempted assassination
of President Truman, the heart attack and strokes sustained by
President Eisenhower, and the tragic assassination of President
Kennedy have made the American people readily aware of the
critical need for an able successor to the President, and a presidential candidate who failed to heed this in recommending a
running mate would be inviting political disaster.
D. Congressional Confirmation
Professor Haimbaugh suggests that nomination of a Vice
President by the President is less democratic than the present
succession law, under which the "Speaker is elected to Congress
t2. Nixon, "The Second Office," in 1964 YEAR Boos, WOLD BooK ENCYC.,
at 82.
23. Newsweek, December 2, 1963, p. 28.
24. Nixon, supra note 22, at 89.
25. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1964, p. 14.
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by the people of his district and to the Speakership by the biennially elected representatives of the people of each of the congressional districts."2 6 In giving the President the power to nominate
a Vice President, the amendment is most practical and in no
way inconsistent with American tradition. The method recognizes that the effectiveness of a Vice President depends almost
completely on his relationship with the President. To achieve a
good relationship, the Vice President and President must be of
the same party and of compatible temperament and views. This
is more readily assured under the proposed amendment than
under any of the other proposals which were thoroughly considered by the Congress.27
That a new Vice President might not be an elected official,
although it is likely that he would be, does not weaken the vice
presidential provision of the amendment. It should be recalled
that for over 135 years of our existence the immediate successor
after the Vice President was not a person directly elected by the
people. From 1792 to 1886, when Senators were chosen by state
legislatures, the President pro tempore of the Senate was the
immediate successor after the Vice President. From 1886 to 1947
the Secretary of State, an appointed official, was the immediate
successor. Even the present succession law places the members of
the Cabinet in the line of succession after the Speaker and President pro tempore.
The vice presidential provision of the proposed amendment
subjects the President's nominee to confirmation not only by the
Senate, as is the case under the Constitution with other presidential nominees, but also by the House of Representatives. Thus
all congressional districts and all states have a voice in the selection of the new Vice President. In contrast to the regular presidential elections, where one cannot vote against a vice presidential candidate if he wants to vote for the presidential candidate,
under the Bayh-Celler amendment the person nominated for
Vice President must be judged solely on his own merits.
Professor Haimbaugh suggests that congressional confirmation would be nothing more than a formality. Yet it should be
noted that the United States Senate has not been hesitant to
disapprove presidential nominees who were not qualified for the
office for which they were nominated.9
AIt is unreasonable to
26. 17 S.C.L. REV. 315, 326-27 (1965).
27. See 43 CONG. DIG. 136-37 (1964).
28. The recent action of the Senate in rejecting the nomination of Francis X.
Morrissey for federal district court judge is in point.

206
assume that the United States Congress would not give careful
consideration to the qualifications of a nominee for the Vice
Presidency and, if it felt he were not qualified, to reject his
nomination. In this connection, the proposed amendment provides that a nominee must obtain the votes of a majority of each
House of Congress. Each House would meet and vote separately
and could have such hearings and discussions regarding the
nominee as it thought desirable. Accordingly, the presence of
Congress under this amendment does guarantee an important
role for the representatives of the people in the process of vice
presidential succession.
E. Conclusion
Professor Haimbaugh's criticisms of the Bayh-Celler plan for
vice presidential succession are not justified. A line of succession
beyond the Vice Presidency is a guarantee against catastrophe. It
is not a substitute for having a Vice President at all times. A
major requirement for the Vice Presidency is the person's qualifications for the Presidency. The office of Vice President offers
the best apprenticeship for possible succession to the Presidency.
This Nation cannot rely upon a succession law under which those
in the line of succession are chosen almost exclusively on the basis
of their qualifications for other positions as a substitute for a
Vice President at all times.
The proposed twenty-fifth amendment deals with not only
vice presidential succession but also the problem of presidential
inability which has long been in need of solution.29 No one claims
that this amendment is perfect, covering every possible contingency. Indeed, no such claim was made on behalf of the Constitution itself. The following words of Benjamin Franklin, uttered
at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, are appropriate:
I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they
are such; because I think a general Government necessary
for us. . . . I doubt . . . whether any other Convention we
can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution. For
when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage
of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those
men, all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opin29. The author discusses the amendment and its background in The Proposed
Amendment on PresidentialInability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy, 41 A.B.A.J.
915 (October, 1965) ; The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1965).
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ion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such
an assembly can a perfect production be expected? It there-

fore astonished me .

.

. to find this system approaching so

near to perfection as it does.

. .

. Thus I consent .

.

. to

this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I

am not sure, that it is not the best. . . . I cannot help expressing a wish that every member . . . who may still have

objections to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little
of his own infallibility. . . . 30

There is no other amendment to the Constitution which has
been as thoroughly considered as the proposed twenty-fifth
amendment. It is, as Walter Lippmann so well stated, "a great
deal better than an endless search .
solution .

sary."31

.

.

. for the absolutely perfect

. which will never be found, and .

.

. is not neces-

The problems with which it deals involve the Nation's
security. To leave these problems unsolved is to trifle with that
security!

30. 2 THE RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL. CONVENTION

ed. 1911 & 1937).
31. N.Y. Herald Tribune, June 9, 1964, p. 20.

OF

1787, at 642-43 (Farrand

208

VICE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
A BRIEF REBUTTAL
GEORGE D. HAIMBAUGH, JR.*

Mr. John D. Feerick's article, "Vice Presidential Succession:
In Support of the Bayh-Celler Plan," adds to his already substantial contribution to an understanding of the vice presidency
and the problem of vice presidential succession. Were it not for
the remarks concerning the constitutionality of the present vice
presidential succession law, I would have declined the invitation
to reply and have been content to let my article 2 and his answer
to it speak for themselves. Referring to an opinion held by a
number of respected scholars," Mr. Feerick states that "there is
reason to believe that the present law of vice presidential succession is unconstitutional . ..

because of real doubt as to wheth-

er the Speaker or President pro tempore is an officer of the
United States." However this statement was intended, it calls
for an answer because it carries the implication that the present
plan may be unworkable in the sense that the Supreme Court
might be prevailed upon to depose a Speaker who had been
sworn in as President pursuant to that law.
The Constitution provides that "the Congress may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President. . . ."' Congress has exercised
this power5 and it is highly unlikely that the Court would intervene. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote in the recent case of Baker v.
Carr"-in an opinion not noted as an expression of judicial restraint-that,
prominent on the .surface of any case held to involve a
political [and therefore non-justiciable] question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or * * * the im-

* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; A.B.,
DePauw University; J.D., Northwestern University; J.S.D.,
Yale University.
1. 18 S.C.L. REv. 226 (1966).
2. Vice-Presidential Succession: A Criticism of the Bayh-Celler
Plan, 17
S.C.L. REv. 315 (1965).
3. See Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MicH.
L. REV.
451, 457-64 (1949).
4. U. S. CONST. art. II § 1, para. 6.
5. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.7
It has been suggested that since Baker the Court has acted in
Westberry v. Sanders" with regard to rights the protection of
which has been given by the Constitution exclusively to Congress.9 But the Court acted in Westberry with regard to the
validity of state apportionment laws and in a matter upon which
the Congress had not acted. It follows that the question of whether the Speaker or the President pro tempore are, as the Congress
has determined, officers eligible to succeed to the presidency is
a constitutional issue which the Congress, not the Court, decides.
Also calling for an answer, perhaps, is the reference to "the
past, upon which Professor Haimbaugh places so much reliance"-a surprising observation in view of the fact that Mr.
Feerick in his conclusion quotes and relies upon a long statement
made by Benjamin Franklin in 1787. If Mr. Feerick believes that
my article contains too much historical documentation, some
might think that parts of his answer require more.
For example, Mr. Feerick quotes with approval an assertion
by William White that "Kennedy gave his Vice-President wide
powers to negotiate and to act on behalf of the United States."
But not a single example of diplomatic negotiations conducted
by Vice President Johnson is offered.
Also, Mr. Feerick criticizes the present vice presidential succession act on the ground that "it would permit a political party
different from that of the President and Vice President to take
control of the Executive in the event of the death, resignation
or removal of both the President and Vice President." This
amounts to a contention that in such an eventuality it would be
bad to have the new President be of the same political party as
a majority of the members of the House of Representatives-a
theory which is left wholly undeveloped.
7. Id., at 217. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote, "Where
the Constitution assigns a particular function wholly and indivisibly to another
department, the federal judiciary does not intervene." Id., at 246.

8. 367 U.S. 1 (1964).
9. Employing the argument found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946).
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The principal point made in my original article was that to
grant the President "the constitutional power to nominate a Vice
President would, under the circumstances of the tragic termination of one presidential administration and the honeymoon atmosphere attending the advent of another, tend to reduce the role
of Congress in the matter to little more than a formality." The
single example marshalled to rebut this contention is "the recent
action of the Senate in rejecting the nomination of Francis X.
Morrissey for federal district court judge."10 The weakness of
the intended analogy is obvious when one considers that at stake
in the one case would be the prestige of the President at the very
outset of his administration while the other case involved, principally, the prestige of a junior senator-sponsor-the Congress
having already manifested almost unparalleled support for the
President from the time of his succession to office two years
before.
Mr. Feerick expresses his great satisfaction with the four vice
presidents who have succeeded to the Presidency in this century.
His attention is called to the fact that these men all advanced
under a system where the initiative in choosing candidates for
the vice presidency is not a constitutional prerogative of one
man. As they say in the Marine Corps, when you're shooting in
the black, don't change your sights.

10. As a matter of fact, the Senate did not actually "reject" the Morrissey
nomination. The Judiciary Committee of the Senate approved the nomination
but, after debate, Senator E. M. Kennedy, who sponsored Judge Morrissey,
moved that the nomination be sent back to committee. Kennedy claimed that a
majority of the Senate would have voted for confirmation but Senator Dirksen
said enough votes for recommittal were already available. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1965. The nomination was later withdrawn by the President at the request of
Judge Morrissey. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1965.
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PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY: THE
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
Richard P. Longaker*
I. THE ORIGINS
It is worthy of comment when Congress finally and overwhelmingly agrees to settle a constitutional issue which previous
sessions of Congress have managed to avoid. It is also noteworthy
when the issue is discussed on a high level of nonpartisan abstraction
and consensus, both as to the urgent need for a solution and the
solution itself; but it is especially noteworthy when the issue involves one of the most critical problems facing political regimesthe preservation of continuity in executive leadership.
The proposed twenty-fifth amendment to the Constitution,
which is designed to end the accumulated ambiguities arising out of
presidential inability,' passed both houses of Congress by an overwhelming vote in 1965. It has been approved by half of the 38 state
legislatures required for adoption, and undoubtedly within a year or
two it will take its place among the rapidly growing number of
formal amendments to the Constitution.2 A century of desultory congressional concern, which ebbed when dying Presidents were replaced or presidential illnesses had subsided, came to an end with the
arrival of the nuclear age. But for the tragedy of Dallas and the
presence of other chance factors, it is likely that constitutional drift
would have continued. Even the succession of Eisenhower illnesses
did not move Congress to joint action although hearings were held
in response to the seriousness of the situation and proposals were
reported out of committee. In the absence of congressional action
following President Eisenhower's ileitis attack and stroke during his
* Professor of Political Science and Chairman of Department, University of
California, Los Angeles.
1 Throughout this article the term "inability" will be used throughout rather
than "disability." It is possible for a President to be disabled without being rendered
unable to carry out the duties of his office. The term also connotes inability to act for
reasons other than illness: breakdown in communications, capture by a hostile force,
etc. The Constitution, art. II § 1, uses both terms, but the proposed twenty-fifth
amendment avoids the term "disability," using instead "inability" and "unable."
2 As of February, 1966, 19 states had ratified the Amendment: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Utah,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. In 1965 Colorado rejected the Amendment, but this was
reversed in February, 1966.
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second term, the President and Vice President Richard Nixon
reached an agreement on the temporary devolution of presidential
authority in the event of illness or other occurrence rendering the
Chief Executive incapable of exercising the powers and duties of the
office. The agreement, the specific substance of which was known at
first only to the President, Vice President, Sherman Adams, and the
President's personal Secretary, was never published as an official
document and was finally made known to the public through the
avenue of a press release. It was essentially an effort to circumvent
constitutional ambiguity by means of a personal vow between
institutional associates.
The constitutional ambiguity had been clearly recognized since
President Garfield's death by assassination in 1881. In operational
terms, the Constitution fails to specify who determines that a
President is unable to exercise his powers and duties, nor does it
assist in answering when and how the inability is to be declared at
an end.s Moreover, before the passage of the proposed twentyfifth amendment there was a respectable body of opinion that an ill
President, who yielded his powers even temporarily, lost them permanently. The Eisenhower-Nixon agreement was a stop-gap measure of limited application which Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
adopted as a pattern. Common to each of the agreements was the
understanding that the President would declare his own inability,
whereupon the Vice President would serve as Acting President. If
the President was unable to communicate his inability, the Vice
President, after "appropriate" consultation, would serve until the
inability ended. In either case, the President was to decide the
termination of his inability and resume the full powers and duties
of the office. 4
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 reads in part: "In case of the removal of the President
from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties
of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and
such officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until
the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."
4 For the original Eisenhower-Nixon agreement, see New York Times, March 4,
1958, p. 1, col. 2. The later agreements included President Kennedy and Vice President
Johnson, New York Times, Aug. 11, 1961, p. 1, col. 3; President Johnson and Speaker
of the House McCormack-under the Succession Act of 1947, next in line for the
Presidency, New York Times, Dec. 6, 1963, p. 1, col. 8; and currently President
Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, New York Times, Jan. 28, 1965, p. 13, col. 1.
The only variation among the agreements is that President Kennedy specifically
induded the Cabinet as an "appropriate" body for consultation. Because Speaker
McCormack, as a member of Congress, is barred from "holding any office
ungler the
United States," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, his position was particularly delicate
following
President Kennedy's assassination when there was no Vice President.
Even a temporary
presidential illness would have required the Speaker to resign
from the House of
Representatives.
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Although some scholars believe the Eisenhower-Nixon solution
is adequate, the overwhelming weight of opinion, Presidents and
Attorneys General included, called for a more precise understanding
in law that would extend beyond the terms of office of the principals
and would reach toward a predictable procedural understanding of
the Constitution itself. John F. Kennedy's assassination spread a
diffuse sense of loss and anxiety about further losses throughout
the political system; in more concrete constitutional terms, it conjured visions of a severely wounded President, unconscious and
paralyzed, and a Vice President with only the fragile authority of a
personal agreement to justify his assumption of the prerogatives of
the world's most powerful office. There were other factors helping to
produce change, however. After a decade of intermittent hearings,
congressional committees had narrowed and refined a multiplicity of
proposals for dealing with presidential inability into a few commonly
accepted principles. Second, a mood of urgency replaced the relative
complacency of the 1950's on this issue when a new dramatis personae and shifting political roles emerged. Before the mid-1960's
there were compelling political, if not constitutional reasons, for
avoiding a constitutional decision regarding presidential inability.
Some Republican leaders hesitated to heighten public doubt about
Eisenhower's health by encouraging adoption of formal inability
procedures before the 1956 elections; others no doubt were reluctant to enhance Vice President Nixon's position by regularizing
procedures for a transfer of power in the event of a presidential
illness. Reluctance about making allusions to presidential health
possibly stayed the hand of the Kennedy administration in initiating
legislation on presidential inability, although the President's youth
and vitality seemed to be assurance enough." But by 1964, the scene
was set for widespread discussion of the question. It was common
knowledge that President Johnson had suffered a serious heart
attack in 1955 and that the ages of those next in line for the
presidency, the Speaker of the House and President-pro-tem of the
Senate, were 72 and 86 respectively. Prior to the election of 1964
there was little hope that the House would offend Speaker McCormack by approving a measure to fill the Vice Presidency by a new
method or formulate inability procedures. After the Johnson-Humphrey inauguration the issue faded and the twenty-fifth Amendment
passed overwhelmingly in the House; without doubt the bill was
helped in the Senate because Vice President Humphrey had been a
5 See THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (Greenberg &
Parker eds. 1965); CHILDREN AND THE DEATH OF A PRESIDENT (Wolfenstein ed. 1965).
6 NIXON, SIX CRISES 139-43 (1962)
KENNEDY 38 (1965).

[hereinafter cited as NIXON]; SORENSON,
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respected member of the Senate inner circle. Finally, there was
strong presidential support for the measure; a Chief Executive
without Johnson's Senate background might well have resisted this
increment to congressional power.
Only in the immediate presence of presidential illness or death
does the American public show concern about the inadequate constitutional means for dealing with the process of political succession. Because presidential inability or near inability have appeared
in moments of domestic and international crisis, there is reason to
be concerned. Quite apart from this, there is a statistical basis for
concern. Since 1789 the United States has experienced five assassinations, over 600 days without a fully active President, eight Vice
Presidential successions to the Presidency, and, related to this last
contingency, thirty-seven years when there was no Vice President.
Of the several contingencies only two were unequivocally covered
in the Constitution. Since 1787 the Constitution has stated clearly
that the Vice President is first in line of succession upon the death
of a President. Also, there is no doubt that Congress can establish
the line of succession in the event of removal, death, resignation, or
inability of both the President and Vice President. But by device
or accident the Constitution did not provide means for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency and left unanswered critical questions
of appropriate constitutional behavior by the Vice President in the
event of presidential death or inability. John Tyler provided one of
the answers, but until the passage of the twenty-fifth amendment
the others were unresolved.
William Henry Harrison died after little over a month in office
in 1841. His death occasioned the first interpretation of Article II,
Section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution, although Madison's near
capture by the British in the War of 1812 and an attempt on the life
of President Andrew Jackson in 1834 almost provided earlier opportunities. Harrison's illness developed soon after he delivered a lengthy
inaugural address in bitter weather, was aggravated by a rainy shopping tour for White House supplies, and was speeded to its termination
by the primitive medical treatment of the day. While Harrison lay
critically ill Vice President Tyler remained in Virginia; he was the
first of several Vice Presidents who were reluctant to move into a
partial vacuum. Two days passed after Harrison's death before
Tyler reached Washington. In the interim he apparently had examined the constitutional alternatives and decided neither to become
"Acting" President for the remainder of Harrison's term nor to
remain "Vice" President, but rather to become President in his own
7 See Appendix A infra.

215
right.8 Interpreting the words in article II, section 1 ("In case of the
removal of the President from Office, or of his death, resignation,
or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the
same shall devolve on the Vice President .

.

."), Tyler concluded

that "the same" embraced the office as well as the powers and
duties. He took the oath of office but prudently recorded a declaration that the Constitution did not require him to do so because the
office of President devolved on the Vice President automatically
upon the death of the President and he had already taken an oath to
perform the duty he was about to discharge.'
Although Tyler's determination resolved one constitutional
ambiguity, he stirred up other doubts for later Vice Presidents.
Did the Tyler interpretation that, on the death of the President,
the Vice President should assume the powers, duties, and the office
of the President, extended by analogy to Vice Presidents who took
charge when a President was seriously ill? If so, should a President
declare his inability to discharge the office, he would be displaced
for the remainder of the term. This uncertainty was to vex later
Vice Presidents and presidential aides when prolonged presidential
illness seemed to demand Vice Presidential leadership. Those closest
to the President hesitated to support a Vice Presidential assumption
of power, fearing that the office of the President might also be surrendered, perhaps permanently. Similarly, Vice Presidents were
reluctant to assume a stricken President's duties, when their constitutional position was not clear, partly out of the desire to avoid
being accused of usurpation. There were other reasons for Vice
Presidential reluctance-resistance by presidential intimates, partisan considerations, and, inevitably, the opposition of those in power
to any shift in command relationship-but the procedural ambiguity
in the Constitution certainly intensified the Vice Presidential
dilemma.'*
8 HANSEN, THE YEAR WE HAD No PRESIDENT 7-8 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
HANSEN]; MORGAN, A WHIG EMBATTLED 7-17 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN].
* See FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS 92 (1965) [hereinafter cited as FEERICK];
MORGAN 8. Judge William Cranch administered the oath of office. Tyler cautiously
requested that he certify as follows: "I, William Cranch, chief judge of the circuit
court of the District of Columbia, certify that the above-named John Tyler personally
appeared before me this day, and although he deems himself qualified to perform the
duties and exercise the powers and office of President on the death of William Henry
Harrison, late President of the United States, without any other oath than that which
he has taken as Vice-President, yet as doubts may arise, and for greater caution, took
and subscribed the foregoing oath before me." 4 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS

OF THE PRESIDENTS 31-32 (1897).

Constitutional uncertainty did not inhibit Tyler, who filled a leadership
vacuum-but a partial vacuum is something else again. As Woodrow Wilson's Vice
President, Thomas Marshall declared, "I am not going to seize the place and then have
Wilson-recovered--come around and say 'get off, you usurper."' THOMAS, TroMAS
RILEY MARSHALL: HOOSIER STATESMAN 226-27 (1939). For an even more difficult
situation, see NIXON 134-39.
10
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Ironically, the framers of the Constitution intended quite a
different result. The original report of the Committee on Detail was
a model of undistinguished clarity. The revisions by the Committee
on Style (appointed to "revise the style and arrange the articles
agreed to by the House") changed the original wording to more
graceful obscurity. It is doubtful that the intent was anything more
than stylistic, but the differences were critical.
Reported to the
Committee on Style

Revision of the
Committee on Style

In case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or
inability to discharge the powers
and duties of his office the Vice
President shall exercise those
powers and duties until another
President be chosen, or until the
inability of the President be removed.

In case of the removal of the
President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to
discharge the powers and duties
of the same office, the same shall
devolve on the Vice President.."

If the Committee on Style had not revised the wording origi-

nally approved by the Convention, each subsequent Vice President
would have known that his responsibility, in the event of a serious
presidential illness, would be fulfilled only as acting President until
the inability was removed. Instead, by the end of John Tyler's
term only two things were certain: (1) a Vice President assumed
the office of the President as President, on the death of his successor,
and (2) the language of the Constitution was of no assistance in
delimiting the responsibilities of a Vice President when a President
was ill, nor did the Constitution help to specify procedures for
determining when a period of presidential inability began or ended.
On three dramatic occasions after the Tyler episode, Vice Presidents
juggled these uncertainties.
The death of Zachary Taylor while in office and Lincoln's
assassination raised no serious problems of Vice Presidential succession. In 1881, however, Garfield was shot and lingered for eighty
days, sometimes in a coma and with occasional hallucinations. Although presidential business was at a standstill Vice President
Chester Arthurn remained at a distance. Then as now, Vice Presidential nominations were a product of ticket balancing; Arthur was
a leader of the Stalwart faction of the Republican party while
Garfield was a leader of the reformist element, the Halfbreeds. The
assassination, in fact, was a demented response to just this struggle
11 1 ErLIort's DEBATES 228, 302 (2d ed. 1836). For an excellent discussion of the
proceedings of the Convention, see FEERICK 39-51. Alexander Hamilton refers to the
Vice President who "may occasionally become a substitute for the President." THE

FrOEALisT No. 68 (Hamilton).
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within the party. Chester Arthur's position was made even more
delicate when a letter informing him of the assassination and his
"succession" to the Presidency was found in the assassin's pocket."
Arthur apparently decided to avoid any step that would embarrass
either Garfield or his own followers. Nonetheless, as Garfield's
inability stretched on, the Cabinet discussed the advisability of
asking Arthur to act for the President. There were two conflicting
viewpoints. The Cabinet agreed unanimously that it was desirable
to have Arthur act as President, but only with Garfield's consent;
the Cabinet then divided (4-3) on whether Arthur would become
President for the remainder of Garfield's term even if Garfield
recovered. This critical division of opinion, Garfield's inaccessability, and Arthur's reluctance, led the Cabinet to back away. Garfield's death a few days later brought Arthur to the Presidency
but left the constitutional questions unanswered.13
During Garfield's illness division of opinion was centered in the
Cabinet and within the party; when Woodrow Wilson was incapacitated by a stroke in 1919 a bitter conflict developed between the
Cabinet and White House intimates, including Mrs. Wilson. The
President was taken ill in the midst of an exhausting cross-country
trip designed to marshall support in the Senate for the Treaty of
Versailles. Wilson had shown signs of severe and debilitating exhaustion while negotiating the peace settlement in Paris; but the real
illness, including partial paralysis, did not become evident to those
around him until he suffered a stroke in Wichita and a more severe
one immediately after his return to Washington."
In direct contrast to the graphic publicity associated with
President Eisenhower's illnesses and President Lyndon Johnson's
See FEEIuCK 118.
13 Id. at 135-38. See also Silva, PresidentialInability, 35 U. DET. L.J. 139 (1957).
14 One aide commented on the President's exhaustion in Paris: "Even while lying
in bed he manifested peculiarities, one of which was to limit the use of all the automobiles to strictly official purposes, when previously he had been so liberal in his suggestions that his immediate party should have the benefit of this possible diversion, in
view of the long hours we were working. When he got back on the job, his peculiar
ideas were even more pronounced. He now became more obsessed with the idea that
every French employee about the place was a spy for the French Government. Nothing
we could say would disabuse his mind of this thought. He insisted they all understood
English, when, as a matter of fact, there was just one of them among the two dozen
or more who understood a single word of English. About this time he also acquired
the peculiar notion that he was personally responsible for all the property in the
furnished palace he was occupying. He raised quite a fuss on two occasions when he
noticed articles of furniture had been removed. Upon investigation-for no one else
noticed the change-it was learned that the custodian of the property for the French
owner had seen fit to do a little re-arranging. Coming from the President, whom we
all knew so well, these were funny things, and we could but surmise that something
queer was happening in his mind." HANSEN 31.
12
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gall bladder operation, the Wilson illness was wrapped in mystery.
It was not a matter of good taste but rather a jealous guardianship
imposed by the family and friends of the sick President. For long
periods Wilson was out of touch with all but his wife and doctors
and his personal secretary, Joseph Tumulty. Confused and confusing
bulletins were released now and then, referring to the President as
"a very sick man," who was in a "state of nervous exhaustion." The
confusion continued week after week until Wilson, a visibly changed
man, emerged to meet with his Cabinet some eight months after the
initial stroke. In the interim all items of public business which were
directed to the President were channelled through Tumulty, the
President's physicians, and Mrs. Wilson. In the early weeks it is
doubtful that the President was well enough to consider anything
but the most minor items of public concern. Throughout the illness
he was allowed to receive only those questions which would not harm
his recovery. Cabinet meetings were called by Secretary of State
Lansing twenty times in a four month period to transact what little
business was possible under existing conditions.15 One commentator
presents the following evidence of the price of Wilson's illness:
During the special session of the Sixty-sixth Congress, twenty-eight
acts became law without the President's passing on them within the
requisite ten days. Although he vetoed the Prohibition Enforcement
Act on October 27, he did not pass on fifteen of the sixteen acts sent
to the White House between October 28 and November 18. He did not
meet his Cabinet for eight months after his collapse. He failed to
answer the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's repeated requests
that he take some action or supply the Committee with some information about the Shantung Settlement, a situation which prompted Senator Albert B. Fall to suggest that the Senate should recess until the
President became able to resume the duties of his office. Although the
Constitution says that the President shall receive the representatives
of foreign states, the New York Times reported that Wilson's illness
prevented him from seeing the Belgian sovereigns and the Prince of
Wales when they visited the United States... .
This evidence is only a small part of that which could be presented to
show that neither foreign nor domestic affairs received the President's
proper attention. The Versailles Treaty was probably the most important casualty of Wilson's disability. He was forced to abandon his
western tour in behalf of the Treaty. A month later, the Democratic
leader in the Senate, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, believed he could work out
a compromise with the Treaty's foes in the Senate. But Wilson's physicians would not allow Hitchcock to see the President. Hitchcock complained that he would have to consult with the President before he
could agree to any compromises. Although it was reported
five days
later that Hitchcock had seen Wilson three times, many students
of the
period agree that the Treaty was defeated largely because
of Wilson's
15 FEERICK ch. 13; HANSEN 29-42;
SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

57-97 (1951).
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isolation from public opinion, from his advisors, and from congressional
leaders, whose advice he so badly needed in his enfeebled condition.1 6

Those in an official position of responsibility were little more
informed than the general public. Vice President Thomas Marshall
received no special information on the President's health, and when
Secretary Lansing reputedly reminded Joseph Tumulty of the need
for an acting President, Tumulty replied, "You may rest assured
that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the White House on the
broad of his back, I will not be a party to ousting him."17 For this
effort and his initiative in calling Cabinet meetings, Lansing was
removed from office by President Wilson four months after his
stroke.
In sum, the situation was highly resistant to reason. Personal
animosities were mixed with constitutional uncertainty about the
Vice Presidential role. Vice President Marshall (who is remembered
in American folklore for his prescription, "What this country needs
is a good five cent cigar") was not inclined toward political advancement in any case, and he perceived his own uncomfortable
constitutional position. But had he stepped forward he would have
precipitated a bitter constitutional conflict with the President's entourage, on constitutional grounds that were, to say the least, uncertain regarding the permanence of the Vice President's tenure and
unclear about the means for determining inability when presidential
consent and cooperation were lacking. The result was stalemate.
Although the definitive account of the Eisenhower administration's response to the President's illnesses cannot yet be written,,
it is evident that the performance contrasts sharply with the Wilson
illness. Despite the immediate efforts by White House aides to
minimize the attacks, the public and members of the President's
cabinet and staff received clinically detailed reports on the President's condition. Also, the President's style of "team" leadership
and his practice of delegating decision-making minimized the disruption of administrative patterns. Specifically, Sherman Adams carried
on as the key figure in the administration, a role that had been
assigned to him immediately after the 1952 election. Conflict within
the administration was muted because of the established administrative patterns and because, unlike President Wilson, Eisenhower
16 Id. at 142-43. For an interesting popular account of Wilson's illness, see SMrr,
WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED (1964).
17

18

TumULTY, WOODROw WILSON As I KNow HIM 443-44 (1921).
The dates of President Eisenhower's illnesses are as follows: Sept. 24, 1955,

heart attack; June 9, 1956, ileitis operation; November 25, 1957, stroke. Especially
helpful are ADAMS, FIRsTHAND REPORT ch. 10 (1961)
NIXON pt. 3.
22-517 0 - 73 - 15

[hereinafter cited as ADAMS];
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directed his Vice President to hold cabinet and other meetings. Conflict was also muted by Vice President Nixon's self-effacing posture
and, in the case of the President's heart attack, by the deceptively
quiescent state of international and domestic affairs.19 But members
of the Eisenhower administration agreed that an illness lasting as
long as Woodrow Wilson's or occurring during a time of international
crisis, would have rendered even those administrative routines inadequate. For this reason tension rose noticeably within the administration when the President suffered a stroke in 1957_'* International
and domestic pressures on the White House were perceptibly more
intense than they had been at the moment of the President's heart
attack in 1955, and the members of the administration who. had
experienced 'the previous crisis were less sanguine about the procedures followed at that time. Vice President Nixon stood by in all
three instances as doubtful of his constitutional position as other
Vice Presidents had been when confronted by the problem of succession. Partly as a result of the second illness, proposals for constitutional amendments were sent to Congress in 1957 and 1958;
finally in March 1958, with congressional action doubtful, the
President and the Vice President announced that they had concluded
their own agreement.
No doubt Vice President Nixon's position would have been less
difficult had the agreement existed during all three presidential illnesses (it was only in effect during the stroke, but even then it was
not known publicly). If the President's condition had deteriorated,
procedures would have been at hand directing that the Vice President should take over as temporary executive until the President
decided otherwise. 2 1 Nonetheless it was a personal agreement without basis in a statute or in the Constitution. Furthermore, there is
much to suggest that considerations other than constitutional insufficiency were operating. For one thing, the channels of influence and
power did not run normally through Vice President Nixon's office;
also, others stood to lose influence if the Vice President gained. It is
not surprising that Sherman Adams was selected by the Cabinet
(the decision was concurred in after mild objections by the Vice
President) to go to Denver after the President's heart attack as
"the sole official channel of information between Eisenhower and
the world outside of the hospital room." Adams relates that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed the arrangement: "In
insisting upon having me with Eisenhower, Dulles was once again
vigilantly protecting his own position as the maker of foreign
19 NIXON 134.
20 Id. at 124-50; ADAMs 192.
21 Id. at 198-200.
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policy."" Not surprisingly, Adams and others in the administration
did not want the established pattern of influence and power disrupted, if it could be avoided. There were also forces in the party
that wanted to avoid any step which might make Vice President
Nixon the heir apparent and a candidate either in 1956 or in 1960.
Among others, the President himself had doubts on that score.23 An
unpleasant struggle for influence within the administration and the
party was avoided by preserving the appearance of the status quo.
Beyond any abstract procedural virtues of a given constitutional
provision to deal with presidential inability, the Eisenhower experience suggests that the success of any inability procedure will be
determined by the manner in which the specific provisions and the
political system at large absorb political factors such as these.2 4
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH

AMENDMENT

The congressional hearings which led to the passage of the
twenty-fifth amendment began soon after President Eisenhower's
heart attack. Over the next decade alternative solutions were focused upon and debated within Congress, the executive branch, and
in journals of opinion. 5 History provided the raw material: the
2

22 Id. at 186.
23 NIXON 161-62.
24 Two other observations should be made about the Eisenhower experience with
inability. In spite of full publicity within a few hours, there were periods during all
three illnesses when the only press releases referred to "digestive upset" (heart attack),
"upset stomach" (ileitis), and "a chill" (stroke). Of more significance for presidential
inability and the command problem is that following the President's heart attack at
2:30 a.m., Dr. Howard Snyder, the President's personal physician, is on record as
being the only one who knew about the President's condition. He wanted the President
to benefit from "sedation" and the "decision also spared him, his wife and mother-inlaw emotional upset 'upon too precipitant an announcement of such serious import."
FEERICK 213-25. For the moment medical and personal factors, not constitutional
factors, were dominant. Similarly, some friends of the President were convinced that
President Eisenhower should run for office again following his heart attack because
not to do so might kill him. The reasoning was somewhat reminiscent of the calculations of President Wilson's physicians. Vice President Nixon reports, "Personal considerations, as always, played their role along with the political and public aspects of
Eisenhower's decision. Several of his close friends and personal advisors became convinced that if he gave up his public life, he would never shake off the grip of despondency. General Lucius Clay, an intimate and long-time friend who could speak to him
more frankly and bluntly than perhaps anyone else, observed a moody, depressed
Eisenhower soon before he left Fitzsimmons Hospital, and from that day forward
Clay worked all-out to get him to run for re-election. He called meetings and he rallied
many of us privately to urge the President to run again for his own good. 'I don't care
what happens to the Republican Party, but if he quits, it'll kill him,' was the way
Clay, a Democrat, put it. The same opinion was held by Dr. Snyder, and, as time went
on, others close to the President recognized the wisdom of Clay's attitude from Eisenhower's personal point of view." NIxON 162-63.
25 For articles which are worthy of attention, see Brownell, Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68 YALE L.J. 190 (1958) ; Constitu-
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Tyler precedent, the serious illness of three Presidents, and the
absence of any clear guidelines for determining or ending inability
or for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. By 1964 a rough
consensus had been reached centering around a proposal made by
Attorney General Brownell in 1957 and a set of principles adopted
by a special committee of the American Bar Association in a two
day session in 1964.26 The principal issues will be discussed here in
an ascending order of relative difficulty in reaching agreement on
them.
Although there were strong arguments to the contrary, it was
agreed by most congressional participants and commentators that
the question of presidential inability should be dealt with by means
of a constitutional amendment. There was virtually no dissent from
the view that procedures for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency
required an amendment largely because article I, section 6 authorizes Congress to legislate only when the Presidency and Vice Presidency are both vacant. But those supporting an amendment on the
inability question met with greater resistance. Some argued that
Congress should specify procedures by passing a joint resolution,
avoiding ratification with its built-in rigidities and the lengthy time
consumed. Professor Neustadt, one of the most respected authorities
tional Amendment Urged on Presidential Inability and Succession, 50 A.B.A.J. 237
(1964) ; Feerick, Proposed Amendment on Presidential Inability and Vice-Presidential
Vacancy, 51 A.BA.J. 915 (1965) ; Gilliam & Sloat, Presidential Inability: The Problem
and a Reconstruction, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448 (1956) ; Haimbaugh, Vice Presidential Succession: A Criticism of the Bayh-Celler Plan, 17 S.C.L.Q. 315 (1965) ; Heinlein,
Problem of Continuity in the Presidency, U. CINC. L. REV. 447 (1964); Hofstadter &
Dinnes, Presidential Inability: A Constitutional Amendment Is Needed Now, 50
A.B.A.J. 59 (1964) ; Kuhn, Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy, 32
TENN. L. REV. 1 (1964); Kury, Crisis in the Law of Presidential Succession, 36 PA.
B.A.Q. 301 (1965); Powell, The Risk of Having No President, 36 OKLA. B.A.J. 354
(1965); Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy, 44 MICH. S.B.J. 20
(1965).
For the applicable hearings and reports of Congress, see Hearings Before the
Special Subcommittee to Study Presidential Inability of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 20 (1956); Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Study of PresidentialInability of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3 (1957) ; Hearings on Presidential Inability Before Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) ; Hearings on Presidential Inability Before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963) ; Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office
of Vice
President Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL
INABILITY AND VACANCIES
IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT (Comm.
Print 1965).

26 Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Study of Presidential
Inability
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 3, at 4-32 (1957);
for a report by a participant on the A.B.A. Committee, see FEERICK
244-54; the report
isin 50OA.B.A.J. 237 (1964).
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on the Presidency, opposed a constitutional amendment on the
grounds that inability procedures should grow out of "the common
law accretions" of the Constitution, specifically the evolution of
personal agreements between Presidents and Vice Presidents. Aside
from the difficulty of ever amending an amendment, Neustadt feared
a weakening of the Presidency by the formation of a regency
council (the Cabinet or a special commission determining inability);
or put more simply, placing power to remove the President in the
hands of someone other than the President himself. 27
In opposition to these considerations it was said that personal
agreements between President and Vice President do not carry force
in law or protection against challenge. Alluding to the Wilson experience, Vice President Nixon noted the fragility of such agreements in the event of conflict between the President's "personal
family and the President's official family," and the natural reluctance of a Vice President to move without unequivocal constitutional
authorization.2 8 Further, because most of the procedures proposed
included participation by the Cabinet or a special advisory group,
it was argued that inasmuch as the Vice President was given no
choice under the Constitution but to act in the event of presidential
inability, any proposal that required him to share the power of decision required a constitutional amendment. 29 There was also generalized uncertainty over the power of Congress to legislate in this
area.
The two sources of power usually referred to by those who
favored the legislative alternative were the inability provisions in
article I, section 1 and the necessary and proper clause. The conclusion
drawn by the Judiciary Committees in both Houses was that article
I, section 1 authorized a statutory solution only when the President
and Vice President are incapable of executing the powers and duties
of the Presidency. As for the necessary and proper clause, it was
assumed that power was not specifically vested in Congress to determine inability, nor when and how the President could regain his
prerogatives. Under article II, section 1, Congress was only empowered to determine a successor if both the President and Vice President
were immobilized. Without powers being vested, it was argued, Congress could hardly act to carry them out.3o
27 Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on

the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 166-70 (1964).
28 Id. at 241.
29 See Attorney General Brownell's testimony, Hearings Before the Special Sub-

committee on Study of Presidential Inability of the House Committee on the Judiciary,

85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, at 12 (1957).
30 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT ON
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Above all, the uncertainty about the power of the Executive
or Congress to act, together with the very serious implication of a
Vice Presidential assumption of presidential power, called for the
legitimating effect of a constitutional amendment. If the occasion
arose, the Vice President (and the President if he were capable of
giving consent) would have to act speedily to maintain continuity
in the executive branch unburdened by questions of constitutionality.
The consensus which gradually emerged was based in part on a fundamental policy understanding that delay by challenge in the courts
or elsewhere would shatter the continuity of executive leadership
and thereby endanger the nation. Further, only an amendment
would free the Vice President from a web of constitutional inhibitions by imposing on him a duty to assume power, however temporarily, in the event of serious illness or other inability. The procedures, it was finally concluded, were to be enumerated as distinctly as possible in an amendment to the Constitution.
There was initial agreement that one of the key elements of
any constitutional amendment would be a provision removing the
uncertainties arising from temporary presidential inability. It was
assumed that the conduct of Vice Presidents Arthur, Marshall, and
Nixon had been affected by the constitutional obscurity brought to
light in the Tyler precedent, namely the length of their tenure should
they decide to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency.31
Adding force to this historical point was a more contemporary, if
fugitive, current of opinion which held that the Vice President would
assume the powers and office of the Presidency for the remainder
of the term whether the President died or was temporarily unable
to fulfill his responsibilities. Former President Truman contended
that a permanent accession to power was the proper constitutional
solution partly because a Vice President, acting as President, could
be effective only if protected from reprisal by his predecessor.32
Enough doubt existed to bring quick agreement regarding the desirability of including in the amendment the flat pronouncement
that the Vice President became Acting President only for the period
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
9
(Comm. Print 1965); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF
THE VICE PRESIDENT 9

(Comm. Print 1965). See also FEERICK 247; Kuhn, Presidential Inability
and Vice
Presidential Vacancy, 32 TENN. L. REV. 4-5 (1964).
31 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG.,
lST SESS., REPORT
Om
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 5
(Comm. Print 1965).
32 Hearings on Presidential Inability Before
Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1958).
See also FEERICK 247.
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of presidential inability. Although he was to exercise the powers
and duties of the Presidency, he would not hold the office.
The method of filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency was
agreed upon just as easily. Until the election of Vice President
Humphrey in 1964, there was only the most circumspect discussion
of the question in Congress, largely in deference to Speaker McCormack.33 Immediately after the election, however, sentiment began to be heard on the question of congressional participation in
the process. The alternatives ranged from election by the Electoral
College to election from among a panel of cabinet members and
members of Congress, "by and with the advice and consent" of the
President."' The rationale for congressional initiative was to prevent the President from choosing his successor-which ignored the
fact that the presidential nominee traditionally names the Vice
Presidential candidate at the nominating conventions. The justification for election by the electoral college was to avoid conflict if
the President and Congress were of different party persuasions and
to assure the participation of a popularly elected body. There was
little enthusiasm for either alternative, and dominant opinion centered on presidential initiative and congressional consent.
An ancillary but potentially momentous issue was avoided when
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary deleted any specified time
period from its bill. At one time the bill had required the President to nominate a Vice President within thirty days after a vacancy occurred. It is unclear whether those considering the proposed
amendment understood the implication of such a restriction on the
President.3" Nonetheless, it is generally recognized that a President's
power is closely related to his ability to hold choice, and therefore
power, in abeyance. Naturally, rational deliberation about an heir
apparent is least effective if it is hemmed in by the calendar. The
rigid time requirement was wisely deleted.36
3 This circumspect attitude extended to President Johnson who, when asked
about the matter in 1964, responded that the issue was important but "I don't have
any deep-set views on just how that should be done." New York Times, March 15,
1964, p. 40, col. 1.
34 Vice President Nixon proposed election by the Electoral College. Hearings on
Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Ofice of Vice President Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,

88th Cong., 2d Sess. 241-42 (1964). See also id. at 53.
35 A recommendation that the thirty day limitation be deleted in the interest of
flexibility was made during the hearings on S.J. Res. 1 in 1964. Id. at 229 (testimony
of Clinton Rossiter).
38 The shifting patterns of administrative and political power in the thirty days
following President Kennedy's assassination demonstrates that a new President's
decision should not be forced before he can clarify his own position. Also, one of the
most productive political games played by Lyndon Johnson during the spring of 1964
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These issues were resolved with comparative ease. Differences
deepened over the solution to the perennial vexing questions regarding the inability provision: who was to participate in the determination of presidential inability; who was to decide that the
inability had ceased; how were conflicting diagnoses of the President's state of health to be resolved? Each question produced a
rich variety of solutions nearly all of which presumed that the
President was fully authorized to determine the beginning and end
of his own inability if he was in a position to communicate the decision and if his interpretation was not challenged. It was also generally agreed that absent a decision by the President, the Vice President was the key figure. More difficult to decide was whether the
Vice President should share his decision making with another body,
how that body should be constituted, and under what if any circumstances the Vice President's findings could supersede a contrary finding by the President.
Consultation between the Vice President and Cabinet was the
prevailing solution of the several solutions examined over the ten
year period following President Eisenhower's heart attack. Other
proposals which were seriously considered included (1) unfettered
presidential discretion in determining when he has regained his
powers, 3 7 with protection against abuse of his discretion lying only
in the impeachment power; (2) a determination of inability by a
commission of medical specialists, the Chief Justice, the Secretaries
of State and Defense, and the Speaker of the House and Majority
Leader of the Senate; 3 8 (3) a determination by the Supreme Court
responding to a resolution approved by two-thirds vote of Congress
"suggesting" presidential inability; (4) a finding by Congress itself. 9 Those who had initially argued that the President should
decide when his inability was at an end with disputes to be settled
by the impeachment power, soon relented because of "the odium,"
uncertainty, and protracted nature of the impeachment process, as
involved the Vice Presidency. Theodore White describes the President's process of
sifting out Vice Presidential nominees: "In its mixture of comedy, tension and teasing,
it was a work of art; it was as if, said someone, Caligula were directing I've Got A
Secret." WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1964, at 282 (1965). See also id.
at 260.
37 One variation appears in Attorney General Brownell's testimony.
Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Study of PresidentialInability of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, at 30 (1957).
38 Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee to Study Presidential Inability of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 20, at 81, 94-95
(1956).
39 Id. at 35. See also Hearings on Presidential Inability
Before Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 24 (1958).
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well as the fact that inability itself is not a high crime or misdemeanor." The proposals to use the Supreme Court (or the Chief
Justice sitting as a member of a special commission) were undermined when Chief Justice Warren wrote to the Senate subcommittee that such responsibility would violate the separation of
powers and involve the Supreme Court in political controversy.41
The idea of giving Congress the task of determining when inability
began or ended was dismissed after candid introspection on the part
of members of Congress: the debate would be long, tedious, time
consuming, and partisan. 42 In this discussion, as elsewhere, the principle of the separation of powers was alluded to; but the invocation
had a hollow ring. There were arguments against congressional involvement far more compelling than the separation of powers (e.g.,
its cumbersome process when speed is essential) or participation by
the Supreme Court (which could be enmeshed in bitter partisan conflict). Moreover, many of the proposals, although not giving Congress the role as primary agent in determining inability, did involve
Congress in other capacities, including the election of the Vice President.
40

Id. at 155.

41 Id. at 14:

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C., January 20, 1958.

Hon. Kenneth B. Keating
Member of Congress
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR MR. CONGRESSMAN: During the time the subject of inability of a
President to discharge the duties of his office has been under discussion, the
members of the Court have discussed generally, but without reference to any
particular bill, the proposal that a member or members of the Court be
included in the membership of a Commission to determine the fact of Presidential inability to act.
It has been the belief of all of us that because of the separation of powers
in our Government, the nature of the judicial process, the possibility of a controversy of this character coming to the Court, and the danger of disqualification which might result in lack of a quorum, it would be inadvisable for any
member of the Court to serve on such a Commission.
I realize that Congress is confronted with a very difficult problem, and if
it were only a matter of personal willingness to serve that anyone in the
Government, if requested to do so, should make himself available for service.
However, I do believe that the reasons above mentioned for nonparticipation
of the Court are insurmountable.
With best wishes, I am,
sincerely,
Earl Warren,
Chief Justice
42 Hearings on Presidential Inability Before Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25
(1958) ; Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-72 (1964); Hearings on Presidential Inability
and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
26-27 (1965).
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The proposal which died hardest was the so-called Inability
Commission in its several variations. Support for a commission of
top government officials, top citizens, and top medical men was
stimulated by the comforting lure of expertise. Its appeal gradually
waned as supporters of the idea came to realize that persons known
for their experience and expertise inevitably would be consulted 3
and that a severe presidential illness was essentially a political problem to be solved, if at all, by political instrumentalities." An equally
persuasive argument against an Inability Commission was the prospect of time-consuming deliberations, conflicting medical testimony,
and the possibility of a divided vote in full public view. Nonetheless,
the concept of a Commission had enough vitality to produce an
important concession in the final wording of the amendment. The
Vice President and the Cabinet were to be the basic participants
but the authors of the amendment added "or . . . such other body
as Congress may by law provide. . . ." This provision could yield

some upsetting political results.
In sum, the view that prevailed was that if a President were
unable to declare his own inability by reason of illness or accident,
Cabinet participation in a decision by the Vice President would
strengthen the hand of a reluctant Vice President and encourage an
immediate decision. The cohesive nature of the Cabinet would tend
to avoid the possibility of embroiling a special commission in long
and contentious deliberations on the questions. As consultants the
Cabinet was chosen because it is more likely to be composed of
presidential intimates who, in their administrative capacities, would
be aware of the state of the President's health and would also be
immediately available. It was argued also that the Cabinet would
inspire popular confidence and thereby lend an added note of legitimacy to the Vice President's decision.4 5 But, if Congress were to
43 Prior to President Lyndon B. Johnson's gall bladder operation he made a
public announcement stating that the Vice President was fully informed in policy
matters and during the operation would be in Washington with the White House staff
and the Secretaries of State and Defense. He announced that he had consulted with
the Vice President, the Cabinet, congressional leaders, and former President Eisenhower about his decision. Obviously, his physicians were consulted too. New York
Times, Oct. 6, 1965, p. 1, col. 8.
44 There was the unsettling record of the Wilson medical team. The President's
nerve specialist argued against any declaration of inability because he doubted the
capacities of Vice President Marshall, did not want to see the Versailles treaty provisions defeated, and believed that recognition might damage his patient's health
further. Silva, supra note 13, at 163-64; Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
161 (1964).
For a set of proposals seeking to place the decisions of experts in a position
of primacy
with respect to the mental health of government officials, see Rooow, JAMEs
FORRESTAL
347-50 (1963).
45 STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 13
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decide in the future that the Cabinet mechanism was inadequate,
recourse to the legislature would still be possible.
The most perplexing constitutional question remained. How
should conflicts be resolved between the Vice President and Cabinet
on the one hand and the President on the other? The least unpleasant situation involves a President who is ill but refuses to
declare his own inability out of a sense of duty. More complicated
is the situation in which a President jealously guards his power although unable to exercise it. Most unpleasant of all is the possibility
that a President might refuse to yield power or attempt to regain
power while mentally ill.46 Conflict is possible either when the Vice
President and Cabinet discover that the President is ill while the
President executes full constitutional powers and refuses to declare
his own inability, or if the President attempts to return to power
against the best judgment of the Vice President, Cabinet, and
medical consultants. The solution proposed by the special committee
of the American Bar Association and adopted with some modifications by Congress, placed the legislature in an appellate role. Specifically, if a President declares a state of inability at an end, and if
(Comm. Print 1965). For an excellent discussion of the Cabinet's role, see Attorney
Brownell's testirIony in the Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Study of
Presidential Inability of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.,

ser. 3, at 27-30 (1957).
46 The history of the Presidency reveals no instances of mental illness diagnosed
as such although the hypersensitivity of some ill presidents might, on investigation,
show approximations of mental illness. See generally MARx, THE HEALTH OF PRESI-

(1960). Wilson's alleged paranoia might be a case in point. The best known
recent case at the Cabinet level is that of James Forrestal. See generally Rocow, op.
DENTS

cit. supra note 44.

The most famous of recent instances at the state level involved Governor Earl
Long of Louisiana. In a series of events verging on opera bouffe, the Governor was
allegedly drugged and spirited from the state by his wife in a Louisiana National
Guard plane for treatment in a Texas hospital. After agreeing to submit to treatment
in Louisiana, Long was committed to the Southeast Louisiana Hospital at Mandeville
under court order, an order which was effective until the hospital superintendent
decided the Governor was well enough to be released. Long removed the hospital
superintendent (and for good measure, the director of the State Department of
Hospitals and the Chief of the state police). His new appointees declared. him sane
His return to active public life is recorded in one of the more memorable volumes on
American politics. Immediately after his release from the hospital, a disciple, Joe
Arthur Sims, introduced the Governor at a political rally. As A. J. Liebling describes
the scene, quoting Mr. Sims, "When our beloved friend, the fine Governor of the Gret
Stet of Loosiana, sent for me in his need at Mandeville ... his conditions had been so
MISREPRESENTED ... that people I knew said to me, 'Don't you go up there, Joe Sims.
That man is a hyena. He'll BITE YOU IN THE LAIG.' But I went. I went to Mandeville,
and before I could reach my friend, the armed guard had to open ten locked doors.

and lock each one of 'em again after us. And theah, theah, I found the FINE Governor.
of the Gret Stet of Loosiana .

.

. without SHOES, without a stitch of CLOTHES to put

awn him, without a friend to counsel with. And he was just as rational as he has ever
been in his life, or as you see him here today. He said, 'JOE SIMS, WHERE THE IIELL
YOU BEEN?" LIEBLING, THE EARL OF LOUISIANA 35 (1961). See also FEERICK 288-91.
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the Vice President and the Cabinet contest the declaration, the question is to be submitted to Congress for a decision. The Vice President remains as Acting President until, by two-thirds vote of each
House, the condition of inability is affirmed. Without a two-thirds
vote, the President is to regain the powers and duties of the office.
A two-thirds majority was adopted because of the analogy to the
vote required for impeachment. Moreover, Congress concluded that
the scales should be weighted against those in disagreement with
the President, because he is popularly elected.4 7 This sally into the
constitutional never-never land of palace-guard politics, insanity,
and open struggle for the nation's highest office, occasioned the only
real dispute between the Senate and House during passage of the
proposed twenty-fifth amendment. The issue was whether to impose a time limit on a congressional determination that the President is unable to carry out the duties of his office. For nearly ten
weeks the House and Senate conferees were deadlocked on whether
to adopt the wording of the Senate committee report ("shall immediately proceed to decide the issue") or the House wording ("within
ten days") .48 The Senate tradition of unlimited debate clashed with
the more restrictive House rules. In particular the House managers
feared that a determination of inability might become subject to a
filibuster or other delaying tactics used as weapons in a struggle for
power. A compromise was finally reached requiring congressional
action within twenty-one days.4"

III. CoNGRESSIONAL INTENT
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President.

Section 1 embeds the Tyler precedent in the Constitution. If
the office of the Presidency is vacant, a Vice President becomes President in his own right. One service rendered by this provision is to
47 Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President

Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1964).
48 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT 16
(1965); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
oNPRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE
OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 16

(Comm. Print 1965).

49 The floor action on S.J. Res. 1 is
found in 111 CONG. REc. 14587 (daily ed.
June 29, 1965); id. at 14665-66, 14831 (daily ed. June 30, 1965). The
vote for passage
was 68-5 in the Senate, 111 CONG. REC. 15031-32 (daily
ed. July 6, 1965), and 328-29
in the House on passage before the Conference Report, id. at
7069 (daily ed. April 13,
1965), with voice vote approval of the Conference Report,
id.
at 14668 (daily ed. June
30, 1965).
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set off clearly by exclusion the acting status of the Vice President
when inability exists, an ambiguity unresolved in article II, section 1,
clause 6.0
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
both houses of Congress.

The United States has been without a Vice President sixteen
times." One Vice President resigned, eight became President on the
death of the President, and seven died in office. Section 2 of the
proposed amendment makes it possible to keep the office filled at all
times. The amendment sets no time limit for a presidential nomination to fill a vacancy. Although there may be political reasons for
delay, 2 prolonged vacancy creates dangers which the section was
designed to eliminate, for unlike other executive offices when vacant,
the functions cannot be deputized. Therefore, the constitutional
presumption seems to be for speedy action by the President. The
case for speedy action is reinforced by the sense of deliberate urgency found elsewhere in the amendment. Section 4 requires the
Vice President to become Acting President "immediately" after a
finding of presidential inability. The same section sets a restricted
time limit on congressional action when conflicting estimates of
presidential inability emerge. There is no reason to suppose that a
similar intent does not hold for this section."
The vote of confirmation is by both Houses acting separately,"
and by a majority of those members present and voting, a quorum
being present. 5 There is no limit to the number of times a President
50 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

12 (Comm. Print 1965).
51 See Appendix A, Table II infra.
52 See text accompanying note 36 supra.

53 At one time the bill under consideration by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee on the Judiciary specified a thirty day limit.
The deletion was not intended to lessen the urgency, but rather to avoid providing
additional language for the situation where the first presidential nominee was rejected
and the second (or third) could not be approved within the thirty day period. Also,
thirty days was held to be unnecessarily specific. Hearings on Presidential Inability
and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
228-29 (1964).
64 111 CONG. REc. 7675 (daily ed. April 13, 1965).
5 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

14-15 (Comm. Print 1965). On this question Attorney General Katzenbach recommended that the nature of the majority appear in the final Committee report. It did
not, but the exchange between Senator Bayh and the Attorney General indicates
implicit acceptance of the stated majority and reliance on Missouri Pac. Ry. v.
Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1918).
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may put forward nominees if his initial choice is rejected by Congress; conversely, there is no limit on the number of candidates
Congress may turn down. No explicit or implicit procedural instrument for ending a deadlock appears in the record. It can be conjectured that Congress should look favorably on the President's
nominee by analogy to the custom of nominating conventions of accepting the presidential candidate's choice for a vice presidential
running mate 6 and the high likelihood of favorable Senate action on
other high executive nominations made by the President. 7
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.

Section 3 strikes directly at the problem which has been put
forth by some authorities as the key factor in Vice Presidential
reluctance to take part in a transfer of the powers and duties of
the office temporarily: the uncertainty of a Vice President's status
if he assumes the powers of the Presidency, and also the question
of whether the powers are to be exercised temporarily or until the

end of the President's term. The section specifies that upon a declaration of inability he will assume the powers and -duties but not the
office of the President, and therefore he will be Acting President,
not President in his own right. 8 This responsibility is to terminate
the moment inability has ended. Section 3 makes clear that the President is the prime initiator of a declaration of inability, assuming
that he is aware of the condition or can foresee it. The President
also has the prime authority to declare his inability at an end. A
56 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SEsS., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
89 (Comm. Print 1965).
57 CORwIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POwERs 73 (1957); HARRIs, THE ADVICE
AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 259 (1953).
58 Senator Bayh, the manager of the bill in the Senate, stated for the record the

following definition of inability under § 4: "[T]he word 'inability' and the word
'unable' as used in [§ 4 of] this article, which refers to an impairment of the President's faculties, mean that he is unable either to make or communicate his decisions
as to his own competency to execute the powers and duties of his office .

. . ."

The

statement was an elaboration of a definition which included illness and other factors
under both §§ 3 and 4: "[T]he intention of this legislation is to deal with any type of
inability, whether it is from travelling from one nation to another, a breakdown of
communications, capture by the enemy, or anything that is imaginable. The inability

to perform the powers and duties of the office is inability under the terms that we
are
discussing." Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice
President Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Committee
on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1965).
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President declares his inability to Congress by transmitting a written
statement to the constitutionally designated officers of the House
and Senate; he may regain his powers by the same unilateral process. The President may declare "either an indefinite or a specified
period of time, and [can] specify a particular hour of commencement of the Vice President's role as Acting President." 9 The Senate
draft of the amendment originally stated, "If the President declares
in writing that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President." This wording was attacked as
leaving open to question the right of the President unilaterally to
announce that he had regained his powers because it did not specifically state that he could do so; also it left unclear whether the Vice
President and Cabinet could challenge a presidential declaration
ending inability when the initial declaration of inability had been
made by the President himself. Critics emphasized that any ambiguity in the language prescribing the process of regaining power
might make Presidents reluctant to yield power to the Vice President in the first place. 0 The section was amended. Consequently,
congressional intent under section 3 is that a President voluntarily
relinquishing his powers and duties may unilaterally regain them
by declaring the inability to be at an end. A challenge by the Vice
President and the Cabinet is restricted to conditions anticipated
under section 4.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four
69 Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 1, at 240 (1965).
60 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
14-16 (Comm. Print 1965). For the House draft, see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 12-13, 15-16 (Comm. Print 1965).
61 Id. at 12-13. The President, under these conditions, immediately regains the
powers and duties of office. There is no reason why the Vice President and Cabinet
could then proceed under § 4, but unlike § 4 the President would be in office.
IN THE
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days to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall
decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for
that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one
days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by
two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting
President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers
and duties of his office. 6 '

If a President cannot or does not declare his inability, the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet may do so by informing
Congress of the state of inability in a written declaration. The Vice
President will assume the powers and the duties of the office immediately without further communication with Congress. When the
President informs Congress that the inability no longer exists, the
President resumes the powers and duties of the office unless the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet object and inform Congress
of their disagreement within four days. In the event of such a challenge Congress is to convene automatically within forty-eight hours
and must decide the issue within twenty-one days after convening.
If the two Houses do not uphold the challenge by a two-thirds vote,
the President will resume the prerogatives of office.
A proper construction of the amendment would be that until
such a determination is made the Vice President will remain as Acting
President. On its face, section 4 of the amendment is ambiguous,
because no specific language governs whether or not the President
automatically resumes the powers and duties of office until his
declaration of ability is challenged by the Vice President and Cabinet and the matter is thrown into Congress. One possible interpretation would be that as soon as the President has made his declaration, his powers are restored automatically subject to defeasance by
the Vice President and Cabinet acting within four days. Alternatively, the record definitely supports the interpretation that the
President would not be permitted to resume office until the four
day period has expired without such challenge by the Vice President and Cabinet; however, the President could do so immediately
with the concurrence of the Acting President.6 2 The presumption
62 Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1965); STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES
IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 14 (Comm. Print 1965); Hearings Before the

House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, at 42, 58, 99-100 (1965).
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underlying section 3, allows the President unilaterally to declare
the inability at an end. However, the assumption on which section
4 is based is that if the difference in opinion between the President
and Vice President is so great that the Vice President and Cabinet
feel they must act contrary to the President's wishes, then the President should not be allowed unilaterally to resume the powers and
duties of office without a waiting period during which the Vice
President and Cabinet may object and submit the matter to Congress.
Other interpretations of the language in section 4 appear in the
legislative record. Either the Cabinet or the Vice President may
initiate inquiry into presidential inability although the declaration
to Congress must have the blessing of the Vice President and a
majority of the Cabinet.63 The "Cabinet" as defined in the language
of the amendment consists of "the principal officers of the executive
departments," or only the traditional departments appearing in sections 1 and 2 of 5 U.S.C. and any executive department established
in the future "generally considered to comprise the President's cabinet."" Beyond these statements of intent, the phrasing which
caused the most discussion in the Senate debate on the amendment
was the provision for an auxiliary body which appears in section 4:
"a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide.

. ..

"

Critics asserted that the wording as it stood was a source of potential conflict between two authoritative bodies. They were not
satisfied when the floor managers assured them that the purpose of
the clause was to provide an alternate mode for deciding issues of
inability after experience with the amendment. In any event, it was
argued, the two bodies could not conflict, for if Congress created
another body it would possess exclusivity and supersede the Cabinet
on the issue."5 It was stated specifically as legislative intent that
twenty-one days is to be the limit for a decision by Congress and,
if possible, a decision should be made before the end of that period.66 If either House declines to sustain by two-thirds vote a challenge to presidential resumption of duties pursuant to a declaration
by the President that his inability has ended, the powers and duties
of the President would revert to him forthwith. There are no limits
on congressional consideration of the question after the twenty-one
63 Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 1, at 79-82 (1965).
64 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
3 (Comm. Print 1965) ; 111 CONG. REC. 3200-01 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965).

65 Id. at 14667 (daily ed. June 30, 1965); id. at 15023 (daily ed. July
6, 1965).
66 Id. at 14665-66 (daily ed. June 30, 1965).
22-517 0 - 73 - 16
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the prerogatives of office."
day period but the President will regain
amendment or in its legislative
Conversely, there is nothing in the
is upheld by twohistory to prohibit the President, if the challenge
to declare his inability at an
thirds vote of both Houses, to continue
declaration by the
end or to prohibit continued challenges of the is doubt th
there
Vice President and the Cabinet. On balance,
systmisl
the procedures favor the President unless the political
begins to crumble.
IV.

CONCLUSION

flaws now
When the twenty-fifth amendment is first applied,
imperfections
inevitable
hidden will no doubt appear. Some of the
will depend on factors
are already evident, though their seriousness
perhaps
extrinsic to the wording of the amendment. For example,
a numerical majority of the
Congress should not have required
a decision of such
Cabinet to concur in a finding of inability. Should when in fact it is
gravity be left to the whim of a simple majority
by the Cabinet that
more realistic to suppose that any expression
is not unanimous would stimulate discord? More fundamentally,
the formal process
should the Cabinet have been introduced into
duty it is
at all? Should not a Vice President, whose constitutional be able to
to decide this critical issue of public policy objectively,or personal
consult those who have no immediate administrative
stake in the outcome? And does the theory of exclusivity truly reevaluamove the possibility of conflict between rival bodies i their
prohibited
have
tion of a President's health? Should the amendment
the use of the removal power, either by the President or the Acting
to exercise the
President, when the issue of the President's ability
Finally, the great parpowers and duties of the office is in question?
very existence
ticularity of the provisions of section 4 (indeed the
of it will likely be used in case of a challenge procedure) can
usually
be questioned, because bizarre, if not psychotic behavior
comone
as
or,
associated with a Dr. Strangelove, a Captain Queeg,
momittee report said, "rogues [with] no sense of constitutional
rality."68 Unfortunately, such a case would require far more subtle
and imposing procedures than section 4 specifies.
These questions can properly be raised although none of them
seems to strike at the soundness of the amendment as a constitutional mechanism for filling vacancies in the Vice Presidency and
67 Id. at 14587, 14837.

1ST SESS., REPORT
68 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG.,
VICE PRESIDENt
ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE

13 (Comm. Print 1965).
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for relieving the President and Vice President of constitutional uncertainty if the provisions must be used. Had the twenty-fifth
amendment been in effect during President Garfield's illness, the
Cabinet and Vice President Arthur probably would have used section 3. And President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon possibly would have applied the same section during the brief period
of the President's ileitis operation. But it is doubtful that sections 3
or 4 could have been used in the Wilson case, taking into account
the President's intransigence, Vice President Marshall's doubts
about his own capacities, and his distaste for conflict with the President. As for the heart attack and stroke episodes during the Eisenhower administrations, it is unlikely that section 3 of the current
amendment would have been invoked in view of the President's team
mode of operation, and the fact he could communicate with his staff
during much of his indisposition. In Eisenhower's case those interested in the status quo gambled on minimum contact with the
President and his eventual recovery, which gamble paid off. Had the
international situation worsened or the illness become more severe
and prolonged, the response might have been quite different.
Beyond these retrospective guesses about the use of the amendment, it is obvious that its application will depend on the nature of
the inability, personality and political factors, and the relative intensity of domestic and international pressures on the Presidency.
If a vacancy in the Vice Presidency is in question under section 2, similar considerations will be operative, but at a different
level of urgency. In all probability, the answer to whether and when
a President will move to fill a vacancy in the Vice Presidency will
turn on such considerations as the past health of the President, the
degree of potential antagonism toward the President by Congress,
the gravity of the prevalent domestic and international crises at
the time, and the proximity of the next election. Such a decision
will be further complicated by considerations related to the nature
of the Vice Presidency itself. The powers of the Vice President are
contingent," and therefore the President will desire to fill a vacancy
to avoid great disruption of important administrative and political
balances. On the other hand, the very contingency of the Vice President's assumption of real power may encourage delay in filling a
vacancy, when ranged against the more dramatic and pressing presidential priorities. Moreover, the President derives great power from
holding the choice of a Vice Presidential nominee in abeyance. Cones As Vice President John Adams remarked, "I am possessed of two separate
powers, the one in -esse and the other in posse. I am Vice President. In this I am
nothing, but I may be everything." ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 137 (1960).
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sequently, although section 2 of the amendment is designed to
achieve speedy presidential action, perhaps only if a President is in
good health, has a questionable congressional majority and another
term in office, and faces a relatively calm domestic and international
situation, will he be inclined to use section 2. But beyond saying
that such factors inevitably will be present, prediction is impossible.
All that can be stated for sure is that the amendment provides an
orderly means for filling a constitutional vacuum if the President
decides to act.
Predictions about sections 3 and 4 are even more difficult, although certain observations should be made. Under section 3, if the
President declares a state of inability related either to terminal
illness or to a temporary, minor inability, the amendment has a good
chance of working without disruptive side effects. The President
will have based his choice either on necessity or on preference; in
the one case his designate will be accountable to the Constitution,
but in the other case to the President. One can envision Robert Taft,
had he been elected President in 1948, delegating the powers and
the duties of his office to his Vice President in the final days before
his death by cancer, or, similarly, had the prognosis darkened,
President Eisenhower doing the same in the early hours of his heart
attack.7 0 At the other extreme is temporary designation of the Vice
President as Acting President while a President is under anesthesia.
All other options except one-that is, if the President is completely
paralyzed or unable to communicate or unarguably psychoticpresent troublesome difficulties. It is when the illness is obscure or
its severity and duration are unknown, or when the President himself is uncertain about his condition, that the amendment will be
put to the test. It is quite possible that under such circumstances the
amendment will not even be used. Some will try to dissuade the
President from declaring his inability, and unilateral action by the
Vice President and the Cabinet will create so much uncertainty
that conflict almost surely will arise. Without a clear presidential
declaration of inability (and even in that case conflict will not be
absent) an Olympian atmosphere of rational detachment would be
required by all whose influence is enhanced or displaced if power
is to be transferred without serious dissention. If Congress becomes
directly involved the hubbub will increase. The terms "majority
of the Cabinet" and "two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress"
do not guaranty an orderly transfer of power. Pressure on the Vice
President will be especially great if he must assist in the decision
70 President Eisenhower gave serious thought to this
matter immediately before a
hopeful upturn in his condition after his heart
attack. ADAMS 192.
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to declare or not declare the President's inability; perhaps he and
the others whose interests are involved will select a compromise
arrangement favoring an appearance of things as they are.
Thus neither section 3 nor section 4 are likely to be used except in the clearest situations. Even under conditions calling for
application of section 3, the President likely will seek special understandings with his staff and the Vice President rather than invoke
the amendment formally; in situations in which section 4 was intended to cover, the leadership in the executive branch probably will
try to cover up differences while relying on a subsystem of ad hoc
arrangements to carry on governmental functions until the President
dies, recovers, or until his term expires. Failure of these pragmatic
adjustments will leave the amendment a frail set of ground rules for
struggle in a larger arena.
In sum, each case of presidential inability will impose its own
set of imperatives and inhibitions on the President and the Vice
President alike. Among the many variables in each case will be the
relative urgency of international and domestic problems, the ambition and self-restraint of the political actors, and the nature of the
President's inability. In a word, the amendment is only technically
self-executing. Nonetheless, it contains all that a constitutional
device should: a set of presumptions about the process of exercising
power and an implicit expectation that it will be applied in a mood
of restraint. Once the amendment is ratified a Vice President will
know that he has a constitutional obligation to seek support if deterioration of the President's health threatens the political order.
Moreover, a President will know that a temporary declaration of
inability is an accepted condition under the Constitution and that
if he so declares, a Vice President will be available during this period
to exercise the executive prerogatives without drawing into question
his constitutional authority. However difficult the amendment may
be to apply, its greatest service is in making at least this much
certain.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE I

Vice Presidential Succession to the Presidency
Vice President
Succeeding to
the Presidency

President

John Tyler
Millard Filmore
Andrew Johnson
Chester A. Arthur
Theodore Roosevelt*
Calvin Coolidge*
Harry S. Truman*
Lyndon B. Johnson*

Harrison
Taylor
Lincoln
Garfield
McKinley
Harding
Roosevelt
Kennedy

Term They Completed
Apr.
July
Apr.
Sept.
Sept.
Aug.
Apr.
Nov.

6,1841-Mar. 3,1845
10, 1850-Mar. 3,1853
15, 1865-Mar. 3, 1869
20, 1881-Mar. 3,1885
14, 1901-Mar. 3,1905
3, 1923-Mar. 3, 1925
12, 1945-Jan. 20, 1949
22, 1963-Jan. 20, 1965

Years
Served
3.91 yrs.
2.65
3.88
3.45
3.47
1.58
3.77
1.16

TOTAL
23.87 yrs.
* Vice Presidents who have succeeded to the Presidency as a result of a President's
death and who have in turn been elected to the office of President for a 4-year term.

TABLE II

Periods Without A Vice President
Presidential
Administration
Madison
Madison
Jackson
Harrison
Taylor
Pierce
Lincoln
Grant
Garfield
Cleveland
McKinley
McKinley
Taft
Harding
Roosevelt
Kennedy

Vice President
Succeeding to
the Presidency
George Clinton1
Elbridge Gerry1
John C. Calhoun 2
John Tyler 3
Millard Fillmore3
William R. Kingl
Andrew Johnson 3
Henry Wilson 1
Chester A. Arthur3
Thomas A. Hendricks1
Garret A. Hobart1
Theodore Roosevelt$
James S. Sherman1
Calvin Coolidge3
Harry S. Trumans
Lyndon B. Johnson3

Period Office of
Vice President
was Vacant

Years
Vacant

Apr. 20, 1812-Mar. 3, 1913
Nov. 23, 1814-Mar. 3,1817
Dec. 28, 1832-Mar. 3,1833
Apr. 6, 1841-Mar. 3, 1845
July 10, 1850-Mar. 3, 1853
Apr. 18, 1853-Mar. 3,1857
Apr. 15, 1865-Mar. 3, 1869
Nov. 22, 1875-Mar. 3, 1877
Sept. 20, 1881-Mar. 3, 1885
Nov. 25, 1885-Mar. 3, 1889
Nov. 21, 1899-Mar. 3, 1901
Sept. 14, 1901-Mar. 3, 1905
Oct. 30, 1912-Mar. 3, 1913
Aug. 3, 1923-Mar. 3, 1925
Apr. 12, 1945-Jan. 20, 1949
Nov. 22, 1963-Jan. 20, 1965

0.88 yrs.
2.28
0.18
3.91
2.65
3.88
3.89
1.28
3.45
3.28
1.28
3.47
0.34
1.58
3.77
1.16

Presidents who died in office.
2 Vice Presidents who resigned.
3 Vice Presidents who succeeded to the Presidency.
1 Vice

TOTAL

37.28 yrs.
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TABLE III

Periods of Critical Presidential Illness or Inability*
President

Length of
Illness or
Inability

Term

William Henry Harrison
Zachary Taylor
Abraham Lincoln
James A. Garfield
Grover Cleveland
William McKinley
Woodrow Wilson
Warren G. Harding
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Dwight D. Eisenhower

Mar. 4,
Mar. 4,
Mar. 4,
Mar. 4,
Mar. 4,
Mar. 4,
Mar. 4,
Mar. 4,
Mar. 4,
Jan. 20,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Nov. 22, 1963-

1841-Apr.
1849-July
1861-Apr.
1881-Sept.
1893-Mar.
1897-Sept.
1913-Mar.
1921-Aug.
1933-Apr.
1953-Jan.

4, 1841
9, 1850
15, 1865
19, 1881
3, 1897
14, 1901
3, 1921
2, 1923
12, 1945
19, 1961

7 days
5 days
9 hours
80 days
5 days
8 days
280 days
4 days
2 hours
143 days
2 hours
13 days

* Source: FEERIcK; HANSEN.

TABLE IV

Presidential Assassinations, and Near Misses
James Madison (nearly captured, war of 1812)1

Andrew Jackson (attempted assassination, 1835)2
John Tyler (near miss, explosion on U.S.S. Princeton, 1844)3
Abraham Lincoln (near misses, Fort Stevens, 1864)4
Abraham Lincoln (assassination, 1865)
James Garfield (assassination, 1881)
William McKinley (assassination, 1901)
Franklin D. Roosevelt (attempted assassination, 1933)5
Harry S. Truman (attempted assassination, 1950)6
John F. Kennedy (assassination, 1963)7
1 He was accused of fleeing to safety. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: COMMANDER IN
CHIEF 291-308 (1961).

2 JAMES, ANDREW JACKSON, PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT 390-91 (1937).
3 FEERICK 97.
4 3 SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 142-43 (1939).
5 SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 466 (1958).
6 FEERICK 202.
7 For observations on the "Presidential assassination syndrome" in mental patients,
see New York Times, March 21, 1965, p. 66, col. 1.
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PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY AND
VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY AMENDMENT

Introduction

At least three times in our history, during the administrations
of Garfield, who lay in the twilight zone between life and death for
eighty days before succumbing to an assassin's bullet, Wilson who, after
suffering a stroke, spent the last eighteen months of his term in a
state of at least semi-invalidism, and Eisenhower who had three separate
and serious illnesses, the President of the United States, for varying
periods, has been unable to carry out the duties of his office.

Although

the Constitution provides that when a President is disabled the Vice
President shall take over, it does this in language so ambiguous that
there is disagreement about whether the Vice President becomes President
for the balance of the term or simply acts as President until the disability is ended.

Moreover, no specific method is set forth for deter-

mining when presidential inability begins or ends.

Nor is the respon-

sibility for making such determination clearly spelled out.
Despite the virtual unanimity of informed contemporary opinion that existing law empowers the Vice President to make the determination that a President is disabled and thereafter to assume the powers
and duties of the presidential office until the inability is ended, no
Vice President has ever done so.

Historical precedents as well as the

weight of informed opinion are inclined toward the conclusion that no
Vice President will act until the constitutional ambiguities have been
removed.

The cries for a solution to the problem have intensified as
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Americans have apprehended the dread possibility of a nation immobilized
in a moment of maximum peril because there might be neither a fit President
nor someone unquestionably authorized to act in his stead.
Following his third illness, President Eisenhower attempted
to fill in some of the constitutional gaps by entering into a working
agreement with Vice President Nixon.

The terms of the agreement provided

that whenever the President informed the Vice President that he was unable to act the Vice President would assume the powers and duties of the
presidential office until the inability had ended.

If, however, the

President were unable to communicate the existence of his inability, the
Vice President would assume the duties of the office after such consultation as seemed to him appropriate under the circumstances.

In either

case the President, himself, would determine when the inability had
ended and at that time resume the powers and duties of his office.

Similar

agreements were made between President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson
and between President Johnson and Speaker McCormack who was next in line
of succession until the inauguration of Vice President-elect Humphrey.
A similar agreement also exists between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey.
There has been general agreement that however valuable these
working agreements might be nothing short of an amendment to the Constitution will give the person who assumes the duties of the presidential
office the air of legitimacy so indispensable to their successful execution.
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Furthermore, although three Attorneys General have expressed the view
that these agreements are "consistent with the correct interpretation
of . .

. the Constitution' their legal standing continues to present a

nagging question.

11

Since the Supreme Court does not render advisory

opinions it is extremely doubtful that the matter could ever be resolved
in advance of the crisis.

Not until the assassination of President

Kennedy, however, had there been anything approaching a consensus on
precisely what the amendment to the Constitution should provide.

That

consensus was embodied in the resolution proposed by the 89th Congress.
This report will outline the nature of the constitutional
problem and examine the legislative history and analyze the amendment.

Statement of the Problem(s)

Article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution now provides that--

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office,
or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge
the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by
Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation,
or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and
such Officer shall act accordingly. until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
Constitutional scholars have debated for many years the meaning
of Article II, section 1, clause 6.

The crux of the disability problem
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arises from the first clause, i.e., "In the Case of the Removal of the
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to
discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office the Same shall devolve
on the Vice President, . . ."

The second clause relating to the con-

gressional power has been implemented from time to time through the
enactment of statutes setting forth the succession to the office of
President in the event of the removal, death, resignation, or inability
of both the President and Vice President.

Although the latter clause

also raises several problems of constitutional interpretation, these
more properly relate to presidential succession and are outside the
scope of this paper. S
Turning to the first clause, it will be noted that it outlines four situations in which the Vice President may be called upon
to act as President.

Three of these, namely, removal, death, and resig-

nation, obviously contemplate the permanent exclusion of the President
for the balance of his term.

The source of the uncertainty arises in

connection with the fourth contingency, specifically, the "Inability to
discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office."

Did the Framers

intend such "inability" to permanently exclude the President, even in
the event of recovery, from resuming the discharge of his powers and
duties?

Another question arises from the remaining language of the first

clause which provides "the Same shall devolve on the Vice President."
To whet do the words "the Same" refer?

In other words, what is it that
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"devolves" on the Vice President?

Is it the "Office" of the President

or the presidential "Powers and Duties"?

If the former interpretation

prevails, the contingency of inability like the other three would operate
to effect a permanent exclusion.

However, if the latter interpretation

prevails, the powers and duties would once again attach to the office
upon the President's recovery.
Historical investigation and the weight of constitutional
authority tend to support the conclusion that under Article II, section 1,
clause 6 of the Constitution the Vice President merely discharges the
powers and duties of the Presidency during the President's inability.
The sole dissenting voice in this otherwise harmonious picture springs
from actual practice whereby Vice Presidents have become Presidents upon
the latter's death.

The precedent was established by John Tyler's succes-

sion upon the death of William Henry Harrison on April 4, 1841.

In her

authoritative volume, Presidential Succession, Ruth C. Silva describes
these events, in part, as follows:
. . . The presidential office was vacant for the first
time. It was then decided that in conformity with the Constitution, Vice President Tyler was to be the President for
the remaining three years and eleven months of Harrison's
term. Exactly who made this decision is uncertain. Legend
tells us that the precedent was established merely because
Tyler claimed presidential status. The Cabinet had decided,
so the story goes, that Mr. Tyler should be officially styled
"Vice President of the United States, acting President."
But Tyler is supposed to have promptly determined that he
would enjoy all the dignities and honors which he assumed
he had inherited. 4/
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Although objections were raised in Congress and in the press,
Tyler's assumption established the precedent that when the presidential
office is vacant, the Vice President becomes the President for the remainder
of the term.

-

As a consequence, on each of the eight occasions that

the Vice President has assumed office because of the death of the President, he has taken the presidential oath.

Notwithstanding that succes-

sion in these instances arose from one of the contingencies that contemplates a permanent exclusion, namely, death, they threw a cloud on a
disabled President's claim to office upon full recovery.
These precedents combined with the ambiguities of Article II,
section 1, clause 6 served to throttle any action in the event of a
presidential crisis.

Arthur, Garfield's Vice President, emphatically

declined to take any steps whatsoever to assume the powers of the President.

Vice President Marshall flatly refused to assume any of the

powers of the presidency because of. the constitutional uncertainty
as to whether Wilson could resume his office when he recovered.
Adding to this already highly uncertain situation was the
recurrent and troubling problem of vice presidential vacancy.

Between
Seven

the years 1787 and 1965, eight Presidents died in office.

-

Vice Presidents also died in office and one resigned. ?1

As a result

of these occurrences, the nation has been without a Vice President
more than twenty percent of the time during its history.
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It became apparent that in order to adequately correct the
flaws in our constitutional system it was necessary to accomplish the
following objectives:
(1) To establish once and for all that the Vice President
assumes the presidential office upon removal from office, death, or
resignation of the President;
(2) To provide that in the event of the fourth contingencyy,
namely, inability, the Vice President shall exercise the powers and
duties of the office of President;
(3) To establish the procedure for determining the existe nce
of an inability and its termination; and
(4) To provide for filling a vacancy occurring in the Vice
e

Presidency.

Legislative History

After more than eighty years of study by congressional committees, attorneys general, constitutional experts and bar association
committees, the Congress, in the dying moments of 1963, began to act
on a presidential continuity amendment.

Sparked by the assassination

of President Kennedy which alerted the American people as never before
to the dangerous constitutional void, hearings were scheduled for early
1964.

V

Even as the nation mourned the loss of the President many

thoughts were troubled by the prospect of the political crisis which
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might have followed had the fallen leader lingered on in hopeless and
permanent incapacity.

"As distasteful as it is to entertain the thought,

a matter of inches spelled the difference between the painless death of
John F. Kennedy and the possibility of his permanent incapacity to exercise the duties of the highest office of the land."

2.

Also, the record

of Vice President Johnson's prior heart attack and advanced ages of the
two immediate successors doubtless contributed to the general desire
for a prompt solution.
A proposed constitutional amendment designed to solve the
problem was introduced by Senator Birch Bayh, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.

Senate.

The resolution was favorably reported on August 13, 1964, 11/ and
passed the Senate on September 29, 1964.

Congress adjourned before

the House of Representatives had taken any action on the measure.
Similar proposals were introduced in the opening days of
the 89th Congress by Senator Bayh and Congressman Celler. 13/

On

January 28, President Johnson lent his support and urged prompt passage
of the resolution.

In broad outline, these resolutions provided that

upon the removal, death, or resignation of a President, the Vice President would become President.

It would require a President to nominate

a person who meets the constitutional qualifications to be a Vice
President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.

The nominee

would take office as Vice President once he had been confirmed by a
majority vote of both Houses of the Congress.

22-517 0 - 73 - 17

10/
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spelled out the procedure
The remainder of the resolution
inand termination of presidential
commencement
the
determining
for
inability
the President could declare his
ability. It made clear that
President would
such an occurrence the Vice
in writing and that upon
not declare the
However, if a President did
become acting President.
that the
the Vice President, if satisfied
existence of his inability,
a majority
with the written approval of
President was disabled would,
duties of the
discharge of the powers and
of the Cabinet, assume the
such declaration
upon the transmission of
office as acting President
to the Congress.
permit the President to resume
Finally, the resolution would
to the Congress
office upon his transmission
the powers and duties of the
if the
no inability existed. However,
of his written declaration that
President was
of the Cabinet fell that the
Vice President and a majority
and
President from resuming the powers
unable, they could prevent the
their written declaration so stating
duties of the office by transmitting
the Conthe proposal recommended that
to the Congress. At this point
If
on the existence of inability.
gress make the final determination
vote of both Houses that the
the Congress determined by a two-thirds
President would continue as acting
President was unable, then the Vice
failed in any manner to cast a vote
President. However, if the Congress
supporting the position that the
of two-thirds or more in both Houses
powers and duties of his office,
President was unable to perform the
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then the President would resume the powers and duties of the office.
The Senate Judiciary Committee submitted a favorable report
on an amended resolution on February 10, 1965.

1

The Committee ver-

sion contained a number of language ch nges in two of the three sections
which embraced the procedures for determining the commencement and
termination of presidential inability.

Section 4, dealing with the

factual determination of inability when the President does not make
a declaration to that effect, was entirely rewritten.

The purpose of

these amendments was explained as follows:

The text of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as introduced,
requires, under certain contingencies, for a written declaration to be made by the President, under section 3, and by
the Vice President and principal officers of the executive
departments under section 4, and by the President, the Vice
President and principal officers of the executive departments
under section 5. It is the intention of the committee that
for the best interests of the country to be served, notice
by all parties should be public notice. The committee feels
that notice by transmittal to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives guarantees notice
to the entire country.
The committee is concerned about the possibility that
such written declaration might be transmitted during a
period in which Congress was not in session. In this event
the committee feels that transmittal of such written declaration to the presiding officers of both Houses, the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
would be sufficient transmittal under the terms of this
amendment.
It is the opinion of the committee that, under the
language of section 5, Congress is empowered to reconvene
in special session to consider any disability question
arising under this section. Furthermore, under the language
of this section, the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives would be required to call a
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special session of the Congress to consider the question of
presidential inability whenever the President's ability to
perform the powers and duties of his office are questioned
under the terms of section 5. However, nothing contained in
this proposed amendment should be construed to limit the
power of the President from exercising his existing constitutional authority to call for a special session of the Congress.

It is further understood by the committee that should
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives not be found in their offices at the time
the declaration was transmitted that transmittal to the office of such presiding officers would suffice for sufficient
notice under the terms of this amendment.
It is the judgment of the committee that the language
"principal officers of the executive departments" more adequately conveys the intended meaning of sections 4 and 5,
thrt only those members of the President's official Cabinet
were to participate in any decision of disability referred
to under these sections. This language finds precedent
under article II, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution.
The pertinent language there reads as follows:
he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
In its discussion of the ramifications of section 5,
the committee considered it important to add additional stress
to the interpretation of two questions which might arise:
(1) Who has the powers and duties of the office of the
President while the provisions of section 5 are being implemented?
(2) Under what sense of urgency is Congress required
to act in carrying out provisions of this section?
Under the terms of section 3 a President who voluntarily transfers his powers and duties to the Vice President
may resume these powers and duties by making a written declaration of his ability to perform the powers and duties of
his office and transmitting such declaration to the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
This will reduce the reluctance of the President to utilize
the provisions of this section in the event he fears it would
be difficult for him to regain his powers and duties once he
has voluntarily relinquished them.
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However, the intent of section 5 is that the Vice President is to continue to exercise the powers and duties of the
office of Acting President until
determination on the
President's inability is made by Congress. It is also the
intention of the committee that the Congress should act swiftly
in making this determination, but with sufficient opportunity
to gather whatever evidence it determined necessary to make
such a final determination. The language, as amended, reads
as follows:
Thereupon Congress shall immediately proceed to
decide the issue.
It was the opinion of the committee that the words "Thereupon", "shall", and "immediately" were sufficiently strong to
indicate the necessity for prompt action.
Precedence for the use of the word "immediately" and the
interpretation thereof may be found in the use of this same
word, "immediately" in the 12th Amendment to the Constitution.
In the 12th amendment, in the event no candidate for President receives a majority of electoral votes, the House of
Representatives "shall choose immediately,". The committee
was of the opinion that the same sense of urgency attendant
to the use of the word "immediately" in the 12th amendment
when Congress was in fact deciding who would be the President
of the United States should be attendant in proceedings in
which the Congress was deciding whether the President of the
United States should be removed from his office because of
his inability to perform the powers and duties thereof.
The committee is concerned that congressional action
under the terms of section 5 should be taken under the
greatest sense of urgency. However, because of the complexities involved in determining different types of disability, it is felt unwise to prescribe any specific time
limitation to congressional deliberation thereupon. Indeed,
the committee feels that Congress should be permitted to
collect all necessary evidence and to participate in the
debate needed to make a considered judgment.
The discussion of the committee made it abundantly
clear that the proceedings in the Congress prescribed in
section 5 would be pursued under the rules prescribed, or
to be prescribed, by the Congress itself. 1"
On February 19 the Senate passed (72 - 0) and sent to the
House a modified version of the resolution submitted by Senator Bayh. 16/
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During debate on the measure the Senete adopted several amendments of
a technical and corrective nature submitted by the Indiana Senator as
well as the changes proposed by the Committee.

1-

Also

adopted was

an amendment proposed by Senator Hruska which would allow the Vice President seven days--rather than two--to communicate with the Congress in
the event of a disagreement between him and the President concerning the
termination of a disability.

18/

--

The Senator felt "that the two day

period is insufficient for the Vice President and the members of the
Cabinet to decide whether they want to raise the issue of the President's
ability." 19/
On March 24 the House Committee on the Judiciary favorably
reported an <mended version of the resolution submitted by Congressman
Celler. --

As noted above, the latter was identical to the proposal

originally introduced by Senator Bayh.

The changes made in Committee

were explained at length in its report on the measure.
The principal purpose of the amendment is to distinguish between inability voluntarily declared by the President himself and inability declared without his consent.
In the former case, the President can resume his duties by
making a simple declaration that the inability has ceased;
in the letter, the measure provides procedures for promptly
determining the presence or absence of inability when that
issue is present.
The amendment makes no changes in sections 1 and 2
of the constitutional amendment proposed by House Joint
Resolution 1 as introduced; it does make changes in sections
3 and 4 and it eliminates section 5 by merging the substance of that section with tha t of section 4.
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The changes made by the amendment in section 3 clrify
the procedure and clarify the consequences when the President himself declares his inability to discharge the powers
and duties of his office. There are two: First, the amendment indicates the officials to whom the President's written
declaration of inability shall be transmitted, namely the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. The committee deemed it desirable to add this specification which was absent from the
joint resolution as introduced. Second, the amendment makes
clear that, in case of such voluntary self-disqualification
by the President, the President's subsequent transmittal
to the same officials of a written declaration to the contrary, i.e., a written declaration that no inability exists,
terminates the Vice President's exercise of the Presidential
powers and duties, and that the President shall thereupon
resume them. In short, it is the intent of the committee
that voluntary self-disqualification by the President shall
be terminated by the President's own declaration that no
inability exists, without further ado. To permit the Vice
President and the Cabinet to challenge such an assertion
of recovery might discourage a President from voluntarily
relinquishing his powers in case of illness. The right of
challenge would be reserved for cases in which the Vice
President and Cabinet, without the President's consent,
had found him unable to discharge his powers and duties.
Sections 4 and 5 of the amendment proposed by House
Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, dealt respectively with
the devolution upon the Vice President, as Acting President,
of the President's powers and duties pursuant to a declaration of his inability made by the Vice President and other
officials, and with the procedure upon subsequent declaration by the President that no inability exists.
The amendment places the substance of former section
5 into section 4, in order to emphasize the committee's
intent that the procedure provided by former section 5
relates only to cases in which Presidential inability has
been declared by others than the President. Two identical
changes are made in former sections 4 and 5. First, the
term "principal officers of the executive departments" is
substituted for the term "heads of the executive departments" to make it clearer that only officials of Cabinet
rank should participate in the decision as to whether
presidential inability exists. The substituted language
follows more closely article II, section 2, of the Constitution, which provides that the President may require the
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opinion in light "of the principal officers in each of the
The intent of the committee is
executive departments
that the Presidential appointees who direct the 10 executive
departments named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive department
established in the future, generally considered to comprise
the President's Cabinet, would participate, with the Vice
President, in determining inability. In case of the death,
resignation, absence, or sickness of the head of any executive department, the acting head of the department would be
authorized to participate in a presidential inability determination.
The second change made in former sections 4 and 5 is
to specify the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives as the congressional
officials to whom declaration concerning Presidential inability shall be transmitted, as is done in section 3.
The language of former section 5 of the House Joint
Resolution 1 is further amended to make clear that if Congress is not in session at the time of receipt by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives of a written declaration by the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments contradicting a Presidential declaration that
no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble for
the purpose of deciding the issue. Finally, the language of
former section 5 is further amended by providing that in such
event the President shll resume the powers and duties of
his office unless the Congress within 10 days after receipt
of such declaration of Presidential inability determines by
two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is in fact
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
The committee deems it essential in the interest of
stability of government to limit to the smallest possible
period the time during which the vital issue of the executive power can remain in doubt. Under the bill, following
a Presidential declaration that the disability previously
declared by others no longer exists, a challenge to such
declaration must be made within 2 days of its receipt by
the heads of the Houses of Congress and must be finally determined within the following 10 days. Otherwise the President,
having declared himself able, will resume his powers and
duties. An unlimited power in Congress might afford an
irresistible temptation to temporize with respect to restoring
the President's powers. In this highl charged area there
is no room for equivocation or delay. _1/
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As reported by the House Committee, the resolution differed
from the Senate-passed version in three major particulars.

First, it

spelled out more clearly that the Vice President would discharge the
powers and duties of a President who voluntarily declared his own inability only until the President transmitted to Congress a written declaration stating that his inability had terminated.

Second, it rein-

stated the two day limitation (rather then seven days) during which the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet might challenge a President's contention that his inability had ended.

Third, it provided

that in the event of disagreement between the President and Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet over the termination of presidential
inability, Congress, if not in session, would immediately assemble to
decide the issue within ten days.

The Senate-passed version provided

only that Congress would "immediately proceed to decide" the issue.
On April 13, 1965, the House passed the amended version by
a vote of 368 to 29.

22/

Following passage, the House substituted the

text of its resolution for that passed by the Senate.

/

The only amend-

ment adopted on the floor was a proposal by Congressman Poff providing
that Congress, if not in session, shall assemble "within 48 hours" to
decide a dispute between the President and Vice President over termination
of presidential inability. 24/
The tenor of the House debate was fairly well summarized by
Congressman Celler who said:
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This is by no means, ladies and gentlemen, a perfect
No bill can be perfect. Even the sun has its
billl.
spots. The world of actuality permits us to attain no
perfection. Admirable as is our own Constitution, it had
to be amended 24 times. But nonetheless, this bill has a
minimum of drawbacks. It is well-rounded, sensible, and
efficient approach toward a solution of a perplexing problem-a problem that has baffled us for over 100 years.
As to attaining perfection, let me call your attention to a very pertinent remarks (sic) made by Walter
Lippman in the New York Herald Tribune of June 9, 1964,
when he referred to this proposed amendment. He said:
It is a great deal better than an endless search
for the absolutely perfect solution, which will
never be found and, indeed, is not necessary.
As was said by the distinguished former Attorney General
of the United States, the honorable Herbert Brownell--I commend
his words indeed to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown]-speaking for himself and speaking for the American Bar Association:
Certainty and prompt action are *** built into
this proposal--namely, House Joint Resolution 1.
During the 10-year debate on presidential disability
many plans have been advanced to have the existence of disability decided by different types of
commissions or medical experts, by the Supreme Court,
or by other complicated ad hoc procedures. But upon
analysis *** they all have the same fatal flaw
they would be time consuming and divisive.
We tried to avoid freighting down this amendment with too
much detail. We leave that to supplementing, implementing
legislation. We make the provisions as simple yet as comprehensive as possible.
This is certain: we have trifled with fate long enough
on this question of presidential inability. We in the United
States have been lucky, but luck does not last forever. The
one sure thing about luck is that it is bound to chEnge.
Sir Thomas Brown once said:
Court not felicity too far and weary not the
favorable hand of fortune.

261
LRS-18

We can no longer delay. Delay is the art of keeping up
with yesterday. We must keep abreast of tomorrow. Let
us
stop playing presidential inability roulette. Let us pass
this measure. .

.

. 25/

The House on June 30, 1965, by voice vote and with little
debate, adopted the conference report embodying the compromised version
of the resolution. 26/
The Senate the same day debated the conference report but
deferred action on it until July 6 to allow further debate after Senators
Gore, Kennedy (N.Y.) and McCarthy raised a question concerning the provision allowing the Vice President "and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may
by law provide" to declare the President disabled. 27/

Senator Gore

expressed concern that the words "either" and "or" might give rise to
a situation in which the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet,
and a body which Congress might establish, would both claim the authority
to exercise the function.

Senator Bayh explained that this language

was intended to mean "either one or the other."
On July 6, the Senate, by a vote of 68 to 5, adopted the
conference report on the resolution. -2/ During the debate Senator
Gore renewed his objections to the proposal which he said would lead
to the potentially disastrous spectacle of competing claims to the
Presidency.

Senator Bayh, supported by Senator Ervin, argued that

the proposal was the very best obtainable in the Congress of the United
States.
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As reported from conference and approved by both Houses the
resolution contained a number of changes from the earlier passed versions.

These changes were explained by Senator Bayh as follows:

The conference report, which has now been approved
by the House of Representatives, contains certain changes
from the proposal which the Senate approved earlier this
year by a vote of 72 to 0. I should like to describe those
changes and then urge approval of the conference report by
this body.
In the Senate version of the measure we prescribed
that all declarations concerning the inability of the
President or of his ability to perform the powers and
duties of that office, particularly a declaration concerning his readiness to resume the powers and duties of his
office made by the President of the United States himself,
be transmitted to the Speaker of the House and to the
President of the Senate.
The conference committee report proposes that those
declarations go to the Speaker and to the President pro
tempore of the Senate. The reason for the change is, of
course, that the Vice President, who is also the President
of the Senate, would be participating in making a declaration of presidential inability, and therefore would be
unable to transmit his own declaration to himself. In
addition, I believe that we would be on better legal ground
not to send the declaration to a party in interest. The
Vice President, who would be shortly assuming or seeking
to assume the powers and duties of the office, would indeed
be a party in interest.
In the Senate version of the bill we did not specify
that if the President were to surrender his powers and
duties voluntarily--and I emphasize the word "voluntarily"-he could resume them immediately upon declaring that his
inability no longer existed. We believe that our language
clearly implied this. Certainly the intention was made
clear in the debate on the question on the floor of the
Senate and in the record of our committee hearings, but
the Attorney General of the United States requested that
we be more specific on this point so as to encourage a President to make a voluntary declaration to the effect that he
was unable to perform the powers and duties of the office,
if it was necessary for him to do so.
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We made that point clear in the conference committee
report.
We added specific language enabling the President to
resume his powers and duties immediately, with no waiting
period, if he had given up his powers and duties by voluntary
declaration.
That had been the intention of the Senate all along,
as I recall the colloquy which took place on the floor of
the Senate; and we had no objection to making that intention
crystal clear in the wording of the proposed constitutional
amendment itself.
In the Senate version we prescribed that the President,
having been divested of his powers and duties by declaration
of the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet, or such
other body as Congress by law may provide, could resume the
powers and duties of the office of President upon his declaration that no inability existed, unless within 7 days the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet, or such other body
issued a declaration chEllenging the President's intention.
The House version prescribed that the waiting period be 2
days. The conference compromised on 4 days, and I urge the
Senate to accept that as a reasonable compromise between the
time limits imposed by the two bodies.
Furthermore, we have clarified language, at the request
of the Senate conferees, to make crystal clear that the Vice
President must be party to eny action declaring the President
unable to perform his powers and duties.
I remember well the words of President Eisenhower, before
the American Bar Association conference, when he said that it
is a constitutional obligation of the Vice President to help
make these decisions. We in the Senate felt that to be the case,
and thus changed the language a bit to make it specifically clear.
That, I am sure, had been the intention of both the Senate
and the House, but we felt that the language was not specific
enough, so we clarified it on that point.
The Senate conferees accepted a House amendment requiring
the Congress to convene within 48 hours, if they were not then
in session, and if the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet or the other body were to challenge the President's
declaration that he, the Chief Executive, were not disabled or,
once again, able to perform the powers and duties of his office.
We feel that the requirement would encourage speedy disposition of the question by the Congress, and I urge its acceptance by the Senate.
Finally, the Senate version imposed longtime limitations
upon the Congress to settle a dispute as to whether the President or the Vice President could perform the powers and duties

264
LRS-21

of the office of President. Senators know the question would
come to the Congress only if the Vice President, who would
then be acting as President, were to challenge, in conjunction
with a majority of the Cabinet, the President's declaration
that no inability existed. The House version imposed a 10day time limitation. The Senate conferees were willing to
have a time limitation as a further safeguard to the President,
but we were unanimous in agreeing that 10 days was too short
a period in which to decide on that grave a question.
The conferees finally agreed to a 21-day time limitation
after which, if the Vice President hed failed to win the support
of two-thirds of both the Houses of Congress, the President
would automatically return to the powers and duties of his
office. I urge the Senate to accept that change.
I should like to specify one thing further about this
particular point since I feel it is the main point of contention between the House and the Senate, and one upon which
I was happy to see we could find some agreements.
First, including a time limitation in the Constitution
of the United States would impose upon those who come after
us in this great body a limitation on their discussions and
deliberation when surrounded by contingencies which we cannot foresee. The Senate conferees felt that a 10-day time
limitation was too short a period.
Our feeling in the Senate, as represented by the views
of the conferees, was that we should go slowly in imposing
a maximum time limitation if we could not foresee the contingencies that might confront those who were forced to make
their determination as to who would be the President of the
United States. I believe 21 days is a reasonable time. I
emphasize that it is our feeling that this is not necessarily
an absolute period. The 21 days need not always be used. In
my estimation, most decisions would be made in a shorter time.
But if the Nation were involved in a war or other international
crisis, and the President suffered an illness whose diagnosis
might be difficult, a longer time might be needed, and the
maximum of 21 days that was agreed upon might be required.
It should be made clear that if during the 21-day limit
one House of Congress, either the Senate or the House of Representatives, voted on the issue as to whether the President
was unable to perform his powers and duties, but failed to
obtain the necessary two-thirds majority to sustain the position
of the Vice President and the Cabinet, or whatever other body
Congress in its wisdom might prescribe at some future date,
the issue would be decided in favor of the President. In other
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words, if one House voted but failed to get the necessary
two-thirds majority. the other House would be precluded
from using the 21 days and the President would immediately
reassume the powers and duties of his office. 30/

25th Amendment Summarized

The amendment proposed to the States by the 89th Congress
meets the four basic objectives noted earlier.
torical practice

It affirms the his-

by which a Vice President has become President upon

the death of the President, further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or removal from office.

In order to assure

that the second highest office will always be occupied, it requires
the President to nominate a person to be Vice President whenever there
is a vacancy in that office.

The nominee is to take office as Vice

President upon confirmation by a majority in both Houses of Congress.
The proposal permits the President to declare himself disabled and to declare the end of his disability.

The declarations are

to be reduced to writing and transmitted to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate.
interim, the Vice President becomes Acting President.

In the

If a President

does not declare the existence of his inability, the Vice President
and a majority of the "principal officers of the executive departments"
may declare the President disabled by transmitting their written
declaration to this effect to the presiding legislative officers of
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the House and Senate.

In such an event the Vice President is to under-

take the discharge of the presidential powers and duties as Acting President.

If for any reason the Cabinet proves not to be a workable instru-

ment in this matter, Congress is empowered to set up another body to
work with the Vice President.
"Thereafter" the President may announce his own recovery and
"resume the powers and duties of his office".

However, if the Vice

President and a majority of the Cabinet disagree with the President,
they hove four days to send a written declaration of the fact to the
Speaker and the President pro tempore.
responsible for a final decision.

At this point the Congress is

If Congress is not in session, it

would have to assemble within forty-eight hours of receipt of the declaration.

From the time of receipt Congress has twenty-one days in which to

decide the issue.

Pending the decision, the Vice President is to con-

tinue as Acting President.

If Congress fails to Frrive at a decision,

or if more than one-third of the membership of either House sides with
the President, the President is to resume his powers and

duties.

If two-

thirds of the membership of each House support the Vice President and the
Cabinet, the Vice President is to continue as Acting President.
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Footnotes

1/ 42 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 5 (1961), as reproduced in Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. J. Res. 28,
S. J. Res. 35 and S. J. Res. 84 (1963).
2/ The principal issue arising from the second clause concerns the legal
propriety of placing legislative officers in the order of presidential
succession. Despite the inclusion of such persons in two of the three
succession laws passed by Congress--including that currently in effect-debate on the matter continues unabated. The specific points at issue
are (1) whether the Speaker and the President pro tempore are "officers"
in the sense of Article II, section 1, clause 6; (2) whether a legislative officer (named to act as President) who resigns his office thereafter is eligible to act as President; and (3) whether it violates the
constitutional principal of separation of powers for a Member of Congress to act as President. See Celada, Presidential Succession: A
Recurrent Problem, pp. 21-30 (1963) (L.R.S. Multilith Report).
3/ 42 Op. Atty. Gen.,

supra, note 1 at 89-96:

1. The records and history of the Constitutional Convention.
Without dispute, Article II, section 1, clause 6 nowhere expressly provides that the Vice President shall under any circumstances become President. Had the framers of the Constitution
intended the Vice President in certain contingencies to become
President, they would not have been at a loss for words. Reference to the records of the Constitutional Convention discloses
that the framers of the Constitution never intended the Vice President in event of Presidential inability to be anything but an
acting President while the inability continued.
Of the various written plans submitted for consideration at
the Convention, only Charles Pinckney's draft offered May 29,
1787, specifically referred to Presidential disability. Article
VIII of this draft provided in part that in case of the President's removal through impeachment, death, resignation or disability "the President of the Senate shall exercise the duties
*"
1
of his office until another President be chosen *
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole to
consider various proposals, but having made little progress on
1 3 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787 (1911 Ed.), 600.

22-517 0-73 -18
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the question of the President's inability, referred this proposal
to the Committee of Detail which was then considering other matters.
This Committee reported a draft on August 6, 1787, which contained
Article X, section 2 relating to Presidential inability. It provided that in case of the President's removal as aforesaid through
impeachment, death, resignation, or disability to discharge the'
powers and duties of his office, "the President of the Senate shall
exercise those powers and duties, until another President of the
United States be chosen, or until the disability of the President
be removed." 2 On August 27, Mr. Dickinson remarked about the vagueness of this clause. "What," he said,"is the extent of the term
'disability' & who is to be the judge 4f it?" Unfortunately. his
suggestion produced no clarification.
It will be noted that up to this point the official to act as
President until the President's disability was ended was "the President of the Senate," not the Vice President. Article X of the
draft was then referred to the Committee of Eleven which reported
on September 4. In its report provision was included for the
first time for a Vice President, as distinguished from the President of the Senate 4 who was to be ex officio, President of the
Senate, except on two occasions: when the Senate sat in impeachment of the President, in which case the Chief Justice would preside, and "when he shall exercise the powers and duties of the
President," in which case of his absence, the Senate would choose
a President pro tempore. The Committee of Eleven also recommended
that the latter part of section 2 of Article X be amended to
provide that in case of the President's removal on impeachment,
death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers
or duties of his office "the Vice President shall exercise those
powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the
inability of the President be removed." 5 He was not to become
the President in either event.
On September 7, the Convention adopted an amendment to cover
the vacancy or disability of both the President and Vice President providing that the Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United States shall act as President in such event,
and "such Officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected." 6

2
3
4
5
6

2
2
2
2
2

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

186.
427.
495.
495, 499.
532.
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On September 8, the last clause of section 2, Article X was
agreed to by the Convention, and a Committee of five was appointed
"to revise the style and arrange the articles agreed to b the
Thus,
House" including those provisions dealing with inability.
as the proposed article came to the Committee on Style, it consisted of two clauses dealing with Presidential succession. The
first related to the devolution of the powers and duties of the
President's office on the Vice President in certain cases including
the President's inability. The second authorized Congress to
designate an officer to act as President in cases in which both
the President and Vice President were disabled, had died, resigned,
or been removed. A temporal clause modified each main clause
limiting the tenure of an acting President to the duration of
the inability or until "another President be chosen" (first clause)
or until "a President shall be elected" (second clause). Nothing
in either clause said that the Vice President was to become President.
On September 12 the Committee on Style, condensing and combining the provision for Presidential inability, together with
the provision for joint inability of both the President and Vice
President, reported the clause as follows: 8 "(e) In case of the removal of the president from office,
or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve
on the vice-president, and the Congress may by law provide for
the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of
the president and vice-president, declaring whet officer shall
then act as president, Fnd such officer shEll act accordingly,
until the disability be removed, or the period for chusing another
arrive."
Madison crossed out the words "the period for chusing another
president arrive" and inserted in their plice "a President shall
be elected." 9 In this form the clause was written into the
final draft of the Constitution.
The Committee on Style had no authority to amend or alter the
substance or meaning of the provisions, but merely to combine and
integrate them as a matter of form. 10 In this setting, the effect of what was done by it may be better understood by placing

7 Davis, Inability of the President, Sen. Doc. No. 308, 65th
Con

.,

3d sess. 10 (1918).

g 2 Ferrand,

op. cit. supra note 1, 598-599.
9 2 id. 626. See also 2 id. 599.
10 Davis, op. cit. supra note 7, 11.
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the provisions originally agreed to by the Convention side by
side with the clauses as they were adopted by the Convention.
"Articles Originally Agreed
to by the Convention

As Later Reported by Committee
on Style and Finally Adopted

Article X, section 2:.*...*
and in case of removal as
aforesaid, death, absence,
resignation or inability to
discharge the powers or duties
of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those
powers and duties until another President be chosen, or
until the inability of the
President be removed.

Article II, section 1, paragraph 6: In case of the removal
of the President from office,
or of his death, resignation,
or inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the said
office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President;

Article X, section 1: The Legislature may declare by law
what officer of the United
States shall act as President,
in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the
President and Vice President;

and the Congress may by law
provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or
inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring whit officer shall then
act as President;

and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

and such officer shall act
accordingly. until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."

Comparison of these provisions makes clear the intention of
the framers of the Constitution. When the provisions were placed
into the hands of the Committee on Style and Arrangement, they
explicitly provided that in case of inability of the President,
the Vice President was not to become President, but merely to
until the inability of
"exercise those powers and duties
the President be removed." When, therefore, the Committee on
Style condensed the language and reported the provision to read
in case of the President's "inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice
President," the exact meaning intended by the Convention was
carried over to the revised language.
It has been argued by one school of thought that "the Same"
as used in the succession clause refers to "Office," and therefore the office devolves on the Vice President who thereby
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becomes President. The other school asserts that "the Same"
has reference to "Powers and Duties," and that the Vice President may merely discharge those powers and duties, but does
not become President. Since a definitive answer is not to be
found in any fixed rules of English usage, Professor Ruth C.
Silva has concluded that the antecedent of "the Same" should
be ascertained on the basis of the intention of those who framed
and ratified the Convention. 11 This is sound construction.
This interpretation is reinforced by other language initially
agreed to by the Convention. If it were intended that the Vice
President should act permanently as President, it seems unlikely
that the language adopted by the Convention and sent to the Committee on Style would expressly prescribe a temporary period
during which the Vice President shall exercise "those powers
and duties," viz: "until another President be chosen, or until
the inability of the President be removed."
When we refer to the provisions before and after the Committee on Style had combined them, it appears that the Committee
did several things: consolidated the two provisions into one
and introduced the words "the same shall devolve on the Vice
President"; omitted reference to "absence" as an occasion for
operation of the succession rule; used the adverbial clause
"until the disability be removed," only once instead of using
it to modify each of the preceding clauses separately; substituted "inability" for "disability" in the clause referring to
succession beyond the Vice President, possibly as being more
comprehensive and covering both absence and temporary physical
disability; and changed the semicolon after "Vice President" to
a comma so that the limiting clause beginning "and such Officer"
would refer both to the Vice President and the officer designated
by Congress. Thus the evolution of this clause makes clear that
merely the powers and duties devolve on the Vice President, not
the office itself.
2. The debates in the Convention and in the ratifying conventions.

The debates in the Convention are not too illuminating on
the question whether a Vice President was merely to act as President until the latter's disability was over or to become President.
In support of the view tha t the debates demonstrate recognition
that the Vice President's role was to be a temporary one while the
inability existed, statements relied on are not squarely in point,
but the inferences drawn are entitled to weight.
Thus, Professor Silva states: 12

"

*

.This assumption [that

the Vice President is an acting President] is implicit in James
11
12

Silva, Presidential Succession 32 (1951).
Id. 10.

22-517 0-73 -19
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Wilson's objections to the election of the President by Congress.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania said that the Senate might prevent the filling of a vacancy by dilatory action, so that their
own presiding officer could continue to exercise the executive
function. Gouverneur Morris and James Madison likewise objected
to this mode of election for a similar reason--the Senate might
retard appointment of a President in order that its own presiding
officer might continue to possess veto power. Such objections
are without merit if the President's successor was intended to
become President for the remainder of the term."
There is other evidence from which the intention of the
delegates may be determined. Charles Warren reports that during
the debates little enthusiasm was expressed for an officer such
as the Vice President, that the discussion centered on his status
as a legislative officer, Fnd there was no discussion as to his
succession even in case of the President's death. 13 However,
Warren is of the opinion "the delegates probably contemplated
that
the Vice President would only perform the duties of
President until a new election for President should be held; and
that he would not ipso facto become President." 14 It seems
fairly clear that if the delegates did not contemplate thatthe
Vice President shall become President on the death of the President, but only perform the duties of the office, that they certainly did not intend any different result upon the President's
inability.
Discussion of the succession clause at the ratifying conventions was also singularly unenlightening.
Professor Silva, who has made a careful study of the matter,
reports there is no record of discussion of the succession clause
at the ratifying conventions except briefly at the Virginia Convention. George Mason objected to the clause because it lacked
provision for the prompt election of another President in event
of vacancy in both the Presidential and Vice-Presidential offices.
Madison's attempt to answer this objection indicated that he did
not think that the designated officer in event of succession
beyond the Vice President "would have that tenure which the Constitution guarantees to a de jure President," but it does not
appear that Madison h; d in mind the status of a Vice President
who might be acting as President. 15 What is of greater significance is that the delegates in the ratifying conventions always

13
14
15

Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution, 634-635 (1928).
Id. at 635.
Silva, op. cit. supra note 11, 11.
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carefully distinguished between "the President" and "the acting
President."
Reference was made to "the Vice President, when
acting as President," not "the Vice President when he becomes
President." 16 Silva says that "nowhere in the debates of the
ratifying conventions did a single one of the delgates use the
latter expression." 17
The Federalist, in which Hamilton defended the proposed Constitution and explained in detail its provisions, is surprisingly
silent as a whole on what was intended when a President suffers
inability. However, at one point Hamilton defended the role of
a Vice President over the objection that his position would be
"superfluous, if not mischievous." He urged that two considerations justified the Vice President's position: one to cast the
deciding vote in the Senate-when they were equally divided; the
other, that "the vice-president may occasionally become a substitute for the president * *,

and exercise the authorities and

discharge the duties of the president." 18
While these debates in the Convention and ratifying conventions appear to be inconclusive, generally they tend to support
the argument that a Vice President or designated officer was
never, in the view of the framers of the Constitution, intended
to become President. If there was Presidential inability, the
Vice President was to act only until the inability was terminated. 19
4/ Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1951, at 14.
5/ Id., at 15-24.

6/ The eight Vice Presidents who succeeded to the Presidency were John
Tyler (Harrison), Millard Fillmore (Taylor), Andrew Johnson (Lincoln),
Chester A. Arthur (Garfield), Theodore Roosevelt (McKinley), Calvin
Coolidge (Harding), Harry S. Truman (Roosevelt), and Lyndon B. Johnson
(Kennedy).
7/ The seven Vice Presidents who died in office were George Clinton,
Elbridge Gerry, William R. King, Henry Wilson, Thomas A. Hendricks,
Garrett A. Hobart, and James Sherman. The only Vice President to
have ever resigned was John C. Calhoun.
8/ Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Five President.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the
Committee on the Judiciary. United States Senate, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., (1964).
9/ Id.,

at 22 (Senator Keating).
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10/ S. J. Res. 139, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
11/ S. Rept. No. 1382, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
12/ 110 Cong. Rec. 23061 (1964).
13/ S. J. Res. 1, H. J. Res. 1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
14/ S. Rept. No. 66, 89th Cong.,
15/ Id.,

1st Sess. (1965).

at 2-3.

16/ 111 Cong. Rec. 3203 (daily ed.).
17/ Id., at 3167-3168.
18/ Id.,

at 3194.

19/ Id.,

at 3192.

20/ H. Rept. No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
21/ Id.,

at 2-3.

22/ 111 Cong. Rec. 7699 (daily ed. April 13, 1965).
23/ Id.,

at 7700.

24/ Id.,

at 7698.

25/ Id., at 7667-7668.
26/ 111 Cong. Rec. 14668 (daily ed. June 30, 1965).
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).

H. Rept. No. 564,

27/ 111 Cong. Rec. 14829-14832, 14833-14839 (daily ed. June 30, 1965).
28/ Id.,

at 14835.

29/ 111 Cong. Rec. 15031-15032 (daily ed. July 6, 1965).
30/ 111 Cong. Rec. 14830-14831 (daily ed. June 30, 1965).
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Appendix
Text of the 25th Amendment

JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating
to succession to the Presidency and Vice Presidency and to cases where
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid
to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified
by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"Article-"Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office
or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"Sec. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall
take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress.
"Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
"Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either
the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and 'the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
"Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that no inability exists, he shell resume the
powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority
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of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress
shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after
receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in
session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble,
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office."
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ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF DECEMBER 3, 1965,
PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL
VACANCY AMENDMENT

The proposal to assure continuity of Presidential power in the
case of disability was formally proclaimed the 25th Amendment at a White
House ceremony on Thursday. February 23, 1967.

Mr. Lawson Knott, Adminis-

trator, General Services Administration, signed the document certifying
that the Amendment had been ratified in accordance with procedures set
forth in Article V of the Constitution.

President Johnson signed as a

witness.
The Amendment, the subject of intensive study for almost a
century, went into effect when Nevada became the 38th State to ratify.
Although the joint congressional resolution containing the terms of the
Amendment allowed seven years for completion of the ratification process,
a scant 20 months had elapsed since its formal presentation to the
States.
Briefly, the Amendment specifies the procedures to be followed when a President is disabled and authorizes a President to fill
the office of Vice President if it becomes vacant.
President Johnson emphasized the importance of the 25th
Amendment during the ceremonies of February 23.

He said:

Twice in our history we have had serious and prolonged
disabilities in the Presidency. Sixteen times in the history
of the Republic the office of Vice President . .

. has been

vacant. [In this] crisis-ridden era there is no margin for
delay, no possible justification for a vacuum in national
leadership.
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LRS-35

states: *
The Amendment was ratified by the following
1965; Oklahoma,
Nebraska, July 12, 1965; Wisconsin, July 13,
1965; Pennsylvania, August 18,
July 16, 1965; Massachusetts, August 9,
September 22, 1965;
1965; Kentucky, September 15, 1965; Arizona,
1965; California,
Michigan, October 5, 1965; Indiana, October 20,
Jersey, November 29,
October 21, 1965; Arkansas, November 4, 1965; New
1966; West Virginia,
1965; Delaware, December 7, 1965; Utah, January 17,
January 28,
January 20, 1966; Maine, January 24, 1966; Rhode Island,
February 3, 1966;
1966; New Mexico, February 3, 1966; Colorado,
February 18,
Kansas, February 8, 1966; Vermont, February 10, 1966; Alaska,
1966; Virginia, March 8,
1966; Idaho, February 25, 1966; Hawaii, March 3,
14, 1966; Maryland,
1966; Mississippi, March 10, 1966; New York, March
June 13, 1966;
March 23, 1966; Missouri, March 30, 1966; New Hampshire,
25,
Louisiana, July 5, 1966; Tennessee, January 12, 1967; Wyoming, January
Oregon,
1967; Iowa, January 26, 1967; Washington, January 26, 1967;
February 2, 1967; Minnesota, February 10, 1967; Nevada, February 10,
1967.

with
According to the official papers on file February 15, 1967,
Archives.
the National
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M E MO R A N D U M
September 24, 1973
TO:

Hon. Birch Bayh

FROM:

John D. Feerick

RE:

Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

The purpose of this memorandum is to relate briefly
the historical and legislative background of Section 2 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
1. Historical.
When President Lyndon Johnson succeeded to the
Presidency upon the death of President Kennedy, there resulted
for the sixteenth time in American history a vacancy in the
Vice Presidency.

During the year and one-half that Johnson

served without a Vice President, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate,
respectively, were next in line to the Presidency, neither of
whom was selected for his position with an eye to such succession.
In recognition of the growing importance of the Vice Presidency
in our government, there emerged a concensus that there was a
need for a Vice President at all times and that the best way to
handle the question of presidential succession was to settle upon
a method of filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency whenever it
occurred.
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As you will recall, during the development of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, a number of proposals were advanced
to fill a vacancy in the Vice Presidency.

Among these were

that the vacancy be filled by the electoral college--that
Congress elect a Vice President subject to the President's
veto--that there be a special election for Vice President-that the President submit a list of not less than three nor
more than five names to either the House or the Senate; and
that there be two vice presidents elected at election time.
The electoral college was rejected on grounds that
it was too ministerial in nature, would be cumbersome, would
involve delay, and would not command the respect and support
of the people.

A special election for Vice President was

rejected because of concern about delay, the departure from
our system of quadrennial presidential elections, and the
possibility it might produce a Vice President not able to
work effectively with the President. A selection by Congress was
objected to on the grounds that if the President were from a
minority party,Congress might select a Vice President from
the other party; that even if the President had a veto over a
congressional nominee he might be put in a politically embarrassing
position or considered reckless by the people if he rejected
that person; and that congressional selection might not give
the President a person with whom he could work effectively.
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The method contained in Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment was embraced for a number of reasons.

First, it would

assure that the person nominated was a member of the President's
own party, of compatible temperament and views, and someone with
whom he could work effectively.

It also would closely conform

to the pre-election practice whereby the presidential candidate
has a large say in the selection of his running mate.

Second,

confirmation by Congress would tend to create public confidence
in the selection.

The involvement of the Senate was considered

desirable because of its historic "advise and consent" role
with presidential appointments and because it is assigned a
role in the selection of a Vice President under the Twelfth
Amendment.

The involvement of the House was felt desirable

because its members would be close to the people and because
it has a role in the presidential selection process under the
Twelfth Amendment.

The involvement of both houses, it was

believed,was deemed appropriate for the selection of our
nation's second highest officer since it would elevate his
selection over other presidential appointments and more
accurately reflect the wishes of the people than either House
alone and achieve public confidence in the final choice.
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2.

Legislative.
The congressional debates and hearings in both

Houses in 1964 and 1965 established a number of principles
with respect to the meaning and intent of Section 2.

These

principles, and the pertinent legislative history, are set
forth below.
As for the general intendment of Section 2, the
following statements are in point.
By Senator Bayh:
"This requirement will accomplish two
purposes. First, it will guarantee that
there will be a Vice President, who will be
able to work with the President. Second, it
guarantees to the people that their representatives in Congress, those who are most responsive to the wishes of the people at any given
time, will be able to express the voice of
those whom they represent."
(Cong. Rec.
Senate, September 29, 1964, p. 22340)
"....
It is the feeling, first of all, in
the normal procedure of our convention process,
the President does have a strong voice--not always the final voice--but a strong voice in
choosing who his running mate may be. Certainly
it is wise, and particularly in the time of crisis
it is imperative, that we have a Vice President
with whom the President can work. It would be
worse, in my judgment, to have a Vice President
who was looking for ways to embarass the President
than to have no Vice President at all. For this
reason, we give the President the same authority
that he now has as far as the Cabinet officials
and others are concerned to nominate. Then,
instead of his selection being confirmed only by
the Senate, we bring in the Senate and the House-sort of a combination of the election procedure
of the 12th amendment plus the advise-and-consent
powers that the Senate now has. They would work
together as two Houses sitting separately, but
making the final determination to support or refuse to support the President.

"If they refuse to go along with his nominee,
he certainly would bring up a second and perhaps
a third or fourth."
(1965 House Hearings, p. 89)
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By Senator Ervin:
"....
This method satisfies the requirement,
voiced by President Truman, that the 'plan of
succession be devised so that the office of
President would be filled by an officer who
holds his position as a result of the expression
of the will of the voters of this country'; and
by having the President nominate the candidate, it
will insure his compatibility with the nominee.
Also, the need for continuity is met. There will
always be a Vice President who can participate
in the creation and execution of the policies
(1965 Senate
of the existing administration."
Hearings,p. 104)

By Senator Church:
"....

So this proposal commences with a

nomination made by the President himself to
insure that any man finally selected would have
the President's full confidence, that any man finally selected would be a member of the President's
own party, and would have such rapport with the
President as to be an effective Vice President
and as to give continuity in the event that he
should have to succeed to the Presidency itself."
(1964 Senate Hearings, p. .81)

By Senator Moss:
If the President nominated the man
"....
to be the Vice President, the Congress, the entire
Congress in this instance, would then consider his
qualifications and I think the Congress naturally
would give great deference to the choice of the
Chief Executive. They would want to uphold his
hand if he felt in all good conscience that that
could be done. The chances are that he would
nearly always be ratified. But there would be
that check. These are the representatives of the
people and if, after inquiring into it, they felt
that there was any weakness or disability in this
man, I am sure this person, this man or woman,
would then ask the Congress, the Congress could
(1964 Senate Hearings,
then exercise its choice."
p. 62)
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By Representative Tenzer:
"Selection by the President of a nominee
to fill vacancies in the Vice-Presidency would
follow the traditional practice of nominating
conventions. Confirmation by a majority of
the Congress would tend to create public confi(Cong. Rec. House,
dence in the selection."
April 13, 1965, p. 7689)

By Nicholas de B. Katzenbach:
"Permitting the President to choose the
Vice President, subject to congressional
approval, in the event of a vacancy in that
office, will tend to insure the selection of an
associate in whom the President has confidence,
and with whom he can-work in harmony. Participation by Congress in the procedure should help
to insure that the person selected would be
broadly acceptable to the people of the Nation."
(1965 Senate Hearing, p. 11)

By Herbert Brownell:
"I think our Government has come to a
position in modern times where it is almost
essential for a President who wants to go down
in history as a great President to have a Vice
President who is able, public spirited, and an
effective public servant, the job has become
big. In each administration, more and more
authority, power, and duties seem to be placed
upon the Vice President, so that I think to
counteract the points which you raised--and
reasonably raised--you have a very strong selfinterest on the part of the President to select
the best possible man, and we must keep that in
mind in weighing and trying to figure all the
motives that would go into such a choice.
"We have what I think is the sensible
protective measure in that Congress, in case an
irresponsible nomination is made, can block it."
(1965 House Hearings, p. 256)
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By Clinton Rossiter:
"It is this final method, sir, which would
join the three great political branches of our
Government--President, Senate, and House--in a
solemn and responsible act which strikes me as
much the most sensible and convenient way to
handle this delicate and vital problem.
"There would be, I think, a clear burden on
the President to nominate a man of the highest
stature and abilities. There would be a clear
burden on the Congress to withhold its approval
unless such a man were nominated, and to give
its approval if such a man were nominated. Because the President disposes, we could expect
the promise of continuity in the executive branch,
and because Congress, as it were, disposes, we
could assume the fact of legitimacy. We would
have once again that doublecheck, that system of
checks and balances, that has made our system so
(1964 Senate Hearings, p. 218)
great and lasting."
By Lewis F. Powell, Jr.:
"It is true that this procedure would give
the President the power to choose his potential
successor. But with the safeguard of congressional approval, it is believed that this is
sound in theory and in substantial conformity with
current nominating practice. It is desirable that
the President and Vice President enjoy harmonious
relations and mutual confidence. The importance
of this compatibility is recognized in the modern
practice of both major parties in according the
presidential condidate the privilege of choosing
his running mate subject to convention approval.
In the proposed amendment, the President would
choose his Vice President subject to congressional
approval."
(1964 Senate Hearings, pp. 93-94)

By Paul A. Freund:
"....
The Vice Presidency should have a
popular base and at the same time be in harmony
with the Presidency. These objectives can best
be achieved by associating the Congress and the
President in the selection, with the opportunity
for informal consultation to be expected in such
a process."
(1964Senate Hearings, pp. 130-131)
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The specific principles undergirding Section 2
are:
1.

There should be both a President and Vice
President at all times.

You stated in the Senate debates of February 19, 1965
that "we need provisions in the Constitution to enable the
United States to have a Vice President at all times" (p.3171).
In the House debates of April 13, 1965, Representative
Celler adopted and quoted your statement that
"Whatever tragedy may befall our national
leaders, the Nation must continue in stability
functioning to preserve the society in which
freedom may prosper. The best way to insure
this is to make certain that the Nation always
has a Vice President as well as a President." (p.7690)
You made this statement at the outset of the January 22, 1964
hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments.
The President should have the power to
nominate so as to assure that the Vice
President will be a person who has his
confidence, is of the same party, and is
of compatible temperament and views.

2.

During the Senate debates of February 19, 1965,
you said that the method would provide a Vice President "with
whom the President could work" (p. 3170).

In the Senate hearings

of that year you stated:
"

...

I would like to ask you a question

on the need for the inclusion of the wording
in your bill which says that he shall be a member
of the same political party as the President.
From the practical standpoint, I think that is
what we want to accomplish."
(1965 Senate Hearing,
p. 45)
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You stated in the Senate debates of September 28,
1964:
"The Vice-Presidential office under
our system of government is tied very
closely with the Presidency. The extent
to which the President takes the Vice
President into his confidence or shares with
him the deliberations leading to executive
decisions is largely determined by the
President.
Another important reason for allowing
the President to nominate a Vice President
is that the close relationship between the
President and Vice President will permit the
person next in line to become familiar with
the problems he will face should he 'be called
on to assume the Presidency.
This close relationship between the
President and the Vice-President is recognized
by our political conventions, which allows the
presidential nominee to choose his own running
mate. This system has proved workable in our
history.
Practical necessity would seem to require
that the President be given a primary say as
to who the Vice President will be." (p. 22993-94)
You further stated:
"By this means, it is virtually assured that the
Vice President will continue to be a man in whom
the President has full confidence and a man of the
same political party and political philosophy."
(p. 22994)
During the Senate debates of September 28, 1964,
you also stated:
"In a time of crisis and turmoil, such as
we experience with the loss of a President, we
must give the new President the individual upon
whom he can depend, the one who would cooperate
with him and help him carry on the tremendous burden
of the Presidency." (p. 22988)

22-517 0 - 73 - 20
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3.

Congress should have the role of confirming
a President's nominee because it would know
and be able to express the will of the people.

You stated in the Senate debates of February 19, 1965:
"Third, it would provide for a Vice
President who would have received a vote of
confidence and would have been, in fact,
elected by the Members of both Houses who
have the responsibility for being close to
the people and knowing what they desire and
expressing their wishes in Congress."
(Cong. Rec. Senate, February 19, 1965, p. 3170)
You also stated:
"...by combining both presidential and
congressional action, we were doing two
things. We were guaranteeing that the
President would have a man with whom he could
work. We were also guaranteeing to the people
their right to make that decision."
(Cong.
.Rec. Senate, February 19, 1965, p. 3173)
In the Senate debates of September 28, 19 6 4 you stated:
"At the same time, congressional confirmation
gives the people of the United States a voice
through their elected representatives." (p. 22994)
You further stated:
"If Congress is to choose the man nominated,
it will certainly consider this serious responsibility and act as the voice of the people.
Whatever better opportunity is there for the
people to express their wishes than through
those who serve in Congress?" (p. 22996)

289
4.

The confirmation process would be a deliberative
one in which the nominee's qualifications for the
Vice Presidency would be subject to scrutiny.

In the House debates of April 13, 1965,
Representative Rodino stated that
"The requirement of congressional
confirmation is an added safeguard that
only fully qualified persons of the highest
character and National stature would ever be
nominated by the President." (p. 7686)
In objecting to the Electoral College as a body to
pass upon the President's nomination, you stated that the College
is not chosen or equipped to exercise considered judgment or
"conduct hearings on qualification of the nominee submitted by
the President" (1964 Hearings, p.5).

Senator Thurmond recognized

and answered this objection in the Senate debates of February 19,
1965* (p.3191).
In an exchange with Senator Monroney at the Senate
hearings of January 22, 1964, you stated with reference to
the confirmation powers that they would be taken "even greater
than is normally the case

.

.

."

(p.39).

* This is the only reference that I have been able to locate specifically
focusing on the question of hearings in the context of filling a vice
presidential vacancy. See Appendix A for two law review articles which
I did contemporaneously with the development of the amendment noting
that such hearings would be appropriate and within the power of Congress.
There were several references to the subject of hearings with respect to
the situation where Congress had to decide an inability dispute between
the President on the one hand and the Vice President and Cabinet on the
other. See February 19, 1965 Senate Debates at 3195 (Pastore and Ervin),
3199 (Hruska); 1965 Senate Hearings at 21 (Hruska); 1965 House Hearings
at 69 (Bayh), at 154-55 (Folsom). A point of contention was over whether
the term "immediately" precluded such hearings.
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You stated during the 1965 House hearings:
The President already has the power
"....
to nominate many executive offices and the Senate
of the United States has the power to ratify,
to confirm, to advise and consent or not to, and
we are giving him the same power and bringing in
the House of Representatives as the most populous
and most representative power of the Congress.
These shall have the final power of election
after the President has nominated a Vice President."
(1965 House Hearings, p. 92)
Senator Long said in the 1964 Senate hearings:
Confirmation by the Congress, under
"....
the proposed system for replacement of Vice
Presidents, is a check and balance similar to
(1964
those presently in our Constitution."
Senate Hearings, p. 68)
Professor Kirby said in his testimony in the 1964
Senate hearings:
"However, a joint assembly of Congress has
the same theoretical and symbolic values for our
present purpose without the dangers of the
electoral college. It is a numerical counterpart of the electoral college in which each State
has the same representation through its congressional delegation as it has electoral votes. It
is deliberative. It is easily assembled. It is
responsible to the people. In all three of those
respects it is in contrast to the electoral
college."
(1964Senate Hearings, p. 42)

You also stated:
"... The specific point to which the Senator
from Tennessee refers, I should like to point out,
is very little different from the customary
constitutional requirements of advise and consent
which the Senate has had over Executive appointments."
(Cong.Rec.Senate, February 19, 1965, p. 3193)
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5.

There would be a working relationship
between the President and Congress in the
selection of a Vice President.

That a working relationship between President
and Congress was intended is indicated by the following.
Senator Ervin stated:
"...
this resolution would allow the
selection to be made when the vacancy actually
occurs; and then conceivably, of course, the
President and Congress together could select
the best qualified man."
(Cong. Rec, Senate,
February 19, 1965, p. 3173)

Represented Hutchinson said:
"But under the provisions of Resolution l,
where he would send a name down and say, 'Take
it,' he would still have to deal with the party
leadership in Congress making sure that they
(1965 House Hearings, p. 210)
would take it."
As previously noted, Paul Freund said:
"...

The Vice Presidency should have a popular

base and at the same time be in harmony with
the Presidency. These objectives can best be
achieved by associating the Congress and the
President in the selection, with the opportunity
for informal consultation to be expected in such
a process." (196 4Senate Hearings, pp. 130-131)
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6.

Partisan politics should be eliminated from
the process.

The following statements by you are revealing on
the question of partisan politics:
"I have more faith in the Congress acting
in an emergency in the white heat of publicity,
with the American people looking on. The last
thing Congress would dare to do would be to become
involved in a purely political move." (from Cong.
Rec. Senate, February 19, 1965, p. 3193)
"...
Our feeling is that in a time of
national tragedy such as a death of a President
where the Vice President succeeds, or where the
Vice President himself dies--the country is in
no mood to tolerate political chicanery in the
appointment of a Vice President and I don't
think this would be the case." (1965 House Hearings,
p. 47).
You had this exchange with Clinton Rossiter:

Bayh - "Do you see this as an insurmountable
problem? Might there be a Congress of a
different party and would it want to play
politics with the office and refuse to let,
say, a Republican President select a
Republican Vice President merely because a
Democratic Congress was in power or vice
versa?"
Mr. Rossiter - "Well, two points on that: I am
assuming for this point that politics,
petty politics would be pretty well laid
aside but in addition remember that the
onus then is placed on the Congress, they
can confirm under the system that you and
I have agreed on, the President's nomination,
but they can't then reject and then put someone
else in." (1964 Senate Hearings, p. 226)
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In the Senate Debates of September 28, 1964, you
stated that
"I believe that the Senator firmly agrees
with me that at a time of national crisis the
public would not tolerate the playing of politics
in the choice of a Vice President." (p. 22988)
Also in that debate you said
"However, it was our thinking that the
committee's proposal would lead to a more
peaceful transition, a more peaceful choice,
if the President were not put on the spot to
select, as he would probably have to do, from
among many names in order to choose up to five
that he would submit to Congress. Under the
committee's proposal, he would have to choose
only one. This- choice would become known. At a
time of crisis, when a death or illness had occurred,
turmoil might otherwise result.
That was our
reasoning." (p. 22999).
Senator Monroney made these observations

in

the same

debate:
"We do not know what the situation will be
20, 30, or 40 years from now, or what great rivalry
might exist between the two parties. I can think of
nothing worse, looking into the future, and the
dangers of that situation, than to have a newly
succeeding Vice President to the Presidency send to
Congress as his first act the name of the man who he
believes is competent to be his successor, and having
it tied up in a long confirmation fight, with the ultimate
possibility of rejection; and with a rival party in the
majority in both Houses, or even rivalry in the majority
party, over the choice of the nominee, with perhaps
leading Members in either House being anxious to
come in the line of authority, and one or the other
Houses refusing to confirm." (p. 22996)
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7.

There was no limit placed on the number
of persons a president may nominate. The
hearings and debates indicate that if a
President's nominee is rejected, he has
the right to nominate another person for
the position.

As you testified before the House Judiciary
Committee on February 9, 1965:
"There is no limit on the number of names
the President could submit to the Congress.
I think if we didn't pass on the first name,
it would be logical for a second name to be
submitted." (p. 50).
You further stated that "If the person is a nambypamby person, the Congress wouldn't go along.

He would

have to send another name."
8.

The Houses of Congress would vote separately
on the nomination.

Representative Celler stated in the House debates
of April 13, 1965 that
"There is no joint session. There is a
separate vote of each body, and when the
terminology is found in House Joint Resolution 1,
it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
to mean a separate body. I refer to the case of
Missouri Pacific Railway v. Kansas, 248 U.S.,
page 276." (p. 7675-76)
You stated at the hearings of January 29, 1965
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
that one of the reasons for the individual session formula
was that a joint session would involve "a rather vigorous,
time-consuming discussion on the establishment of rules"
(p. 52).
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At the House Judiciary Committee hearings
of
February 9, 1965 you stated that the confirmation would
be
by ".

.

. separate action by both Houses.

There seems to be

ample precedent whenever the wording is used in
the Bill
that it does mean separate sessions of each branch
of the
Legislature" (p. 45).
9.

The required vote in each House would be a
majority of those members present
providing a quorum were present.. and voting,

You stated at the House hearings of February 9,
1965
that the majority referred to is "a majority of the
quorum
which is necessary to conduct the business in the first
place"
(p. 60). This was covered by Attorney General Katzenbach
at the same hearings when he said:
"What is meant is a majority...of those
Members in each House present and voting, a
quorum being present. This interpretation
is consistent with long-standing precedent."
(pp. 95-96)
This was reiterated again by the Attorney General
later in
his testimony (p. 101).
10.

It was contemplated and assumed that the President
would nominate and Congress would render its
judgment within a reasonable period of time. *

In the Senate debates of February 19, 1965 you
stated
that you did not believe it was necessary"to
grind everything
to a halt to decide who the vice president
is" (p. 3197).
At the House hearings you stated that the business
would be "disposed of judiciously and quickly"
(p. 65)You
* Your original proposal provided for the
President to nominate within
30 days. The Senate rejected a proposal by Senator
Bass that Congress
be required to act "immediately." (Feb.
19, 1965, p. 3199)
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also stated that both the President and Congress should use
"...their good judgment as to what would
be reasonable. There would be some times, perhaps, when a name would be submitted for which there
would be patent reasons for a tremendous amount of
debate. Other times a name might be submitted and
would be readily acceptable and there would be little
reason for a prolonged debate and everyone would
recognize this." (p. 66).
You had the following exchange with Herbert Brownell
in the Senate hearings of 1965:
Bayh

"Would the same thing apply as far as
Senator Miller's feeling that we need to specify
that the appointment of the eventual successor
to the office of Vice President must be a member
of the political party of the President?"

Mr- Brownell - "I am sure of that; yes. I think
the same thing would apply- I think that
public opinion would not only demand quick
action, but the commonsense of the Members
of the Congress would make them realize that
they could not perform their constitutional
functions unless they had a strong executive
branch prepared to meet all emergencies."
(1965 Senate Hearing, p. 6 4).
With respect to Congress "sitting still" on a
President's nomination, Senator Ervin stated:
"God help this Nation if we ever get a
House of Representatives or a Senate, which
will wait for a President to die so someone
whom they love more than their country will
succeed to the Presidency." (p. 3199).*
During the House debates of April 13, 1965, Representative
John Lindsay stated that "Congress must answer to the country
if it does not speedily perform its job" (p. 7692

* February 19, 1965 Senate Debates.

).
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11.

General Qualifications.

During the debates and hearings a great deal of
concern was expressed over the possibility of the President
using his appointing power to select a weak Vice President
or a person inexperienced in national affairs, or a person
who had never held public office.*

The sponsors of the

amendment argued that the President would be obliged to
choose a person of national stature in view of the possibility
of him having to succeed to the Presidency during the
President's term.**

As you stated in the debates of

September 28, 1964:
I believe that this is a feeling shared
"...
by all of us, Republicans and Democrats alike-that the vice-presidential candidate should be
the man best qualified to be President of the
United States, should that unhappy day come.
I believe there is a general awareness on
the part of all citizens of the country that
this is the prime qualification that the vicepresidential candidate should have--the ability
to fulfill the office of President if tragedy
should strike." (p. 22987)

* April 13, 1965 House Debates at 7664 (Brown); 1965 House

Hearings at 89-91 (Mathias), at 190 (Fuqua).
**

February 19, 1965 Senate Debates at 3171 (Ervin), 3173-74
(Bayh); April 13, 1965 House Debates at 7686 (Rodino);
1965 Senate Hearings at 11 (Katzenbach); 1964 Senate
Hearings at 19 (Ervin), at 63 (Moss).
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12.

Record Vote.

Representative
During the April 13, 1965 House Debates,
amendment did not contain
Celler made clear that the proposed
stated that "the right
any provision for a record vote. He
(p. 7697).
already exists to demand a record vote"
13.

Constitutional Qualification.

clear that
During the 1965 House Hearings you made
born citizen of the
the nominee would have to be a natural
within
United States, at least 35 years of age, and a resident
48).
the United States for a minimum of 14 years (p.
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In the following two articles which I did contemporaneously with the
development of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, I observed that Congress
would have the right to subject a President's nominee to such hearings.
In my article "Vice Presidential Succession: In Support of the
Bayh-Celler Plan", 18 South Carolina Law Review, 226 (1966), I stated:
"It is unreasonable to assume that the United States
Congress would not give careful consideration to
the qualifications of a nominee for the Vice Presidency
and, if it felt he were not qualified, to reject his
nomination. In this connection, the proposed amendment
provides that a nominee must obtain the votes of a
majority of each House of Congress. Each House would
meet and vote separately and could have such hearings
and discussions regarding the nominee as it thought
desirable. Accordingly, the presence of Congress
under this amendment does guarantee an important role
for the representatives of the people in the process
of vice presidential succession."
Similarly, in a December, 1965 article in the Fordham Law
Review entitled "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution",
[ stated:
"Before making a nomination, the President probably
would seek the advice and views of the congressional
leaders. His nominee might be asked to undergo hearings
in the House and Senate. If the nomination were not confirmed,
the President would nominate another Vice-President." (p.197)

APPENDIX A

